Old Statutes of limita tions. Present enactments. Mercantile trespass on the case, except as hereinafter excepted, shall be commenced and sued within six years after the cause of such actions, but not after; and all actions for assault, menace, battery, wounding, and imprisonment, shall be commenced and sued within four years after the cause of such actions, but not after; and all actions for words, and for penalties (j), damages, or sums of money given to the party grieved, by any Statute now or hereafter to be in force, shall be commenced and sued within two years after the words spoken, or the cause of such action or suit, but not after; and with respect to every cause of action not herein specifically provided for, being the subject matter of a personal action, such actions in respect thereof shall be brought within the sa period of limitation now applicable thereto, notwithstanding that such cause of action may be described or expressed in such Statutes by reference to any particular form of action: provided that nothing in this Act contained shall alter the period of limitation of any action given by any Statute where the time for bringing such action is or shall be by any Statute specially limited (k). same (e) A discussion on the periods of limitation applicable to the different species of actions would be out of place in a work like the present, and it is therefore, proposed only to refer to a few points in connexion with the subject. Fuller information can be obtained by reference to Darby and Bosanquet's treatise on the Statutes of Limitations, and the other works upon the subject. The old Statutes of limitation applicable to actions were: 10 Charles 1, sess. 2. c. 6, ss. 14, 15, & 17; and 8 Geo. 1, c. 4, ss. 1 & 2. These sections have been repealed by the present Statute, and in their place the above and following sections have been substituted. The periods of limitation applicable to each description of action is prescribed by the above section of the Act. Sections 21-24 provide for cases where the ordinary periods of limitation are extended in favour of the party. The cases provided for are-1st, where a judgment in favour of the party has been arrested or reversed (sect. 21); 2nd, where the party was under disability at the time of the accrual of the cause of action (sect. 22); and, 3rd, where the cause of action is revived by acknowledgment or part payment (ss. 23, 24). As to preventing the operation of the Statute by the issuing of process, see sect. 28, post. Sections 9-14 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, have modified Law Amend the law upon the subject in some important respects. ment Act. Apply to actions only. When time begins to run, The provisions of the present Act are conversant with actions only, and do not apply to any other proceedings. Accordingly, it having been held that a writ of revivor is not an "action," it follows that the proceedings under it are not governed by the present Act. See post, note (h). The time of limitation begins to run from the period when the action might first have been brought. Accordingly, in an action against a solicitor for negligence in lending money upon an insufficient title, time begins to run When a promissory note is made payable on demand, the Statute of Li- non-payment (f) The provisions of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 2, do not apply to rent Actions for reserved upon an indenture of demise, and accordingly though no rent has rent. been paid under a lease for twenty years, the accruing gales and twenty years' arrears may be recovered by action, or an ejectment for non-payment of rent may be brought (Parke v. M'Loughlin, 3 Ir. Jur., O. S., 405). Where an ejectment for non-payment of rent is brought (the lease being Ejectment for under seal) it is doubtful whether the proceedings are subject to the pro- of rent. visions of the present section, or of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 42; in other words, whether six years' or twenty years' arrears of rent are recoverable in the action, and whether the action is maintainable in respect of arrears which accrued due more than six years before the bringing of the action (Percival v. Dunne, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 422). But where the plaintiff in such an action was an infant, he was held entitled to recover nineteen and a-half years' arrears (Nixon v. Darley, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 467). (9) Actions for debt on a Statute (other than penal actions) are con- Actions for sidered as founded on a specialty within the meaning of this enactment, debt under a e. g. actions for calls against a shareholder in a railway company (Cork, &c. Railway Co. v. Goode, 13 C. B. 826). Statute. Writ of Revivor. (h) A writ of revivor has been held not to be an action upon a judgment within the meaning of the section (Johnson v. Bell, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 526; Wall v. Walsh, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 103). It follows, therefore, that the period Time within within which it may be issued is regulated by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40, which it by which it is enacted that "no action, or suit, or other proceeding, shall must be be brought to recover any sum of money secured by any judg ment but within twenty years next after a present right to receive the same shall have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same, unless in the meantime some part of the principal money, or some interest thereon, shall have been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto shall have been given in writing, signed by the person by whom the same shall be payable, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto, or bis agent; and in such case no such action or issued. Where judg. ment entered on a bond and warrant. Where judgment is re vived. Where reregistered. Actions for not accounting. Actions for penalties. Special periods of limitation. Limitation suit, or proceeding shall be brought, but within twenty years after such payment, or acknowledgment, or the last of such payments or acknowledgments, if more than one was given." It will be observed that the period fixed by this section as the starting point from which time begins to run is different from the time fixed in the Act we are considering, and that the manner in which the acknowledgment spoken of is to be made, is different from that prescribed in section 23 post. Accordingly, where judgment is entered on a bond, conditioned for payment of money upon the happening of a future event, time does not begin to run until the happening of the event (Gilman v. Chute, 11 Ir. L. R. 442; Barber v. Shore, 1 Jebb & Sym. 610). So, also payment by one of the parties responsible for payment of the sum secured, keeps the judgment alive as against all (Wall v. Walsh, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 103), in which case separate judgments had been entered on a joint and several bond; although in the case of an "action," the result would be different by the express provisions of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, sect. 14; and see Martin v. M'Causland, 3 Ir. L. R. 113. When a judgment is revived the plaintiff thereby acquires a new right, and time begins to run afresh (Farrell v. Gleeson, 11 Cl. & F. 702). But if a second writ of revivor be issued, it should be founded on the judgment of revival, and not on the original judgment (Farran v. Beresford, 10 Cl. & F. 319). The re-registration of a judgment does not operate as a revival (Pearson v. M'Craith, Hay, and Jon. 372). (i) By sect. 9 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, this exception has been repealed, and such actions must be brought within six years. (j) The present section provides only for cases where the penalty is by the Statute given to the party grieved. Where an action is brought by an informer, the Statute, 2 Geo. I., c. 20, ss. 3 & 4 (Ir.), provides that the action must be brought within one year after the offence committed, and it has been held that the Statute applies as well to actions by an informer who sues pro seipso as to actions where he sues qui tam (Dyer v. Best, L. R. 1 Ex. 152; Barrett v. Johnson, 2 Jones, 197). (k) The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5, provides a uniform period of limitation of two years for cases where special periods of limitations were fixed by Statutes of a local or personal nature. As to the construction of this Act, see Browne v. City of Dublin Steam Packet Co., 7 Ir. Jur. O. S. 53. Special periods of limitation are also provided in other cases by particular Acts. Thus actions against justices for anything done in the execution of their office, must be brought within six months (12 Vict. c. 16, s.8). Actions under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93) must be brought within twelve months after the death. Actions by executors, &c., for injury to the testator's real estate during his lifetime must be brought within a year after the death (3 & 4 Vict. c. 105, 8. 31). By the same section, actions against executors for any wrong committed by a testator, in relation to the real or personal property of the plaintiff, must be brought within six months after probate; and actions against a person for anything done in pursuance of the Criminal Law Consolidation Acts (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 97, & 99), must be commenced within six months after the act complained of. 21. If in any of the said actions judgment be given for after judg- the plaintiff, and the same be reversed by error, or a rested or c. 16, s. 4. verdict pass, or, upon judgment by default, damages be ment arassessed for the plaintiff, and upon matter alleged in arrest reversed. of judgment the judgment be given against the plaintiff Jac. 1. that he take nothing by his plaint, in all such cases the party, plaintiff, his heirs, executors, or administrators, as the case shall require, may commence a new action or suit from time to time within the period of limitation herein before provided for in such action, or within a year after such judgment reversed or judgment given against the plaintiff, and not after. disabilities. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7 s. c. 19. & 4 Wm. 4, 42, s. 4. 22. If any person that is or shall be entitled to any such Remedy for action is or shall be at the time of any such cause of action accrued (7) within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, of unsound mind, or beyond the seas (m), then such person shall be at liberty to bring the same action, so as he commence the same within such time after the cessation of such disability or his return from beyond the seas, as other persons having no such impediment should, according to the provisions of this Act, have done; and if any person or persons against whom there shall be any such cause of action is or shall be at the time such cause of action accrued beyond the seas (n), then the person entitled to any such cause of action shall be at liberty to bring the same against such person, within such time as is before limited, after the return of such person from beyond the seas.. (1) This section extends the time within which a plaintiff may sue in cases where he was under disability at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. The provisions of the section have been modified in some respects by the sections of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act referred to below. Disabilities has begun to run. where time When time has once begun to run no subsequent disability will suspend the operation of the Statute (Smith v. Hill, 1 Wils. 134). In cases where the plaintiff relies upon any of the disabilities enumerated as taking his case out of the Statute of Limitations he must reply it, if the Statute be pleaded. If an action be brought by, or against an executor or administrator, where the cause of action did not accrue during the life-time of the testator, or intestate, it has been held that the Statute does not begin to run until the granting of probate or letters of administration, on the principle that a executor. cause of action does not exist, unless there be a person in existence capable of suing, and of being sued (Murray v. East India Company, 5 B. & Ald. 204; Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686). (m) By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 1o, it is no longer an answer to the Statute of Limitations that the plaintiff, or some or one of the plain Extension of time in actions by or against an Where rlintiff beyond Where one of several codebtors is beyond seas. After acknowledg payment on judgment, re- 3 & 4 Wm. 4, tiffs was beyond the seas at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. It has been held that this provision is retrospective (Pardo v. Bingham, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 735). (n) By the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 11, it is provided that in the case of joint debtors, although one of the co-debtors be beyond the seas at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, the plaintiff shall not by reason thereof be entitled to any further time to bring his action against the other co-debtor or co-debtors, who shall not be beyond the seas at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. And in such a case it is further provided that the plaintiff shall not be barred from commencing an action against the codebtor who was absent, after his return, by reason only that judgment has already been recovered against the other co-debtor or co-debtors. 23. If any acknowledgment (o) shall have been or shall be ment or part made, either by writing signed by the party liable by virtue of any indenture, specialty, judgment, statute staple, or statute merchant, or recognizance, or his agent (p), or by part payment or part satisfaction on account of any principal or interest being then due thereon (q), it shall be lawful for the person entitled to bring his action for the money remaining unpaid, and so acknowledged to be due, within twenty years after such acknowledgment by writing, or part payment or part satisfaction as aforesaid, or in case the person entitled shall at the time of such acknowledgment be under such disability as aforesaid, or the party making such acknowledgment be at the time of making the same beyond the seas, then within twenty years after such disability shall have ceased as aforesaid, or the party shall have returned from beyond the seas, as the case may be; and the plaintiff in any such action on any indenture, specialty, judgment, statute staple, or statute merchant, or recognizance, may rely on such acknowledgment, and that such action was brought within the time aforesaid, in answer to a plea of this statute (r). Acknowledg ment or pay ment in actions on a specialty. Acknowledg ment must be in writing. Only applica ble in cases of a money demand. (0) This and the following section deal with cases where the period of limitation is deferred in consequence of an acknowledgment made by writing or payment in the manner provided. The present section provides expressly that the period shall be deferred in actions upon an indenture, specialty, judgment, statute staple, or statute merchant, or recognizance, when an acknowledgment is so made. The acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party or his agent. The liability of the party can, however, be renewed under this section only in cases of money demands, and not where the liability has arisen in respect of other acts or omissions (Blair v. Ormond, 19 Q. B. 423). The acknowledgment or payment may be made even although twenty years have passed since the accruing of the cause of action (Harty v. Davis, 13 Ir. L. R. 23). |