such a Reform, the Constitution should long consist of more than one body, and that body a popular assembly.

Why, Gentlemen, is this theory? or is it a theory of mine? If there be among those who hear me any man who has been (as in the generous enthusiasm of youth any man may blamelessly have been) bitten by the doctrines of Reform, I implore him, before he goes forward in his progress to embrace those doctrines in their Radical extent; to turn to the history of the transactions in this country in the year 1648, and to examine the bearings of those transactions on this very question of Radical Reform. He will find, Gentlemen, that the House of Commons of that day passed the following Resolution:

"Resolved that the people are, under God, the original of all just powers!"

Well! can any sentiment be more just and reasonable? Is it not the foundation of all the liberties of mankind? Be it so let us proceed. The House of Commons followed up this Resolution by a second, which runs in something like these terms:

"Resolved, That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by and representing the people, have the supreme authority of this nation."

In this resolution the leap is taken. Do the Radical Reformers deny the premises or the inference? or do they adopt the whole of the precedent before them?

But the inference did not stop there. The House of Commons proceeded to deduce from these propositions an inference, the apparently logical dependence of which upon the propositions I wish I could see logically disproved.

Resolved, without one dissenting voice: "That whatsoever is enacted and declared law by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, hath the force of law, and all the people of this nation are included thereby, although the consent and concurrence of the King and House of Peers be not had thereunto."

Such was the theory: the practical inferences were not tardy in their arrival, after the theory. In a few weeks the House of Peers was voted useless; and in a few more we all know what became of the Crown.

Such, I say, were the radical doctrines of 1648, and such the consequences to which they naturally led. If we are induced to ad❤ mit the same premises now, who is it, I should be glad to know, that is to guarantee us against similar conclusions.?

These, then, are the reasons why I look with jealousy at schemes of Parliamentary Reform. I look at them with still more jealousy, because in one of the two classes of men who cooperate in support of that question, I never yet found any two

individuals who held the same doctrines; I never yet heard any intelligible theory of Reform, except that of the Radical Reformers. Theirs, indeed, it is easy enough to understand. But as for theirs I certainly am not yet fully prepared; I, for my part, will not consent to take one step, without knowing on what principle I am invited to take it; and (which is, perhaps, of more consequence) without declaring on what principle I will not consent that any step, however harmless, shall be taken.

What more harmless than to disfranchise a corrupt borough in Cornwall, which has exercised its franchise amiss, and brought shame on itself, and on the system of which it is a part? Nothing. I have no sort of objection to doing as Parliament has often done in such cases (supposing always the case to be proved) to disfranchising the borough, and rendering it incapable of abusing its franchise in future. But, though I have no objection to doing this, I will not do it on the principle of speculative improvement: I do it on the principle of specific punishment for an offence; and I will take good care that no inference shail be drawn from my consent in this specific case, as to any sweeping concurrence in a scheme of general alteration.

Nay, I should think it highly disingenuous, to suffer the Radical Reformers to imagine that they had gained a single step towards the admission of their theory, by any such instance of particular animadversion on proved misconduct I consent to such disfranchisement; but I do so, not with a view of furthering the radical system, rather of thwarting it. I am willing to wipe out any blot in the present system, because I mean the present system to stand. I will take away a franchise, because it has been practically abused, not because I am at all disposed to inquire into the origin or to discuss the utility of all such franchises, any more than I mean to inquire, Gentlemen, into your titles to your estates. Disfranchis-ing Grampound (if that is to be so), I mean to save old Sarum.

Now, Sir, I think I deal fairly with the Radical Reformers; more fairly than those who would suffer it to be supposed by them that the disfranchisement of Grampound is to be the beginning of a system of Reform: while they know, and I hope mean, as well as I do, not to reform (in the sense of change), but to preserve the Constitution. I would not delude the Reformers, if I could; and I know it is quite useless to attempt a delusion upon persons, quite as sagacious in their generation as any moderate Reformers or Antireformers of us all. They know full well that the Whigs have no more notion than I have of parting with the close boroughs. Not they, indeed. A large, and perhaps the larger, part of them are in their hands. Why, in the assembly to which you send me, Gentlemen, some of those who sit on the same side with me repre

sent, to be sure, less popular places than Liverpool-but on the bench immediately over against me, I descry amongst the most eminent of our rivals for power scarce any other sort of representatives than members for close, or, if you will, for rotten boroughs. To suppose, therefore, that our political opponents have any thoughts of getting rid of the close boroughs, would be a gross delusion; and, I have no doubt, they will be quite as fair and open with the Reformers on this point as I am.

And why, Gentlemen, is it, that I am satified with a system which, it is said, no man can support who is not in love with corruption? Is it that I, more than any other man, am afraid to face a popular election? To the last question you can give the answer. To the former I will answer for myself. I do verily believe, as I have already said, that a complete and perfect democratical representation, such as the Reformers aim at, cannot exist as part of a mixed Government. It may exist, and, for aught I know or care, may exist beneficially, as a whole; but I am not sent to Parliament to inquire into the question whether a democracy or a monarchy be the best. My lot is cast under the British Monarchy. Under that I have lived; under that I have seen my country rish; under that I have seen it enjoy as great a share of prosperity, of happiness, and of glory, as I believe any modification of human society to be capable of bestowing; and I am not prepared to sacrifice or to hazard the fruit of centuries of experience, of centuries of struggles, and of more than one century of liberty, as perfect as ever blessed any country upon the earth, for visionary schemes of ideal perfectibility, for doubtful experiments even of possible improvement.

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I am, therefore, for the House of Commons, as a part and not as the whole of the Government; and, as a part of the Government, I hold it to be frantic to suppose, that from the election of members of Parliament you can altogether exclude, by any contrivance, even if it were desirable to do so, the influence of property, rank, talents, family, connexion, and whatever else in the Radical Language of the day is considered as intimidation or corruption. I believe, that if a reform to the extent of that demanded by the Radical Reformers were granted, you would, before an annual election came round, find that there were new connexions grown up which you must again destroy; new influence acquired which you must dispossess of its authority; and that in these fruitless attempts at unattainable purity, you were working against the natural current of human nature.

I believe, therefore, that, contrive how you will, some such human motives of action will find room to operate in the election of members of Parliament. I think that this must and ought to be

so, unless you mean to exclude from the concerns of the nation all inert wealth, all inactive talent, the retired, the aged, and the infirm, all who cannot face popular assemblies or engage in busy life; in short, unless you have found some expedient for disarming property of influence, without (what I hope we are not yet ripe for) the abolition of property itself.

I would have by choice, if the choice were yet to be made, I would have in the House of Commons great variety of interests, and I would have them find their way there by a great variety of rights of election; satisfied that uniformity of election would produce any thing but a just representation of various interests. As to the close boroughs, I know that through them have found their way into the House of Commons men whose talents have been an honor to their kind, and whose names are interwoven with the brightest periods in the history of their country. I cannot think that system altogether vicious which has produced such fruits. Nor can I think that there should be but one road into that assembly, or that no man should be presumed fit for the deliberations of a senate, who has not had the nerves previously to face the storms of the hustings.

I need not say, Gentlemen, that I am one of the last men to disparage the utility and dignity of popular elections: I have good cause to speak of them in far different language; but, among numberless other considerations which endear to me the favors which I have received at your hands, I confess it is one, that as your representative, I am enabled to speak my genuine sentiments on this (as I think it) vital question of Parliamentary Reform, without the imputation of shrinking from popular canvass, or of seeking shelter for myself in that species of representation which, as an element in the composition of Parliament, I shall never cease to defend.

In truth, Gentlemen, though the question of Reform is made the pretext of those persons who have vexed the country for some months, I verily believe that there are very few even of them who either give credit to their own exaggerations, or care much about the improvements which they recommend. Why, do we not see that the most violent of the Reformers of the day are aiming at seats in that assembly, which, according to their own theories, they should have left to wallow in its own pollution, discountenanced and unredeemed? It is true, that if they found their way there, they might endeavour to bring us to a sense of our misdeeds, and to urge us to redeem our character by some self-condemning ordinance; but would not the authority of their names, as our associates, have more than counterbalanced the force of their eloquence as our Reformers?

But, Gentlemen, I am for the whole Constitution. The liberty of the subject as much depends on the maintenance of the constitutional prerogatives of the Crown, on the acknowledgment of the legitimate power of the other House of Parliament, as it does in upholding that supreme power (for such is in one sense of the word, though not in the sense of the Resolution of 1648, the power of the purse,) which resides in the democratical branch of the Constitution. Whatever beyond its just proportion was gained by one part, would be gained at the expense of the whole; and the balance is now, perhaps, as nearly poised as human wisdom can adjust it. I fear to touch that balance, the disturbance of which must bring confusion on the nation.

Gentlemen, I trust there are few, very few, reasonable and enlightened men, ready to lend themselves to projects of confusion. But I confess I very much wish, that all who are not ready to do so would consider the ill effect of any countenance given, publicly or by apparent implication, to those whom, in their hearts and judgments, they despise. I remember that most excellent and able man, Mr. Wilberforce, once saying in the House of Commons, that he "never believed an Opposition really to wish mischief to the country; that they only wished just so much mischief as might drive their opponents out, and place themselves in their room. Now, Gentlemen, I cannot help thinking that there are some persons tampering with the question of Reform, something in the same spirit. They do not go so far as the Reformers; they even state irreconcilable differences of opinion; but to a certain extent they agree, and even co-operate with them in inflaming the public feeling, not only against the Government, but against the support given by Parliament to that Government, in the hope, no doubt, of attracting to themselves the popularity which is lost to their opponents, and thus being enabled to correct and retrieve the errors of a displaced administration. Vain and hopeless task, to raise such a spirit and then to govern it! They may stimulate the steeds into fury, till the chariot is hurried to the brink of a precipice; but do they flatter themselves that they can then leap in, and, hurling the incompetent driver from his seat, check the reins just in time to turn from the precipice, and avoid the fall?-I fear they would attempt it in vain. The impulse, once given, may be too impetuous to be controlled; and intending only to change the guidance of the machine, they may hurry it and themselves to irretrievable destruction.

May every man who has a stake in the country, whether from situation, from character, from wealth, from his family, and from the hopes of his children-may every man who has a sense of the