TRIAL OF JOINT RECEIVERS.

715. If, upon the trial of two or more persons indicted for jointly receiving any property, it is proved that one or more of such persons separately received any part or parts of such property, the jury may convict, upon such indictment, such of the said persons as are proved to have received any part or parts of such property. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 200. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 94, (Imp.). See s. 314, et seq., as to the offence of receiving stolen goods.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RECEIVERS.

716. When proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given, at any stage of the proceedings, that there was found in the possession of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months, and such evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him to be stolen: Provided, that not less than three days' notice in writing has been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of such other property, stolen within the preceding period of twelve months, having been found in his possession; and such notice shall specify the nature or description of such other property, and the person from whom the same was stolen. R. S. C. c. 174, 8. 203. 34-35 V. c. 112, s. 19, (Imp.).

See s. 314, et seq., for the offence of receiving stolen goods.

The cases of R. v. Oddy, 2 Den. 264; R. v. Dunn, 1 Moo. 146; and R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177, are not law since the above enactment.

Upon an indictment for receiving stolen goods evidence may be given under this section that there was found in the possession of the prisoner other property stolen within the preceding twelve months, although such other property is the subject of another indictment against him: R. v. Jones, 14 Cox, 3.

In order to show guilty knowledge, under this section, it is not sufficient merely to prove that "other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months" had at some time previously been dealt with by the prisoner, but it must be proved that such "other property" was found in the possession of the prisoner at the time when he is found in possession of the property which is the subject

of the indictment: R. v. Drage, 14 Cox, 85; R. v. Carter, 15 Cox, 448, Warb. Lead. Cas. 183.

THE SAME AFTER PREVIOUS CONVICTION.

717. When proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person has, within five years immediately preceding, been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous conviction may be given at any stage of the proceedings, and may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the person accused knew the property which was proved to be in his possession to have been stolen: Provided, that not less than three days' notice in writing has been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of such previous conviction; and it shall not be necessary, for the purposes of this section, to charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so accused. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 204. 34-35 V. c. 112, s. 19 (Imp.).

See s. 314, et seq., as to the offence of receiving stolen goods.

EVIDENCE UNDER SECTIONS 460, ET SEQ.

718. Upon the trial of any person accused of any offence respecting the currency or coin, or against the provisions of Part XXXV., no difference in the date or year or in any legend marked upon the lawful coin described in the indictment, and the date or year or legend marked upon the false coin counterfeited to resemble or pass for such lawful coin. or upon any die, plate, press, tool or instrument used, constructed, devised, adapted or designed for the purpose of counterfeiting or imitating any such lawful coin, shall be considered a just or lawful cause or reason for acquitting any such person of such offence; and it shall, in any case, be sufficient to prove such general resemblance to the lawful coin as will show an intention that the counterfeit should pass for it. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 205.

See s. 460, et seq., for offences relating to the coin. This s. 718 is not in the English Act. It was s. 31 of 32 & 33 V. c. 18 of Canada.

719. Verdict in case of libel, see ante, under s. 302, p. 305.

IMPOUNDING DOCUMENTS.

720. Whenever any instrument which has been forged or fraudulently altered is admitted in evidence the court or the judge or person who admits the same may, at the request of any person against whom the same is admitted in evidence, direct that the same shall be impounded and kept in the custody of some officer of the court or other proper person for such period and subject to such conditions, as to the court, judge or person admitting the same seems meet. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 208.

It was

This clause is not in the Imperial statutes. originally taken from c. 101, s. 2, C. S. U. C; see s. 569,

S-8. 5.

DESTROYING COUNTERFEIT COIN.

721. If any false or counterfeit coin is produced on any trial for an offence against Part XXXV., the court shall order the same to be cut in pieces in open court, or in the presence of a justice of the peace, and then delivered to or for the lawful owner thereof, if such owner claims the same. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 209.

See ss. 460, et seq., as to offences relating to the coin, and s. 569, s-s. 6, as to search warrant. The repealed clause applied to all courts. This one applies only to criminal

courts.

VIEW.

722. On the trial of any person for an offence against this Act the court may, if it appears expedient for the ends of justice, at any time after the jurors have been sworn to try the case and before they give their verdict, direct that the jury shall have a view of any place, thing or person, and shall give directions as to the manner in which, and the persons by whom, the place, thing or person shall be shown to such jurors, and may for that purpose adjourn the trial and the costs occasioned thereby shall be in the discretion of the court. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 171.

2. When such view is ordered, the court shall give such directions as seem requisite for the purpose of preventing undue communication with such jurors: Provided that no breach of any such directions shall affect the validity of the proceedings. R. S. C. c. 174, ss. 171, 172.

This is more a re-enactment of the Imperial Act, 39 & 40 V. c. 18, s. 11, (for Ireland) than of s. 171, c. 174, R. S. C. Quære, if evidence is improperly received by the jury during such view: R. v. Martin, 12 Cox, 204. View ordered in R. v. Whalley, 2 Cox, 231 (see this case as to forms); Anon, 2 Chit. Rep. 422. If witnesses accompany the jury so as to give explanations to them the prisoner has a right to be present: see R. v. Petrie, 20 O. R. 317.

VARIANCE AND AMENDMENTS AT TRIAL.

723. If on the trial of any indictment there appears to be a variance between the evidence given and the charge in any count in the indictment, either as found or as amended, or as it would have been if amended in conformity with any particular supplied as provided in sections six hundred and fifteen and six hundred and seventeen, the court before which the case is tried may, if of opinion that the accused has not been misled or prejudiced in his

defence by such variance, amend the indictment or any count in it or any such particular so as to make it conformable with the proof.

2. If it appears that the indictment has been preferred under some other Act of Parliament instead of under this Act, or under this instead of under some other Act, or that there is in the indictment, or in any count in it, an omission to state or a defective statement of anything requisite to constitute the offence, or an omission to negative any exception which ought to have been negatived, but that the matter omitted is proved by the evidence, the court before which the trial takes place, if of opinion that the accused has not been misled or prejudiced in his defence by such error or omission, shall amend the indictment or count as may be necessary.

3. The trial in either of these cases may then proceed in all respects as if the indictment or count had been originally framed as amended: Provided that if the court is of opinion that the accused has been misled or prejudiced in his defence by any such variance, error, omission or defective statement, but that the effect of such misleading or prejudice might be removed by adjourning or postponing the trial, the court may in its discretion make the amendment and adjourn the trial to a future day in the same sittings, or discharge the jury and postpone the trial to the next sittings of the court, on such terms as it thinks just.

4. In determining whether the accused has been misled or prejudiced in his defence the court which has to determine the question shall consider the contents of the depositions, as well as the other circumstances of the case.

5. Provided that the propriety of making or refusing to make any such amendment shall be deemed a question for the court, and that the decision of the court upon it may be reserved for the Court of Appeal, or may be brought before the Court of Appeal like any other decision on a point of law. R. S. C. c. 174, ss. 237, 238, 239. (Amended).

AMENDMENT TO BE ENDORSED.

724. In case an order for amendment as provided for in the next preceding section is made it shall be endorsed on the record; and all other rolls and proceedings connected therewith shall be amended accordingly by the proper officer and filed with the indictment, among the proper records of the court. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 240.

FORMAL RECORD IN SUCH CASE.

725. If it becomes necessary to draw up a formal record in any case in which an amendment has been made as aforesaid, such record shall be drawn up in the form in which the indictment remained after the amendment was made, without taking any notice of the fact of such amendment having been made. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 243.

These clauses are taken with alterations from the 14 & 15 V. c. 100, of the Imperial statutes (Lord Campbell's Act), in relation to which Greaves remarks:

"This is one of the most important sections in the Act, and, if the power given by it be properly exercised, will

tend very materially to the better administration of criminal justice. Formerly, if any variance occurred between any allegation in an indictment, and the evidence adduced in support of it, the prisoner was entitled to be acquitted. This led to much inconvenience. It caused the multiplication of counts, varying the statement in as many ways as it was possible to conceive the evidence could support, and thereby greatly increased the expense of the prosecution. It sometimes led to the entire escape of heinous offenders, for it happened in some cases that the grand jury were discharged before the acquittal took place; and though such acquittal in many cases would not have operated as a bar to another indictment, yet the prosecutor chose rather to submit to the first defeat than to prefer another indictment at a subsequent assizes; and even in some cases an acquittal took place under such circumstances that the prisoner was enabled successfully to plead it in bar to another indictment. Thus in Sheen's case, 2 C. & P. 634, where the prisoner had been indicted for the murder of Charles William Beadle, and acquitted on the ground that the name of the deceased could not be proved, to a subsequent indictment, which charged him with the murder of Charles William, he pleaded the former acquittal, and that the deceased was as well known by the name mentioned in the one indictment as by the name mentioned in the other, and so the jury found. This case clearly shows that the preferring a new bill was not in all cases sufficient to prevent a failure of justice in consequence of a variance; and many like cases have occurred."

"The provisions as to the amendment of variances in criminal cases have been gradually extended. The first statute which introduced the power of amendment was the 9 Geo. IV. c. 15, which empowered any judge at nisi prius, or any court of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery, to amend any variance, in cases of misdemeanour, between any matter in writing or in print, and the recital thereof on the record. After this statute had been in opera