several persons possessing an equal title to it: Wharton, Law Lexicon.

It must be remembered that the words in s. 619, s-s. (a) are, "another or others;" and if an indictment allege property to belong to A. B. and others, and it appears that A. B. has only one partner, it is a variance.

The prisoner was indicted for stealing the property of G. Eyre" and others," and it was proved that G. Eyre had only one partner; it was held, per Denman, Com. Serj., that the prisoner must be acquitted: Hampton's Case. 2 Russ. 303. So where a count for forgery laid the intent to be to defraud S. Jones " and others," and it appeared that Jones had only one partner, it was held that the count was not supported: R. v. Wright, 1 Lewin, 268.

In R. v. Kealey, 2 Den. 68, the defendant was indicted for the common law misdemeanour of having attempted, by false pretenses made to J. Baggally and others, to obtain from the said J. Baggally and others one thousand yards of silk, the property of the said J. Baggally and others, with intent to cheat the said J. Baggally and others of the same. J. Baggally and others were partners in trade, and the pretenses were made to J. Baggally; but none of the partners were present when the pretenses were made, nor did the pretenses ever reach the ear of any of them. It was objected that there was a variance, as the evidence did not show that the pretenses were made to J. Baggally and others; but the objection was overruled by Russell Gurney, Esq., Q. C., and, upon a case reserved, the conviction was held right.

Greaves, in note (a), 2 Russ. 304, says on this case: "It is clear that the 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 14 (s. 619 ante) alone authorizes the use of the words and others;' for, except for that clause, the persons must have been named. There the question really was, whether that clause authorized the use of it in this allegation. The words are,' whenever it shail be necessary to mention, for any purpose whatsoever,

any partners, etc.,' ('if it be necessary for any purpose to mention,' etc., s. 619, ante). Now it is plain that the prisoner had applied to Baggally to purchase the goods of the firm, and the inference from the statement in the indictment is that he had actually made a contract for their purchase, and, if that contract had been alleged, it must have been alleged as a contract with the firm, and it was clearly correct to allege an attempt to make a contract as made to the firm also."

Now such a variance as mentioned in Hampton's and Wright's cases, ubi supra, would not be fatal, if amended: 3 Burn, 25; see s. 723 post; and R. v. Pritchard, L. & C. 34; R. v. Vincent, 2 Den. 464; R. v. Marks, 10 Cox, 367.

It is not necessary that a strict legal partnership should exist: Where C. & D. carried on business in partnership, and the widow of C., upon his death, without taking out administration, acted as partner, and the stock was afterwards divided between her and the surviving partner, but, before the division, part of the stock was stolen; it was holden that the goods were properly described as the goods of D. and the widow: R. v. Gaby, R. & R. 178.

And where a father and son carried on business as farmers; the son died intestate, after which the father continued the business for the joint benefit of himself and the son's next of kin; some sheep were stolen, and were laid to be the property of the father and the son's next of kin, and all the judges held it right: R. v. Scott, R. & R. 13.

In an indictment for stealing a Bible, a hymn-book, etc., from a Methodist chapel, the goods were laid as the property of John Bennett and others, and it appeared that Bennett was one of the Society, and a trustee of the chapel: Parke, J., held that the property was correctly laid in Bennett: R. v. Boulton, 5 C. & P. 537.

In R. v. Pritchard, L. & C. 34, it was held that the property of a banking co-partnership may be described as the

property of one of the partners specially named and others, under the clause in question. See s. 620, post, as to bodies corporate, and the property under their control: R. v. Beacall, 1 Moo. 15.

On s-s. (c), it has been held that if a person employed by a trustee of turnpike tolls to collect them lives in the toll house rent free, the property in the house, in an indictment for burglary, may be laid in the person so employed by the lessee, he having the exclusive possession, and the toll house not being parcel of any premises occupied by his employer: R. v. Camfield, 1 Moo. 42.

PROPERTY OF BODY CORPORATE.

620. All property, real and personal, whereof any body corporate has, by law, the management, control or custody, shall, for the purpose of any indictment or proceeding against any other person for any offence committed on or in respect thereof, be deemed to be the property of such body corporate. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 122.

This clause is not in the English statutes. It was held in England, without this clause, that when goods of a corporation are stolen they must be laid to be the property of the corporation in their corporate name and not in the names of the individuals who comprise it: R. v. Patrick and Pepper, 1 Leach, 253.-So in R. v. Freeman, 2 Russ. 301, the prisoner was indicted for stealing a parcel, the property of the London and North Western Railway Company. The parcel was stolen from the Lichfield Station, which had been in the possession of the company for three or four years, by means of their servants, but no statute was produced which authorized the company to purchase the Trent Valley Line; an Act incorporating the company was, however, produced. It was held that, as a corporation is liable in trover, trespass and ejectment, they might have an actual possession though it might be wrongful, which would support the indictment.

In R. v. Frankland, L. & C. 276, it was held: 1st. That the incorporation of a private company must be proved by legal and documentary evidence; 2nd. That partners in a

company not incorporated might be proved to be such by parol evidence; 3rd. That Thomas Bolland and others, who were described in the indictment as the owners of the property embezzled, being partners in a company not incorporated, the indictment was supported by proof that the money was the property of the company.

By s. 613, ante, no count is objectionable on the ground that it does not contain the name of the person injured, or defrauded, or that it does not state the owner of any property therein described, or that it does not name any one with precision.

INDICTMENTS FOR STEALING ORES, ETC.

621. In an indictment for any offence mentioned in section three hundred and forty-three or three hundred and seventy-five of this Act, it shall be sufficient to lay the property in Her Majesty, or in any person or corporation, in different counts in such indictment; and any variance in the latter case, between the statement in the indictment and the evidence adduced, may be amended at the trial; and if no owner is proved the indictment may be amended by laying the property in Her Majesty. R. S. C. c. 174,

8. 124.

See under ss. 343 & 375, ante.

OFFENCES AS TO POSTAGE STAMPS, ETC.

622. In any indictment for any offence committed in respect of any postal card, postage stamp or other stamp issued or prepared for issue by the authority of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislature of any province of Canada, or by, or by the authority of any corporate body for the payment of any fee, rate or duty whatsoever, the property therein may be laid in the person in whose possession, as the owner thereof, it was when the offence was committed, or in Her Majesty if it was then unissued or in the possession of any officer or agent of the Government of Canada or of the Province by authority of the legislature whereof it was issued or prepared for issue. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 125.

See interpretation clause, s. 3.

INDICTMENTS UNDER SECTIONS 319-321.

623. In every case of theft or fraudulent application or disposition of any chattel, money or valuable security under sections three hundred and nineteen (c) and three hundred and twenty-one of this Act, the property in any such chattel, money or valuable security may, in any warrant by the justice of the peace before whom the offender is charged, and in the indictment preferred against such offender, be laid in Her Majesty, or in the municipality, as the case may be. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 126.

INDICTMENTS AS TO MAIL BAGS, ETC.

624. When an offence is committed in respect of a post letter bag, or a post letter, or other mailable matter, chattel, money or valuable security sent by post, the property of such post letter bag, post letter, or other mailable matter, chattel, money or valuable security may, in the indictment preferred against the offender, be laid in the Postmaster-General; and it shall not be necessary to allege in the indictment, or to prove upon the trial or otherwise, that the post letter bag, post letter or other mailable matter, chattel or valuable security was of any value.

2. The property of any chattel or thing used or employed in the service of the post office, or of moneys arising from duties of postage, shall, except in the cases aforesaid, be laid in Her Majesty, if the same is the property of Her Majesty, or if the loss thereof would be borne by Her Majesty, and not by any person in his private capacity.

3. In any indictment against any person employed in the post office of Canada for any offence against this Act, or against any person for an offence committed in respect of any person so employed, it shall be sufficient to allege that such offender or such other person was employed in the post office of Canada at the time of the commission of such offence, without stating further the nature or particulars of his employment. R. S. C. c. 35, s. 111.

See ss. 3 and 4, ante, for interpretation of terms.

STEALING BY TENANT OR LODGER.

625. An indictment may be preferred against any person who steals any chattel let to be used by him in or with any house or lodging, or who steals any fixture so let to be used, in the same form as if the offender was not a tenant or lodger, and in either case the property may be laid in the owner or person letting to hire. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 127. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 74 (Imp.). See s. 322, ante.

JOINDER OF COUNTS. (New).

626. Any number of counts for any offences whatever may be joined in the same indictment, and shall be distinguished in the manner shown in the form EE in schedule one hereto, or to the like effect: Provided that to a count charging murder no count charging any offence other than murder shall be joined.

2. When there are more counts than one in an indictment each count may be treated as a separate indictment.

3. If the court thinks it conducive to the ends of justice to do so, it may direct that the accused shall be tried upon any one or more of such counts separately. Such order may be made either before or in the course of the trial, and if it is made in the course of the trial the jury shall be discharged from giving a verdict on the counts on which the trial is not to proceed. The counts in the indictment which are not then tried shall be proceeded upon in all respects as if they had been found in a separate indictment.

4. Provided that, unless there be special reasons, no order shall be made preventing the trial at the same time of any number of distinct charges of