statute), and the setting fire thereto wilfully and maliciously is not felony R. v. Satchwell, 12 Cox, 449; s. 487 post. : Section 19 of repealed statute did not apply to manufactured lumber; R. v. Berthé, 16 C. L. J. 251. It is equally an offence within this section to set fire to a mine in the possession of the party himself, provided it is proved to be done with intent to injure or defraud any other person. The mine may be laid as the property of the person in possession of or working it, though only as agent: R. v. Jones, 2 Moo. 293. As to setting fire to ships.-A pleasure boat, eighteen feet long, was set fire to and Patteson, J., inclined to think that it was a vessel within the meaning of the Act, but the prisoner was acquitted on the merits, and no decided opinion was given: R. v. Bowyer, 4 C. & P. 559. Upon an indictment for firing a barge, Alderson, J., seemed to doubt if a barge was within the meaning of the statute: R. v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 569. The burning of a ship of which the defendant was a part owner is within the statute: R. v. Wallace, 2 Moo. 200. In R. v. Philp, 1 Moo. 263, there was no proof of malice against the owners, and the ship was insured for more than its value, but the court thought that the defendant must be taken to contemplate the consequences of his act, and held that, as to this point, the conviction was right: see R. v. Newill, 1 Moo. 458. The destruction of a vessel by a part-owner shows an intent to prejudice the other part-owners, though he has insured the whole ship and promised that the other part-owners should have the benefit thereof: R. v. Philp, 1 Moo. 263. The underwriters on a policy of goods fraudulently made are within the statute, though no goods be put on board: Idem. If the intent be laid to prejudice the underwriters then prove the policy, and that the ship sailed on her voyage: R. v. Gilson, R. & R. 138. While tapping A sailor goes on a ship to steal rum. the casks a lighted match held by him set the rum on fire, and a conflagration ensued which destroyed the vessel. Held, that a conviction for arson of the ship could not be upheld R. v. Faulkner, 13 Cox, 550. : ATTEMPT. 483. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who wilfully attempts to set fire to anything mentioned in the last preceding section, or who wilfully sets fire to any substance so situated that he knows that anything mentioned in the last preceding section is likely to catch fire therefrom. R. S. C. c. 168, ss. 9, 10, 20, 29 & 48 (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 97, ss. 7, 8, 18, 27 & 44 (Imp.). See R. v. Child, Warb. Lead. Cas. 193, and cases there cited. "Wilfully attempt" in this section is not a happy expression. Can any one be said to not wilfully attempt? at Indictment.unlawfully and wilfully did attempt, without legal justification or excuse and without colour of right, to set fire to a certain dwelling-house (building) of F. N. Where the prisoners were indicted for setting fire to letters in a post-office, divers persons being in the house, it was held that there was no evidence of any intent, but it was what is vulgarly called a lark, and even if the house had been burned they would not have been guilty: R. v. Batstone, 10 Cox, 20. A person maliciously sets fire to goods in a house with intent to injure the owner of the goods, but he had no malicious intention to burn the house, or to injure the owner of it. The house did not take fire but would have done so if the fire had not been extinguished: Held, that if the house had thereby caught fire, the setting fire to it would not have been within this section, as, under the circumstances, it would not have amounted to felony: R. v. Nattrass, 15 Cox, 73; R. v. Harris, 15 Cox, 75. But see now s. 481. It is not necessary in a count in an indictment laid under this section to allege an intent to defraud, and it is sufficient to follow the words of the section without substantively setting out the particular circumstances relied. on as constituting the offence. Evidence of experiments made subsequently to the fire is admissible in order to show the way in which the building was set fire to: R. v. Heseltine, 12 Cox, 404. The words "with intent to injure or defraud" have been left out of these sections. Lighting a match by the side of a stack with intent to set fire to it is an attempt to set fire to it, because it is an act immediately and directly tending to the execution of the crime: R. v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511. On an indictment against two prisoners for attempting to set fire, one prisoner had not assisted in the attempt, but had counselled and encouraged the other; both were convicted: R. v. Clayton, 1 C. & K. 128. See R. v. Goodman, 22 U. C. C. P. 338. SETTING FIRE TO CROPS, TREES, Lumber. 484. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who wilfully sets fire to (a) any crop, whether standing or cut down, or any wood, forest, coppice or plantation, or any heath, gorse, furze or fern; or (b) any tree, lumber, timber, logs, or floats, boom, dam or slide, and thereby injures or destroys the same. R. S. C. c. 168, ss. 18 & 12 (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 97, s. 16 (Imp.). Indictment under s. 12 of repealed statute quashed, for want of the words "so as to injure or to destroy": R. v. Berthé, 16 C. L. J. 251. Such an indictment bad, even after verdict: R. v. Bleau, 7 R. L. 571. See form of indictment under s. 482, to which add for an offence under s-s. (b) " and thereby injured (or destroyed) the same," or "injured and destroyed the same." ATTEMPT. 485. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seven years' imprisonment who wilfully attempts to set fire to anything mentioned in the last preceding section, or who wilfully sets fire to any substance so situated that he knows that anything mentioned in the last preceding section is likely to catch fire therefrom. R. S. C. c. 168, s. 20 (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 97, s. 18 (Imp.). See remarks under the last three sections. SETTING FIRE TO FORESTS, ETC. 486. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment who, by such negligence as shows him to be reckless or wantonly regardless of consequences, or in violation of a provincial or municipal law of the locality, sets fire to any forest, tree, manufactured lumber, square timber, logs or floats, boom, dam or slide on the Crown domain, or land leased or lawfully held for the purpose of cutting timber, or on private property, on any creek or river, or rollway, beach or wharf, so that the same is injured or destroyed. 2. The magistrate investigating any such charge may, in his discretion, if the consequences have not been serious, dispose of the matter summarily, without sending the offender for trial, by imposing a fine not exceeding fifty dollars, and in default of payment by the committal of the offender to prison for any term not exceeding six months, with or without hard labour. R. S. C. c. 168, s. 11. Fine, s. 958. that A. B. on at acting with reckless negligence and wantonly regardless of consequences (or in violation of a provincial "or" a municipal law) did unlawfully set fire to a forest then and there situate on the Crown domain, so that the said forest was injured (or destroyed.) THREATS TO BURN. 487. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to ten years' imprisonment who sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing threatening to burn or destroy any building, or any rick or stack of grain, hay or straw or other agricultural produce, or any grain, hay or straw or other agricultural produce in or under any building, or any ship or vessel. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 8. 24-25 V. c. 97, s. 50 (Imp.). See remarks under ss. 233 & 482, ante. A threat to burn standing corn is not within the statute: R. v. Hill, 5 Cox, 233; See R. v. Jepson, 2 East, P. C. 1115, note (a), as to what constitutes a threat. See s. 959 post, as to articles of the peace. ATTEMPT TO DAMAGE BY EXPLOSIVES. 488. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who wilfully places or throws any explosive substance into or near any building or ship with intent to destroy or damage the same or any machinery, working tools, or chattels whatever, whether or not any explosion takes place. R. S. C. c. 168, ss. 14 & 49. 24-25 V. c. 97, ss. 10-45 (Imp.). Indictment for throwing gunpowder into a house with intent, etc.unlawfully and wilfully did at throw into the dwelling-house of J. N., a large quantity, to wit, two pounds of a certain explosive substance, that is to say, gunpowder, with intent thereby then to destroy the said dwelling-house. (Add counts varying the statement of the act, and also stating the intent to be to damage the house.) Indictment under 8. 99 for destroying by explosion part of a dwelling-house, so as to endanger life.— wilfully and unlawfully did, by the explosion of a certain explosive substance, that is to say gunpowder, destroy a certain part of the dwelling-house of J. N., situate one A. N., then being in the said dwelling-house, so as to endanger the life of the said A. N. (Add counts for throwing down and damaging part of the dwelling-house,) under s. 488: See R. v. McGrath, 14 Cox, 598; and ss. 99, 100, 247, 248 & 499, which also provide for offences by explosives. Prove that the defendant by himself or with others destroyed or was present aiding and abetting in the destruction of some part of the dwelling-house in question, by the explosion of gunpowder or other explosive substance mentioned in the indictment: R. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437. It has been held that firing a gun loaded with powder through the keyhole of the door of a house, in which were several persons, and by which the lock of the door was blown to pieces, is not within this section: R. v. Brown, 3 F. & F. 821. But Greaves is of opinion that this case would bear reconsideration: 2 Russ. 1045 note. Prove that it was the dwelling-house of J. N., and situate as described in the indictment. Prove that the act was done maliciously, that is, wilfully and not by accident. Prove also |