the moneys of the said J. N., to the amount of ten dollars, from the person and against the will of the said J. N. then unlawfully and violently did steal.

The indictment may charge the defendant with having assaulted several persons and stolen different sums from them, if the whole was one transaction.

If the robbery be not proved the jury may return a verdict of an assault with intent to rob, if the evidence warrants it, and then the defendant is punishable as under s. 400. By s. 713, if the intent be not proved a verdict of common assault may be given: R. v. Archer, 2 Moo 283; R. v. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167; R. v. Ellis, 8 C. & P. 654; R. v. Nicholls, 9 C. & P. 267; R. v. Woodhall, 12 Cox, 240, is not to be followed here, as the enactment to the same effect is now, in England, repealed.

The word "together" is not essential in an indictment for robbery against two persons to show that the offence was a joint one: R. v. Provost, M. L. R. 1 Q. B. 477.

ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO ROB.

400. Every one who assaults any person with intent to rob him is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to three years' imprisonment. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 33; 24-25 V. c. 96 s. 42 (Imp.).

Fine, s. 958: see annotation under the three next preceding sections.

Indictment.

in and upon one C. D., unlawfully did make an assault with intent the moneys, goods and chattels of the said C. D., from the person and against the will of the said C. D. unlawfully and violently to steal: R. v. Huxley, Car. 2 M. 596; R. v. O'Neil, 11 R. L. 334.

STOPPING THE MAIL WITH INTENT TO ROB.

401. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life, or to any term not less than five years, who stops a mail with intent to rob or search the same. R. S. C. c. 35, s. 81. 7 Wm. IV. and 1 V. c, 36 (Imp.).

Section 4, ante, as to definitions, and s. 624, post, as to indictment.

Indictment.-

a certain mail for the conveyance

of post letters, unlawfully did stop with intent to rob the

same.

A verdict of attempt may be given, if the evidence warrants it, s. 711.

COMPELLING EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS.

402. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life who, with intent to defraud, or injure, by unlawful violence to or restraint of the person of another, or by the threat that either the offender or any other person will employ such violence or restraint, unlawfully compels any person to execute, make, accept, endorse, alter or destroy the whole or any part of any valuable security, or to write, impress or affix any name or seal upon any paper or parchment, in order that it may be afterwards made or converted into or used or dealt with as a valuable security. R. S. C. c. 173, ss. 5 & 6 (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 48 (Imp.).

The obtaining money by accusing or threatening to accuse of any treason, felony or any crime, now falls under ss. 405-406, post.

"Valuable security" defined, s. 3.

On this clause, Greaves says: "This clause is new. It will meet all such cases as R. v. Phipoe, 2 Leach, 673, and R. v. Edwards, 6 C. & P. 521, where persons by violence to the person or by threats induce others to execute deeds, bills of exchange or other securities.

The defendants, husband and wife, were indicted under this clause, for having by threats of violence and restraint induced the prosecutor to write and affix his name to the following document: "London, July 19th, 1875. I hereby agree to pay you £100 on the 27th inst, to prevent any action against me."

Held, that this document was not a promissory note, but was an agreement to pay money for a valid consideration which could be sued upon and was therefore a valuable security. To constitute a valuable security within the meaning of the statute an instrument need not be negotiable. A wife who takes an independent part in the commission of a crime when her husband is not present is not

protected by her coverture: R. v. John, 13 Cox, 100; see

cases under s. 405, post.

See that case of R. v. John as to form of indictment.

EXTORTION BY LETTER.

403. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing demanding of any person with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, any property, chattel, money, valuable security or other valuable thing. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 1. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 44 (Imp.).

"Valuable security" and " writing" defined, s. 3.

An indictment on this clause should always contain a count for uttering without stating the person to whom the letter or writing is uttered: Greaves, Cons. Acts, 135.

with menaces.

Indictment for sending a letter, demanding money that J. S., on unlawfully did send to one J. N. a certain letter, directed to the said J. N. by the name and description of Mr. J. N., of demanding

money from the said J. N. with menaces, and without reasonable or probable cause, he the said J. S. then well knowing the contents of the said letter; and which said letter is as follows, that is to say, (here set out the letter verbatim). And the jurors aforesaid, do further present, that the said J. S. on the day and in the year aforesaid, unlawfully did utter a certain writing demanding money from the said J. N. with menaces and without any reasonable or probable cause, he the said J. S. then well knowing the contents of the said writing and which said writing is as follows, that is to say (here set out the writing verbatim). See s. 613.

Where the letter contained a request only, but intimated that, if it were not complied with, the writer would publish a certain libel then in his possession accusing the prosecutor of murder, this was holden to amount to a demand: R. v. Robinson, 2 Leach, 749. The demand must be with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, and it will be for the jury to consider whether the letter does

CRIM. LAW-29

expressly or impliedly contain a demand of this description. The words "without any reasonable or probable cause apply to the demand of money, and not to the accusation threatened by the defendant to be made against the prosecutor; and it is, therefore, immaterial in point of law, whether the accusation be true or not: R. v. Hamilton, 1 C. & K. 212; R. v. Gardner, 1 C. & P. 479. A letter written to a banker, stating that it was intended by some one to burn his books and cause his bank to stop, and that if 250 pounds were put in a certain place the writer of the letter would prevent the mischief, but if the money were not put there it would happen, was held to be a letter demanding money with menaces: R. v. Smith, 1 Den. 510. The judges seemed to think that this decision did not interfere with R. v. Pickford, 4 C. & P. 227. In R. v. Pickford the injury threatened was to be done by a third person. It is immaterial whether the menaces or threats herein before mentioned be of violence, injury or accusation to be caused or made by the offender, or by any other person. See R. v. Tranchant, 9 L. N. 333 and R. v. Grimwade, 1 Den. 30.

32 & 33 V.c. 21, s. 43 made it a felony to send "any letter demanding of any person with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, any money, etc." Held, that the words "without reasonable or probable cause" apply to the money demanded, and not to the accusation threatened to be made: R. v. Mason, 24 U. C. C. P. 58.

DEMANDING WITH INTENT TO STEAL.

404. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment who, with menaces, demands from any person, either for himself or for any other person, anything capable of being stolen with intent to steal it. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 2. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 45 (Imp.).

The repealed clause had the words "or by force" after
The words in italics are new.

menaces.

Indictment.

unlawfully with menaces did demand of A. B. the money of him the said A. B. with intent the said money from the said A. B. unlawfully to steal.

The prosecutor must prove a demand by the defendant of the money or other thing stated in the indictment " by menaces" with intent to steal it. It is not necessary to prove an express demand in words; the statute says "with menaces." 'Demands," and menaces are of two kinds, by words or by gestures; so that, if the words or gestures of the defendant at the time were plainly indicative of what he required, and tantamount in fact to a demand, it should seem to be sufficient proof of the allegation of demand in the indictment: R. v. Jackson, 1 Leach, 267. If a person, with menaces, demand money of another, who does not give it him, because he has it not with him, this is a felony within the statute; but if the party demanding the money knows that it is not then in the prosecutor's possession, and only intends to obtain an order for the payment of it, it is otherwise R. v. Edwards, 6 C. & P. 515. That would now fall under this section.

See R. v. Walton, L. & C. 288; R. v. Robertson, L. & C. 483; 3 Russ. 203, note by Greaves.

Why is the punishment only two years under this section. and fourteen under the next preceding one?

EXTORTION BY CERTAIN THREATS.

405. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who, with intent to extort or gain anything from any

person

(a) accuses or threatens to accuse either that person or any other person, whether the person accused or threatened with accusation is guilty or not, of

(i) any offence punishable by law with death or imprisonment for seven years or more;

(ii) any assault with intent to commit a rape, or any attempt or endeavour to commit a rape, or any indecent assault;

(iii) carnally knowing or attempting to know any child so as to be pun-ishable under this Act;

(iv) any infamous offence, that is to say, buggery, an attempt or assault with intent to commit buggery, or any unnatural practice, or incest;

(v) counselling or procuring any person to commit any such infamous offence; or

(b) threatens that any person shall be so accused by any other person; or