The words of the statute are "from any dock," so that, upon an indictment for stealing from a dock, wharf, etc., a mere removal will not suffice; there must be an actual removal from the dock, etc: Archbold, 409.

A man cannot be guilty of this offence in his own ship: R. v. Madox, R. & R. 92; but see R. v. Bowden, 2 Moo. 285. And now, s. 305, ante, would apply to such a case, being stealing by fraudulent conversion.

The luggage of a passenger going by steamer is within the statute. The prisoners were indicted for stealing a portmanteau, two coats and various other articles, in a vessel upon the navigable River Thames. The property in question was the luggage of a passenger going on board the Columbian steamer from London to Hamburg; and it was held that the object of the statute was to protect things on board a ship, and that the luggage of a passenger came within the general description of goods: R. v. Wright, 7 C. & P. 159.

Upon an indictment for any offence mentioned in this section the jury may convict of an attempt to commit the same, under s. 711, if the evidence warrants it.

STEALING WRECKS.

350. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seven years' imprisonment who steals any wreck. R. S. C. c. 81, s. 36 (c). 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 64, (Imp.),

"Wreck" defined, s. 3.

Indictment.

that on

at

a certain ship, the property of a person or persons to the jurors unknown (or of ) was stranded, and that A. B., on the said day, ten pieces of oak planks, being parts of the said ship (or twenty pounds weight of cotton of the goods and merchandize of a shipwrecked person belonging to the said ship), unlawfully did steal.

STEALING ON RAILWAYS. (New).

351. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who steals anything in or from any railway station or building, or from any engine, tender or vehicle of any kind on any railway.

Indictment.

that A. B., at

on

unlawfully did steal a leather portmanteau of the goods and chattels of C. D. in (or from) a railway station, to wit, the station there situate belonging to the Canadian Pacific Railway.

The value is immaterial. A verdict for attempt, s. 711, or for simple larceny, s. 713, may be given if the evidence warrants it. In the first case, the punishment would be under s. 528, post: in the latter case, under s. 356.

See remarks under s. 349 as to the words in or from in this section.

STEALING THINGS IN INDIAN GRAVE.

352. Every one who steals, or unlawfully injures or removes, any image, bones, article or thing deposited in or near any Indian grave is guilty of an offence and liable, on summary conviction, for a first offence to a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars or to three months' imprisonment, and for a subsequent offence to the same penalty and to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 98. (Amended).

This enactment by the repealed statute applied only to British Columbia.

DESTROYING DOCUMENTS.

353. Every one who destroys, cancels, conceals or obliterates any document of title to goods or lands, or any valuable security, testamentary instrument, or judicial, official or other document, for any fraudulent purpose, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the same punishment as if he had stolen such document, security or instrument. R. S. C. c. 164, ss. 12, 13, 14. (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 96, ss. 27, 28, 29 (Imp.).

See ante remarks under s. 335. S. 101, c. 35, R. S. C., provides for certain offences of the same nature by postmasters.

"Document of title to goods or lands," "valuable security" and "testamentary instrument" defined, s. 3. Punishment, for stealing testamentary instruments, is provided for by s. 323; documents of title to lands or goods, by s. 324; and judicial or official document, by s. 325. For stealing other documents not specially provided for in this Code, and for promissory notes, bills of exchange, and other valuable securities, the punishment falls under

ss. 356 & 357. The repealed section (12, c. 164, R. S. C.) provided in express terms for the stealing of such securities, but the Code has no express provision on the subject. S. 303 is the only one under which the stealing of these securities may be held to be indictable: s. 353 merely assumes that they are.

As to what constitutes a "valuable security," it must be remarked that the interpretation given to this word, in s. 3, ante, is wider or, at least, more explicit than the interpretation given in the Imperial Act, 24 & 25 V. c. 96, s. 1. The case of Scott v. R., 2 S. C. R. 349, and (in first instance) 21 L. C. J. 225, refers to a number of cases as to unstamped documents, where stamps are necessary. R. v. Phipoe, 2 Leach, 673, and R. v. Edwards, 6 C. & P. 521, would now fall under s. 405, post. An instrument need not be negotiable to be a "valuable security" under the statute R. v. John, 13 Cox, 100. See Austin and King's cases, 2 East P. C. 602; R. v. Hart, 6 C. & P. 106; R. v. Clark, R. & R. 181; R. v. Watts, 6 Cox, 304; R. v. Morton, 2 East P. C. 955; R. v. Dewitt, 21 N. B. 17; R. v. Bowerman, 17 Cox, 151, [1891] 1 Q. B. 112. The cheque of a firm before it is endorsed by the payee, and while still in the hands of one of the members of the firm, is not a valuable security within the meaning of this Act: R. v. Ford, M. L. R. 7 Q. B. 413; but a receipt is: R. v. Doonan, M. L. R. 6 Q. B. 186.

on

Indictment under s. 353.— a certain valuable security, to wit, one bill of exchange for the payment of one hundred dollars (drawn ) unlawfully did, for a fraudulent purpose, destroy and cancel (conceal or obliterate), the said bill of exchange, being then due and unsatisfied. (In another count detail the purpose.)

Upon an indictment for taking a record from its place of deposit, with a fraudulent purpose, the mere taking is evidence from which fraud may fairly be presumed, unless it be satisfactorily explained.

The first count charged the prisoner with stealing a certain process of a court of record, to wit, a certain warrant of execution issued out of the county court of Berkshire, in an action wherein one Arthur was plaintiff and the prisoner defendant. The second count stated that at the time of committing the offence hereinafter mentioned, one Brooker had the lawful custody of a certain process of a court of record, to wit, a warrant of execution out of the county court of that defendant intending to prevent the due course of law, and to deprive Arthur of the rights, benefits and advantages from the lawful execution of the warrant, did take from Brooker the said warrant, he, Brooker, having then the lawful custody of it. Brooker was the bailiff who had seized the defendant's goods, under the said writ of execution. The prisoner, a day or two afterwards, forcibly took the warrant out of the bailiff's hand, and kept it. He then ordered him away, as having no more authority, and, on his refusal to go, forcibly turned him out. The prisoner was found guilty, and the conviction affirmed upon a case reserved. Cockburn, C.J., said: "I think that the first count of the indictment which charges larceny will not hold. There was no taking lucri causa, but for the purpose of preventing the bailiff from having lawful possession. Neither was the taking animo furandi. I may illustrate it by the case of a man who, wishing to strike another person, sees him coming along with a stick in his hand, takes the stick out of his hand, and strikes him with it. That would be an assault, but not a felonious taking of the stick. There is, however, a second count in the indictment which charges in effect that the prisoner took the warrant for a fraudulent purpose. The facts show that the taking was for a fraudulent purpose. He took the warrant forcibly from the bailiff, in order that he might turn him out of possession. That was a fraud against the execution creditor, and was also contrary to the law. I am therefore of opinion that it amounts to a fraudulent purpose within the enactment, and that the

conviction must be affirmed": R. v. Bailey, 12 Cox, 129. Such a case would now fall under next section.

Maliciously destroying an information or record of the police court is a felony within 32 & 33 V. c. 21, s. 18; R. v. Mason, 22 U. C. C. P. 246.

CONCEALING. (New).

354. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment who, for any fraudulent purpose, takes, obtains, removes or conceals anything capable of being stolen.

Fine, s. 958. See remarks and cases under ss. 343 and 353, ante. S. 26, c. 164, R. S. C. was confined to the concealing of minerals.

Indictment.

on

did unlawfully take (or obtain, remove or conceal) ten bushels of oats, the property of the value of five dollars, for a fraudulent

of

purpose, to wit, for the purpose of

BRINGING BY THIEF INTO CANADA OF ANYTHING STOLEN ELSEWHERE.

355. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seren years' imprisonment who, having obtained elsewhere than in Canada any property by any act which, if done in Canada, would have amounted to theft, brings such property into or has the same in Canada. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 88. (Amended).

"Property" defined, s. 3: see R. v. Hennessey, 35 U. C. Q. B. 603.

The repealed section extended to property obtained by false pretenses. There is no statutory enactment of this kind in England: R. v. Prowes, 1 Moo. 849; R. v. Debruiel, 11 Cox, 207. One was proposed in the draft code.

Receiving in Canada property stolen abroad by any other person does not fall under the above clause. It falls under s. 314, ante.

On a charge of having in possession goods stolen in a foreign country not always necessary to prove state of the law in that country. Crown proved that prisoner had in Canada property taken in another country under circumstances which would have made it felony in Canada if so