716, post. Where the stolen goods are goods that have been found the jury must be satisfied that the prisoner knew that the circumstances of the finding were such as to constitute larceny: R. v. Adams, 1 F. & F. 86. Belief that the goods are stolen, without actual knowledge that they are so, is sufficient to sustain a conviction: R. v. White, 1 F. & F. 665.

Recent possession of stolen property is not generally alone sufficient to support an indictment under this section: 2 Russ. 555; R. v. Perry, 10 R. L. 65. However, in R. v. Langmead, L. & C. 427, the judges would not admit this as law, and maintained the conviction for receiving stolen goods grounded on the recent possession by the defendant of stolen property: see also R. v. Deer, L. & C. 240.

An indictment charged S. with stealing eighteen shillings and sixpence, and G. with receiving the same. The facts were S. was a barman at a refreshment bar, and G. went up to the bar, called for refreshments and put down a florin. S. served G., took up the florin, and took from his employer's till some money, and gave G. as his change eighteen shillings and six pence, which G. put in his pocket and went away with. On leaving the place he took some silver from his pocket and was counting it when he was arrested. On entering the bar signs of recognition took place between S. and G., and G. was present when S. took the money from the till. The jury convicted S. of stealing and G. of receiving. Held, that this was evidence which the judge ought to have left to the jury as reasonable evidence upon which G. might have been convicted as a principal in the second degree, and that, therefore, the conviction for receiving could not be sustained: R. v. Coggins, 12 Cox, 517.

On the trial of a prisoner on an indictment charging him with receiving property which one M. had feloniously stolen, etc., the crime charged was proved, and evidence for the defence was given to the effect that M. had been

tried on a charge of stealing the same property and acquitted. The counsel for the crown then applied to amend the indictment by striking out the allegation that M. had stolen the property, and inserting the words “some evil disposed person" which was allowed. Held, 1. That the record of the previous acquittal of M. formed no defence on the trial of this indictment, and was improperly received in evidence. 2. That the amendment was improperly allowed: R. v. Ferguson, 4 P. &. B. (N.B.) 259.

Defendant sold to C., among other things, a horse power and belt, part of his stock in the trade of a butcher in which he also sold a half interest to C. The horse power had been hired from one M. and at the time of the sale the term of hiring had not expired. At its expiry M. demanded it and C. claimed that he had purchased it from the defendant. Defendant then employed a man to take it out of the premises where it was kept and deliver it to M., which he did. Defendant was summarily tried before a police magistrate and convicted of an offence against 32 & 33 V. c. 21, s. 100. Held, that the conviction was bad, there being no offence against that section. Remarks upon the improper use of criminal law in aid of civil rights : R. v. Young, 5 O. R. 410.

On an indictment for receiving stolen goods it is not necessary to prove by positive evidence that the property found in the possession of the prisoner belongs to the prosecutor: R. v. Gillis, 27 N. B. Rep. 30.

RECEIVING STOLEN POST-LETTER, ETC.

315. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to five years imprisonment who receives or retains in his possession any (stolen) post letter, post letter bag, or any chattel, money or valuable security, parcel or other thing, the stealing whereof is hereby declared to be an indictable offence knowing the same to have been stolen. R. S. C. c. 35, ss. 83, 84 (Amended). 7 Wm. IV. & 1 V. c. 36, s. 30 (Imp.).

See ss. 622 & 627, post, as to indictment and trial; also ss. 715, 716, 717, post: ss. 326 & 327 are the

CRIM. LAW-23

enactments on the stealing of post letters, etc. See s. 4, ante, for definitions of expressions in the Post Office Act. Indictment.- that A. B., on at one post letter the property of the postmaster-general before then, from and out a certain post letter bag unlawfully stolen, unlawfully did receive and retain in his possession, he, the said A. B., then well knowing the said letter to have been stolen.

Why is the punishment less under this clause than under the preceding one?

For stealing, the fact that the article stolen is a post letter is an aggravation, and renders it liable to imprisonment for life, s. 326, whilst stealing money or other things is punishable by only seven years, s. 356; but for criminal receiving of a stolen post letter, the offence is punishable only by five years, whilst the criminal receiving of any other stolen thing is fourteen years! Then, this s. 315 enacts that every one is guilty of an indictable offence punishable by five years, who receives any chattel, money, or valuable security, parcel or other thing, the stealing whereof is hereby declared to be an indictable offence, knowing the same to have been stolen, whilst s. 314 enacts a punishment of fourteen years against any one who knowingly receives anything obtained by any offence punishable on indictment. The consequence is that s. 314 does not apply to any chattel, money or valuable security, parcel or other thing, the stealing whereof is declared by the Code to be an indictable offence. Its provisions are cut down by s. 315. This last section, it may be assumed, was intended to apply only to money or valuable security stolen out of a post letter, but it does not say it.

RECEIVING PROPERTY-OTHER CASES.

316. Every one who receives or retains in his possession anything, knowing the same to be unlawfully obtained, the stealing of which is punishable, on summary conviction, either for every offence, or for the first and second offence only, is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction, for every first, second or subsequent offence of receiving, to the same punishment as if he were

guilty of a first, second or subsequent offence of stealing the same. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 84. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 97 (Imp.).

This enactment is singularly worded.

WHEN RECEIVING COMPLETE.

317. The act of receiving anything unlawfully obtained is complete as soon as the offender has, either exclusively or jointly with the thief or any other person, possession of or control over such thing, or aids in concealing or dispos ing of it.

See cases, ante, under s. 314.

RECEIVING AFTER RESTORATION TO OWNER.

318. When the thing unlawfully obtained has been restored to the owner, or when a legal title to the thing so obtained has been acquired by any person, a subsequent receiving thereof shall not be an offence although the receiver may know that the thing had previously been dishonestly obtained.

See cases, ante, under s. 314, and R. v. Villensky, [1892], 2 Q. B. 597.

PART XXVI.

PUNISHMENT OF THEFT AND OFFENCES RESEMBLING THEFT COMMITTED BY PARTICULAR PERSONS IN RESPECT OF PARTICULAR THINGS IN PARTICULAR PLACES.

THEFT BY CLERKS OR SERVANTS.

319. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment, who

(a) being a clerk or servant, or being employed for the purpose or in the capacity of a clerk or servant, steals anything belonging to or in the possession of his master or employer; or

(b) being a cashier, assistant cashier, manager, officer, clerk or servant of any bank, or savings bank, steals any bond, obligation, bill obligatory or of credit, or other bill or note, or any security for money, or any money or effects of such bank or lodged or deposited with any such bank;

(c) being employed in the service of Her Majesty, or of the Government of Canada or the Government of any province of Canada, or of any municipality, steals anything in his possession by virtue of his employment. R. S. C. c. 164, ss. 51, 52, 53, 54 & 59 (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 67 et seq. (Imp.).

See s. 623, post, as to indictments against public servants.

Special provisions as to embezzlement by post-office officers are contained in s. 105, c. 35, R. S. C.

There is no such thing as embezzlement under the Code. What constituted embezzlement is now theft.

Indictment under (a).

on

was clerk to J. N., and that the said J. S., whilst he was such clerk to the said J. N., as aforesaid, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, certain money to the amount of forty dollars, ten yards of linen cloth, and one hat, of and belonging to the said J. N., his master, unlawfully did steal.

Indictment under (b).- being employed in the public service of Her Majesty, and being intrusted, by virtue of such employment, with the receipt, custody, management and control of a certain valuable security, to wit,

did then and there, whilst he was so employed as aforesaid, receive and take into his possession the said valuable security, and the said valuable security then fraudulently and unlawfully did steal: see R. v. Cummings, 16 U. C. Q. B. 15.

If the defendant is not shown to be the clerk or servant of J. N., but a larceny is proved, he may be convicted of the larceny merely, and punishable then under s. 356, post: R. v. Jennings, Dears. & B. 447. It is not necessary by the statute that the goods stolen should be the property of the master; the words of the statute are, belonging to, or in the possession of the master. A second count stating the goods "then being in the possession" of the master, may be added.

Evidence of acting in the capacity of an officer employed by the crown is sufficient to support an indictment; and the appointment need not be regularly proved: R. v. Townsend, Car. & M. 178; R. v. Borrett, 6 C. & P. 124; R. v. Roberts, 14 Cox, 101