officer to say to her, "It might be better for you to tell the truth and not a lie." Held, that a further statement made by A. to the policeman after the above inducement was inadmissible in evidence against her, as not being free and voluntary. A. was taken into custody the same day, placed with two accomplices, B. and C. and charged with concealment of birth. All three then made statements. Held, that those made by B. and C. could not be deemed to be affected by the previous inducement to A. and were, therefore, admissible against B. and C. respectively, although that made by A. was not so. The prisoners were sent for trial, but before their committal they received the formal caution from the magistrate as to anything they might wish to say. Whereupon A. made a statement which was taken down in writing, as usual, and attached to the deposition: Held, that this latter statement of A. might be read at the trial as evidence against herself. Mere proof that a woman was delivered of a child and allowed two others to take away its body is insufficient to sustain an indictment against her for concealment of birth: R. v. Bate, 11 Cox, 686.

A woman delivered of a child born alive endeavoured to conceal the birth thereof by depositing the child while alive in a corner of a field, when it died from exposure. Held, that she could not be indicted under the above section: R. v. May, 16 L. T. 362.

The prisoner who lived alone had placed the dead body of her new born child behind a trunk in the room she occupied, between the trunk and the wall. On being charged with having had a child she at first denied it. Held, sufficient to support a conviction for concealment of birth: R. v. Pichè, 30 U. C. C. P. 409.

See other cases under s. 714 post, and R. v. Handley 13 Cox, 79.

PART XIX.

BODILY INJURIES, AND ACTS AND OMISSIONS CAUSING
DANGER TO THE PERSON.

WOUNDING WITH INTENT.

241. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life who, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable any person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, unlawfully by any means wounds or causes any grievous bodily harm to any person, or shoots at any person, or, by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, attempts to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person. R. S. C. c. 162, s. 13 (Amended); 24-25 V. c. 100, s. 18 (Imp.).

The repealed clause contained the words "unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever."

"Loaded arms defined, s. 3: see R. v. Latimer, 16 Cox, 70, Warb. Lead. Cas. 117; and R. v. Clarence, Warb. Lead. Cas. 180, 22 Q. B. D. 23.

An indictment under the English clause charging that the prisoner did "inflict" grievous bodily harm instead of "cause" is sufficient: R. v. Bray, 15 Cox, 197.

Indictment for wounding with intent to maim.-that J. S. on one J. N. unlawfully did wound, with intent in so doing him the said J. N. thereby there to maim. (add count stating "with intent to disfigure" and one "with intent to disable." Also one stating "with intent to do some grerious bodily harm." And if necessary, one" with intent to prevent (or resist) the lawful apprehension of.) See form F. F. schedule one under s. 611 post, in which the words "did actual bodily harm " are quite wrong.

"

An indictment under the repealed act, charging the act to have been done" feloniously, wilfully and maliciously was held bad, the words of the statute, then being "unlawfully and maliciously:" R. v. Ryan, 2 Moo. 15. In practice the first count of the indictment is generally for wounding with intent to murder. These counts are allowed to be joined in the same indictment.

This clause includes every wounding done without lawful excuse with any of the intents mentioned in it; from the act itself malice will be inferred: R. v. Latimer, 17 Q. B. D. 359, Warb. Lead. Cas. 117, and cases there cited.

The instrument or means by which the injury was inflicted need not be stated in the indictment, and if stated need not be proved as laid: R. v. Briggs, 1 Moo. 318. And in the same case it was held that upon an indictment which charged a wound to have been inflicted by striking with a stick and kicking with the feet, proof that the wound was caused either by striking with a stick or kicking was sufficient, though it was uncertain by which of the two the injury was inflicted.

In order to convict of the offence the intent must be proved as laid; hence the necessity of several counts charging the offence to have been committed with different intents. If an indictment alleged that the defendant cut the prosecutor with intent to disable, and to do some grievous bodily harm, it will not be supported by proof of an intention to prevent a lawful apprehension: R. v. Duffin, R. &. R. 365; R. v. Boyce, 1 Moo. 29; unless for the purpose of affecting his escape the defendant also harboured one of the intents stated in the indictment: R. v. Gillow, 1 Moo. 85; for where both intents exist it is immaterial which is the principal and which the subordinate. Therefore where, in order to commit a rape, the defendant cut the private parts of an infant, and thereby did her grievous bodily harm, it was holden that he was guilty of cutting with intent to do her grievous bodily harm, notwithstanding his principal object was to commit the rape: R. v. Cox, R. & R. 362. So also, if a person wound another in order to rob him, and thereby inflict grievous bodily harm, he may be convicted on a count charging him with an intent to do grievous bodily harm.

An indictment charging the prisoner with wounding A. with intent to do him grievous bodily harm, is good although it is proved that he mistook A. for somebody else, and that he intended to wound another person: R. v. Stopford, 11 Cox, 643: see R. v. Hunt 1 Moo. 93.

The prisoner was indicted for shooting at A. with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. He fired a pistol into a group of persons who had assaulted and annoyed him, among whom was A., without aiming at A. or any one in particular, but intending generally to do grievous bodily harm, and wounded A. Held, on a case reserved, that he was rightly convicted: R. v. Fretwell, L. & C. 443.

With respect to the intents mentioned in the statute it may be useful to observe that to maim is to injure any part of a man's body which may render him in fighting less able to defend himself, or annoy his enemy; to disfigure is to do some external injury which may detract from his personal appearance; and to disable is to do something which creates a permanent disability, and not merely temporary injury: Archbold, 666. It is not necessary that a grievous bodily harm should be either permanent or dangerous; if it be such as seriously to interfere with health or comfort that is sufficient; and, therefore, where the defendant cut the private parts of an infant. and the wound was not dangerous, and was small, but bled a good deal, and the jury found that it was a grievous bodily harm, it was holden that the conviction was right: R. v. Cox, R. & R. 362.

Where the intent laid is to prevent a lawful apprehension it must be shown that the arrest would have been lawful; and where the circumstances are not such that the party must know why he is about to be apprehended it must be proved that he was apprised of the intention to apprehend him: Archbold, 667.

While the defendant was using threatening language to a third person a constable in plain clothes came up and

interfered. The defendant struck the constable with his fist, and there was a struggle between them. The constable went away for assistance, and was absent for an hour; he changed his plain clothes for his uniform and returned to defendant's house with three other constables. They forced the door and entered the house. The defendant refused to come down, and threatened to kill the first man who came up to take him. The constables ran upstairs to take him, and he wounded one of them in the struggle that took place. Held, upon a case reserved, that the apprehension of the prisoner at the time was unlawful, and that he could not be convicted of wounding the constable with intent to prevent his lawful apprehension: R. v. Marsden, 11 Cox, 90.

Upon an indictment for an assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm a plea of guilty to a common assault may be received if the prosecution consents: R. v. Roxburgh, 12 Cox, 8.

Upon an indictment for any offence under this clause the jury may find a verdict of guilty of an attempt to commit it, s. 711.

A verdict of common assault may also be found, s. 713. And, if the prosecutor fail in proving the intent, the defendant may be convicted of unlawfully wounding, and

sentenced under the next section.

And where three are indicted for malicious wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm the jury may convict two of the offence under s. 241, and the third of unlawfully wounding under s. 242: R. v. Cunningham, Bell, 72.

Where a prisoner was indicted for feloniously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm: Held, that the intention might be inferred from the act: R. v. LeDante, 2 G. & O. (N. S.) 401.

L. was tried on an indictment under 32 & 33 V. c. 20, containing four counts. The first charged that he did