them, in order to kill any person who may fall into it. So, also, cases of sending or placing infernal machines with intent to murder: see R. v. Mountford, 1 Moo. 441. Indeed, the malicious may now rest satisfied that every attempt to murder, which their perverted ingenuity may devise, or their fiendish malignity suggest, will fall within some clause of this Act, and may be visited with penal servitude for life. In any case where there may be a doubt whether the attempt falls within the terms of any of the preceding sections, a count framed on this clause should be added."

A verdict under ss. 241, 242 & 265 may be given, 8. 713, if the evidence warrants it.

THREATS BY LETTER TO MURDER.

233. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to ten years' imprisonment who sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing threatening to kill or murder any person. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 7. 24-25 V. c. 100, s. 16 (Imp.). Not triable at quarter sessions, s. 540.

A verdict of attempt allowed, s. 711, if the evidence warrants it. Writing" defined, s. 3.

Indictment.

66

unlawfully did send to one J. N. a certain letter (or writing) directed to the said J. N., by the name and description of Mr. J. N. threatening to kill and murder the said J. N. he the said (defendant) then well knowing the contents of the said letter, which said letter is as follows,

In R. v. Hunter, 2 Leach, 631, the court said: "In an indictment for sending a threatening letter, the letter must be set out in order that the court may judge from the face of the indictment whether it is or is not a threatening letter within the meaning of the statute on which the indictment is founded."

The same ruling had been held in R. v. Lloyd, 2 East, P. C. 1122.

Under s. 613 post an indictment would not be quashed for the omission of the letter, but it is undoubtedly more correct to set it out.

Greaves says on this clause: "The words directly or indirectly causes to be received, are taken from the 9 Geo. IV. c. 55, s. 8, and introduced here in order to prevent any difficulty which might arise as to a case not falling within the words send, deliver or utter. The words to any other person in the 10 & 11 V. c. 66, s. 1, were advisedly omitted, in order that ordering, sending, delivering, uttering, or causing to be received may be included. If, therefore, a person were to send a letter or writing without any address by a person with direction to drop it in the garden of a house in which several persons lived, or if a person were to drop such a letter or writing anywhere, these cases would be within this clause. In truth, this clause makes the offence to consist in sending, etc., any letter or writing which contains a threat to kill or murder any person whatsoever, and it is wholly immaterial whether it be sent, etc., to the person threatened or to any other person. The cases, therefore, of R. v. Paddle, R. & R. 484; R. v. Burridge, 2 M. & Rob. 296; R. v. Jones, 2 C. & K. 398, 1 Den. 218; and R. v. Grimwade, 1 Den. 30, are not to be considered as authorities on this clause, so far as they decide that the letter must be sent, etc., to the party threatened. In every indictment on this and the similar clauses in the other acts, a count should be inserted alleging that the defendant uttered the writing without stating any person to whom it was uttered."

Where the threat charged is to kill or murder, it is for the jury to say whether the letter amounts to a threat to kill or murder: R. v. Girdwood, 1 Leach, 142; R. v. Tyler, 1 Moo. 428.

The bare delivery of the letter, though sealed, is evidence of a knowledge of its contents by the prisoner in certain cases: R. v. Girdwood, 1 Leach, 142.

And in the same case, it was held that the offender may be tried in the county where the prosecutor received the letter, though he may also be tried in the county where the sending took place.

In R. v. Boucher, 4 C. & P. 562, the following letter was held to contain a threat to murder:-"You are a rogue, thief and vagabond, and if you had your deserts, you should not live the week out; I shall be with you shortly, and then you shall nap it, my banker. Have a care, old chap, or you shall disgorge some of your illgotten gains, watches and cash, that you have robbed the widows and fatherless of. Don't make light of this, or I'll make light of you and yours. Signed, Cut-throat."

Where an indictment contained three counts, each charging the sending of a different threatening letter, Byles, J., held that the prosecutor must elect on which count he would proceed, though any letter leading up to or explaining the letter on which the trial proceeded would be admissible: R. v. Ward, 10 Cox, 42; see s. 626, post.

CONSPIRACY TO MURDER.

234. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment, who

(a) Conspires or agrees with any person to murder or to cause to be murdered any other person, whether the person intended to be murdered is a subject of Her Majesty or not; or is within Her Majesty's dominions or not; or

(b) Counsels or attempts to procure any person to murder such other person anywhere, although such person is not murdered in consequence of such counselling or attempted procurement. R. S. C. c. 162, s. 3. (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 100, s. 4 (Imp.).

Not triable at quarter sessions, s. 540. The words in italics are new, and unnecessary. As to conspiracies generally see remarks under s. 527, post.

Indictment.

that J. S., J. T., and E. T., on unlawfully and wickedly did conspire, confederate and agree together one J. N. unlawfully to kill and murder.

See 1 Russ. 967; 8 Russ. 664; R. v. Bernard, 1 F. & F. 240; 2 Stephen's Hist. 12.

In R. v. Banks, 12 Cox, 393, upon an indictment under this clause, the defendants were convicted of an attempt to commit the misdemeanour charged. In R. v. Most, 14 Cox, 583, the defendant having written a newspaper article encouraging the murder of foreign potentates, was found guilty of an offence under the corresponding clause of the Imperial Act.

Would any one conspiring in Canada with another person in the United States to himself murder any one in the United States be subject to indictment under s. 284?

ACCESSSORY AFTER THE FACT TO MURDER.

235. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable to imprison ment for life, who is an accessory after the fact to murder. R. S. C. c. 1621 8. 4. 24-25 V. c. 100, s. 67 (Imp.).

Not triable at quarter sessions, s. 540. See remarks under s. 63, ante, and s. 532, post.

PUNISHMENT OF MANSLAUGhter.

236. Every one who commits manslaughter is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable to imprisonment for life. R. S. C. c. 162, s. 5. (Amended). 24-25 V. c. 100, s. 5 (Imp.).

Indictment.

that A. B. on

at

and thereby

unlawfully did kill and slay one.

committed manslaughter.

The evidence is the same as in murder, with this exception, that in murder the prosecutor need only prove the homicide without going into evidence of the circumstances: under which it was committed in manslaughter; he must. give evidence of all the facts in the case, so as to prove the homicide to be manslaughter. As to the cases in which a homicide amounts to manslaughter only, and not to murder, see ante, ss. 229, 230, and remarke pages 181 et seq. A summary conviction for assault under s. 42 of 24 & 25 V. c. 100, is not a bar to a subsequent indictment for manslaughter, upon the death of the man assaulted consequent

CRIM. LAW-15

upon the same assault: R. v. Morris, 10 Cox, 480; R. v. Friel, 17 Cox, 325; see ss. 866 & 969, post.

AIDING AND ABETTING SUICIDE. (New).

237. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life who counsels or procures any person to commit suicide, actually committed in consequence of such counselling or procurement, or who aids or abets any person in the commission of suicide.

This is new. By the common law suicide is murder, and if one encourage another to commit suicide, and is present abetting him while he does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal, and if two persons encourage each other to self murder and one kills himself, and the other one fails, the latter is a principal in the murder of the other: R. v. Dyson, R. & R. 523; R. v. Russell, 1 Moo. 356; R. v. Alison, 8 C. & P. 418; R. v. Jessop, 16 Cox, -204. Now, under analogous facts, he would be indictable under this s. 237 for counselling the other to commit suicide, and also under the next section for attempting himself to commit suicide.

A felo de se, or felon of himself, is a person who, being of sound mind and of the age of discretion, voluntarily killeth himself: 3 Inst. 54.

If a man give himself a wound, intending to be felo de se, and dieth not within a year and a day after the wound, he is not felo de se: Id.

The following passages from Hale and Hawkins may be usefully inserted here :

-

"It is not every melancholy or hypochondriacal distemper that denominates a man non compos, for there are few who commit this offence but are under such infirmities, but it must be such an alienation of mind that renders them to be madmen, or frantic, or destitute of the use of reason; a lunatic killing himself in a fit of lunacy is not felo de se; otherwise it is, if it be at another time:" 1 Hale, 412.

"But here, I cannot but take notice of a strange notion which has unaccountably prevailed of late, that every one