there has been a misjoinder of separate and independent causes of action.

8. For that the said pro narr. or declaration in the several counts thereof is defective, uncertain and confused in attempting to put in issue contrary and repugnant matters, in connection with one and the same transaction.

ment of the cause, as far as may be, to the possible state of the proof to be exhibited on the trial; or to guard, if possible, against the hazard of the proof's varying materially from the statement of the cause of action. So that if one or more of the several counts should not be adapted to the evidence, some other of them may be so."

We think the defendant here cannot be left in any doubt, because the plaintiff has annexed to his declaration a bill of particu lars. The declaration and the several counts therein are good.

We overrule the demurrer.

At the election of defendant's counsel let

4. For that the sixth and seventh counts of said pro narr. or declaration are defective in that it is alleged that a certain contract existed on the 1st day of June, A. D. 1911, between the plaintiff below, respondent, and the defendant below, appellant, with regard to certain goods, wares and merchandise previously bargained and sold to the defend-judgment of respondeat ouster be entered. ant below, appellant, and delivered to one James Tigani-the said contract, being void with respect to the said defendant below, appellant, under the statute of frauds, for lack of consideration. That said counts are uncertain, indefinite and insufficient in other respects.

BOYCE, J. (delivering the opinion of the court). [1] The court has considered the questions raised by the demurrer filed. Counsel for defendant concedes that each count standing alone is good except the sixth and seventh, it being alleged that the last two counts are based on a contract of sale of goods, wares and merchandise without consideration. These two counts are practically in the language of Chitty, and show a sufficient consideration.

[2] It was urged by counsel for defendant that the plaintiff had by the several counts averred several causes of action which are inconsistent. In Gould's Pleadings, c. 4, 8 3, it is said:

"In all cases, however, in which there are two or more counts-whether there is actually but one cause of action, or several each count purports, upon the face of it, to disclose a distinct right of action, unconnected with that stated in any of the other counts. So that, upon the face of the declaration, there appear to be as many different causes of action, as there are counts inserted. And therefore, whether a plaintiff, whose declaration contains more than one count, claims a recovery upon one right of action only, or upon several, cannot appear, except in evidence. Practically, however, the defendant can seldom be left in doubt on this point."

Mr. Morris' contention in support of his declaration is sustained by Mr. Gould in the following section:

"One object proposed in inserting two or more counts in one declaration, when there is in fact but one cause of action, is, in some cases, to guard against the danger of an insufficient statement of the cause, where a doubt exists as to the legal sufficiency of one or another of two or more different modes of declaring. But the more usual and proposed, in inserting more than one count, in

At the trial, a witness for the defendant was asked by defendant's counsel, "Do you know the general reputation of Joseph Perry, the defendant, in this community for honesty and fair dealing?" This was objected to by counsel for plaintiff as improper and irrelevant in a civil case. The objection was sustained.

RICE, J. (charging the jury). Gentlemen of the jury: This controversy concerns certain goods which the plaintiff, Thomas N. Stayton, claims he sold and delivered at Eighth and King streets, in this city, to be charged to and paid for by Joseph Perry, the defendant.

The plaintiff, who had a place of business at Third Street market, claims that Joseph Perry, the defendant, in the last part of 1910 or first part of 1911, with one Tigani came to the plaintiff's place of business and stated to him that he, Perry, was about to open another place at Eighth and King streets, and that Tigani was to be in charge of the store at Eighth and King streets, bought for that place and the goods were to be charged to Joseph Perry, the defendant, and he further claims that the defendant is indebted to him in the sum of $148.59, with interest thereon from June 1, 1911, for goods sold to the account of Joseph Perry and delivered at Eighth and King streets, on various days from May 9, 1911, to May 27, 1911.

The defendant claims that he did go, during the month of December, of last year, with one Tigani, to the plaintiff's place of business, and request the plaintiff to extend the time for payment of a bill then owed by Tigani, and then Tigani would pay the same; that Tigani was not a stranger to the plaintiff, and that he did not take Tigani to the plaintiff and introduce him to be the person in charge of a place to be opened by him, the defendant, at Eighth and King streets : and he further claims that he did not buy the goods in question, nor did he direct that they be charged to his account, and that he was not the owner of the business at Eighth and King streets.

The Action by Samuel S. Marley against Isaac C. Slaw. On demurrer to the whole declaration. Demurrer sustained.

Certiorari to a justice of the peace, in and for New Castle county (No. 22, September term, 1911), commanding him to send up his record and proceedings in the case institut- To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme

Under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon the Governor by the ConstituThe following exceptions were filed to the tion of Maine, art. 6, § 3, and being advised, record and judgment, viz.:

cretion, call for bids, and contract sepa- | Supreme Judicial Court have the honor to rately, for distinct portions of the state submit the following answer to the question printing but may reject any and all bids proposed: which they do not deem it in the interest of the state to accept, and may take such security as they deem necessary, if any, for the faithful performance of any contract hereunder. No such contract shall be for a longer time than two years."

Under the authority of this act, the Governor and Council have awarded a contract for doing certain printing for the state to the Waterville Sentinel Publishing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Maine. This work was awarded to the above-named corporation after competitive bids had been submitted; it being the lowest bidder.

Hon. Cyrus W. Davis, the present Secretary of State, is a stockholder in and treasurer of the above-named corporation. The Secretary of State had nothing to do with the awarding of the contract. The prices for the work done under it are fixed in detail in said contract, and it is entirely out of the control of the Secretary of State to alter the same in any way. All bills presented by said corporation against the state on account of said contract must be audited by the State Auditor and approved by the Governor and Council, before being paid. The Secretary of State has nothing whatever to do with the auditing of said bills or approval or payment of the same.

It appears from the statement of facts accompanying the question that, in accordance with the authority conferred upon them by section 1 of chapter 155 of the Public Laws of 1905 the Governor and Council awarded a contract for doing certain printing for the state to the Waterville Sentinel Publishing Company; that corporation being the lowest bidder therefor among those submitting competitive bids. It also appears from the statement of facts that "the present Secretary of State is a stockholder in and treasurer of the Waterville Sentinel Publishing Company."

Section 11 of chapter 121 of the Revised Statutes declares that: "No * * * person holding a place of trust in any state office * * shall be pecuniarily interested directly or indirectly in any contracts made in behalf of the state * ** and any con

tract made in violation hereof is void."

The general terms employed in the foregoing statement of facts, that the Secretary of State "is a stockholder in and treasurer of" the publishing company, raise a clear implication, and warrant the conclusion, that the Secretary's financial interest in the company is an appreciable and substantial one. If it were otherwise, it is reasonable to infer that the statement of facts would have contained a specification of the number and

Section 11 of chapter 121 of the Revised value of the shares of stock actually held Statutes provides as follows:

"No trustee, superintendent, treasurer or other person holding a place of trust in any state office or public institution of the state shall be pecuniarily interested directly or indirectly in any contracts made in behalf of the state or of the institution in which he holds such place or trust, and any contract made in violation hereof is void; and if such officer or person receives any drawbacks, presents, gratuities or secret discounts to his own use on account of such contracts, or from the profits in any materials, supplies, or labor, furnished or done for the state or such institution he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than a year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars."

Question.

Do the provisions of section 11 of chapter 121 of the Revised Statutes, in the light of the foregoing facts, and in view of the provisions of chapter 155 of the Public Laws of 1905, make void the before-mentioned contract between the state and the Waterville Sentinel Publishing Company?

Very respectfully,

Frederick W. Plaisted, Governor.

and owned by the Secretary, and the amount and terms of payment of his salary as treasurer. The question submitted must therefore be examined upon the assumption that the Secretary of State has a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the contract for certain state printing which the Governor and Council awarded to the Waterville Sentinel Publishing Company.

When the language of a statute is capable of only one meaning, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended what it has plainly expressed; and there is consequently no room for construction. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Davis v. Randall, 97 Me. 36, 53 Atl. 835. It has accordingly been distinctly stated, from early times down to the present day, that "judges are not to mold the language of statutes, in order to meet an alleged convenience or an alleged equity, * and are not to alter plain words, though the Legislature may not have contemplated the consequences of using them." Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 4.

*

It does not need to be formally asserted that the Secretary of State is necessarily "a person holding a place of trust in a state office." Analogous legislation is found in sec

To the Honorable Frederick W. Plaisted, tion 39 of chapter 4 of the Revised Statutes, Governor of Maine:

[1, 2] In obedience to the Constitution of

which provides that: "No member of a city government shall be interested, directly or

such government, while he is a member thereof, and contracts made in violation hereof are void."

This question was brought in question in O'Neil v. Flannagan and City of Portland, Trustee, and Johnson, Claimant, 98 Me. 426, 57 Atl. 591.

In Commonwealth v. De Camp, 177 Pa. 112, 35 Atl. 601, it was held that the secretary, who was also a stockholder of a corporation having a contract for the lighting of the city, is within the statute prohibiting any councilman from being interested in any contract with the city, though he was elected councilman after the execution of the contract.

The plaintiff had a contract to perform work for the city. The plaintiff Johnson was surety on the plaintiff's bond to a surety In Foster et al. v. City of Cape May, 60 N. company, to protect it from loss as surety on J. Law, 78, 36 Atl. 1089 (1897), it was held the plaintiff's bond to the city for the per- that, under a charter providing that no memformance of his contract. The plaintiff fail- ber of the city council shall be interested in ed to perform, and Johnson, by arrangement any contract, the expense of which shall be of all parties, completed the contract, and paid by the city, a member, who held as colclaimed the amount due from the city on the lateral security a share of the stock of the contract for work done by him, under an as- electric light company, was disqualified to signment from the plaintiff. During this vote to authorize a contract with said comtime, Johnson was an alderman of Portland.pany to light the city. The member testified It was held by the court that the plaintiff's that he never put any value on the stock, and contract was tainted and rendered void by that the company had not been prosperous; Johnson's illegal connection with it. In the but in the opinion the court said: "It is opinion by Mr. Justice Strout, the court said: | probable that a company which theretofore "It is clearly within the inhibition of the re- | had not been prosperous may become prospercited statute. The provision is a wise one, ous, and this stock which was valueless may and tends to honest dealing, and exclusion of become of value, by means of this contract motive for improper practices harmful to which Johnson's vote awarded to the comthe community. It should be applied without pany. The interest of Johnson may be small evasion to all contracts falling within its pro- but the statute makes no discrimination with visions. So applying it, the result necessari- respect to the interest which should disqually follows that the city's contract with Flan-ify." nagan was absolutely void. Goodrich v. Wa- In Drake v. City of Elizabeth, 69 N. J. terville, 88 Me. 39 [33 Atl. 659]."

Law, 190, 54 Atl. 248 (1903), the city coun

for state printing to the Times Publishing Company, and, it appearing that several members of the council were stockholders in the publishing company, it was held that this "infection" was sufficient ground for avoiding the action of the entire board; and in the analogous case of Traction Company v. Board of Public Works, 56 N. J. Law, 431, 29 Atl. 163, it appeared that the vote of the disqualified member was not necessary to the result, but the court said: "The fact that there was a sufficient number of votes, apart from his vote, to pass the ordinance is no answer to the objection taken upon the vote. The infection' of the concurrence of the interested person spreads, so that the action of the whole board is voidable."

In Consolidated Coal Co. v. Board of Trus-cil of the defendant city awarded a contract tees of Institute for the Blind, 164 Mich. 235, 129 N. W. 193 (1910), a member of the defendant board of trustees was a stockholder in the plaintiff corporation, which sold coal to the State Institution for the Blind. Such member had no control of the corporation, and received no benefit, other than the dividend on his stock, and had nothing to do with securing the contract; but it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan that the sale was within the prohibition of the statute, which provided that no trustee of any board having control of any public institution in the state should be interested in any contract for the sale of supplies to such institution; and that the contract was therefore void. In the opinion of the court, it is said: "We do not regard the statute as merely putting in form of positive law a rule developed by the courts, but as a legislative rule founded in public policy, the plain effect of which the courts are not at liberty to deny or amend. There can be but one answer to the question."

In Milford v. Milford Water Company, 124 Pa. 610, 17 Atl. 185, 3 L. R. A. 122 (1889), a majority of the city council made a contract for the supply of water with a water company, in which they were directors; but the contract was held void under the statute prohibiting any member of any corporation or public institution, or any officer or agent thereof, to be in any wise interested in any contract for supplies to said corporation or municipality. "This act," said the court, “is another and valuable safeguard thrown around municipalities. It was passed to protect people from the frauds of their own servants and agents. It may be there was

In City of Northport v. Northport TownSite Company, 27 Wash. 543, 68 Pac. 204, it was held that, where a member of the city council was a stockholder and business manager of a lumber company, and the lumber company sold to the contractor materials for improvements on the streets of the plaintiff city, such member was within the statute prohibiting any such officer to be directly in-no fraud, actual or intended, in the present