$95 (Me.) Under Rev. St. c. 121, § 11, a

SEWERS.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS OF REM-
EDY IN GENERAL.

$ 22 (Pa.) Purchaser of property of natural
gas company with notice of existing contracts
for supplying gas held liable to be compelled to
specifically perform the contracts.-People's
Natural Gas Co. v. American Natural Gas Co.,
82 A. 935.

IV. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF.
§ 105 (R.I.) Suit to compel agreement for
retransfer of lands, brought within the period
of limitation, held diligently brought.-Knowles
v. Knowles, 82 A. 257.

§ 121 (R.I.) Evidence in a suit to compel a
grantee to reconvey property to the grantors
held sufficient to sustain a decree for plaintiffs.
-Knowles v. Knowles, 82 A. 257.

SPENDTHRIFTS.

See Trusts, §§ 12, 147.

SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS.
See Intoxicating Liquors.

SPLITTING CAUSES.

See Action, § 53.

STATEMENT.

Laws 1905, c. 155, § 1, held invalidated through
interest of the Secretary of State.-In re Opin-
ion of the Justices, 82 A. 90.

IV. FISCAL MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC
DEBT, AND SECURITIES.

§ 114 (Conn.) Pub. Acts 1911, c. 187, pro-
viding annual state aid to certain Civil War
veterans or their widows, was invalid in fur-
nishing aid to all classes regardless of need.-
Beach v. Bradstreet, 82 A. 1030.

state aid to soldiers and their widows, is in-
Pub. Acts 1911, c. 187, providing for annual
valid as disposing of state money for other
than public purposes.-Id.

For statutes relating to particular subjects,
see the various specific topics.
See Frauds, Statute of; Limitation of Actions.
I. ENACTMENT, REQUISITES, AND
VALIDITY IN GENERAL.

§ 64 (Conn.) Invalidity of part of a statute
will not render the whole act invalid, where
the valid parts can be separated from those
invalid.-Beach v. Bradstreet, 82 A. 1030.

Pub. Acts 1911, c. 187, giving state aid to
soldiers and their widows, must be taken as a
whole, as no provisions in regard to the sol-
diers of the Civil War serving as part of the
quota of Connecticut could be separated from
the provision for soldiers who served for oth-
er states but later resided in Connecticut.-Id.
III. SUBJECTS AND TITLES OF ACTS.

$105 (Md.) The purpose of Const. art. 3,
$29, held to be to prevent ingrafting of for-
eign matter on a statute.-Bond v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 82 A. 978.

quisition of land for highways, held not to re-
§ 107 (Md.) Acts 1910, c. 110, relating to ac-
late to more than one subject, within the pro-
hibition of Const. art. 3, § 29.-Bond v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 82 A. 978.

§ 123 (Md.) The title of Acts 1910, c. 110,
relating to acquisition of land for highways
held to sufficiently indicate the contents, as
required by Const. art. 3, § 29.-Bond v. May-
or & City Council of Baltimore, 82 A. 978.
V. REPEAL, SUSPENSION, EXPIRA-
TION, AND REVIVAL.

$153 (Pa.) The title to Act June 24, 1895
(P. L. 258), "An act relating to and regulating
the issue and transfer of certificates of stock
of companies incorporated under the laws of
the commonwealth," is sufficient to embrace
the repeal of the lien on shares of capital
stock of state banks given by Act May 13,
1876 (P. L. 161).-Bank of Millvale v. Ohio
Valley Bank, 82 A. 1115.

§ 158 (N.J.Sup.) Repeals by implication are
not favored.-Walker v. Board of Chosen Free-
holders of Essex County, 82 A. 422.

§ 159 (N.J.Sup.) Employés of a county held
improperly removed by a chosen board of free-

as amended in 1909, and the civil service act,
by a referendum vote.-Walker v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 82 A.
422.

VI. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-

TION.

§ 190 (R.I.) If the language of a statute is
ambiguous, the legislative intent may be ascer-
tained by the aid of all legitimate considera-
tions showing its meaning.-East Shore Land
Co. v. Peckham, 82 A. 487.

§ 205 (Md.) All the parts of an act relating
to a single subject should, for the purposes of
construction, be read together.-D. E. Foote &
Co. v. Stanley, 82 A. 380.

§ 181 (R.I.) The object of statutory inter-
pretation is to ascertain, primarily from the
language, the intention of the Legislature.
East Shore Land Co. v. Peckham, 82 A. 487.

§ 181 (Vt.) Where the meaning of a statute
is plain, the court must enforce it according to
its terms.-Stearns v. Graham, 82 A. 835.

$184 (R.I.) If the statute be subject to sev-
eral interpretations, that meaning should be
taken which conforms to the scope and pur-
pose of the act.-East Shore Land Co. v.
Peckham, 82 A. 487.

§ 185 (R.I.) Everything is implied in a stat-
ute which may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or the rights, powers, etc.,
which it grants.-East Shore Land Co. v.
Peckham, 82 A. 487.

§ 188 (Me.) When the language of a statute
is susceptible to only one meaning, the courts
cannot give it any other construction.-In re
Opinion of the Justices, 82 A. 90.

§ 188 (R.I.) Primarily a statute should be
construed according to the ordinary meaning
of its words.-East Shore Land Co. v. Peck-
ham, 82 A. 487.

§ 189 (R.I.) The rules of grammar may be
disregarded in construing a statute, where to
adhere to them would make it self-repugnant,
absurd, or would defeat the legislative intent.
-East Shore Land Co. v. Peckham, 82 A. 487.

looked to to determine the legislative intent,
§ 21 (R.I.) The title of a statute may be
where the body of the act is obscure.-East
Shore Land Co. v. Peckham, 82 A. 487.

§ 2252 (Vt.) A general statute relating to a
particular subject prevails over a contrary
earlier general statute.-Stearns v. Graham, 82
A. 835.

§ 226 (Del.Ch.) The rule that the construc-
tion placed by foreign courts on foreign stat-
utes adopted will be retained by the adopting
state held not to apply to 25 Del. Laws, c. 51.
approved April 7, 1909, and General Corpora-
tion Act, 108 (General Corporation Act
1899, § 105), adopted from the New Jersey
statutes.-Slaughter v. Moore, 82 A. 963.

As a rule, a state which adopts a foreign
statute also adopts its judicial construction by
the foreign courts.-Id.

(D) Retroactive Operation.

$271 (N.J.) General Corporation Act 1896,
§ 47, revising General Corporation Act 1875,
applies to corporations organized before its
enactment.-Murray v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 82 A.

1038.

§ 273 (N.J.Sup.) Strong act, as amended in
1909, held not to repeal civil service act.-
Walker v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Es-
sex County, 82 A. 422.

233

487

798.

268, 1030

268, 380

802.

233
.1027
.1025

822.

.1030

973

$ 1110.
$1211.
1351.

972

STATUTES AT LARGE.
1898, July 1, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544 (U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 2418).....1090
1898, July 1, ch. 541, §
4a, b, 30 Stat. 547 (U. S.

572 Wilmington, § 15........ 539

COMPILED STATUTES

31

223

292

1909, ch. 69, § 1..

720 1903, p. 251, § 1.

525

Art. 1, § 12.

.268, 487

268

$67 (Pa.) Judgment of board of directors of
street railroad company, in operation of road
and running of cars, is supreme and exclusive,
in absence of statutory provision, even
against municipality. Mahoning & S. Ry. &
Light Co. v. City of New Castle, 82 A. 501.
$70 (N.J.Sup.) Ordinance of city of Cam-
den, granting permission to operate street rail-
road requiring cars to stop at street crossings,

STOLEN GOODS.

See Receiving Stolen Goods.

STREET RAILROADS.

See Carriers, §§ 320, 346; Damages, § 78; Ev-
idence, §§ 116, 471; Injunction, § 85; Man-
damus, 133; Railroads.

I. ESTABLISHMENT, CONSTRUC-
TION, AND MAINTENANCE.
§ 14 (Del.Ch.) In view of General Corpo-
ration Act, § 117, and 25 Del. Laws, c. 51,
approved April 7, 1909, an electric railway
company held not entitled to recover from the
State Treasurer the guaranty deposits made
with him, pursuant to General Corporation
Act, 108 (General Corporation Act 1899,
105), where no mileage was completed and
depositor cannot complete the work.-Slaugh-
ter v. Moore, 82 A. 963.

II. REGULATION AND OPERATION.
§ 65 (Pa.) Neither Act Feb. 25, 1869 (P. L.
249), Act May 16, 1901 (P. L. 224), amend-
ing Act May 23, 1889 (P. L. 277), nor Act
March 22, 1887 (P. L. 8), held to confer pow-
er on city of New Castle to enact ordinance
requiring street railway lines to equip every
car with latest and most approved safety
brakes.-Mahoning & S. Ry. & Light Co. v.
City of New Castle, 82 A. 501.

§ 67 (N. J. Sup.) Regulation in ordinance
granting street railroad company right to op-
erate along streets of the city, and providing
that it shall apply to streets "hereafter" used
held to apply to the exercise of the franchise
upon streets subsequently within the limits of

erated from the ferry in Camden to Moores-
town and return.-City of Camden v. Public
Service Ry. Co., 82 A. 607.

$70 (N. J. Sup.) Under ordinance granting
right to operate street railway in certain
streets, city council held to have power to en-
act an ordinance compelling railway company
to stop each car on the near side of each street
crossing to take on or let off passengers.-City
of Camden v. Public Service Ry. Co., 82 A.
609.

Ordinance requiring street railroad to stop
cars on near side of each street crossing held
to apply to special cars from the ferry in Cam-
den to Moorestown and return.-Id.

$73 (Pa.) In absence of express authority,
penal ordinance regulating safety devices of
street railway, enforcing higher standard than
that imposed by common law, held not sustain-
able.-Mahoning & S. Ry. & Light Co. v. City
of New Castle, 82 A. 501.

$79 (Del.Super.) Negligence of a motorman
in running a street car is imputable to the
company.-Riccio v. People's Ry. Co., 82 A.

604.

§ 81 (Del.Super.) A motorman must use rea-
sonable diligence, depending upon the partic-
ular circumstances, to prevent an accident, and
his failure to do so is negligence.-Riccio v.
People's Ry. Co., 82 A. 604.

§ 81 (Del.Super.) The ordinary care and dil-
igence required in the management of electric
cars varies according to the particular cir-
cumstances with the changing danger.-Culbert
v. Wilmington & P. Traction Co., 82 A. 1081.

A motorman must make reasonable use of
his senses and use the care of an ordinary per-
son.-Id.

A motorman, approaching a crossing where
the view is obstructed or another car is dis-

$90 (R.I.) A motorman, who sees a wagon
blocked by an automobile at a narrow place in
the road, has no right to speculate upon the
possibility of passing without injury to the
Occupant of the wagon.-Champlin v. Pawca-
tuck Valley St. Ry. Co., 82 A. 481.

§ 93 (Del.Super.) A pedestrian cannot recov-
er for injuries by being struck by a street car,
unless the company was guilty of negligence.-
Riccio v. People's Ry. Co., 82 A. 604.

A motorman could assume that a pedestrian
would act as a reasonably prudent person un-
til the contrary appeared.-İd.

Increased danger of a street car striking a
pedestrian, in view of the particular circum-
stances, requires an increase of diligence com-
mensurate with the danger.-Id.

§ 93 (Del.Super.) A street railroad company,
failing to give proper warnings, is negligent,
and liable for resulting injury, unless the in-
jured party is guilty of contributory negli-
gence. Culbert v. Wilmington & P. Traction
Co., 82 A. 1081.

One in charge of a street car may presume
that one approaching the track will exercise
due care; but such presumption does not re-
lieve him from his duty to exercise proper
care.-Id.

Where the motorman can or could see the
party in time to avoid injuring him, the com-
pany is liable for the resulting injury.-Id.

102 (Del.Super.) One injured by a collision
with a street car may recover, if the negligence
of the company is the sole proximate cause of
the injury, although there has been some neg-
ligence on her part.-Culbert v. Wilmington &
P. Traction Co., 82 A. 1081.

struck and injured by it, without negligence on
One suddenly approaching a street car, and
the part of the motorman, cannot recover.-Id.
§103 (Del.Super.) A motorman held negli
gent if he failed to stop the car to avoid strik-
ing a pedestrian negligently standing in danger,
able care.-Riccio v. People's Ry. Co., 82 A.
if he could have done so by exercising reason-

604.

under the last clear chance doctrine to stop
§ 103 (R.I.) A motorman held not required
his car as soon as he saw a driver who at
Union R. Co., 82 A. 81.
tempted to cross in front of the car.-Winn v.

§ 112 (Del.Super.) The mere fact that a pe-
destrian was struck by a street car does not of
Riccio v. People's Ry. Co., 82 A. 604.
itself raise the presumption of negligence.-

$112 (Del.Super.) The mere fact of plain-
street car raised no presumption of negligence
tiff's injury in a collision with defendant's
of either party.-Culbert v. Wilmington & P.
Traction Co., 82 A. 1081.

er only upon proof by a preponderance of the
Plaintiff, injured by a street car, could recov
evidence that the injuries were from the de-
fendant's negligence, without contributory neg-
ligence by the plaintiff.-Id.

contributory negligence of a pedestrian it has
A street railroad company, relying on the
the evidence that plaintiff's contributory negli
run down, must prove by a preponderance of
gence was the proximate cause of the injury.
-Id.

A pedestrian near street car tracks must use
reasonable care to discover and avoid approach-
ing cars, and is negligent if he fails to use his
senses so as to avoid injury.-Id.

A pedestrian, who moved from a position of
safety near a street car track so suddenly that
it was impossible to stop the car before strik-
ing him, cannot recover for his injury.-Id.

One suddenly placed in a position of peril
without his own fault by the negligence of
street car employés held entitled to recover for
injuries from being struck.-Id.

A street car company exercising due care was
not liable for injuries to a pedestrian who,
stooping, came in contact with the car by his

fault.-Id.

§ 98 (Del.Super.) One approaching or at-
tempting to cross a street car track must
avail himself of his knowledge of the condi-
tions existing at the place.-Culbert v. Wil-
mington & P. Traction Co., 82 A. 1081.

One approaching a street car track must
make reasonable use of his senses and use the
care of an ordinary person.-Id.

One approaching a street car track may as-
sume that the motorman will exercise due care;
but such presumption does not relieve him
from his duty to exercise proper care.-Id.

One approaching a street car track may place
some reliance upon a custom of the company
to give warnings.-Id.

§ 101 (Del.Super.) A pedestrian would be
guilty of contributory negligence, barring recov-
ery, if struck by a street car because of his own
negligence, or of the concurring negligence of
himself and its employés.-Riccio v. People's
Ry. Co., 82 A. 604.

$101 (Del.Super.) One injured by a collision
with a street car cannot recover, where her own
negligence contributed to the accident, although
the company is also negligent.-Culbert v. Wil-

ries received in a collision with a street car,
8118 (R.I.) In an action for personal inju-
and defendant's liability for negligence of the
an instruction as to plaintiff's right to recover
motorman or conductor held proper.-Champlin
v. Pawcatuck Valley St. Ry. Co., 82 A. 481.

In an action for injuries received in a colli-
sion with a street car, instruction upon last
clear chance doctrine held unobjectionable.-Id.
§ 122 (N.J.Sup.) Evidence held to justify a
finding of violation of an ordinance requiring
crossings.-City of Camden v. Public Service
cars to be stopped on the near side of street
Ry. Co., 82 A. 609.

Conviction of motorman of violating ordi-
nance requiring street cars to be stopped at
crossings held justified by the evidence.-Id.

STREETS.

See Dedication, §§ 19-31; Highways; Munici-
pal Corporations, §§ 394-469, 680-706, 805.

STRIKING OUT.

See Criminal Law, § 696; Pleading, §§ 218,
341.

SUBROGATION.

$7 (N.J.Ch.) Surety for a purchaser, after
payment of purchaser's debt to the vendor, held
subrogated to any claim or lien which the ven
dor might have asserted.-Knickerbocker Trust
Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 82 A. 146.

§33 (N.J.Sup.) Where a carrier wrongfully
delivered certain silk to defendant on which
the D. Company had a lien, the carrier could
not recover an alleged balance from defendant
without proof that such balance was in fact
due to the D. Company.-Delaware, L. & W.