XIII. MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES
OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.

(A) Judgments Operative as Bar.

§ 570 (Conn.) A judgment dismissing an ac-
tion on the ground of maintenance and plain-
tiff's want of ownership of the cause sued on
is a final judgment on the merits, so as to
bar a subsequent action on the same cause
of action.-Rogers v. Hendrick, 82 A. 590.

§ 570 (Me.) On setting up an order denying
a motion to dismiss as bar to plea, it will not
be assumed that the court went beyond the
scope of the motion to dismiss and attempted
to decide questions which it did not raise.-
Shurtleff v. Redlon, 82 A. 645.

a judgment, whether declared on as a cause of
action or pleaded as a defense, the courts of all
the states are bound to give full faith and
credit.-Lutz v. Roberts Cotton Oil Co., 82 A.
601.

$815 (N.H.) That a personal judgment ob-
tained by default in a foreign state is valid un-
der the practice there as to service of process
does not necessarily make it valid in another
state in a suit on it.-Hochstein v. James W.
Hill Co., 82 A. 171.

The full faith and credit clause of the federal
Constitution does not extend to void judgments
of a sister state. Id.

§ 818 (Del.Super.) To render a judgment of a
state court conclusive in the courts of another
state under the full faith and credit clause, the

§ 576 (Conn.) An erroneous judgment con-
tinues in force until properly set aside, so as
to bar a subsequent action.-Rogers v. Hen-court rendering the judgment must in fact have
drick, 82 A. 590.

(B) Causes of Action and Defenses Merg-
ed. Barred, or Concluded.

§ 590 (R.I.) Denial of relief in an action of
covenant held no bar to a suit in equity to com-
pel a retransfer of the property.-Knowles V.
Knowles, 82 A. 257.

had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the
parties, and of the res in case the action was
in rem.-Lutz v. Roberts Cotton Oil Co., 82 A.
601.

The full faith and credit clause of the federal

Constitution does not prevent an inquiry into
judgment offered in evidence.-Id.
the jurisdiction of the court rendering a foreign

§ 818 (N.H.) A foreign personal judgment
not supported by legal service of process held
a nullity.-Hochstein v. James W. Hill Co., 82
A. 171.

$ 590 (R.I.) Where an owner of land on
which an adjoining building encroached con-
veyed to the owner of the building the land
encroached on, together with the privilege of
allowing the roof of the building, the eaves of
which encroached about two feet further, to
drip on grantor's land, and a subsequent owner
of the adjoining lands having removed the
overhanging eaves, the owner of the building
brought ejectment, claiming that the strip cov-
$ 824 (Del.Super.) A judgment against a non-
ered by the deed was a strip two feet wide, resident, based wholly on an attachment of his
in addition to that on which the building en- property within the court's jurisdiction, is not
croached, and at the same time brought tres-
res judicata of the same issues, in a suit by
pass for the removal of the eaves, a judgment such nonresident in the courts of his domicile.
against the owner of the building in the eject--Lutz v. Roberts Cotton Oil Co., 82 A. 601.
ment action did not affect his right to maintain
trespass.-First Baptist Society v. Wetherell,
82 A. 1061.

A personal judgment obtained against a New
Hampshire corporation by default in New York
on service against an officer while passing
through New York on a pleasure trip held un-
enforceable in New Hampshire.-Id.

XVIII. ASSIGNMENT.

§ 847 (Conn.) Under Gen. St. 1902, § 631,
an attorney purchasing a judgment in good
XIV. CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDI- faith may sue thereon in his own name.-Rog-
ers v. Hendrick, 82 A. 586.

CATION.

(B) Persons Concluded.

§ 708 (Conn.) In an action for damages for

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

alleged negligence of a surveyor, judgment in See Evidence, §§ 8-35.

ejectment, determining that the line as located
was not the true line, was not admissible as
determining the true line, being admissible

JUDICIAL POWER.

only on the question of damages.-Ferrie v. See Constitutional Law, §§ 52, 70.
Sperry, 82 A. 577.

(C) Matters Concluded.

$713 (Pa.) Judgment of court of concur-
rent jurisdiction held conclusive on same mat-
ter directly in question, but not of any matter
incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be
inferred by argument from the judgment.-Mo-
ser v. Philadelphia, H. & P. R. Co., 82 A. 362.
$715 (R.I.) Judgment in equitable action by
a son to set aside a deed by his mother and
for specific performance of an agreement to
make a will, adjudging that there was no con-
tract to make the will, is no bar to a suit by
the son in assumpsit for services rendered the
mother under an agreement for compensation.
-Messier v. Messier, 82 A. 996.

§ 728 (Pa.) Finding in suit in equity to com-
pel construction of siding by railroad compa-
nies that demands had been made for the con-
struction thereof for two years prior to suit
held not evidence against one of the companies
in a subsequent action at law. Moser v. Phil-

adelphia, H. & P. R. Co., 82 A. 362.

XVII. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
$815 (Del.Super.) When a court has jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter and of the parties, its
judgment on the merits is conclusive between
the parties on every question of fact directly in

JUDICIAL SALES.

$ 31 (Md.) Though the rule of caveat emptor
applies a sale will not be confirmed if it was
induced by mistake or misrepresentation.-Col-
umbia Paper Bag Co. of Baltimore City v.
Carr, 82 A. 442.

Property judicially sold held not to have been
so misdescribed in an advertisement as to en-
title a purchaser to object to confirmation who
knew the premises and was not misled.-Id.

A purchaser who failed to read the advertise-
ment of land judicially sold held not entitled to
object to confirmation because he was mistaken
as to the land sold.—Id.

A purchaser at a judicial sale has the burden
of proving exceptions to confirmation.-Id.

A purchaser at a judicial sale is not entitled
to prevent confirmation merely because he was
mistaken as to the value of the property and
bid more than it was worth.-Id.

§ 39 (N.J.) In the absence of fraud, irregular-
ity, accident, or mistake, judicial sales will not
be set aside for inadequacy of price, unless so
gross as to justify an inference of fraud.-Hoff-
man v. Quigley, 82 A. 900.

JURISDICTION.

See Appearance, § 19; Bail, § 55; Building

36; Corporations, 8 78; Courts; Criminal | held not to involve title to real estate within
Law, §§ 90, 219, 260, 982, 1033; Executors Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 52, §§ 7, 8.—
and Administrators, §§ 333, 349; Garnish- Whittington v. Hall, 82 A. 163.
ment, 167; Guardian and Ward, § 182;
Habeas Corpus, § 27; Husband and Wife,
§ 2852; Injunction, § 119; Judgment, §
818; Quieting Title, § 3; Quo Warranto;
Railroads, § 91; Wills, §§ 252, 253.

term and relet, that the landlord increased the
rent to the new tenant does not create pre-
sumption of surrender by act of law.-Id.

VII. PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT
AND USE THEREOF.

(E) Injuries from Dangerous or Defective
Condition.

§ 166 (N.J.Sup.) A landlord held liable for
damage to a tenant caused by bursting of wa-
ter pipes which froze through the landlord's
negligence in permitting the doors and transom
in a common hall to remain open; the danger
of freezing being imminent to the knowledge of
the landlord.-Dreeves v. Schoenberg, 82 A.
530.

VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES.

(A) Rights and Liabilities.

§ 216 (N.J.) An action under Landlord and
Tenant Act (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3076) § 27,
for double the annual value of demised premises
for holding over after the term and notice to
quit, is a penal action, and a plaintiff must
bring his case strictly within the terms of the
statute.-Mason v. Haurand, 82 A. 892.

A notice demanding possession, or, if claimant
is not entitled to possession, demanding posses-
sion of a specified undivided interest, is not suf-
ficient to support an action under Landlord and
Tenant Act (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3076) § 27.
-Id.

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

See Action, § 41.

I. WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE,
AND LIABILITY THEREFOR.
$7 (Me.) A newspaper item stating that
plaintiff was indicted for larceny and in an-
other place in the article stating that the spe-
cific charge was procuring a genuine signature
to an instrument, false making of which would
be forgery, held not libelous as imputing lar-
ceny.-Macurda v. Lewiston Journal Co., 82 A.
438.

An editorial that it was hoped that it was
not true the plaintiff's extradition on indict-
ment for larceny was refused because of politi-
cal pressure, but stating further that the specific
charge was procuring an order through false
pretenses to deposit money, held not to impute
larceny to plaintiff.-Id.

$19 (Me.) Whether a newspaper article is
libelous is to be determined from an examina-
tion of the entire article.-Macurda v. Lewis-
ton Journal Co., 82 A. 438.

In determining the effect of a newspaper item
relating to plaintiff's indictment, it is unneces-
sary that the reader should be able to make a
legal distinction between the offense charged
and the offense described in the entire article.
-Id.

IV. ACTIONS.

(A) Right of Action and Defenses.
§ 74 (N.J.) One who causes a libel to be pub-
lished in a newspaper is responsible therefor.-
Weston Electrical Instrument Co. v. Benecke,
82 A. 878.

(B) Parties, Preliminary Proceedings,
and Pleading.

§ 86 (Me.) Where a newspaper article is
claimed to be libelous as charging the commis-
sion of a public offense, the charge cannot be
enlarged by innuendo.-Macurda v. Lewiston

See Criminal Law, § 90; Embezzlement; Re- Journal Co., 82 A. 438.
ceiving Stolen Goods.

II. PROSECUTION_AND PUNISH-
MENT.

(A) Indictment and Information.

§ 30 (Conn.) A complaint, alleging the lar-
ceny of chickens, held to charge the larceny of
poultry, punishable by Gen. St. 1902, § 1211.-
Town of Wolcott v. Stickles, 82 A. 572.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

See Street Railroads, §§ 103, 118.

LAW OF THE CASE.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 1097, 1099.

LEADING QUESTIONS.

See Witnesses, § 240.

LEASE.

(C) Evidence.

§ 112 (Me.) Newspaper articles concerning
plaintiff, and relied on by him as being libelous,
cannot be deemed to be malicious, where the ev-
the writer.-Macurda v. Lewiston Journal Co.,
idence showed that plaintiff was unknown_to
82 A. 438.

LICENSES.

See Certiorari, 36; Corporations, § 661;
Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 59, 76, 150; The-
aters and Shows; Trespass, § 44.

See Bailment;

LIENS.

Banks and Banking, § 42;
Mortgages, 150; Statutes, § 153; Subro-
gation, §7; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 246-
266.

LIFE ESTATES.

See Landlord and Tenant; Mines and Min- See Perpetuities, § 4; Remainders; Wills, §§
erals, 62; Trusts, §§ 230, 231.

See Wills.

LEGACIES.

LEGISLATIVE POWER.

See Constitutional Law, §§ 26, 52-65.

LETTERS.

See Evidence, 8 397; Limitation of Actions, §
148.

LEX LOCI.

600, 608, 610.

§8 (Me.) A life tenant's warranty deed in
fee and the taking of possession thereunder by
the grantee do not work disseisin of the re-
maindermen.-Hooper v. Leavitt, 82 A. 547.
Possession and occupation by a life tenant's
grantee in fee held not adverse to the remain-
dermen until the life tenant's death.-Id.

In an action to recover land, evidence held
insufficient to show adverse possession by
plaintiff as against the remainderman.-Id.

§ 15 (Del.Ch.) The increased value of corpo-
rate stock from accumulative earnings should be
added to the corpus, and if sold, and the pro-
ceeds reinvested, a life tenant therein should re-

the principal for the remaindermen.-Bryan v.

Aikin, 82 A. 817.

LIQUOR SELLING.

If a trustee sells the right to subscribe at See Intoxicating Liquors.
par for new shares of corporate stock, the pro-
ceeds should be added to the principal, and go
to the remaindermen under the trust, and not
to the life tenant.-Id.

See Animals.

LIVE STOCK.

LLOYD'S ASSOCIATIONS.

Stock dividends, issued from earnings from
corporate stock bequeathed for life, with re-
mainder over, belong to the remaindermen, and See Building and Loan Associations.
not to the life tenant.-Id.

§ 23 (Me.) A life tenant's warranty deed in
fee conveys a life estate only.-Hooper v. Leav-
itt, 82 A. 547.

LOANS.

See Executors and Administrators, & 427; In-
sane Persons, 88 65, 98; Money Lent;
Trusts, § 222.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

See Justices of the Peace, § 36; Trespass, §
52.

§3 (Md.) A sale of standing timber is a sale
of goods only.-Whittington v. Hall, 82 A. 163.
$3 (Vt.) A conveyance of standing timber
held absolute, a clause merely limiting the
grantee's right of entrance.-De Goosh v. Bald-
win & Russ, 82 A. 182.

An estate in standing timber with the right
of entry for its removal may be sold and dis-
posed of by deed.-Id.

The grantees of standing timber held tres-
passers in going upon the land to remove it.
-Id.
LUMBER.

See Logs and Logging.

LUNATICS.

See Insane Persons.

MACHINERY.

846 (R.I.) Where a son rendered services
and furnished board and money to his mother. See Master and Servant, § 234.

expecting to receive compensation by will, and
his mother expected to pay him by will, and

MAINTENANCE.

allowed him to think he would be so paid, the See Champerty and Maintenance.
statute of limitations did not begin to run un-
til the mother gave notice that he would not
be so paid.-Messier v. Messier, 82 A. 996.

Where a son furnished board to his mother
under an agreement that he should be com-
pensated by will, his right of action on the
various items furnished does not accrue with
each item, but only upon repudiation by the
mother, and the statute of limitations begins
to run from that time.-Id.

§ 54 (R.I.) In mutual accounts and dealings,
the obligations arise, not out of the various
items, but out of the balance, which is the
debt, and so the statute of limitations begins
to run only from the date of the last item.-
Messier v. Messier, 82 A. 996.

III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, NEW
PROMISE, AND PART
PAYMENT.

§ 148 (Del.Super.) Requisites of acknowledg-
ment to take a claim out of the statute of
limitations determined.-Joseph v. Johnson, 82
A. 30.

§ 148 (Vt.) Letters written by a surety up-
on a note held a sufficient acknowledgment to
stop the running of limitations.-Woodsville
Guaranty Savings Bank v. Ricker, 82 A. 2.

V. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

§ 182 (N.J.Ch.) A party who has not plead-
ed the statute of limitations cannot set it up
as a defense.-French v. Armstrong, 82 A. 101.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.

See Carriers, §§ 132, 155-158.

MALICE.

See Homicide, §§ 7, 11 12, 13, 22, 31, 44, 146,
152, 231.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

V. ACTIONS.

§ 72 (N.J.) Where, in an action for malicious
prosecution, there were no disputed facts bear-
ing on the question of probable cause, such
question was for the court, and a refusal to
charge that, to justify a verdict for plaintiff,
the jury must find no probable cause, was not
error.-Sunderbrand v. Shills, 82 A. 914.

MANDAMUS.

See Taxation, § 497.

II. SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF
RELIEF.

(C) Acts and Proceedings of Private Cor-
porations and Individuals.

§ 133 (N.J.Sup.) An ordinance granting per-
mission to street railroad to operate along cer-
tain streets, and providing that all cars shall
stop at street crossings, held enforceable by
mandamus.-City of Camden v. Public Service
Ry. Co., 82 A. 607.

III. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS,
AND RELIEF.

§ 153 (Del.Super.) Objections to substitution
of executrix as a party in mandamus cannot
be made afterwards, on motion to amend the

return.-State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co.,
82 A. 540.

$ 159 (Pa.) Under Act June 8, 1893 (P. L.
345), alternative writ should be asked in pro-
ceeding to compel county commissioners to
print candidate's name on ballots, since per-
emptory mandamus may be awarded only when
the right is clear.-Moore v. Neil, 82 A. 496.
§ 187 (Del.Super.) Where the Supreme Court,
on appeal in mandamus, reversed a judgment
and quashed the return to the alternative writ,
permission to file amended return will be de-
nied, because nothing was left to amend, and
because Const. art. 4, § 24, and Rev. Code
1852, amended to 1893, p. 849, c. 112, § 11, do
not permit such amendment after judgment.-
State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 82 A. 540.
After Supreme Court reversed judgment and
quashed return to alternative writ of manda-
mus, and ordered the issuance of peremptory
writ, Superior Court's power was limited to
the issuance of the peremptory writ.-Id.

MANSLAUGHTER.

See Homicide.

MARRIAGE.

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and
Places for Work.

§ 11 (Del.Super.) An employer, maintaining
a railroad track and equipment to carry stone
from its quarry to a wharf, must furnish rea-
sonably safe appliances for its employés.-
Valerii v. Breakwater Co., 82 A. 597.

$117 (R.I.) Gen. Laws 1909, c. 129, § 16,
relating to protection of elevator openings,
construed.-Wells v. Joslin Mfg. Co., 82 A. 258.
$120 (R.I.) An owner of a vessel held guilty
of gross negligence, resulting in injury to
a laborer on the vessel, authorizing a recovery
from the owner.-Tavares v. Dewing, 82 A.
133.

(E) Fellow Servants.

$182 (N.J.) Employer's Liability Act (P. L
1909, p. 114), enlarging the range of liability
of the employers for injuries to an employé
through the negligence of representatives. is
remedial and should be liberally construed.—
Beagle's Adm'x v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal
Co., 82 A. 890.

$189 (R.I.) An owner of a vessel held lia-
ble for injury to a member of the crew aris-
ing from the unseaworthiness of the vessel.-
Tavares v. Dewing, 82 A. 133.

§ 190 (Me.) Master held not liable to a serv-
construction of which he had worked.-Veano
v. Crafts, 82 A. 293.

See Divorce; Husband and Wife; Wills, ant, injured by defects in the staging, in the
602; Witnesses, § 287.

§ 40 (Conn.) The legal presumption sup
porting the validity of a second marriage held
not overthrown by proof of a prior marriage.
-Town of Roxbury v. Town of Bridgewater,
82 A. 193.

$60 (N.J.Ch.) Evidence held insufficient to
show that defendant was insane when she mar-
ried complainant.-Brainen v. Brainen, 82 A.
327.

864 (N.J.Ch.) The chancery court has no au-
thority to provide for the support of children
upon dissolving a marriage unless authorized
by a statute.-Palmer v. Palmer, 82 A. 358.
Under P. L. 1902, p. 263, § 8, a wife held
properly allowed an amount for the support of
a child upon annulment of the marriage.-Id.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

(F) Risks Assumed by Servant.
§ 204 (Pa.) Where the negligence charged is
failure to perform a statutory duty, questions
relating to assumption of risk do not arise.-
Amiano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 82 A.
780.

§ 206 (Vt.) Dangerous conditions of the
work or business which can be obviated by the
use of practical devices well known and in gen-
eral use are not "inevitable."-Barney v. Quak-
er Oats Co.. 82 A. 113.

$210 (Del.Super.) A brakeman on a railroad
operated by the employer to carry stone from
its quarry to a wharf assumes the risk of in-
jury from derailment of the car, not resulting
from the negligence of the employer.-Valerii v.
Breakwater Co., 82 A. 597.

$217 (Conn.) An employé assisting in han-
&dling heavy machinery and knowing the danger,
while holding a machine to prevent its tipping,
assumed the risk from its tipping and falling
on him.-Tenney v. Baird Mach. Co., 82 A. 639.

See Action, §§ 27-36; Appeal and Error,
1050; Contracts, 8 319; Drunkards; Evi-
dence, $$ 57, 145, 147, 271, 456, 471, 512,
527, 553; Frauds, Statute of, § 138; In-
toxicating Liquors, § 169; Trial, 165;
Witnesses, §§ 236, 240, 268; Work and
Labor, §§ 14, 27.

$217 (R.I.) In view of the experience and
knowledge of an employé, killed in harnessing
a pair of horses, and the warning given him,
held, not only was there no negligence of the

III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN- master, but the employé assumed the risk.-

JURIES TO SERVANT.

(A) Nature and Extent in General,
§ 952 (Pa.) Employer's Liability Act does
not effect a change in the law as to the liability
of employer for injuries to an employé, when
mine is in charge of certified mine foreman.-
Rafferty v. National Mining Co., 82 A. 1089.
For failure of mine foreman to discharge
his duties under Act May 15, 1893 (P. L. 52),
the mineowner is not liable, the mine foreman
being the representative of the state.-Id.

Where a certified mine foreman negligently
fails to make a proper clearance between the
tracks in a coal mine and the wall of the mine
and a miner is injured, the owner is not liable.
-Id.

$100 (Pa.) A member of railroad employés'
relief association, accepting benefits for injury,
cannot claim any additional damages therefor.
-Reese v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 82 A. 461.

Armington v. Providence Ice Co., 82 A. 263.

$219 (Vt.) Dust in air of an elevator or
grinding mill held not a "visible" danger to
one who did not know of the danger of its
explosion.-Barney v. Quaker Oats Co., 82 A.

113.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant.

§ 234 (Pa.) The test of negligence of a serv-
ant in continuing to use a defective machine,
after he has protested against such use and
received a promise to repair, is whether the
danger is so imminent that no man of ordina-
ry prudence would assume the risk.-Glass v.
Borough of College Hill, 82 A. 771.

§ 235 (Me.) Contributory negligence barred
recovery by an employé for injury resulting
from his clothing catching on a projecting set
screw on a revolving shaft, where, though ex-
perienced and assisting in installing the shaft,
he did not look for projections.-Kimball v.
Bartlett, 82 A. 546.

(H) Actions.

Right of member of employés' relief associa-
tion, accepting benefits for an injury and sub-
sequently accepting benefits for a second in-
jury, caused, as claimed, by an improper issu- § 258 (R.I.) A declaration for injury to an