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The act includes two classes to the mem- | 658, 660; State ex rel. v. Dow, 78 Conn. 53, bers of which $30 a year shall be paid as 56, 60 Atl. 1063; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. state aid: (1) Those resident in the state 290. who served in the army, navy, marine corps, or revenue marine service of the United States during the Civil War as a part of the quota of this state and received an honorable discharge therefrom, the widow resident in this state, or if there be no such widow, the widowed mother resident in this state, of every person who has so served and has died either during his term of service, or after receiving honorable discharge, and the pensioned widows, fathers, and mothers, resident in this state, of such soldiers, sailors, and marines. (2) Similarly described persons who served as a part of the regular army or navy, or as a part of the quota furnished by other states than Connecticut and who have since gained or shall hereafter gain a residence in this state, and similarly described widows, widowed mothers, pensioned widows, fathers, and mothers, who have since gained, or shall hereafter gain, such residence.

All who served in the quotas of other states, whether residents of those states or aliens, or citizens and aliens enlisting in the army or navy of the United States and credited to the quota of no state, come within the benefits of the act as do their widows, widowed mothers, and their pensioned widows, fathers, and mothers. If every living soldier and sailor, and the living widows, widowed mothers, and the pensioned widows, fathers, and mothers of those who served in the Civil War and received honorable discharge and who served as a part of the quota of this state or any other state, or in the army and navy of the United States and not credited to any state, are now or hereafter were to become residents of this state, such "state aid" must be furnished them equally with those who now reside in our state and served to its credit in the Civil War. Those who served to the credit of the state who reside outside its limits are denied the benefits given those who did not serve to her credit but who have since become residents. It applies equally to the drafted, as to the volunteer to those who received a bounty, as to those who did not; to those who were disabled, as to those who were not; to those who are in receipt of pensions or other governmental favor, as to those who are not; to those who served a few days, as to those who served for the entire war. It limits its bounty neither by age, by disability, nor by necessity, except so far as this may be read in the term "state aid."

[7] If some part of this act were valid and other parts invalid because unconstitutional, it would be our duty to sustain the valid part, unless the parts were "so mutually connected and dependent as to warrant a belief that the General Assembly intended them to stand or fall together as a whole." Branch

[8] If it could be held that it was within the power of the General Assembly to grant such state aid to those serving in the Civil War as a part of the quota of this state while not within its power to grant such aid to those serving as part of the quota of other states, or as aliens, we should be unable to so separate the provisions of the statute as to include the one class and exclude the other. The act contains a single provision, and that relating to "state aid" is in a single sentence. Neither by the exclusion or addition of a word or words could this separation be made, but only by rewriting the statute. Its language is clear and specific; it must be read as it is written. We think these several provisions are mutually connected and dependent, and that the General Assembly intended that they should stand or fall together. Our conclusion is strengthened by two considerations: One, that the General Assembly had theretofore granted its bounty only to those, or their dependents. who had served in the Civil War to the credit of the state; the other, that the plaintiff has not suggested the possibility of making this separation. It is not alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was a resident of this state when he enlisted, or that he served as a part of the quota of this state. [9] Payments under this act are made as "state aid." The ordinary definition of aid is help, support, or assistance. State aid is support or assistance furnished by the state to its institutions, organizations, or individuals for a public purpose. It is a term of our statutes, applied to pecuniary assistance furnished by the state to towns, schools, etc., and for internal improvements-all recognized public purposes. We also find this term applied to support, pecuniary or otherwise, furnished indigent children of the soldiers and sailors of the Civil War. other states we find a similar designation and use of this term. For example: In Massachusetts a very comprehensive system of state and military aid is maintained. condition of its granting is the indigence of the applicant. The state may use the public funds to support its citizens in need; it cannot use the public funds as state aid to support its citizens not in need. As applied to individuals, state aid can have no meaning other than support for the needy. Undoubtedly there is a distinction between support furnished under this statute and that under a pauper statute. Manchester v. Burns, 45 N. H. 482. In the one, charity is the moving purpose; in the other, charity coupled with the obligation of gratitude for services rendered. The service cannot be disassociated from the necessity. Had this been the intent, the specification of the gratuity as "state aid" would have been unnecessary.

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that not all the resident surviving soldiers government is the federal government; but and sailors of the Civil War, or their im- for many purposes, and in a certain field, mediate relatives and dependents and their Massachusetts is a sovereign state, mainpensioned relatives, are in indigent circum-taining an independent government." Again stances. The veterans of the Civil War have that court said: "When military pensions held, and now hold, a conspicuous part in are granted, it is fitting that they should be the life of our state, and contribute in given by the government in whose army the wealth, in intellect, and in morality largely soldiers served." Opinion of the Justices, to the strength of the commonwealth. 186 Mass. 603, 607, 72 N. E. 95, 97.

The expressed purpose of the act before us is not a single nor a yearly reward for past distinguished and exceptional service, nor for meritorious service, nor as a pension for service, but is given annually as "state aid." We cannot construe it otherwise unless we depart from the legislative language and intent. The act, as we have pointed out, bestows "state aid" upon all who served in the army and navy of the United States, to those who did not serve to her credit and who are not related to those who did serve to her credit, as well as to those who served to her credit or are related to those who did so serve. Whether or not Connecticut could bestow an annual gratuity as a reward for services rendered 50 years ago in the Civil War to all-both the drafted and the volunteer-who served to her credit in the army and navy of the United States, without regard to disability, necessity, age, length of service, or exceptional service, we do not determine. The case does not require it. The justification for such legislation, if found at all, must be in its public purpose, and that in its incitement to patriotism.

[11] State support furnished as state aid indiscriminately to all of these classes, to the needy, and to the well to do, is beyond the power of legitimate legislation. We know of no state legislation where "state aid" has been granted without reference to disability, necessity, age, or exceptional service. No public purpose is subserved by taking by taxation the property of the many and giving it under the guise of state support to those who are out of reach of its need. It was, we think, appreciation of the force and applicability of this principle which led the plaintiff in the argument to assume that the single inquiry here was whether the state could reward the soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and their immediate relatives and dependents because of their meritorious service without regard to disability or indigence. If this were indeed the sole question before us, we should still be obliged to hold the act void. Ve have sustained legislation authorizing bounties, and legislation ratifying the action of a town in voting bounties where service in the army or navy of the United States, or the procuring of a substitute for such service, has been made on the faith of the promise of the bounty. We have refused to sustain such legislation, enacted after the performance of the service, making the bounty a mere gratuity for past services not rendered on the faith of its promise. Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn. 567; Terrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105. We have never had before us the ques-ers than those who served as a part of the tion whether the state might reward, by annual payment, meritorious service rendered in the Civil War.

[12] The grant of "state aid" to those who served to the credit of the state is, as we have seen, inseparably connected with that to those who served in the quota of other states and to aliens. We construed an act of legislation granting bounties, as we should do in this case if possible, so as to avoid the objection that it applied in terms to oth

quota of this state, impliedly suggesting the difficulty of supporting the act if held applicable to those serving in the quotas of other states. Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47, 54, 55; State v. Newark, 29 N. J. Law, 232, 243. The nation can take for its defense the men and the treasure of Connecticut measured only by its necessities. It can call upon her to do her assigned part; it cannot call upon her to do the assigned part of some other state. The soldiers and sailors of oth er states, and the aliens who served, were not hers; to them she owed no duty. She could not tax her people to pay bounties to these to induce them to enter the service of the United States; no more can she reward them for their services in the war.

The Justices of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 190 Mass. 615, 77 N. E. 820, have expressed the opinion that "moneys may be paid, statues erected, medals, decorations, or other badges of honor bestowed by the state to her citizens who had served to her credit in the army of the United States as an appropriate recognition of distinguished and exceptional service, such that the dignity of the state will be enhanced and the loyalty and patriotism of the people will be promoted by making it a subject of government action." The justices are careful to mark the distinction between a reward of this character and the bestowal of a pension. The purposes of taxation must be kept Thus they say: "So far as we have been in- within the range of subjects which bring formed, since the adoption of the federal to the state a direct benefit. The taxation Constitution, none of the states has assumed of Connecticut people for some internal imto grant pensions to soldiers for service in provement in Kansas would universally be the armies of the United States. For such recognized as outside the scope of legitimate

difference between a tax levied for such an ous innovation in legislation and beyond all object and one to reward the soldiers and doubt contrary to the fundamental law. If sailors who helped make up the quota of an annual gratuity of $30 for such a purKansas in the Civil War. Her soldiers and pose as this is lawful, a larger one will be sailors served under the Constitution to lawful. Its size will be the will of the Genwhich she owed allegiance, but they served eral Assembly. If public funds may be used to the credit of Kansas and for her as much to benefit resident soldiers and sailors for as though they had fought under her own past services rendered other states, the prinenlistment to repel an invader on her own ciple will permit gratuities to be given all soil. Connecticut's interest in such service classes of citizens whose past public services was indirect, and identical with that result- entitle them to public gratitude. "If the ing from the services of the quotas of every body of persons to be benefited is numerous, other state. That the soldiers and sailors the greater is the influence that may probawho filled the quotas of other states must bly be brought to bear to secure such an reside in this state to secure "state aid" does appropriation of the public money." Kingnot change the situation. A state's bounty man v. Brockton, 153 Mass. 255, 26 N. E. must be limited to her own soldiers and 998, 11 L. R. A. 123. The right of private sailors. Service to the credit of other states property should and does rest upon a firmer is not service for her. The grant to aliens, basis than this. A public purpose is indisto widows and parents, to pensioned widows pensable to a legitimate exercise of the taxand parents, without affecting the principle ing power; "though the people support the involved, marks with increasing clearness the government, the government should not suplengths to which a vicious principle of taxa-port the people." tion may lead. Cooley in his work on Taxation (Ed. 1879) 70, says, in deciding on which side the tax shall fall, we must be governed "mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purpose have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the gov ernment."

Far from there being a course and usage sanctioning this attempt to tax the people of one state for the services rendered in the Civil War by the soldiers and sailors of another state, we find no attempt of like character either in Connecticut or in any other state of the Union. Objects and purposes such as these have never been regarded as serving a public use. In the long span of time since the Civil War closed, the national government has, in pensions granted and privileges extended, treated those who served her in her hour of peril with generosity. So too, in many ways, the states have exhibited their gratitude, and our state has been among the foremost in this labor of duty and of love. States have granted pensions to the disabled or indigent soldiers and sailors; but, so far as we have discovered, no state has granted a pension to soldiers and sailors who have served in and been honorably discharged from the United States service without regard to disability or indigence.

Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, upon which the plaintiff relies, is not an authority for the giving of a gratuity or bounty for services rendered after the passage; in that case the service was rendered before the passage of the act. We believe no act of so sweeping a character can be found. We think an act which taxes the citizens of our state for the benefit of persons whose only claim to a gratuity is in service long since past, rendered some other state, is a danger

The city court of Hartford is advised to sustain the demurrer on grounds 2 and 4, and to render judgment for the defendant. No costs in this court will be taxed in favor of either party. The other Judges concurred.

PARK CITY YACHT CLUB v. CITY OF
BRIDGEPORT.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
April 9, 1912.)

1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1099*) - LAW OF CASE.

superior court had jurisdiction of the proceedA decision on a former appeal that the ing is the law of the case.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4370-4379; Dec. Dig. § 1099.*]

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3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 394*) STREETS-DAMAGES TO RIGHT OF ACCESSREVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS.

Bridgeport City Charter, $ 59, which gives the superior court power to confirm, annul, or modify local improvement assessments, extends to damages for injury to an abutting owner's right of access.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 938-945; Dec. Dig. § 394.*]

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 386*) STREETS-VACATION-RIGHTS OF ABUTTERS.

Ordinarily vacation of part of a street does not entitle an owner fronting on another part of the street to recover therefor, though

the vacation causes some inconvenience to his access or compels a more circuitous route, or a diversion of travel in front of his premises

and the consequent diminution of value, but | ed making of Stratford avenue as widened an owner is entitled to damages where there is should have been excluded.

a practical discontinuance of a highway in front of his premises.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 929; Dec. Dig. 8 386.*]

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Howard J. Curtis, Judge. Application by the Park City Yacht Club adversely to the City of Bridgeport, in the nature of an appeal from an assessment of special benefits on account of the laying out and widening of Stratford avenue in the city, brought to the superior court, and reserved upon a finding of facts, for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Judgment for $1,200 for plaintiff advised.

John W. Banks, for plaintiff. John S. Pullman and James A. Marr, for defendant.

WHEELER, J. The record upon a former appeal of this case, reported in 81 Conn. 76, 70 Atl. 631, contains a statement of facts substantially similar to those of the present record, by which it appears that:

Two principal questions have been urged in argument: (1) That the superior court could not in this proceeding consider the effect upon the plaintiff's property of the phys ical changes proved. (2) That the damages suffered by the plaintiff by reason of these physical changes and by reason of diversion of travel are not recoverable.

In the former opinion we held that "the application alleges, in substance, that the improvement in question, namely, the lay-out, alteration, exchange, discontinuance, and enlargement of Stratford avenue contemplated such a construction and working of the highway established in place of the one previ ously existing that the plaintiff would be largely shut off from free and direct access from its adjoining property to the main trav eled path of the highway," and that "the application appears to have been tried to the court upon the denial of these allegations." The opinion recites the proof of physical changes made by the city subsequent to the confirmation of the assessment which accorded with the contemplated changes as alleged in the application, and says: "The finding does not state directly whether or not the court found to be true the allegation of the complaint that the improvement ordered by the city contemplated a construction such as that proved upon the trial. It would perhaps appear from the memorandum of decision that the fact alleged was a fair inference from the facts proved." Upon the application and facts found, the trial court had held that "the only question open upon this proceeding is the effect of the widening of Stratford avenue, and that in consequence of this ruling he did not, in fact, estimate the effect of said changes other than the widening of said highway upon the value of the appellant's property." The basis of the ruling was that the scope of the application was limited by the vote of the common council to the widening of Stratford avenue, and hence other physical changes were not elements of damage to be considered in this proceeding. This was the important question involved in the former appeal, and was the most strongly argued of the questions reserved on this appeal.

The plaintiff is a yacht club, owning and occupying a clubhouse upon the south side of Stratford avenue in Bridgeport and on the easterly bank of an arm of the harbor, which was crossed by Stratford avenue by means of a solid stone causeway. Acting under its charter and the various votes and orders of its common council, committees, and boards, all of which appear in detail in the opinion in that case, the city tore down in 1901 and 1902 the part of this causeway just west of plaintiff's premises and north of the present roadway in front of said premises, and laid out a highway and constructed a bridge north of the causeway being parallel with said causeway, but much higher in grade and having a high and immovable railing along its south side and extending 150 feet east of the entrance to the clubhouse. South of the bridge is a gap of water 23 feet wide left by the tearing out of the causeway. The traveled way remaining over the old causeway is only 24 feet wide. The plaintiff's property is thus left as a result of this improvement on a cul-de-sac. The former finding did not state directly whether or not the improvement ordered by the city contemplated a construction such as that in fact After reciting the various provisions of the made. The present finding sets forth in de- charter and the proceedings thereunder, we tail the history of the building of the bridge say in our former opinion: "This action of and of the changes actually made as evidence the common council contemplated a lay-out received to show that at and before the lay- of the public improvement previously resolvout and appraisal the city contemplated the ed upon by the common council, by which construction of the bridge and the physical Stratford avenue was altered, changed, dischanges in front of plaintiff's premises, and continued and enlarged, as set forth in the finally it sets forth the ultimate fact that report. * And in this case that imthis "was contemplated by the city before the provement as established in front of the said lay-out and appraisal." The court re- plaintiff's premises was a highway involving served the question whether the history and an alteration, extension, and practical disfacts showing what use the city contemplat- continuance for public use of portions of a

[3] The statutory appeal provided by section 59 of the charter of Bridgeport giving the court the power to "confirm, annul, or modify the said assessments, or make such order in the premises as equity may require," is certainly broad enough to include all cases of damage within this general rule. Whether it would include cases not within the rule we need not now consider.

previously existing highway." We held this | tion arises either through constitutional propublic improvement was of a very peculiar hibition or statutory provisions. nature, and under this application, based, as it must have been, upon the action of the common council in instituting the improvement as contemplated by the city, "the superior court was bound to consider any injurious effect upon the value of the plaintiff's property which might result from the contemplated peculiar construction of the highway as well as any beneficial effect which might result from other causes in determining whether or not the whole effect of the improvement was to specially benefit the plaintiff, * and that the provisions of the charter do not so limit the jurisdiction of the court."

*

We thus held that, under this application, all physical changes contemplated by the improvement should have been considered by the trial court, and that the record showed by inference that these physical changes had been contemplated by the improvement. Because of this we held the error of the trial court harmful. That no objection had been made to the proof of these physical changes was unimportant. We held them to be relevant and material to this action, otherwise we should not have deemed the failure of the trial court to consider them erroneous. This action is a retrial of the same application, with a denial of the allegations of physical changes contemplated by the city.

[1] The material facts found are the same as on the former trial with the addition of facts showing the history of the improvement, and that the city contemplated the construction and physical changes which we said was perhaps "a fair inference from the facts proved." As we have seen, we held that the superior court had jurisdiction in this proceeding to consider the effect of all of said physical changes upon the plaintiff's property. The former decision upon this point must be accepted as the law of this case. It follows that all of this evidence was properly received.

[2] One other question is reserved which was not specifically included in our former decision: Whether in assessing damages the diversion of travel from passing the plaintiff's premises is an element to be considered. As an abutting owner, the plaintiff has a special and peculiar interest in the street fronting his premises. Cullen v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 66 Conn. 221, 226, 33 Atl. 910. We have spoken of these rights collectively as the easement of access to the premises of an owner. Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 72 Conn. 420, 426, 427, 44 Atl. 813. It is a general rule of law that the owner can recover damages for a direct injury to his right of access, one which is special and peculiar to him, differing from general damages suffered by him in common with the public, not merely in degree,

[4] The vacation of a street closes the lots fronting upon it and destroys the owner's access. The vacation of a part of a street does not ordinarily permit a recovery to an owner fronting on another part of this street. And this is true, even though it result in some incovenience to his access, or compel a more circuitous route of access, or a diversion of travel in front of the premises, and a consequent diminution of value.

To this general rule there are exceptions, and the leading case of Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 254, 256, recognizes their existence. Chief Justice Shaw, in discussing this rule, said: "We do not mean to be understood as laying down a universal rule." Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 72 Conn. 420, 426, 427, 44 Atl. 813, is an example of the application of the general rule. There the improvement did not change the highway in front of the plaintiff's premises, nor cut off travel from either direction. It merely required the distant travel from the south to take a somewhat longer course, and affected his property no differently than all other property on the street.

The case before us presents an entirely different set of facts; indeed, the physical changes resulting from this improvement are of a most unsual character, and make the case a clear exception to the general rule. The plaintiff's premises are in a cul-de-sac, and the traveled way remaining is so narrow as to prevent ordinary modern travel coming to these premises, unless it backs out the 150 feet to the main highway. Access to this property by travel from the west is destroyed, access to it from the north is prevented, and from the east is seriously interfered with. All traffic to and fro in front of plaintiff's premises is absolutely shut off. In many ways this is a practical discontinuance of the highway. The vacation of a part of a street which leaves property abutting on the remaining part of the street with access to the system of streets in either direction has generally been held to constitute no actionable injury. But the vacation of a part of a street which destroys all access by property abutting on the remaining part of the street to the system of streets in one direction, thus putting the property on a cul-de-sac, has generally been held to constitute an actionable injury. Johnston v. Old Colony R. Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 Atl. 594, 49

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