CHAPTER XIII.
Concerning Pleasures.

There are pleasures of the soul and pleasures of the body. The pleasures of the soul are those which are the exclusive possession of the soul, such as the pleasures of learning and contemplation. The pleasures of the body, however, are those which are enjoyed by soul and body in fellowship, and hence are called bodily pleasures: and such are the pleasures of food and intercourse and the like. But one could not find any class of pleasures belonging solely to the body 3.

2

without utterance: grief is pain that is heavy to bear like a burden: envy is pain over the good fortune of others pity is pain over the evil fortune of others.

CHAPTER XV.
Concerning Fear.

Fear is divided into six varieties: viz., shrinking 9, shame, disgrace, consternation, panic, anxiety 9. Shrinking 9 is fear of some act about to take place. Shame is fear arising from the anticipation of blame and this is the highest form of the affection. Again, some pleasures are true, others false. Disgrace is fear springing from some base And the exclusively intellectual pleasures con- act already done, and even for this form there sist in knowledge and contemplation, while is some hope of salvation. Consternation is the pleasures of the body depend upon sensa- fear originating in some huge product of the tion. Further, of bodily pleasures 4, some are imagination. Panic is fear caused by some both natural and necessary, in the absence unusual product of the imagination. Anxiety of which life is impossible, for example the is fear of failure, that is, of misfortune: for pleasures of food which replenishes waste, and when we fear that our efforts will not meet the pleasures of necessary clothing. Others with success, we suffer anxiety.

CHAPTER XVI.

Concerning Anger.

3

Anger is the ebullition of the heart's blood 2 produced by bilious exhalation or turbidity. Hence it is that the words xox and xolos are both used in the sense of anger. Anger is sometimes lust for vengeance. For when we are wronged or think that we are wronged, we are distressed, and there arises this mixture of desire and anger.

are natural but not necessary, as the pleasures of natural and lawful intercourse. For though the function that these perform is to secure the permanence of the race as a whole, it is still possible to live a virgin life apart from them. Others, however, are neither natural nor necessary, such as drunkenness, lust, and surfeiting to excess. For these contribute neither to the maintenance of our own lives nor to the succession of the race, but on the contrary, are rather even a hindrance. He therefore that would live a life acceptable to God must follow after those pleasures There are three forms of anger: rage, which which are both natural and necessary: and the Greeks also call χολή or χόλος, μῆνις and must give a secondary place to those which KÓTOS. When anger arises and begins to be are natural but not necessary, and enjoy them only in fitting season, and manner, and measure; while the others must be altogether

renounced.

Those then are to be considered moral 5 pleasures which are not bound up with pain, and bring no cause for repentance, and result in no other harm and keep 6 within the bounds of moderation, and do not draw us far away from serious occupations, nor make slaves of us.

CHAPTER XIV.
Concerning Pain.

There are four varieties of pain, viz., anguish, grief, envy, pity. Anguish is pain

2 Reading, οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις ἰδίας ἡδονάς.

3 Nemes., ch. 18: Chrys., Hom. in Joan., 74.

roused, it is called rage or xon or xidos. Wrath again implies that the bile endures, that is to say, that the memory of the wrong abides: and indeed the Greek word for it, ñvis, is derived from pérew, and means what abides and is transferred to memory. Rancour, on the other hand, implies watching for a suitable moment for revenge, and the Greek word for it is kóros from κéîobai.

Anger further is the satellite of reason, the vindicator of desire. For when we long after anything and are opposed in our desire by some one, we are angered at that person, as though we had been wronged: and reason evidently deems that there are just grounds for displeasure in what has happened,, in the

9 Nemesius and certain manuscripts give these species of fear

4 See Chrysostom, Hom. in Joannem, 74; Cicero, De fin. bon. in a different order, viz., dread, consternation, panic, anxiety,

et mal., 1.

shame, disgrace.

1 Ceais, boiling.

2 TOÙ Tepi Kapoiar aïμaros, the blood about the heart.
3 Nemes, ch. 21.

case of those who, like us, have in the natural the nostrils transmitting the vapours to the course of things to guard their own position.

digested the intermediate class is formed, and when the digestion is very imperfect or utterly wanting, an evil odour results.

brain and it is bounded by the extreme limits of the anterior ventricle of the brain. CHAPTER XVII. It is the faculty by which vapours are perceived and apprehended. Now, the most Concerning Imagination. generic distinction between vapours is whether Imagination is a faculty of the unreasoning they have a good or an evil odour, or form an part of the soul. It is through the organs intermediate class with neither a good nor of sense that it is brought into action, and an evil odour. A good odour is produced it is spoken of as sensation. And further, by the thorough digestion in the body of the what is imagined 5 and perceived is that which humours. When they are only moderately comes within the scope of the faculty of imagination and sensation. For example, the sense of sight is the visual faculty itself, but the object of sight is that which comes within The fourth sense is taste: it is the faculty the scope of the sense of sight, such as a stone whereby the humours are apprehended or or any other such object. Further, an ima- perceived, and its organs of sense are the gination is an affection of the unreasoning tongue, and more especially the lips, and the part of the soul which is occasioned by some palate (which the Greeks call oupaviosos), and object acting upon the sensation. But an in these are nerves that come from the brain appearance is an empty affection of the and are spread out, and convey to the domiunreasoning part of the soul, not occasioned by any object acting upon the sensation. Moreover the organ of imagination is the

anterior ventricle of the brain.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Concerning Sensation.

Sensation is that faculty of the soul whereby material objects can be apprehended or discriminated. And the sensoria are the organs or members through which sensations are conveyed. And the objects of sense are the things that come within the province of sensation. And lastly, the subject of sense is the living animal which possesses the faculty of sensation. Now there are five senses, and likewise five organs of sense.

The first sense is sight: and the sensoria or organs of sight are the nerves of the brain and the eyes. Now sight is primarily perception of colour, but along with the colour it discriminates the body that has colour, and its size and form, and locality, and the intervening space and the number 7: also whether it is in motion or at rest, rough or smooth, even or uneven, sharp or blunt, and finally whether its composition is watery or earthy, that is, wet or dry.

nant part of the soul the perception or sensation they have encountered 8. The so-called gustatory qualities of the humours are these:sweetness, pungency, bitterness, astringency, acerbity, sourness, saltness, fattiness, stickiness; for taste is capable of discriminating all these. But water has none of these qualities, and is therefore devoid of taste. Moreover, astringency is only a more intense and exaggerated form of acerbity.

The fifth sense is touch, which is common to all living things 9. Its organs are nerves which come from the brain and ramify all through the body. Hence the body as a whole, including even the other organs of sense, possesses the sense of touch. Within

its scope come heat and cold, softness and hardness, viscosity and brittleness, heaviness and lightness: for it is by touch alone that these qualities are discriminated. On the other hand, roughness and smoothness, dryness and wetness, thickness and thinness, up and down, place and size, whenever that is such as to be embraced in a single application of the sense of touch, are all common to touch and sight, as well as denseness and rareness, that is porosity, and rotundity if it is small, and some other shapes. In like manner also by the aid of memory and thought perception The second sense is hearing, whereby voices of the nearness of a body is possible," and and sounds are perceived. And it distin- similarly perception of number up to two guishes these as sharp or deep, or smooth or three, and such small and easily reckoned or loud. Its organs are the soft nerves of the figures. But it is by sight rather than touch brain, and the structure of the ears. Further, that these things are perceived. man and the ape are the only animals that do not move their ears.

The third sense is smell, which is caused by

The Creator, it is to be noted, fashioned

all the other organs of sense in pairs, so that if one were destroyed, the other might fill its place. For there are two eyes, two ears, two orifices of the nose, and two tongues, which in some animals, such as snakes, are separate, but in others, like man, are united. But touch is spread over the whole body with the exception of bones, nerves, nails, horns, hairs, ligaments, and other such structures.

Further, it is to be observed that sight is possible only in straight lines, whereas smell and hearing are not limited to straight lines only, but act in all directions. Touch, again, and taste act neither in straight lines, nor in every direction, but only when each comes near to the sensible objects that are proper to it.

CHAPTER XIX.
Concerning Thought.

The faculty of thought deals with judgments and assents, and impulse to action and disinclinations, and escapes from action and more especially with thoughts connected with what is thinkable, and the virtues and the different branches of learning, and the theories of the arts and matters of counsel and choice 2. Further, it is this faculty which prophesies the future to us in dreams, and this is what the Pythagoreans, adopting the Hebrew view, hold to be the one true form of prophecy. The organ of thought then is the mid-ventricle of the brain, and the vital spirit it contains 3.

CHAPTER XX.

Concerning Memory.

6

apprehension of matters of thought depends on learning, or natural process of thought, and not on sensation. For though objects of sense are retained in the memory by themselves, only such objects of thought are remembered as we have learned, and we have no memory of their essence.

Recollection is the name given to the recovery of some memory lost by forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is just loss of memory. The faculty of imagination then, having apprehended material objects through the senses, transmits this to the faculty of thought or reason (for they are both the same), and this after it has received and passed judgment on it, passes it on to the faculty of memory. Now the organ of memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which the Greeks call the παρεγκεφαλίς, and the vital spirit it contains.

CHAPTER XXI.

Concerning Conception and Articulation. Again the reasoning part of the soul is divided into conception and articulation. Conception is an activity of the soul originating in the reason without resulting in utterance. Accordingly, often, even when we are silent we run through a whole speech in our minds, and hold discussions in our dreams. And it is this faculty chiefly which constitutes us all reasoning beings. For those who are dumb by birth or have lost their voice through some disease or injury, are just as much reasoning beings. But articulation by voice or in the different dialects requires energy: that is to say, the word is articulated by the tongue and mouth, and this is why it is named articulation. It is, indeed, the messenger of thought, and it is because of it that we are called speaking beings.

The faculty of memory is the cause and storehouse of remembrance and recollection. For memory is a fantasy 5 that is left behind of some sensation and thought manifesting itself in action; or the preservation 7 of a sensation and thought. For the soul comprehends objects of sense through the CHAPTER XXII. organs of sense, that is to say, it perceives, and thence arises a notion: and similarly Concerning Passion and Energy. it comprehends the objects of thought through Passion is a word with various meanings. the mind, and thence arises a thought. It is It is used in regard to the body, and refers to then the preservation of the types of these notions and thoughts that is spoken of as memory.

Further, it is worthy of remark that the

2 Nemes.. ch. 11.

3 Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 13.

4 Text, αἴτιον. R. 2930, ἀγγεῖον.

5 φαντασία.

diseases and wounds, and again, it is used in reference to the soul, and means desire and anger. But to speak broadly and generally, passion is an animal affection which is succeeded by pleasure and pain. For pain succeeds passion, but is not the same thing as passion. For passion is an affection of things without sense, but not so pain. Pain then

6 kai vonσews is wanting in some MSS, nor is it found in is not passion, but the sensation of passion :

Nemesius, who borrowed his description from Origen.

coacer

7 Text, awrnpía. Variant, owpeia, a heaping up, vatio." Faber has "confirmatio," which is nearer σwrηpia, conservatio, which is found in Nemesius, &c.

and it must be considerable, that is to say,

8 Nemes., ch. 13.

9 TO PAVTAσTIKóv, the faculty of fantasy.

it must be great enough to come within the scope of sense.

weighing the truth or falseness of the notion, determines what is true: and this explains the Greek word for thought, diavola, which is derived from diavoeiv, meaning to think and discriminate. That, however, which is judged 1 and determined to be true, is spoken of as mind.

Again, the definition of passions of the soul is this: Passion is a sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the presentation to the mind of something good or bad. Or in other words, passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the notion of some- Or to put it otherwise: The primary activity thing good or bad. For the notion of some of the mind, observe, is intelligence, but inthing good results in desire, and the notion of telligence applied to any object is called a something bad results in anger. But passion thought, and when this persists and makes on considered as a class, that is, passion in general, the mind an impression of the object of is defined as a movement in one thing caused thought, it is named reflection, and when by another. Energy, on the other hand, is a reflection dwells on the same object and puts drastic movement, and by "drastic" is meant itself to the test, and closely examines the that which is moved of itself. Thus, anger is relation of the thought to the soul, it gets the the energy manifested by the part of the soul name prudence. Further, prudence, when it where anger resides, whereas passion involves extends its area forms the power of reasoning, the two divisions of the soul, and in addition and is called conception, and this is defined the whole body when it is forcibly impelled to action by anger. For there has been caused movement in one thing caused by another, and this is called passion.

But in another sense energy is spoken of as passion. For energy is a movement in harmony with nature, whereas passion is a movement at variance with nature. According, then, to this view, energy may be spoken of as passion when it does not act in accord with nature, whether its movement is due to itself or to some other thing. Thus, in connection with the heart, its natural pulsation is energy, whereas its palpitation, which is an excessive and unnatural movement, is passion and not energy.

as the fullest activity of the soul, arising in that part where reason resides, and being devoid of outward expression: and from it proceeds the uttered word spoken by the tongue. And now that we have discussed the faculties of knowledge, let us turn to the vital or appetitive faculties.

It should be understood that there is implanted in the soul by nature a faculty of desiring that which is in harmony with its nature, and of maintaining in close union all that belongs essentially to its nature: and this power is called will or déλnis. For the essence both of existence and of living yearns after activity both as regards mind and sense, and in this it merely longs to realise its own natural and perfect being. And so this definition also is given of this natural will: will is an appetite, both rational and vital, depending only on what is natural. So that will is nothing else than the natural and vital and rational appetite of all things that go to constitute nature, that is, just the simple faculty. For the appetite of creatures without reason, since it is irrational, is not called will.

But it is not every activity of the passionate part of the soul that is called passion, but only the more violent ones, and such as are capable of causing sensation: for the minor and unperceived movements are certainly not passions. For to constitute passion there is necessary a considerable degree of force, and thus it is on this account that we add to the definition of passion that it is a sensible activity. For the lesser activities escape the Again Bouλnois or wish is a sort of natural notice of the senses, and do not cause passion. will, that is to say, a natural and rational Observe also that our soul possesses two- appetite for some definite thing. For there fold faculties, those of knowledge, and those is seated in the soul of man a faculty of of life. The faculties of knowledge are mind, rational desire. When, then, this rational dethought, notion, presentation, sensation and sire directs itself naturally to some definite the vital or appetitive faculties are will object it is called wish. For wish is rational and choice. Now, to make what has been desire and longing for some definite thing. said clearer, let us consider these things more Wish, however, is used both in connection closely, and first let us take the faculties of with what is within our power, and in conknowledge. nection with what is outside our power, that Presentation and sensation then have al- is, both with regard to the possible and the ready been sufficiently discussed above. It is impossible. For we wish often to indulge sensation that causes a passion, which is called | lust or to be temperate, or to sleep and the presentation, to arise in the soul, and from presentation comes notion. Thereafter thought,

1 Cf. 1 Cor. i. 10.

2 Max. ad Marin, et ad Incert. p. 98.