like, and these are within our power to accomplish, and possible. But we wish also to be kings, and this is not within our power, or we wish perchance never to die, and this is an impossibility. free in impulse, and free in action where that is in accordance with nature. But in the case of God 5, it is to be remembered, we speak of wish, but it is not correct to speak of choice. For God does not deliberate, since that is a mark of ignorance, and no one deliberates about what he knows. But if counsel is a mark of ignorance, surely choice must also be so. God, then, since He has absolute knowledge of everything, does not deliberate 7. Nor in the case of the soul of the Lord do we speak of counsel or choice, seeing that He had no part in ignorance. For, although He was of a nature that is not cognisant of the future, yet because of His oneness in subsistence with God the Word, He had know I The wish 3, then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health but the means by which the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of deliberation. Then after wish follow inquiry and speculation (nois and okeys), and after these, if the object is anything within our power, comes counsel or deliberation (Bouλn or Boúdevois): counsel is an appetite for in- ledge of all things, and that not by grace, but, vestigating lines of action lying within our as we have said, because He was one in subown power. For one deliberates, whether sistence 8. For He Himself was both God one ought to prosecute any matter or not, and Man, and hence He did not possess and next, one decides which is the better, and the will that acts by opinion or disposition. this is called judginent («piois). Thereafter, While He did possess the natural and simple one becomes disposed to and forms a liking will which is to be observed equally in all for that in favour of which deliberation gave the personalities of men, His holy soul had judgment, and this is called inclination (yvun). not opinion (or, disposition) that is to say, For should one form a judgment and not no inclination opposed to His divine will, nor be disposed to or form a liking for the object aught else contrary to His divine will. For of that judgment, it is not called inclination. opinion (or, disposition) differs as persons difThen, again, after one has become so disposed, fer, except in the case of the holy and simple choice or selection (pouipers and emλoy) and uncompound and indivisible Godhead2. comes into play. For choice consists in the There, indeed, since the subsistences are in choosing and selecting of one of two possi- nowise divided or separated, neither is the bilities in preference to the other. Then one object of will divided. And there, since there is impelled to action, and this is called im- is but one nature, there is also but one natural pulse (ópun): and thereafter it is brought into will. And again, since the subsistences are employment, and this is called use (xpñvis). unseparated, the three subsistences have also The last stage after we have enjoyed the use one object of will, and one activity. In the is cessation from desire. case of men, however, seeing that their nature is one, their natural will is also one, but since their subsistences 3 are separated and divided from each other, alike in place and time, and disposition to things, and in many other respects, for this reason their acts of will and their opinions are different. But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, since He possesses different natures, His natural wills, that is, His volitional faculties belonging to Him as God and as Man are also different. But since the subsistence is one, and He Who exercises In the case, however, of creatures without reason, as soon as appetite is roused for anything, straightway arises impulse to action. For the appetite of creatures without reason is irrational, and they are ruled by their natural appetite. Hence, neither the names of will or wish are applicable to the appetite of creatures without reason. For will is rational, free and natural desire, and in the case of man, endowed with reason as he is, the natural appetite is ruled rather than rules. For his actions are free, and depend upon reason, since the faculties of knowledge and life are bound up together in man. He is free in desire, free in wish, free in examination and investigation, free in deliberation, free in judgment, free in inclination, free in choice, 3 τὸ βουλητόν. 4 Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. x ad Marin. the will is one, the object of the wil!, that is. the gnomic will 5, is also one, His human will evidently following His divine will, and willing that which the divine will willed it to will. Further note, that will (éanos) and wish (Boulnois) are two different things: also the object of will (rò eλnrv) and the capacity for will (Beλntikov), and the subject that exercises will (ó év), are all different. For will is just the simple faculty of willing, whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food. The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will. The capacity for will, moreover, means that which possesses the volitional faculty, for example, man. Further, the subject that exercises will is the actual person who makes use of will. The word rò λnua, it is well to note, sometimes denotes the will, that is, the volitional faculty, and in this sense we speak of natural will: and sometimes it denotes the object of will, and we speak of will (8Xŋua yvwμikóv) depending on inclination". CHAPTER XXIII. Concerning Energy. 8 instance, speaking, eating, drinking, and such like. The natural affections 9 also are often called energies, for instance, hunger, thirst, and so forth. And yet again, the result of the force is also often called energy. Things are spoken of in a twofold way as being potential and actual. For we say that the child at the breast is a potential scholar, for he is so equipped that, if taught, he will become a scholar. Further, we speak of a potential and an actual scholar, meaning that the latter is versed in letters, while the former has the power of interpreting letters, but does not put it into actual use: again, when we speak of an actual scholar, we mean that he puts his power into actual use, that is to say, that he really interprets writings. It is, therefore, to be observed that in the second sense potentiality and actuality go together; for the scholar is in the one case potential, and in the other actual. The primal and only true energy of nature is the voluntary or rational and indepen lent life which constitutes our humanity. I know |not how those who rob the Lord of this can say that He became man 2. Energy is drastic activity of nature and by drastic is meant that which is moved of itself. CHAPTER XXIV. Concerning what is Voluntary and what is Involuntary. All the faculties 7 we have already discussed, both those of knowledge and those of life, both the natural and the artificial, are, it is to be noted, called energies. For energy & is the natural force and activity of each esThe voluntary 3 implies a certain definite sence or again, natural energy is the activity action, and so-called involuntariness also iminnate in every essence: and so, clearly, things plies a certain definite action. Further, many that have the same essence have also the same energy, and things that have different natures have also different energies. For no essence can be devoid of natural energy. Natural energy again is the force in each essence by which its nature is made manifest. And again: natural energy is the primal, eternally-moving force of the intelligent soul that is, the eternally-moving word of the soul, which ever springs naturally from it. And yet again natural energy is the force and activity of each essence which only that which is not lacks. But actions 9a are also called energies: for 4 Text, Beλntov, as given by Faber. Variant, deλnikóv. 5 τὸ γνωμικὸν θέλημα, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will. Or, acting by opinion, or disposition. 7 Anast. Sin. in '08ny., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151 8 The Greek vepyeía being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio as operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentia. 9 Cf. Anast. Sin. in '08yós, p. 43; John of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, 11., p. 155. θα πράξεις. Το πράξις is defined as ενέργεια λογική in the ful lowing chapter. attribute true involuntariness not only to suffering, but even to action. We must then understand action to be rational energy. Actions are followed by praise or blame, and some of them are accompanied with pleasure and others with pain; some are to be desired by the actor, others are to be shunned : further, of those that are desirable, some are always so, others only at some particular time. And so it is also with those that are to be shunned. Again, some actions enlist pity and are pardonable, others are hateful and deserve punishment. Voluntariness, then, is assuredly followed by praise or blame, and renders the action pleasurable and desirable to the actor, either for all time or for the moment of its performance. Involuntariness, on the other hand, brings merited pity or pardon in its train, and renders the act painful and unde CHAPTER XXV. Concerning what is in our own power, that is, concerning Free-wili 9. sirable to the doer, and makes him leave it in actions, but do not in the least involve free a state of incompleteness even though force choice. Also, if a friend suddenly appears is brought to bear upon him. on the scene, or if one unexpectedly lights on Further, what is involuntary depends in a treasure, so far as we are concerned it part on force and in part on ignorance. It is quite voluntary, but there is no question depends on force when the creative beginning of choice in the matter. For all these things o cause is from without, that is to say, when are voluntary, because we desire pleasure one is forced by another without being at from them, but they do not by any means all persuaded, or when one does not con- imply choice, because they are not the result tribute to the act on one's own impulse, or of deliberation. And deliberation must asdoes not co-operate at all, or do on one's suredly precede choice, as we have said above. own account that which is exacted by force 4. Thus we may give this definition: "An involuntary act is one in which the beginning is from without, and where one does not contribute at all on one's own impulse to that to which one is forced." And by beginning we mean the creative cause. An involuntary act depends, on the other hand, on ignorance, when one is not the cause of the ignorance one's self, but events just so happen. For, if one commits murder while drunk, it is an act of ignorance, but yet not involuntary 5 for one was one's self responsible for the cause of the ignorance, that is to say, the drunkenness. But if while shooting at the customary range one slew one's father who happened to be passing by, this would be termed an ignorant and involuntary act. The The first enquiry involved in the consideration of free-will, that is, of what is in our own power, is whether anything is in our power: for there are many who deny this. second is, what are the things that are in our power, and over what things do we have authority? The third is, what is the reason for which God Who created us endued us with free-will? So then we shall take up the first question, and firstly we shall prove that of those things which even our opponents grant, some are within our power. And let us proceed thus. Of all the things that happen, the cause As, then, that which is involuntary is in two is said to be either God, or necessity, or fate, parts, one depending on force, the other on or nature, or chance, or accident. But God's ignorance, that which is voluntary is the oppo- function has to do with essence and provisite of both. For that which is voluntary dence: necessity deals with the movement is the result neither of force nor of ignorance of things that ever keep to the same course: A voluntary act, then, is one of which the fate with the necessary accomplishment of the beginning or cause originates in an actor, who things it brings to pass (for fate itself implies knows each individual circumstance through necessity): nature with birth, growth, dewhich and in which the action takes place. struction, plants and animals; chance with By "individual" is meant what the rhetori- what is rare and unexpected. For chance cians call circumstantial elements: for in- is defined as the meeting and concurrence stance, the actor, the sufferer, the action of two causes, originating in choice but bring(perchance a murder), the instrument, the ing to pass something other than what is place, the time, the manner, the reason of natural: for example, if a man finds a treasure while digging a ditch2: for the man who hid Notice that there are certain things that the treasure did not do so that the other might occupy a place intermediate between what find it, nor did the finder dig with the purpose is voluntary and what is involuntary. Al- of finding the treasure: but the former hid though they are unpleasant and painful we it that he might take it away when he wished, welcome them as the escape from a still and the other's aim was to dig the ditch: greater trouble; for instance, to escape shipwreck we cast the cargo overboard 7. the action. Notice also that children and irrational creatures perform voluntary actions, but these do not involve the exercise of choice: further, all our actions that are done in anger and without previous deliberation are voluntary whereas something happened quite different 8 Nemes., ch. 33. 9 TOû avrešovσiov. See also III. 34. power to cultivate these or not as we please. Note, however, that while the choice of what is to be done is ever in our power, the action itself often is prevented by some dispensation of the divine Providence 7. man, if indeed man is not the cause and are included the arts, for we have it in our beginning of action 3? for it would not be right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes base and unjust: nor may we ascribe these to necessity, for they are not such as ever continue the same: nor to fate, for fate implies not possibility only but necessity:| nor to nature, for nature's province is animals and plants: nor to chance, for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected: nor to accident, for that is used in reference to the casual occurrences that take place in the world of lifeless and irrational things. We are left then with this fact, that the man who acts and makes is himself the author of his own works, and is a creature endowed with free-will. Further, if man is the author of no action, the faculty of deliberation is quite superfluous: for to what purpose could deliberation be put if man is the master of none of his actions? for all deliberation is for the sake of action. But to prove that the fairest and most precious of man's endowments is quite superfluous would be the height of absurdity. If then man deliberates, he deliberates with a view to action. For all deliberation is with a view to and on account of action. CHAPTER XXVII. Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will. We hold, therefore, that free-will comes on the scene at the same moment as reason, and that change and alteration are congenital to all that is produced. For all that is produced is also subject to change 9. For those things must be subject to change whose production in being brought into being out of nothing, has its origin in change. And change consists and in transforming a substratum of matter into something different. Inanimate things, then, and things without reason undergo the afore-mentioned bodily changes, while the changes of things endowed with reason depend on choice. For reason consists of a speculative and a practical part. The speculative part is the contemplation of the nature of things, and the practical consists in deliberation and defines the true reason for what is to be done. The speculative side is called CHAPTER XXVI. mind or wisdom, and the practical side is Concerning Events. called reason or prudence. Every one, then, Of events 5, some are in our hands, others who deliberates does so in the belief that the are not. Those then are in our hands which choice of what is to be done lies in his hands, we are free to do or not to do at our will, that he may choose what seems best as the that is all actions that are done voluntarily result of his deliberation, and having chosen (for those actions are not called voluntary may act upon it. And if this is so, free-will the doing of which is not in our hands), and must necessarily be very closely related to in a word, all that are followed by blame or For either man is an irrational being, praise and depend on motive and law. Strictly or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts all mental and deliberative acts are in our and endowed with free-will. Hence also hands. Now deliberation is concerned with creatures without reason do not enjoy freeequal possibilities: and an equal possibility' will for nature leads them rather than they is an action that is itself within our power and nature, and so they do not oppose the natural its opposite, and our mind makes choice of appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs the alternatives, and this is the origin of after anything they rush headlong after it. action. The actions, therefore, that are in our hands are these equal possibilities: eg. to be moved or not to be moved, to hasten or not to hasten, to long for unnecessaries or not to do so, to tell lies or not to tell lies, to give or not to give, to rejoice or not to rejoice as fits the occasion, and all such actions as imply virtue or vice in their performance, for we are free to do or not to do these at our pleasure. Amongst equal possibilities also reason. But man, being rational, leads nature rather Note also that the angels, being rational, are endowed with free-will, and, inasmuch as they are created, are liable to change. This in fact is made plain by the devil who, although made good by the Creator, became of his own free-will the inventor of evil, and by the powers who revolted with him, that is the demons, and by the other troops of angels who abode in goodness. CHAPTER XXVIII. Concerning what is not in our hands. Of things that are not in our hands some have their beginning or cause in those that are in our power, that is to say, the recompenses of our actions both in the present and in the age to come, but all the rest are dependent on the divine will. For the origin of all things is from God, but their destruction has been introduced by our wickedness for our punishment or benefit. For God did not create death, neither does He take delight in the destruction of living things 3. But death is the work rather of man, that is, its origin is in Adam's transgression, in like manner as all other punishments. But all other things must be referred to God. For our birth is to be referred to His creative power; and our continuance to His conservative power; and our government and safety to His providential power; and the eternal enjoyment of good things by those who preserve the laws of nature in which we are formed is to be ascribed to His goodness. But since some deny the existence of Providence, let us further devote a few words to the discussion of Providence. in heaven and in earth, and no one resisted His will7. He willed that all things should be and they were. He wills the universe to be framed and it is framed, and all that He wills comes to pass. That He provides, and that He provides excellently, one can most readily perceive thus. God alone is good and wise by nature. Since then He is good, He provides for he who does not provide is not good. For even men and creatures without reason provide for their own offspring according to their nature, and he who does not provide is blamed. Again, since He is wise, He takes the best care over what exists. When, therefore, we give heed to these things we ought to be filled with wonder at all the works of Providence, and praise them all 9, and accept them all without enquiry, even though they are in the eyes of many unjust, because the Providence of God is beyond our ken and comprehension, while our reasonings and actions and the future are revealed to His eyes alone. And by "all" I mean those that are not in our hands: for those that are in our power are outside the sphere of Providence and within that of our Free-will. At Now the works of Providence are partly according to the good - will (of God) and partly according to permission 3. Works of good-will include all those that are undeniably good, while works of permission are . . . . . . 4. For Providence often permits the just man to encounter misfortune in order that he may CHAPTER XXIX. reveal to others the virtue that lies concealed within him 5, as was the case with Job. Concerning Providence. other times it allows something strange to be Providence, then, is the care that God takes done in order that something great and marover existing things. And again: Providence vellous might be accomplished through the is the will of God through which all existing seemingly-strange act, as when the salvation things receive their fitting issue. But if Providence is God's will, according to true reasoning all things that come into being through Providence must necessarily be both most fair and most excellent, and such that they cannot be surpassed. For the same person must of necessity be creator of and provider for what exists: for it is not meet nor fitting that the creator of what exists and the provider should be separate persons. For in that case they would both assuredly be deficient, the one in creating, the other in providing 5. God therefore is both Creator and Provider, and His creative and preserving and providing power is simply His good-will. For whatsoever the Lord pleased that did He 2 Nemesius speaks of this at greater length. 3 Wisd. i. 13. 4 Nemes., ch. 43. of men was brought about through the Cross. In another way it allows the pious man to suffer sore trials in order that he may not depart from a right conscience nor lapse into pride on account of the power and grace granted to him, as was the case with Paul 7. One man is forsaken for a season with a view to another's restoration, in order that others when they see his state may be taught a lesson, as in the case of Lazarus and the rich man 9. For it belongs to our nature to be 6 Ps. cxxxv. 6. 7 Rom. ix. 19. 8 Nemes., ch. 44. 9 The words návra émaiveir are wanting in Cod. R. 2 and in Nemes., ch. 44 2 κατ' εὐδοκίαν. 3 κατὰ συγχώρησιν. 4 There is a hiatus here in Edit. Veron. and in Cod. R. 2927. Various readings are found in other MSS., some with no sense 5 Nemes, ch. 44. 5 Ibid., ch. 42. 8 Nemes., ch. 44. 6 Job i. 11. |