Opinion of the Court.

chapter 51, of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, and section 906 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. But section 891 of the latter statutes is ample authority for the introduction in evidence of the transcript of the General Land Office in the present case. It reads as follows:

"Copies of any records, books or papers, in the General Land Office, authenticated by the seal and certified by the Commissioner thereof, or, when his office is vacant, by the principal clerk, shall be evidence equally with the originals thereof. And literal exemplifications of such records shall be held, when so int duced in evidence, to be of the same validity as if the names of the officers signing and countersigning the same had been fully inserted in such record."

There is therefore no error in the admission of this transcript in evidence.

As regards its effect upon the rights of the parties, it seems to us it shows that under an act of Congress which authorized it to be done, Uthe, by directing his land warrant to be located upon this land and delivering up the warrant, and by the proceedings of the land office upon that location, which resulted in issuing a patent to him for the land, had acquired an equitable title to the land, or what may be called a vested interest in it, prior to the passage of the swamp land act by Congress. He had done what by the act of Congress of 1847 entitled him to the land on which his warrant was located. He had delivered up the land warrant, the evidence of his claim against the government. He had received in exchange for it the certificate of the receiver and register of the land office, and these entitled him to a patent after such delay as was necessary to ascertain the fact that the land had been granted to no one else, and that all his proceedings were regular, which facts were to be determined by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and which were determined in his favor. He had paid for this land. He had paid by the delivering up and cancellation of his land warrant. He had received the certificate of the register and receiver of the land office at Chicago, which, by the laws of nearly all the Western States, have been made equivalent to a title to the land in actions of ejectment,

Opinion of the Court.

though the strict legal title remained in the United States at the date of the passage of the swamp land act.

Are we to suppose that Congress intended to give to the State of Illinois the land which it had already, by a contract for which value was received, promised to convey to Uthe? As the grant to the States of the swamp land within their jurisdiction was a gratuity, although accompanied with a trust for the reclamation of said land, it is not easily to be supposed that Congress intended to be thus generous at the expense of parties who had vested rights in any of the lands so donated, derived from the United States. It would be a matter of considerable doubt whether such an inference, that Congress intentionally violated its contract, would be indulged, if there were no words of reservation in the statute.. But when we find the broad declaration made that the grant only includes those swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cultivation, which shall remain unsold at the passage of the act, we do not have much difficulty in holding that, this land was not unsold within the meaning of the statute. It is true that in a technical sense, and where a due regard to the intention of the parties using the word "sold" is had, it may mean a transfer of the title of property for a money consideration. Yet, it has other meanings which would include the present transaction, when it is obvious that such was the intent of the party using the phrase. We cannot doubt that the delivery by Uthe of his land warrant to the proper officers of the government, with a direction that it be located on this land, and the paper which they issued to him, showing that he had thereby acquired the right to a patent for the land, constituted a sale within the meaning of the act of Congress granting the swamp lands to the States. The cases of the States of Iowa and Illinois v. McFarland, 110 U. S. 471, 482, it is true, give a different construction to the word "sale" in an act of Congress concerning certain sales of public lands. But the intent of Congress in that case was relied on as indicating that the word "sale," as applied to a disposal of the public lands by the government, was limited to sales for cash. The following language, used in the opinion in that case, indicates this very clearly:

Syllabus.

"When each of these acts speaks of lands 'sold by Congress,' 'five per cent of the net proceeds' of which shall be reserved and be disbursed' or 'appropriated' for the benefit of the States in which the land lies, it evidently has in view sales in the ordinary sense, from which the United States receive proceeds, in the shape of money payable into the treasury, out of which the five per cent may be reserved and paid to the State; and does not intend to include lands promised and granted by the United States as a reward for military service, for which nothing is received into the treasury."

In the present case, the act which we are now construing does not contemplate the receipt of any money into the treasury of the United States, nor the payment of any money out of it, in regard. to these swamp lands. We feel at liberty, therefore, to construe the statute as intending to exclude from the grant all the swamp and overflowed lands for which it had, by contract, given a vested right, for a valuable consideration, to individuals before the passage of that act.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which affirmed the action of the lower court, founded on this principle, is sound, in regard to the questions which we have power to review, and its judgment is therefore Affirmed.

PALMER v. MCMAHON.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK.

No. 145. Submitted January 24, 1890.- Decided March 3, 1890.

P. was a resident in the city of New York and a stockholder in a national bank situated there. In 1881 his shares in the bank were assessed at a valuation of $247,635. This valuation was entered by the tax commissloners in the annual Record of Valuations for 1881, a book which was kept open for public inspection from the second Monday of January, 1881, to May 1, 1881, and a public advertisement thereof was made. Before April, 1881, P. appeared before the commissioners and claimed a reduction, and they reduced the valuation to $190,635. On May 1st the assessment rolls were prepared from that record, with the valuation of

Statement of the Case.

The

P.'s shares at the latter sum, and he was assessed at that valuation. tax rolls were completed on this basis, and notice was given that they would be open for inspection. P.'s tax, upon the reduced valuation, was $4994.63. The tax rolls were confirmed, and due notice was given to all taxpayers that the taxes were due and payable. P. paid $1310 of this tax, but declined to pay the further sum of $3684.63. The collector of taxes thereupon proceeded against him in the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York, under c. 230 of the laws of New York of 1843, for the enforcement of the payment of the sum remaining due. He appeared and answered, and judgment was given against him, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the case was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas. A writ of error was sued out from this court to review that judgment; Held,

(1) That this court was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeale as to P.'s failure to comply with the state statute in relation to the method of procedure, form of assessment, etc.;

(2) That the assessment was not made in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and was, therefore, not void for that reason; .

(3) That the mode provided by the statute of New York for the col lection of the tax was "due process of law," and did not deprive P. of the equal protection of the laws; but that it was a purely executive process to collect the tax after the liability of the party was finally fixed.

When a law provides a mode for confirming or contesting an assessment for taxation, with appropriate notice to the person charged, the assessment cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law.

Assessors should give all persons taxed an opportunity to be heard; but it is sufficient if the law provides for a board of revision, authorized to hear complaints respecting the justice of the assessment, and prescribes the time during which, and the place where, such complaints may be made.

THIS was a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York to review a judgment and order finding Francis A. Palmer guilty of misconduct in neglecting to pay personal taxes assessed, imposed and confirmed against him for the year 1881, and ordering that he stand committed until he should have paid the amount of the said taxes, with interest and costs, unless the court should see fit sooner to discharge him, which judgment and order was rendered in a proceeding brought under the provisions of chapter 230 of the laws of the State of New York of 1843, Art. 2, §§ 12 and 13, which sections are as follows:

.66

Statement of the Case.

§ 12. In case of the refusal or neglect of any person to pay any tax imposed on him for personal property, if there be no goods or chattels in his possession upon which the same may be levied by distress and sale according to law, and if the property assessed shall exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, the said receiver, if he has reason to believe that the person taxed has debts, credits, choses in action, or other personal property, not taxed elsewhere in this state, and upon which levy cannot be made according to law, may thereupon in his discretion make application, within one year, to the Court of Common Pleas of the county, or the Supreme Court, to enforce the payment of such tax.

แ

"§ 13. The court may impose a fine for the misconduct mentioned in the next preceding section, sufficient in amount for the payment of the tax assessed, and of the costs and expenses of the proceedings authorized by this act to enforce such payment, or to punish such misconduct; and the amount of such tax shall be paid out of such fine to the said receiver, who shall pay the same in like manner as the tax was required to be paid; and costs and expenses of such proceedings shall be paid out of such fine to the said receiver who made the application to enforce the payment of the tax."

The record showed that on the 17th day of April, 1882, Martin T. McMahon, the receiver of taxes of the city of New York, filed a petition against Francis A. Palmer in the Court of Common Pleas, stating that in the year 1881 Mr. Palmer was a resident of the twenty-first ward in the city of New York and a stockholder in the National Broadway Bank, located in the third ward of said city; that the shares of stock in said bank owned by Mr. Palmer were duly assessed for the year 1881 at the valuation of $247,635, which valuation was entered by the tax commissioners in "The Annual Record of the Assessed Valuation of Real and Personal Estate" for the year 1881, which record was open for examination and correction from the second Monday of January until the first day of May, 1881, and the fact that the books were so open was duly advertised; that before April 30, 1881, Palmer applied for a reduction of the valuation, and it was reduced by