Statement of the Case.

right to receive all money due from Claflin & Co. without any hindrance or interference upon the part of Butler, Hayden & Co. therewith; and a prayer for general relief.

Butler, Hayden & Co. answered the bill, denying any knowl edge of Bird's insolvency, -id claiming that the assignment to Fayerweather was made in good faith, and that the rights of Fayerweather, as a citizen of Net York, under said assignment cannot be in any way affected by the insolvency of Bird; and afterwards amended the answer, and claimed that even if the assignment to Fayerweather was invalid, the attachment proceedings in New York were regular, and gave a valid lien on the property attached; and that, by the Constitution of the United States, the rights and interests gained by the attachments in New York cannot be taken away by the courts of Massachusetts without violating the provision that full faith and credit must be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State.

The case was heard by a single judge upon certain agreed facts and additional evidence, and reserved by him for the consideration of the full court. It was stipulated "that either party may refer to the statutes of the United States, the statutes of the State of New York, and the several decisions of the State of New York, with the same effect as if the same were regularly introduced in evidence." The Supreme Judicial Court found, in addition to the matters herein before stated, that it was fairly proven from the evidence "that the defendants, with full knowledge that Bird was insolvent, anticipating that there might be proceedings in insolvency in this State, and intending to secure to themselves, to the exclusion of other creditors, the avails of the debt owing to Bird by Claflin & Co., made the transfer of their claims to Fayerweather, and that the suits in New York now carried on in his name are subject to their control and conducted for their benefit. The attachments made in New York by process of garnishment are to be treated, so far as the defendants are concerned, as made by them." The court concluded its opinion, which is certified as a part of this record, and is reported in 142 Mass. 47, thus:

Citations for Plaintiffs in Error.

"In the case at bar it is true that the defendants had made their attachment through Fayerweather in New York before there had been an assignment in insolvency in this State actually executed, but this was done with full knowledge on their part that the debtor, Bird, was embarrassed and had suspended payment, and necessarily with intent to avoid the effect of the assignment, so far as the property attached was concerned. As residents of this State, they cannot be allowed to this extent to defeat the operation of the assignment, and thus tó obtain a preference over other creditors resident here. They are within the limits of the jurisdiction of this court, and amenable to its process, and should be enjoined from prosecuting a suit the effect of which, if successful, will be to work a wrong and injury to other residents of the State."

The court thereupon entered a decree for the injunction prayed for, and Butler, Hayden & Co. sued out a writ of error from this court.

Mr. Henry D. Hyde and Mr. M. F. Dickinson, Jr., (with whom was Mr. Hollis R. Bailey on the briefs,) for plaintiffs in error, cited: Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 300; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 145; Warner v. Jaffrey, 96 N. Y. 248, 259; Sartwell v. Field, 68 N. Y. 341; Dunlop v. Patterson Fire Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 145; Anthony v. Wood, 29 Hun, 239; McGinn v. Ross, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 20; Hibernian Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367, 385; Jenks v. Ludden, 34 Minnesota, 486; Kidder v. Tufts, 48 N. H. 121, 126; Paine v. Lester, 44 Connecticut, 196, 204; Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Illinois, 350; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86; Fuller v. Cadwell, 6 Allen, 503; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Whipple v. Robbins, 97 Mass. 107; S. C. 93 Am. Dec. 64; American Bank v. Rollins, 99 Mass. 313; Garity v. Gigie, 130 Mass. 184; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136, 151; Nicoll v. Spowers, 105 N. Y. 1; Keller v. Paine, 107 N. Y. 83, 90; Bicknell v. Field, 8 Paige, 440; Harris v. Pullman, 84 Illinois, 20; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen,

Opinion of the Court.

545; Dehon v. Foster, 7 Allen, 57; Lawrence v. Batcheller, 131 Mass. 504.

Mr. Eugene M. Johnson, for defendants in error, cited: Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Maryland, 203; Quidnick Co. v. Chaffee, 13 R. I. 367; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516; Vermont & Canada Railroad v. Vermont Central Railroad, 46 Vermont, 792, 797; Great Falls Manfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N. H. 462; Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297, 307; Beckford v. Kemble, i Sim. & Stu. 7; Attwood v. Banks, 2 Beavan, 192; Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515; Glascott v. Lang, 3 Myl. & Cr. 451; Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 1 Ch. 320; Ex parte Tait, L. R. 13 Eq. 311; In re Chapman, L. R. 15 Eq. 75; Sartwell v. Field, 66 N. Y. 341; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The question to be determined is, whether a decree of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, restraining citizens of that commonwealth from the prosecution of attachment suits in New York, brought by them for the purpose of evading the laws of their domicil, should be reversed upon the ground that such judicial action in Massachusetts was in violation of Article 4, sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which read as follows:

"SEC. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

"SEC. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

The act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, now embodied in § 905 of the Revised Statutes, after providing the mode of authenticating the acts, records and judicial proceedings of the States, declares:

Opinion of the Court.

"And the said records, and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or shall be taken."

This does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, in which a judgment is rendered, to pronounce the judgment, nor into the right of the State to exercise authority over the parties or the subject matter, nor whether the judgment is founded in, and impeachable for, a manifest fraud. The Constitution did not mean to confer any new power on the States, but simply to regulate the effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within their territory. It did not make the judgments of the States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but only gave a general validity, faith and credit to them as evidence. No execution can be issued upon such judgments without a new suit in the tribunals of other States, and they enjoy, not the right of priority or privilege or lien which they have in the State where they are pronounced, but that only which the lex fori gives to them by its own laws, in their character of foreign judgments. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 328, 329; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 292; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Story, Constitution, §§ 1303 et seq.; and Story, Conflict of Laws, 8 609. And other judicial proceedings can rest on no higher ground.

These well-settled principles find pertinent illustration in the decisions of the highest tribunal of the State of New York, to one of which we refer, as the contention is that the decree under review was in some way an unconstitutional invasion of the jurisdiction of that State.

In Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. (2 Kernan) 156, the plaintiff in a judgment, recovered in New York, brought an action upon it in the Superior Court of Connecticut, whereupon the defendant in the judgment filed a bill against the plaintiff on the equity side of the same court, alleging that the judgment

Opinion of the Court.

was procured by fraud, and praying relief. The plaintiff in the judgment appeared in and litigated the equity suit, and the court adjudged that the allegations of fraud in obtaining the judgment were true, and enjoined him from prosecuting an action upon it. He assigned the judgment, and it was held in a suit in New York, brought thereon by the assignee, that a duly authenticated copy of the record of the decree in the Connecticut Court was conclusive evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud.

The Court of Appeals held that while a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction could not be impeached collaterally for error or irregularity, yet it could be attacked upon the ground of want of jurisdiction, or of fraud or imposition; that the right of the plaintiff in the judgment was a personal right, and followed his person; that when the courts of Connecticut obtained jurisdiction of his person by the due service of process within the State, these courts had full power to pronounce upon the rights of the parties in respect to the judgment, and to decree concerning it; that the jurisdiction of a court of equity anywhere, to restrain suit upon a judgment at law, upon sufficient grounds, was one of the firmly established parts of the authority of courts of equity; and that it could not be held that a court of equity in one State had no jurisdiction to restrain such a suit upon a judgment of a court of law of another State. If the objection to so doing was founded upon an assumed violation of the comity existing between the several States of the United States, that did not reach to the jurisdiction of the court, a rule of comity being a self-imposed restraint upon an authority actually possessed; and as to the objection that the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance of it inhibited the action of the Connecticut courts, this could not prevail, since full faith and credit are given to the judgment of a state court, when in the courts of another State it receives the same faith and credit to which it was entitled in the State where it was pronounced. Pearce v. Olney, 20 Connecticut, 544; Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Georgia, 206; Cage v. Cassidy, 23 How. 109. The intention of section 2 of Article 4 was to confer on the VOL. CXXXIII-8