yed and assigned
it upon the trusts
the marriage the
ersion in certain
th of the husband
id, that, although
cquired property
by the wife to do
ended to be done
y the wife as by
the reversionary
settlement. (Re
key.) ... ...page 502
entation-Juris-
on to set aside a
e with the defen-
is statement of
the execution of
m that her first
her, and at her
id adultery, and
f been guilty of
ter the death of
ed. He further
made to induce
and execute the
the representa-
he marriage, he
e marriage was
absequently dis-
the representa-
of the defendant
ad herself been
his suit, and by
Held that, the
ase upon which
relief, and that
truck out under
anson.)

operty without
red property-
ection-Seques-

dated in 1890,
d that the wife
ould enter into
for the settle-
s, the husband
for himself for
d then for the
father of the
ch he gave her
te use without
d contained a
to settle any
pon the trusts
-ing the cover-

r separate use
eathed to her.
the wife, but,
the marriage.
cted to avoid
to take it for
nst the settle-
n anticipation
ng compensa-
t the income
he wife if she
or interest to
-d under the
making com-
nted by her
e settlement
dingly. (Re

884

537

46

...

...page 681

anticipation. The question arose whether the above-mentioned married women could be put to their election. Held, that, in the case of a married woman to whom a life interest with a restraint on anticipation is given by the same instrument as that which gives rise to a question of election, the doctrine of election does not apply, as the nature of her interest in the property to be relinquished by way of compensation has, by the terms of the instrument, been made inalienable. (Re Wheatley; Smith v. Spence.) Restraint on anticipation-Settled realty-Mortgage of income of.-By a settlement, dated in 1864, freehold property was conveyed to trustees upon trust to let the same, and pay the rents and annual proceeds to C. S. W., a married woman, during her life, for her own sole and separate use, free from the debts, control, or engagements of her present or any future husband; and "the receipts of her for the said rents and annual proceeds to be given after the same shall become due to be good and effectual discharges to the trustees for the same; and from and after the decease of C. S. W., then upon trust to pay the rents and annual proceeds to her husband, in case he survived her, during his life; with ultimate trusts for sale and division amongst the children and issue of C. S. W. by her then present or any future husband, as should be living at the time of such division. In 1881 C. S. W. and her husband mortgaged the income of the settled property to secure a loan of 1000l., and in 1883 they further charged such income, together with other property, with the payment of 500l. Notices of the mortgage and further charge were duly given to the trustees of the settlement. C. S. W. did not receive any of the money secured thereby, but her husband received the same, and applied the whole in payment of his own debts. The question was, whether the mortgage was a valid charge upon the income of the settled property, and who was entitled to be paid such income. Held, that C. S. W. was restrained from anticipation, and her receipt was the only discharge which the trustees could accept. (Re Smith; Chapman v. Wood.)...

501

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT 1882. Cause of action before Act-Right of married woman to sue alone.-The Married Women's Property Act 1882, s. 1 (2), which provides that a married woman shall be capable of suing in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined as plaintiff, deals with procedure only, and therefore applies where the canse of action arose before the Act came into operation. Plaintiff, a married woman, brought an action for assault, libel, and trespass, and her husband was not joined as plaintiff. The alleged causes of action arose before the Married Women's Property Act 1882 came into operation. At the trial plaintiff was no suited. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action without her husband being joined, and therefore the nonsuit was wrong, and there must be a new trial. (Weldon v. Winslow.) 643 Separate estate Reversionary interests Payment out on separate receipt-Property acquired in possession after 1882-Malins' Act-Married Women's Property Act 1382.-A tenant for life of a fund in court had died, and a petition for payment out was presented by parties entitled in remainder, two of them being married women, and married before 1883. The married women werǝ entitled to their shares on the death of the tenant for life, and the question arose whether they were entitled to have their shares paid out on their separate receipt by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act 1832, s. 5. Held, that property to which a woman married before the Act of 1382 came into operation, was entitle in reversion at the date of the Act, but which had since the commencement of the Act become a title in possession, was within the scope of sect. 5, and therefore might be paid out to her on her separate receipt

Separate use-Property acquired after Married Women's Property Act 1882.was moved to enforce against the def married woman, an arbitrator's award pursuance of a consent reference by a April 1883. The cause of action wa tract entered into in 1879 by the defen the plaintiff, and it appeared that by th reference the defendant had agreed to pa awarded by the arbitrator, and costs. submitted by the plaintiff that sect. 1, s of the Married Women's Property Act retrospective, and that separate property by the defendant subsequently to the da contract could be taken in execution, als consent order must be held to be equiv new contract. Held, that sub-sect. retrospective operation so as to include entered into by a married woman b passing of the Act, as it was not expres that it was to be retrospective; but that made after the passing of the Act by con action by a creditor against a married respect of her contract before the Act order all questions under the contr referred to an arbitrator, who was to ha powers of a judge of the High Court parties bound themselves to keep the a an agreement by a married woman aft within sect. 1, sub-sects. 3 and 4; her separate estate which she had at th such agreement was liable to pay the amo by the award to be due from her under tract; and therefore, that any separa which the defendant had at, or after, th the contract was liable to be taken in ex the judgment founded on the conse (Conolan v. Leyland.) ...

...

MASTER AND SERVANT Action for injury caused by dangerous p Knowledge of master- Ignorance of Sufficiency of statement of claim.-In an a servant against his master to recove for personal injury caused by the defec of machinery on premises or materials p the defendant for the purposes of the necessary, in order that the plaintiff ma to prove that the danger or defect whi the injury was known to the defendan not known to the plaintiff, and a sta claim which does not allege both these closes no cause of action and is bad. (( The London and St. Katherine's Dc pany.)...

...

MAYOR'S COURT, LONDO Prohibition-Cause of action arising wholly within the jurisdiction-Mayor's Court Procedure Act 1857.- A verbal agree entered into outside the jurisdiction of th Court, London, by which the defendai purchase from the plaintiff the lease situate at New Cross, in the county together with the goodwill and stock-indrapery business carried on there. The this agreement were embodied in two co documents, one of which was signed by dant at Bow, in the county of Middlese: other subsequently signed by the plaint city of London, and these two documents exchanged between the parties' solicit the city. Neither of the parties dwelt on business within the city of Lond liberties thereof. A sum of 50%., being t of the purchase money, remaining u plaintiff sued the defendant for this s Mayor's Court. The defendant thereupc at chambers a writ of prohibition restr Mayor's Court from proceeding with t Held, on appeal, that the prohibition w granted, as no part of the cause of ac

METROPOLIS MANAGEMENT AMENDMENT ACT 1862.

"General line of buildings' -"Decided by the superintending architect of the Metropolitan Board of Works"-Jurisdiction of magistrate-Architect's decision.-S., the owner of a house in the High-road, Lee, Kent, the frontage of which did not exceed fifty feet in distance from the said road, without obtaining the consent of the Metropolitan Board of Works, commenced to erect a building, extending the frontage of the house to the road. Subsequently the superintending architect of the Metropolitan Board of Works for the time being fixed the general line of buildings, of which S.'s honse formed part, in such a position that S.'s new building projected beyond it, although it did not extend beyond the line of a stable, chapel, and shops abutting on the same road, east and west of the ends of the general line of buildings fixed as aforesaid. Held, on a case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate, that, on the hearing of a summons for a breach of the 75th section of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), the magistrate is bound by the architect's certificate as conclusive, and has no jurisdiction to consider for himself what is the general line of buildings. (The Plumstead District Local Board v. Spackman.)...

MINES.

...page 757

MONEY-LENDING SOCIETY. More than twenty members - Non-registrationSect. 4 of Companies Act 1862-Loan to memberSubsequent registration-Acquiesence of debtorBankruptcy of debtor-Admissibility of society's proof. A money-lending society, consisting of more than twenty persons, and not being duly registered under the Companies Act 1862, advanced 100l. to one of its members upon a promissory note, the amount to be repaid by monthly instalments. Subsequently the society was registered in accordance with the Act, and the debtor, who had duly paid instalments up to the time of registration, continued to pay further instalments up to the time of his bankruptcy. When he became bankrupt the society tendered a proof for the balance of his debt to them, but the trustee rejected the proof on the ground that the society, by reason of the nonregistration at the period when the advance was made, could not have enforced any claim against the debtor, and were therefore not entitled to prove. The County Court judge, however, admitted the proof on the ground that the society might have enforced their claim against the debtor because, at the first meeting of the society, there were less than the prescribed number of members. Held, on appeal, that the society was within the scope of the 4th section of the Companies Act 1862, but that it must be inferred from the payment by the debtor of instalments after the registration that he had acquiesced in the registration; and that the several members of the society had entered into a mutual and binding contract to treat as binding the engagements of the old society, in which contract the agreement of each member was a good consideration for the agreement of the remainder; and further, that this acquiescence on the part of the debtor was binding on the trustee, and rendered the proof admissible. (Re Thomas; Ex parte Poppleton.)

MORTGAGE. Appointment of receiver by mortgagee-Subsequent distress by mortgagor-Injunction-Conveyancing Act 1881.-A mortgagee appointed a receiver of

602

the income of the mortgaged I Conveyancing Act 1881, and g appointment to the mortgagor. nevertheless distrained for rent b the appointment of the receiver claimed to distrain for the prot perty, alleging that the receiver h in collecting the rent. Held, + must be granted to restrain the interfering with the receiver, or r Semble, that even if the mortg negligence on the part of the rec for the rent was not the proper m his interests. (Bayly v. Went.) Building society-Statutory receip cieties Act 1874-Legal estate-In 1872 A. mortgaged four freel building society. In 1877 he sol one of the houses to the defenda make any investigation of the ti the production of any title deeds, of any incumbrance; but he took mediately after the conveyance, and in possession ever since. A. acted in the transaction. In 1881 A. plaintiff to pay off the mortgage an sum. The plaintiff having agreed attended at the office of the society tiff paid the money due on the m usual statutory receipt was indorsed gage deed, in accordance with se Building Societies Act 1874, under the society was incorporated. The other title deeds were then delivered tary of the society to the plaintiff. A. executed a mortgage of the four b plaintiff, who knew nothing of the def chase. The question was, what was th receipt indorsed upon the mortgage, the plaintiff or defendant had priori the house which had been sold to th was contended that the plaintiff, who h ledge, must be treated as having notice of the defendant's ignorance mortgage, because the defendant was i of the house he had bought. Held, th tiff had no notice that the defendant w of the mortgage to the society, and tha known that fact, it would not alter h Held, also, that the statutory receipt legal estate in the plaintiff, and that hi to the extent of money paid to the s interest, was prior to the defendant's cla ster v. Cochrane.)

Disclaimer by one defendant-Notice of foreclosure-Costs of defendant's appe first mortgagee brought an action for against the mortgagor and a number quent incumbrancers of whom G. was on in a defence disclaiming all interest and to be dismissed without costs. It was that G. had had an interest, and was made a party to the action. The plainti of obtaining the common order to dismi G. with notice of motion for judgment i closure decree against him. G. appear hearing. Held, that it was unnecessary to appear, and he was not entitled to 1 (Lewin v. Jones.)

Foreclosure-Costs of action for foreclosure gages of two estates-Conveyancing Act The costs of a foreclosure action brought by gagee in respect of mortgages to him of tinct estates by the same mortgagor to se distinct advances will not be apportioned the two estates, but an account will be dir what is due to the plaintiff for principal a rest under each mortgage and of the who of the action, and the mortgagor will no liberty to redeem one of the two estates upon payment of what may be so found to (Clapham v. Andrews.)...

Rules of Court, Form 5, Appendix ( mediate judgment-Form of order.-In closure action, when the statement of

March 28, 1885.]

property under the ave notice of the

The mortgagor Decoming due after

T.

...page 761

The mortgagor
tection of the pro-
had been negligent
hat an injunction
e mortgagor from
receiving the rent.
gagor had proved
eiver, distraining
mode of protecting
pt-Building So-
Priority-Notice.
-hold houses to a
ld and conveyed
ant, who did not
Eitle, nor require
nor did he know
k possession im-
nd had continued
das his solicitor
- applied to the
nd lend a larger
to do this, they
y, and the plain-
mortgage. The
ed on the mort-
sent. 42 of the
I which statute

mortgage and
ed by the secre-
A. subsequently
houses to the
efendant's pur-
the effect of the
-e, and whether
ority in title to
the latter. It

o had no snow-
g constructive
ce of the first
s in possession
that the plain-
t was ignorant
that, if he had
his position.
pt vested the
his mortgage,
society and
claim. (Sang-
of motion for
pearance.-A
or foreclosure
ber of subse-
one.

G. put
nd consenting
was admitted
vas properly
ntiff, instead
smiss, served
nt for a fore-
eared at the
sary for him
to his costs.

are of mort-
Act 1881.-
at by a mort-
of two dis-
secure two
hed between

• directed of
al and inte-
whole costs

not be at
Los except

889

59

followed Form 5, Appendix C., the defendant did not appear at the trial, and the plaintiff proved his debt and interest orally. The Court gave judg ment for payment within ten days of principal, interest, and costs. Account to be taken and, in default of payment of certified amount within six months from certificate, foreclosure. (Lee v. Dunsford.)

...page 590

Foreclosure-Subsequent incumbrancers-Time for redemption-Successive periods-Further time.In a foreclosure action the question came before the court whether a judgment for foreclosure nisi should, in the event of there being a second mortgagee entitled to redeem, give successive periods of redemption to such second mortgagee and the mortgagor. Held, that the ordinary right of the mortgagor was that he should have six months wherein he could redeem; that it was ananomaly that a mortgagor by dealing with the equity of redemption should, by further mortgages, gain further time; that, though there was no settled rule, the practice of the courts had been to give one time only, and the court would adopt that practice in this case; that the court would give successive periods of redemption on the request of the puisne mortgagees, but not not on the request of the mortgagor, and that, if the puisne mortgagees made such a request, their mortgages must either be proved by them or admitted by the mortgagor. (Platt v. Mendel and others.)

424

Priority-Legal mortgage-Negligence in custody of deeds-Facilitating fraud-Postponement.-C., being manager of an insurance company, executed a legal mortgage of some property of his own to the company, the title deeds being placed in the company's safe. To this safe C. had, as manager, a key; by means of it he abstracted the deeds and deposited them with W., who had no notice of the fraud, by way of equitable mortgage to secure an advance: Held, that the company had not been guilty of any such gross negligence as would require that their mortgage should be postponed to W.'s. (Northern Counties of England Fire Insurance Company v. Whipp.) 806 Priority-Part of trust fund in court-Notice to trustees-Stop-order.--C. mortgaged a reversionary trust fund to which he was entitled, part of the fund being in the hands of trustees and part in court, and the mortgagee gave notice to the trustees. C. afterwards mortgaged the same fund to an insurance society, who had no notice of the prior mortgage, and the society gave notice to the trustees and obtained a stop-order. Held, that, as to the part of the fund in court, the society was entitled to priority. (Mutual Life Assurance Society v. Langley.) Second mortgage-Notice to first mortgagee-Mistake-Rights of second mortgagee.-The second mortgagees of leaseholds gave notice of their charge to the first mortgagees. The mortgagor, with the concurrence of the first mortgagees, and acting by the same solicitors, subsequently sold the property, and the proceeds of sale were distributed without having regard to the rights of the second mortgagees, whose notice of charge had been forgotten. Upon an action by the second mortgagees against the mortgagor and the first mortgagees for an account, the mortgagor not appearing: Held, that the fact of the notice of the second charge having been forgotten did not alter the rights of the parties; and that the first mortgagees were liable to the extent of the balance of the proceeds of the sale after the satisfaction of their charge. (West London Commercial Bank v. Reliance Permanent Building Society.)

...

...

...

Voluntary settlement-Equity of redemption-Sale by mortgage-Effect of consolidation.-Where a mortgagor has executed a voluntary settlement of the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property, a sale by the mortgagee under his power does not affect the right of the persons claiming under the

284

325

to M. A year afterwards he mortga property to M. Held, that the statu c. 4, gave no right to consolidate against t entitled under the settlement. (Re W Estate.)

MORTMAIN ACT.

Interest in land-Mortgage of life intere funds invested on mortgage of land-M life interest and of estate in remainder trust funds.-A testator gave to trus trusts in favour of charities certain including (a) 100l. due to him from a hu wife, and secured by a mortgage by th wife's life interest under a will in a sum which was at the time of the testat invested upon a mortgage of freeholds; ( of 800l. and 2001., due to him from a wido two children, and secured as to the & mortgage of the widow's life interest child's estate in remainder in settlement as to the 2001. by a mortgage of such life and the other child's estate in remain same funds. The settled funds were at t the testator's death invested upon mortga holds. Held, that the bequest of the 100 good, it being pure personalty, since th could in no manner obtain possession of but that those of the 8001. and 2001. void as being impure personalty, since not necessarily, but by possibility, obta sion of the land by foreclosure. (Re Wat ford . Elliott.)

NEGLIGENCE. Evidence of-Liability of harbour anthori Suits Act 1881 - Public work- Wol nature."-The harbour of W. was undert and management of the Executive Gove the colony. The staithes and wharves b the Government, which received whar tonnage dues in respect of vessels us There were no harbour dues, and the a right to navigate subject to the har lations made by the Government, which h to remove obstructions in the harbour. the respondents, while lying alongside or staithes, in the usual and customary the port, settled with the fall of the ti snag lying at the water and sustained There was evidence that the harbour m aware, before the accident, of the exist danger at the spot, though not of its preci Held, that it was the duty of the Gove take reasonable care that vessels using th in the ordinary manner might do so witho and that they were liable for the injury s The Crown Suits Act 1881, s. 37, ena claim or demand shall be made upon or ag Majesty unless the same shall b a wrong or damage, ind of contract, done or suffered by or ur authority of the Executive Governmer colony,in, upon, or in connection with work as hereinafter defined. Public wor any railway, tramway, road, bridge, elec graph, or other work of a like nature us Government of the colony." Held, that the to take reasonable care in this case was done by or under the authority of the Government, and that the staithes were of a like nature" within the meaning of th (Reg. v. Williams.)... Railway company-Level crossing in stati tributory negligence- Accident caused ceased's own negligence-Province of j jury. The action was brought, und Campbell's Act, by a widow, for the lo husband. The deceased intended travelli defendants' railway to N. by the train W. at 9.50 p.m. He arrived at W. stati 9.30 p.m.. and took his ticket at the booki

and there was no shelter, except a shed, open in front, and without either fire or fireplace. As the night was very cold and dark, the deceased went into the waiting-room on the down platform, and there waited by the fire until the train was heard approaching. On hearing the train approaching, the deceased got up quickly and hurried to get over to the other side of the line from which the train was to start. There was no bridge or subway across the line, but only a level crossing, at each end of which a lamp was fixed. The deceased went to the level crossing, and attempted to cross the line, when the train was about twenty yards distant from the crossing, but before he was able to cross he was struck and killed on the spot by the engine of the train by which he intended to travel. The ticket-office being on the opposite side of the line to that from which the train was to start, it was necessary for the deceased, after getting his ticket, to cross the line, and there was no means of crossing except by the level crossing. At the approach of a train it was usual for a porter to stand at this crossing, to warn passengers against crossing when a train was approaching; but on the night in question there was no porter at the crossing to give warning of such danger, and no notice was given of the approach of the train; no whistle was sounded, and no bell was rung. The learned judge, holding that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants in not having a porter at the crossing to warn passengers, and in not giving notice of the approach of the train, left the whole question to the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff for 100l. Held, that the judge ought to have withdrawn the case from the jury and directed a nonsuit, on the ground that the case, at the end of the plaintiff's evidence, disclosed such a want of care on the part of the deceased, and showed that he had so far conduced, by his negligence, to his own death, as to disentitle the plaintiff to recover. Held also, that in an action for damages for the negligence of the defendants, it is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to have his case submitted to a jury that he has proved some negligence on the part of the defendants, if it also appears, in the opinion of the judge, that the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence that no reasonable jury could find a verdict in his favour. (Wright v. Midland Railway Company.)

...page 539

OVERHEAD WIRES. Telephone-Injunction-Property of district board in street Meaning of words "vest" and "street"-Metropolis Management Act 1855Telegraph Act 1863.-By the Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 96, "all streets being highways. shall vest in and be under the management and control of the vestry or district board of the parish or district in which such highways are situate." Defendants, a telephone company, fixed a telephone wire to a chimney, and stretched it across a street, which was vested in plaintiffs as the district board, at a height of about thirty feet from the ground. Plaintiffs brought an action for an injunction to restrain defendants from keeping up the wire. Held, that what was vested in plaintiffs was the property in the surface of the ground together with as much space, both above and below the surface, as amounted to the area of ordinary user; and that, as the wire in question was above this area, and was not shown to be dangerous, so as to amount to a nuisance, plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction. Held, also, that defendants did not require plaintiffs' consent under 26 & 27 Vict. c. 112, s. 12, to entitle them to place the wire across the street. (The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District v. The United Kingdom Telephone Company Limited.) 148

into partnership in lacemaking purchaser brought an action f his patent against H. and S.: H no estoppel by record or deed or H. from impeaching, by way action, the validity of his ow ground of want of novelty, but th delivered particulars of objection c. 83, s. 41, could not give evidenc of the patent: Held also (Bowen, that H. could not be allowed t purpose of rectifying the omissio ticulars of objection. (Cropper v. Infringement-User-Injunction ordered to be delivered up-Discla Fiat of Attorney-General.-The L M. Company became possessed transmitters, which were proved t ment of the "Blake patent," b U. T. Company. The transmitter dismantled and unused in the w L. and G. T. and M. Company. of another similar patent belonging Company (the Edison patent) w Attorney-General, he had issued h the plaintiff company to disclaim c the specification of that patent, on no proceedings should be taken fendant company in respect of the ments in question, which were also a of the "Edison patent." Held, th the defendant company being in instruments which infringed the pla was of itself enough to give the plai a right to an injunction to restrain sale of such instruments; but the co order them to be delivered up. H that the instruments were not protec of the Attorney-General, which relat Edison patent. (The United Telephor The London and Globe Telephone and Company.)

Issue of warning circular by patentee restrain-Infringement-Cross-action taking by defendants to proceed with t Interlocutory injunction to restrain iss refused. The plaintiffs were the make bow Water Raisers or Elevators," a menced an action for an injunction to defendants from issuing a circular ca public against the use of such elevat direct infringements of certain pate defendants. The plaintiffs subsequently of a motion to restrain the issue of t until the trial of the action. The defe commenced a cross-action, claiming an to restrain the plaintiffs from infrin patents. Held, that, as there was no mala fides on the part of the defendants, not to be restrained from issuing the cir their action had beeen disposed of, but must undertake to prosecute their acti delay. (Household and Rosher v. Fai Hall.)...

PARTNERSHIP. Partnership inter se-Share in profits and By an agreement signed by W. and H. was agreed that for the part taken by business then carried on by H. and Co., th pay him a fixed salary of 180l. per annu addition he was to receive one-eighth sha net profits, and bear one-eighth share of as shown by the books when balanced. V to leave with the business 1500l., which w be withdrawn by him during the continuar agreement, and in the meantime interest at 5 per cent. per annum was to be paid The agreement was to continue in force 1 expiration of four months' notice in wr either side, at the expiration of which the 1500l., with any arrears of interest, sala profits, was to be paid to W., but H. and ( to be at liberty to pay 1500l. to W. on giv month's notice in writing. Held, that no 1

PAUPER LUNATIC. Estate of pauper lunatic-Guardians-Power to recover sums spent on maintenance out of estate of pauper after his death-Rules of Court 1883, Order XLV., r. 1.-Where A. was maintained as a pauper lunatic, though the guardians knew that he had some property which was just sufficient to support his wife, on summons under Order XLV., r. 1, of the Rules of Court 1883, for payment of a sum of 561. 68. in respect of such maintenance : Held, that, though the guardians had not obtained an order from justices during the lifetime of the deceased, they were entitled to payment. (Re Webster; The Guardians of Derby Union v. Sharratt.) ...

POOR LAW.

Delay in going to trial-Proceedings prosecuted with due diligence-Poor Law Boards (Payment of Debts) Act 1859.-An action was brought by an engineer, within the time limited by sect. 1 of the Payment of Debts Act 1859, for services rendered to the defendants, who were a rural sanitary authority acting under the Public Health Act 1875. After issue joined the plaintiff took out a summons to refer the matter to arbitration; this summons was opposed by the defendants, and was dismissed. The plaintiff then allowed two assizes at Leeds (where the action was to be tried) to pass without giving notice of trial; the defendants then took out a summons to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, after which the plaintiff gave notice of trial for the assizes then coming on. At the trial, the learned judge, with the consent of the parties, ordered the matter to be referred to an arbitrator, who found for the plaintiff for a certain sum. In an action for a mandamus to the defendants to levy a rate to satisfy the award: Held, granting the mandamus, that, as the action was a proper one to be referred to arbitration, and as the plaintiff had taken out a summons to refer, which the defendants opposed, the plaintiff had not, under the circumstances, failed to prosecute the proceedings in the action "with due diligence' within the meaning of sect. 4 of the Poor Law Boards (Payment of Debts) Act 1859. (Rhodes v. Guardians of Pateley Bridge Union.)

Select vestry-Workhouse and industrial schools -Power to pay Roman Catholic clergymen for religious ministrations-Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76), s. 56; Poor Law Order 1867.-Sect. 46 of the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 gave the Poor Law Commissioners power to direct the overseers or guardians of any parish or union to appoint "paid officers," which term, by sect. 109, was to include clergymen. By a Poor Law Order of 1867 "the guardians (which included the select vestry of a parish) "might employ such persons as they should deem requisite in or about the workhouse premises, or on the land occupied for the employment of the pauper inmates, or otherwise in or about the relief of the indoor poor, upon such terms and conditions as should appear to them to be suitable." Held, that the select vestry of L. had power, under the above statute and order, to appoint and pay Roman Catholic clergymen to minister to the Roman Catholic inmates of the workhouse, and the industrial schools connected therewith. (Reg. v. Haslehurst.)

...

319

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leasehold premises and certain personal freeholds were conveyed to trustees ( the life estate of J. C. P.), and the leas the personal estate were assigned to th trust as to 10,000l. for B. for life, and for A. (the husband) for life, and subjec as to all the realty and personalty, as appoint, and in default in trust for B. for if she should predecease her husband, to the realty for her heirs, and as to the for her next of kin, as if she had died u The settlement contained the usual co further assurance. At the date of the

it was believed that B. was entitled to th of the freeholds and leaseholds, subject estate of J. C. P., whereas she was e only thirteen-sixteenths thereof, and J. then, and to the time of his death, entitle sixteenths. J. C. P. died in 1866, havi will given his property to B. B. made 1880, and, in exercise of the powers in ment, and of every other power, gave al holds and leaseholds comprised in the to W. W. P. and T. H. P. equally; and all the rest of her personal estate to t pay the income to her husband for life, wards to divide such estate equally J. B. P., W. W. P., and T. H. P. She that her executors should have power t real and personal estate. B. made a 1880, revoking the gift of any money properties which she should have accumul or purchased with the income of the prop prised in the settlement, or the corp property not included in the settlement a wise acquired, and giving the same to her T. H. P. died in B.'s lifetime, without iss questions were, who was entitled to the the residuary personal estate, the gift lapsed by the death of T. H. P.; who was the three-sixteenths of the freeholds; an entitled to the interest in such three-s the gift of which lapsed by the death of Held, that B. had made the personal est was included in the residuary gift part of assets, and that, so far as it lapsed, it her next of kin, as though at her dea belonged to her absolutely. Held, also, person claiming under the appointmen regards the three-sixteenths of the free right to insist upon that claim, either on t that the recital in the settlement amoun estoppel, or that he had an equity to en covenant for further assurance; that B. the property part of her own estate, and far as it lapsed, it devolved upon her heir-at Horton; Horton v. Perks; Horton v. Clar