the income of these legacies was not subject to the
provisions of sect. 43 of the Conveyancing Act
1881. Under the will it would undoubtedly belong
to the testator's residuary legatees until the
infants attained twenty-one, and sect. 43 of the
Act was not intended to apply to incomes to which
infants never could become entitled, but which
passed as residue to other persons. (Re Dickson;
Hill v. Grant.)
...page 891
Necessaries-Infant sufficiently supplied when goods
are ordered-Such fact not communicated to the
person supplying-Admissibility of evidence as to
such supply-Province of judge and jury.-The
plaintiffs, who were tailors, brought an action for
221. 188. 6d. for clothes supplied by them to the
defendant. The defendant pleaded that, at the
time the clothes were supplied, he was an infant,
and the plaintiffs replied that the goods supplied
were necessaries, suitable to the estate and condi-
tion in life of the defendant. On this issue was
joined. At the trial evidence was given to show
that the defendant was already sufficiently supplied
with clothes at the time when the goods in question
were ordered, but this fact was not communicated
to the plaintiffs. The learned judge withdrew
this evidence from the jury, and left the question
to them in the following terms: "Were the goods
necessaries? It does not matter what amount of
clothes he (the defendant) had in his box, trunk, or
wardrobe, it not having been communicated to the
plaintiffs." The jury found for the plaintiffs. On
a motion on behalf of the defendant for a new trial
on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict
was against the weight of evidence: Held, that the
evidence that the defendant was already sufficiently
supplied with articles of the same kind when the
clothes in question were ordered ought to have
been admitted and left to the jury, notwithstanding
that the fact of such supply had not been commu-
nicated to the plaintiffs, it being for the jury to
judge of the effect of that supply on the question
of necessaries. (Baines and Co. v. Toye.)

INJUNCTION.

Agreement for a lease-Subsequent agreement-
Vested rights-Saving clause in Act-Shooting
hares and rabbits-Ground Game Act 1880 (43 &
44 Vict. c. 47), s. 5.-In a case where there was a
good equitable agreement for a lease of land in
existence before the passing of the Ground Game
Act 1880, containing stipulations giving the land-
lord the exclusive right of shooting over the land
and prohibiting the tenant from killing and taking
ground game by a gun, which were at variance
with the Act: the question came before the court,
on a motion for an injunction, whether the saving
clause of the Ground Game Act 1880 (sect. 5) was
applicable to an agreement for a lease for years
made previously to the date of the passing of the
Act, but for a term to come into operation after
that date (7th Sept. 1880). Held, that the agree-
ment in question was within the saving clause, as
the Legislature did not interfere with vested rights
without providing compensation: also that sect. 3
of the same Act was not retrospective. (Allhusen
v. Brookirg.)
Railway-Siding-Order of Board of Trade-Costs
of repairs-Injunction-5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, ss. 4, 6,
and 12-Railways Clauses Act 1845.-A railway
company requested the plaintiff in this action, the
owner of a siding, to provide signalling or inter-
locking apparatus for his junction in accordance
with an order of the Board of Trade, or to pay the
cost of the work it done by the company. On his
refusal the company took up the junction. On
motion by the plaintiff to restrain the company
from interfering with his junction, the Court held
that the company was not entitled to compel the
plaintiff to do the work, or pay the cost of it, and
granted an injunction. (Woodruff v. The Brecon and
Merthyr Tydfil Junction Railway Company.)
Slander-Mandatory injunction-Dismissed servant
-Letters addressed to employers' office.-Where
a defendant, who had been in the employ of the
plaintiffs, had been making statements to the

292

57

536

plaintiffs' customers injuric
and trying to interfere w
making payments to them, a
tion was granted restraining
An injunction was also grant
dant, who had resided at th
business, to withdraw a notic
post-office, to send any letters:
to another address, the plainti
open any letter addressed to
at certain fixed times, with
dant to be present. (Herman

INSURAN
MARINI

Insurable interest-No specif
goods to contract-Property
assured-"Free on board.
merchants of London, agreed
the plaintiff, a merchant at
sugar of a certain quality as
matter, at the price of 21s. 9d.
burg. The sugar was to be
burg to Bristol, and payment
cash in London in exchange for
and Co.'s agents at Hamburg,
this contract and also of anot
for another 200 tons of sugar,
the steamship City of Dublin
and consigned the same to Bri
usual course of business was, a
not to apportion particular bag
ticular buyers at the time of
apportion the various bags and
representing them between their
a particular port, after the suga
and after D. and Co. had re
lading. This was done in orde
might with comparative accurac
buyer the amount of saccharine
for by him. The City of Dublin
voyage from Hamburg to Bri
appropriation of sugar had beer
Co., but D. and Co. afterwards
tons to the plaintiff and sent him
the plaintiff thereupon paid for th
priated to him. The plaintiff ha
on goods, and on hearing of t
thereunder in respect of these 200
the City of Dublin. Held, in a
policy, that the plaintiff had an in
in such sugar, because, although
not passed to him, the words f.o.b
made between the parties, havin
knowledge of the course of busine
be their intention that the 200 ton
plaintiff should be at his risk, and
be liable to pay for it whether it
(Stock v. Inglis.)
Time policy Warranty

1

Ambig

Fortius contra proferentem-Ju
Whether the underwriters or the o
considered as the proferentes in r
dition in a policy of insurance, de
character and substance of the p
tion. The respondents, shipowners,
the appellants, the underwriters
of insurance, as for a total loss, and
resisted the claim on the ground o
warranty in the policy. The warr
St. Lawrence" between certain dat
admitted that the vessel had naviga
St. Lawrence within the prohibited
owners contended that the warrant
to the river St. Lawrence. It was p
navigation of the gulf was dang
season, but less so than that of the
that, in the absence of any evidence
the words of the warranty disclosed
or uncertainty sufficient to prevent
of the ordinary rules of construction
words, and that both the gulf and t
prohibited. A court should take jud
the geographical positions of, aud
applied to a district as shown on
chart. (Birrell v. Dryer.)

ous to their business,
with their customers
an interlocutory injune-
ng him from doing so.
hted, ordering the defen-
the plaintiffs' place of
tice given by him to the
saddressed to him there
ntiffs undertaking not to
to the defendant except
h liberty to the defen-
an Loog v. Bean.)...page 442
ANCE.

INE.

D.

cific appropriation of
-ty not passed to the
"-D. and Co., sugar
ed in writing to sell to
at Bristol, 200 tons of
as regards saccharine
d. per cwt. f.o.b. Ham-
De shipped from Ham-
ent was to be made by
for bills of lading.
arg, in performance of
nother Bristol contract
ar, shipped thence per
lin 400 ̊ tons of sugar,
Bristol. D. and Co.'s
, asthe plaintiff knew,
bags of sugar to par-
- of shipment, but to
and the bills of lading
heir various buyers at
ngar had been shipped
received the bills of
order that D. and Co.
racy make up to each
ice matter contracted
blin was lost on the
Bristol, before any
been made by D. and
rds appropriated 200
him an invoice, and
or the sugar so appro-
I had a floating policy
of the loss declared
e 200 tons of sugar in
11 an action on such
an insurable interest
ngh the property had
f.o.b. in the contract
aving regard to their
1siness, showed it to
) tons bought by the
, and that he should
r it arrived or not.
mbiguity - Maxim,
- Judicial notice.-
the owners are to be
in regard to a con-
›, depends upon the
he particular condi-
ners, claimed against
ers of a time policy
3, and the appellants
ind of a breach of a
warranty was "No
n dates, and it was
avigated the gulf of
bited time, but the
rranty applied only
was proved that the
dangerous at that
of the river. Held,
lence to that effect,
losed no ambiguity
vent the application
ction as to negative
and the river were
I notice of

419

INTERPLEADER.
Indemnity to auctioneers-Objection to interpleader
by claimant giving indemnity-Interpleader Act
(1 & 2 Will 4, c. 58), s. 1.-By Order LVII., r. 2,
it is provided that the applicant (seeking relief by
way of interpleader) must satisfy the court or a
judge by affidavit or otherwise (inter alia) that he
does not collude with any of the claimants. T.
and W. both claimed certain goods. W. ordered
auctioneers to sell. T. gave the auctioneers notice
of his claim, and that if they sold he would hold
them responsible. W. being informed thereof by
the auctioneers replied that he would hold them
indemnified. The auctioneers having sold the
goods applied for an interpleader order that an
issue should be directed to be tried between T. and
W., which having been made at chambers, W.
appealed on the ground that the auctioneers had
colluded with one of the claimants, and were there-
fore not entitled to the order. Held, that the
auctioneers had not colluded with either of the
claimants within the meaning of Order LVII.,
T. 2, and were therefore entitled to the order
prayed. (Ke An Interpleader Issue between
Thompson and Wright and others; Richardson
and Roper, applicants.)...

JUSTICES.

...

...page 634

Refusal of justices to hear case-Rule to show cause
-Mandamus-11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 5.-By the 5th
section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, it is enacted that,
"whereas it would conduce to the advancement of
justice, and render more effective and certain the
performance of the duties of justices, and give
them protection in the performance of the same, if
some simple means, not attended with much
expense, were devised by which the legality of
any act to be done by such justices might be con-
sidered and adjudged by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and such justices enabled and directed
to perform it without risk of any action or other
proceeding being brought or had against them;
therefore in all cases where a justice or justices of
the peace shall refuse to do any act relating to the
duties of his or their office as such justice or
justices, it shall be lawful for the party requiring
such act to be done to apply to Her Majesty's
Court of Queen's Bench, upon an affidavit of the
facts, for a rule calling upon such justice or
justices, and also the party to be affected by such
act, to show cause why such act should not be
done." An information having been laid against
P. under the 51st section of the Highway Act 1864
(27 & 28 Vict. c. 101) for encroaching on a highway,
the justices decided on evidence given that a claim
of right set up by P. to the land alleged to have
been encroached upon by him was bona fide, and
thereupon refused to hear the case on the ground
of want of jurisdiction. The complainant having
applied under the 5th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c.
44, for a rule for the justices to show cause why
they should not hear and determine the case:
Held, that the application was properly made, the
statute not being limited to cases in which the
justices need protection in the performance of
their duties. (Reg. v. Phillimore and others,
Justices, and Pilling.)

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Assignee of reversion-Estoppel by payment of rent
-Jus tertii.-Where a person claiming to be
assignee of the reversion receives rent from the
tenant by fraud or misrepresentation, such pay-
ment is no evidence of title; but where there is no
fraud or misrepresentation, such payment is primâ
facie evidence of title, and the tenant can only
defeat that title by showing that he paid the rent
in ignorance of the true state of the title, and that
some third person is the real assignee of the
reversion and entitled to maintain ejectment.
Hence, in an action for rent by the alleged assignee
of the reversion, where rent had been paid by
the tenant to the agent of the alleged assignee,
it was held to be no defence for the tenant

205

title to the reversion. (Carlton v. Bowc
another.)

Forcible entry on land-Damages-5 Rich. 2,
c. 8-Re-entry for breach of covenant and i
ment of rent-Absence of notice of breac
veyancing Act 1881.-Where a person has
possession of property, but has no title to
in fact a trespasser, the rightful owner is
to use force in ejecting him, to long as he d
no personal injury. Lessors had not be
entering upon premises for nonpayment
and breach of covenant served upon the te
notice required by sect. 14, sub-sect. 1, of 1
veyancing Act 1881, specifying the br
covenant complained of. Held, that, by r
sub-sect. 8 of the section, its provisions
affect the law relating to re-entry for nonpay
rent; and under sub-sect. 2 the court had i
tion to refuse relief against re-entry for b
covenant on the ground of want of notice,
circumstances of this case were such that t
would refuse such relief. (Scott v. Matthev
and Co. Limited.)

Lease-" Rates, taxes, and assessments'
expenses-Liability of occupier.-An ap
ment for the expense of paving a street an
section is in the nature of a statutory d
from the owner of the improved premises
not payable by the occupier under a cove
him to pay or to indemnify his landlord
"all rates, taxes, and assessments pay
respect of the premises during the tenancy.e
the land tax and the property tax." (Will
Collyer.)

Quiet enjoyment-Breach of covenant-Act o
Wh
lawfully claiming through lessor.
lessee's ordinary and lawful enjoyment of
land is substantially interfered with by th
the lessor, or of those lawfully claiming un
the covenant for quiet enjoyment is
although neither the title to nor the posse
the land is otherwise affected. Defendants
a farm to the plaintiff, with a covenant fo
enjoyment. Defendants had previously
an adjoining farm to another lessee, with t
to use the drains through plaintiff's land
purpose of carrying away so much water
were adequate to carry. Water escaped fro
drains, and caused damage to plaintiff'
Part of such damage was owing to the e
use by the lessee of the adjoining farm of
constructed drains, and part to the improp
struction of other drains which he used p
Held, that for the first-mentioned damage
dants were not liable, but that the last-me
damage was a substantial interruption, by a
lawfully claiming through defendants, of pl
enjoyment of the land demised to him, and
stituted a breach of the covenant for quiet
ment, for which defendants were liable in d
(Sanderson v. The Mayor, &c. of Berwic
Tweed.)

Water rates-Covenant by landlord to pa
rates and taxes chargeable in respect of pre
-Waterworks Clauses Act 1817 (10 Vict.
ss. 3, 68, 72.-A lease, under which premis
held, contained a covenant that the lessor
"pay all rates and taxes chargeable in re
the demised premises." The landlord hay
fused to pay the water rate due in respect
premises, the tenant was compelled to
same. In an action brought by the tenant
the landlord to recover the amount so paid
that the water rate was a rate " within th
ing of the above covenant, and that the 1
was bound to pay the same. (The Direct
Telegraph Company v. Shepherd.)

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION
Company-Costs-Entry on land-Abandon
line Taking."-Where a railway compa
paid a deposit, given a bond, and entered a
land under sect. 85 of the Lands Clauses Co

...page 612

in the bank under the provisions of this Act," and
a "taking of the land" within the meaning of
sect. 80, and the court has jurisdiction to make
orders as to the costs mentioned in that section.
(Charlston v. Rolleston)
Person of unsound mind not so found-Compulsory
purchase of land-Purchase by agreement-Con-
firmation by committee-Confirmation by heir-at-
law-Conversion into personalty-Fund in court-
Payment out.-A corporation gave uctice under
the L. C. C. Act 1815 of their intention to take
lands belonging to a person of unsound mind not
so found by inquisition. Her uncle assumed to act
for her, and surveyors were appointed by him and
the corporation, and the price fixed was paid into
court to the credit of the corporation. The money
was afterwards paid into court to the credit of the
corporation. It was afterwards invested, and
placed to the credit of an account “Ex parte the
[corporation]; the account of P. T., a person of
unsound mind." P. T. was afterwards duly
found to be a lunatic, and committees were
appointed, to whom the dividends were subse-
quently ordered to be paid for application in the
same manner as the rents had been applied pre-
vious to the sale. No conveyance to the corpora-
tion was ever executed. Upon P. T.'s death the
question arose whether the fund in court repre-
senting the purchase money was to be treated as
realty or personalty, and a petition was accord-
ingly presented by the heir-at-law asking that it
might be paid out to him, he being willing to con-
vey the land to the corporation. Held, that the
petition must be granted, on the ground that
realty of a person of unsound mind could only be
converted by the statutory and proper methods,
which had not been observed. (Re Tugwell.)
Railways Clauses Act 1845-Jervis's Act-Compen-
sation-Settlement by two justices of the amount
-Time. The determination by justices under
sect. 24 of the Lands Clauses Act 1845 of the
amount of compensation to be paid by a railway
company to a landowner whose lands have been
injuriously affected by the construction of the
railway is not an order for the payment of money
within 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 1, and therefore sect.
11 of that Act does not apply, and the justices
have jurisdiction although the complaint be not
made within six months after the land has been so
injuriously affected. (Reg. v. Edwards (J stice)
and Eastern and Midland Railway Company.)

83

... 586

LAW OF CANADA.
Right of barrister to sue for fees-Professional
remuneration. Where a skilled practitioner is, by
law and the custom of his profession, entitled to
claim and recover payment for his professional
work, those who engage his services must be held
to employ him upon the usual terms according to
which such services are rendered, in the absence
of any stipulation to the contrary; and where the
contract of employment is silent as to remunera-
tion it must be taken to be an implied condition
that he is to be remunerated for his services upon
the same terms upon which they are usually
rendered. The Canadian Government of Ottawa
in the province of Ontario retained the respondent,
a member of the Quebec Bar, to act as their
counsel before a commission sitting at Halifax in
Nova Scotia. By the law of Quebec a member of
the Bar is entitled to sue for his fees, but in
Ontario and Nova Scotia the English rule prevails,
and he cannot do so. Held, that the respondent
could recover as upon a quantum meruit in respect
of the services rendered by him. (Reg. v. Doutre.) 670

LAW OF CEYLON.

Roman-Dutch law - Right of subject to sue the
Crown-Claim in reconvention-Set-off-Petition
of right.-The petition of right does not exist in
Ceylon, but by Ordinances of 1856 and 1868 an
established practice of instituting suits against the
Queen's Advocate in respect of claims against the
Crown arising ex contractu is recognised and regu-
lated. Held, that such practice must be held to be

LAW OF MAU
Bankruptcy Ordinance No. 33
as to bankrupt's estate-For
By sect. 43 of the Bankruptc
of 1853, of Mauritius, a trader
adjudication of bankruptcy ag
vided always that unless such
make it appear to the satisfa
that his available estate is s
creditors at least five shillings
of all charges, to be estimate
prosecuting the bankruptcy, su
dismissed.' Held, that the sa
by the section is in the persona
judge, and that strict legal prod
and that the adjudication is
point. Held, further, that w
carried on business under the
Co.," being in fact himself
interested in the business, an a
the firm was valid as against
defect being merely formal. (Th
Richer.)

-

LAW OF NAT

Surety Power of attorney
privileges by married woman-
By the law of Natal a married
effectually bound as a surety unl
renounces the benefits of the "Se
Velleianum," and of the rule
the effect of which is to render he
she has expressly renounced he
them. The respondent, a married
power of attorney by which she
attorney (inter alia) "in her na
securities
of what nature
and generally for her and in.
perform all such acts, mat
as may be necessary." "H
fessed to bind her personally as a
for the floating balance that migh
firm of J. and Co., and renoun
mentioned privileges in her behalf
the absence of express words in
attorney, or words from which it
implied that she intended to cont
renounce her privileges, the bond
was void. (Mackellar v. Bond.)

LAW OF NEW SOUTH
Use of steam locomotives on tram
Vict. No. 19-Stat. 43 Vict. No. 25.-
ways Extension Act 1880 of New S
Vict. No. 25), sect. 3, the Commiss
ways was authorised to maintain and
way constructed under a repealed
and to exercise all the powers and a
ferred upon him by that Act and th
No. 19 incorporated therewith. T
(the Government Railways Act) by.
it lawful, under proper regulations,
employ locomotive engines or other n

...page 141

macy. Held, that the proper course was for the
court to settle some of the lunatic's property on
his children, and the legitimate children having
raised the question as to the right of the child who
it was alleged was illegitimate to participate,
could then bring an action to perpetuate the testi-
mony. (Re Stoer.)...
Judicial separation-Permanent alimony-Allowance
out of lunatic's estate-Assignment.-Alimony is
not property within the meaning of sect. 25 of
20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. A decree was pronounced for
a judicial separation, and an order made for the
payment of 60l. a year to the wife as permanent
alimony. The husband was afterwards found
lunatic by inquisition, and by an order in Lunacy
and in Chancery, certain dividends to which he
was entitled in a Chancery suit were ordered to
be carried to an account in lunacy, and out of
them the sum of 60l. a year was directed to be
paid to the wife in respect of her alimony, until
further order. She afterwards mortgaged the
annuity to secure the payment of a certain sum.
Held, that the court would not order the payment
of the annuity to the mortgagee, as whether it
was considered as alimony or as an allowance
made to the wife by the court in lunacy, she could
not alienate it. (Re Robinson.)...

-

MANDAMUS.

Jervis's Act Rule for mandamus — Concurrent
remedies-Applicant in person-11 & 12 Vict. c. 44,
s. 5. A rule under sect. 5 of Jervis's Act, and a
rule for a mandamus calling upon justice to show
cause why they should not proceed to hear and
determine the matter of an application for a
summons, are concurrent remedies. A rule under
the 5th section of Jervis's Act is not confined to
cases where the justices need protection in doing
any act relating to their duties. A rule under this
section may be moved for by an applicant in person.
(Reg. v. Biron and others.).

737

429

Return of unconditional compliance - Plea to-
Rules of Supreme Court 1883.-Where a return
is made to a writ of mandamus of uncon-
ditional compliance therewith, the prosecutor can
still plead to the return, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of Order LIII., r. 9, as the former practice
is kept alive by Order LXVIII., r. 1, and Order
LXXII., r. 2. (Reg. on the prosecution of Hooley
v. The Licensing Justices of Pirehill North,
Staffordshire.)...
...203, 534

MARKET RIGHTS.
Injunction-Approaches to a market-District board
of works-Metropolis Local Management Act 1855.
-A district board of works gave notice of their
intention, by virtue of the power given to them by
sect. 108 of the Metropolis Local Management Act
1855, to place posts on the sides of the footways
and carriage-ways leading into a market, and
forming part of the market area. At the trial of
the action, in which the plaintiff claimed an injunc-
tion against the board, the Court held, that, the
plaintiff having established market rights over the
entrance streets, with which the posts would inter-
fere, and market rights being excepted by sect. 91
from the operation of the same Act, the board
had no power to put up posts in the entrance
streets, and granted an injunction with costs.
(Horner v. The Whitechapel District Board of
Works.)

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.
After-acquired property of wife-Covenant to settle.
-By a marriage settlement, dated in 1852, it was
agreed and declared by and among the parties
thereto, and the husband covenanted with the
trustees of the settlement, that all such real and
personal estates and effects as the wife should be,
at the time of the marriage, or as she, or the hus-
band in her right, should during the coverture
become possessed of or entitled to, should, when
and so far as the rights, interests, or powers of the
husband and wife, or either of them, in or over

414

the same would allow, be conv
to the trustees of the settleme
therein declared. At the date o
wife was entitled to a vested re
personal property. After the des
and wife the reversion fell in. He
the clause as to settling after-
contained no express covenant
so, the act contemplated and int
was an act as much to be done 1
the husband, and consequently
interest was bound by the
D'Estampes; D'Estampes v. Han
Setting aside-Fraudulent misrepres
diction. The plaintiff in an acti
settlement made upon his marriag
dant I. S., then a widow, by h
claim alleged that, previous to t
the settlement, I. S. stated to hir
husband had been divorced from
suit, by reason of his cruelty an
further, that she had not herself
adultery with G. W., to whom, aft
her first husband, she was marrie
alleged that such statements were
him to enter into the marriage a
settlement; that, in reliance on
tions, and in consideration of th
executed the settlement; that the
solemnised, and the plaintiff had su
covered, and it was the fact, that t
tions were false to the knowledge of
I. S., the truth being that she ha
divorced from her first husband at h
reason of her adultery with G. W.
statement of claim disclosed no cas
the court had jurisdiction to grant r
it must therefore be ordered to be str
Order XXV., r. 4. (Johnson v. John
Wife an infant-Life interest in prop
power of anticipation-After-acquire
Covenant to settle-Bequest-Elect
tration.--By a marriage settlement, d
after reciting that it had been agreed
(then an infant) and the husband shou
the covenant thereinafter contained fo
ment of her future estate and effects,
settled certain property upon trust for
life, then for the wife for life, and
children of the marriage; and the f
wife settled certain property in which
the first life interest for her separate
power of anticipation; and the deed
covenant by the husband and wife to
after-acquired property of the wife upo
therein mentioned. In 1883, and during
ture, the wife became entitled for her s
to certain property which was bequeat
This was bound by the covenant of the
as she was an infant at the time of the
the covenant was voidable. She electe
her covenant as to the property, and to
her separate use, not under but against
ment. Held, that the restraint upon a
did not prevent the court from giving
tion out of such life interest; that t
which would have been payable to the v
had not so elected, and all the other i
which she would have been entitled
settlement, ought to be applied in mal
pensation to the persons disappointed
election; and that the trustees of the s
must retain and apply the same accordin
Vardon's Trusts.)

MARRIED WOMAN.

Life interests-Election-Restraint on anti
-A testatrix who was donee of a power of
ment amongst the children of J. W., by
and codicils exercised such power in fa
persons, some of whom were objects of the
and also in favour of others who were 1
also gave to two of the appointees. wl
married women, and children of J. W.,
property of her own for life without restr