was to "apply to the company to let the policy go
on." The company were in the habit of allowing
lapsed policies to be revived, upon the payment of
overdue premiums; and upon the representations
thus made by P., V. paid him a sum of money.
Upon a case reserved at the trial of an indictment
which charged P. with having obtained this sum of
Loney by false pretences: Held, that P.'s conduct
on the 7th and 21st April amounted to a repre-
sentation that the policy had not lapsed nor become
void, and that he had authority to say that the
payment on the 21st would keep the policy alive
for another year, and that there was, therefore,
sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
(Reg. v. Powell.)

...

---

...page 713
Public place-Indecent exposure Witnesses of
offence trespassing at time of commission-Place
to which public have access, but no legal right of
access.-In order to support an indictment for
indecent exposure in a public place, it is sufficient
to show that the offence was committed in a place
where an assembly of the public is collected.
(Reg. v. Wellard.)

CROSSED CHEQUES.
Unauthorised signatures per pro. Liability of
collecting unker-Bills of Exchange Act 1882.-
The plaintiffs, B. and Co., appointed S. their
traveller, and S. was to remit all cash, bills, and
cheques to the plaintiffs every week. S. after-
wards opened an account at the defendants' bank,
and paid into this account, without the sanction
or knowledge of the plaintiffs, seven cheques
received by him on account of the plaintiffs, and
payable to B. and Co. or order." These cheques
were indorsed by S. "per pro. B. and Co., H. S."
without authority. The defendants, without in-
quiry as to S.'s authority to indorse, and with
knowledge of his position, received the cheques
as cash, and placed them at once to S.'s credit.
Six of these cheques were drawn on other bankers
than the defendants, three of these being crossed
"and Co." when received by them, and three
being uncrossed. These six cheques were crossed
by the defendants with the name of their London
agents for collection. The seventh cheque was
drawn upon the defendants themselves, and was
not crossed. S. afterwards absconded with the
proceeds of these cheques. Held, in an action by
the plaintiffs to recover the proceeds of these
seven cheques, that the defendants were liable,
and were not protected by sect. 82 of the Bills of
Exchange Act 1882, because, as regards the three
cheques that came to the defendants uncrossed,
they did not become crossed cheques" within
the meaning of that section by being crossed to a
banker for collection; and, further, as regards all
the six cheques not drawn on the defendants,
because the defendants had not merely "received
payment for their customer," but had in fact
under the circumstances received payment for
themselves, and because the defendants had not
received payment without negligence," having
made no inquiry into the authority of S. to indorse
per pro. as required by sect. 24. Held, also, as
regards the cheque drawn upon the defendants
themselves, that they were not protected by
sect. 19 of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, or sect. 60 of the Bills
of Exchange Act 1882, as they had not " 'paid "
the cheque within the meaning of those sections.
(Bissell and Co. v. Fox Brothers and Co.)

DISCOVERY.

Interrogatories-Adversary's case-An order was
brought by two persons on behalf of them-
selves and all other the proprietors and occu-
piers of lands or tenements in the parish of M.
The claim stated that the inhabitants of M. had
from time immemorial had rights of recreation over
a portion of M. Common, known as B. Corner,
that the owners and occupiers of lands and tene-
ments in M. had an immemorial right of pasture,
herbage, and estovers over the whole of M. com-

weg saised in fee of a

604

663

the parish of M., now in his own occupation; t
the plaintiff N. was seised in fee of a freeh
messuage used as a beerhouse, and three freeh
cottages in the said parish, now in his occupat
or that of his tenants; that the plaintiffs w
respectively entitied in respect of their said ho
ings to the several rights claimed; that the def
dant threatened to inclose B. Corner; and it ask
for a declaration that B. Corner was part of
Common, and that the plaintiffs and those on wh
behalf they sued were entitled to the rights claim
and an injunction to restrain the defendant fr
trespassing upon, or otherwise intermeddling wi
the said land. The defendant's case was that
land in question was not part of M. Common, b
of the manor of Wallington, of which he was
lord. In his defence he stated that N.'s beerhou
and cottages had no land attached thereto, and th
such rights of common as were claimed could or
be enjoyed in respect of land; that the rights
estovers claimed could only be enjoyed in respect
ancient tenements, and he did not admit that t
plaintiffs' were such; that the rights claimed w
uncertain and unreasonable. Otherwise he n
the claim with a direct traverse. The defenda
delivered to the plaintiffs interrogatories, whi
may be classified as follows: (1) Whether t
messuages were ancient; (2) Whether any and wh
lands were held with the beerhouse and cottage
(3) Whether the tenements in question were he
of any, and what, manor; (4) Whether there h
been any user by the plaintiffs, or their pred
cessors in title, of the rights over the commo
The plaintiffs declined to answer these interrog
tories on the ground that they related exclusive
to their title, and the particulars demanded form
part of the evidence they would have to bring
support of their case. On a summons by t
defendant that the plaintiffs might be ordered
file a full and sufficient answer. Held, that t
interrogatories coming under the second head mu
be answered, as they sought discovery in supp
of a substantive case set up by the defendant, vi
that no lands were held with the beerhouse a
cottages, but the others need not be answer
as they sought discovery as to facts which 1
plaintiffs would have to prove at the trial, aski
whether they were the facts or not, which was tan
mount to asking the evidence by which they met
to prove their case. (Bidder v. Bridges.) ...pl
Interrogatories-Order to answer by viva voce exa
nation-Order XXXI., r. 11.-Under an order
further answer interrogatories by viva voce exa
nation, only such answer can be required as wo
have been sufficient if originally given in writi
(Litchfield v. Jones.)

1

Interrogatory-Answer-Sufficiency of-Professic
confidence-Solicitor and client.-An action
brought for the specific performance of an ag
ment for sale, which was alleged to be contai
in a receipt. The defendants denied that the rec
contained the true terms of the agreement.
plaintiffs thereupon delivered interrogatories,
second of which was as follows: "Is it not
fact that between the 13th Nov. 1883 and the
of the delivery of the defence in this action, nu
rous, or some, and how many, interviews f
place, and a large amount of correspondence pa
between the plaintiff's solicitor
and
defendant's solicitors
in relation to

said agreement, and to the terms and comple
thereof?" The defendants declined to answer
interrogatory on the ground that they had no
sonal knowledge of these matters, and that the
information they had relating to these matters
derived from confidential communications bet
them and their solicitors in reference to 1
defence of the action. The plaintiffs took o
summons to compel the defendants to mal
better answer to the interrogatory. Held, th
was not sufficient for the defendants to say
they had no personal knowledge of the subje
the interrogatory; that they were bound to sta

to their information and belief, that the inform

...page 621

matters was not privileged; and that the defen-
dants must, therefore, make a further answer.
(Foakes v. Webb.)
Interrogatory - Privilege-Sufficiency of answer-
Answer as to matters within the knowledge of ser-
vants-Privileged reports sent in by servants or
agents. In an action for damage caused by the negli-
gence of the defendants or their servants in the use
of an engine, whereby sparks and red-hot cinders
escaped from the engine and set fire to the plaintiffs'
buildings, the plaintiffs administered the following
interrogatory: "Have the defendants or any of
their servants or agents any knowledge, informa-
tion, or belief as to the cause of the fire in respect
to the happening whereof this action is brought?
If yea, set out the same fully, with dates and all
particulars. If any of the said servants or agents
have communicated to the defendants such know-
ledge, information, or belief, let the defendants
set out the substance of such communications,
with dates and all particulars." To this the
defendants answered: "We have no information
at all on the subject, save such as appears in the
reports set out in the schedule to our affidavits,
filed in this cause on the 28th May 1884, and which
by the judgment of the Divisional Court of the
7th July last were held to be privileged from pro-
duction, which we decline to produce." Held, that
the answer was sufficient, as a further or better
answer could not be given without disclosing the
contents of privileged reports made to the defen-
dants by their servants, which reports the defen-
dants were not bound to disclose. (The London,
Tilbury, and Southend Railway Company v. Kirk
and Randall.)

...

DIVORCE.
Intervention-"Material facts not brought before
the court"-23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, s. 7.-A wife sued
for dissolution of marriage on the ground of
adultery and cruelty. The husband alleged that
the wife had been guilty of adultery. At the trial
a decree nisi for dissolution was made. The
husband applied for a new trial on the ground that
fresh evidence had been discovered to show the
wife's adultery before the decree nisi, and filed
affidavits alleging facts not known at the trial,
which went to prove adultery. He obtained a
rule nisi, but the rule was discharged on argument.
The husband appealed. Immediately afterwards
an uncle of the husband entered an appearance as
intervener, and filed affidavits which were substan-
tially the same as those used on this application
for a new trial. There was nothing to show that
he was acting on behalf of or in collusion with the
respondent. The wife moved to make the decree
for dissolution absolute. This was refused, but
leave was given to her to move the court to reject
the intervention. The husband abandoned his
appeal from the refusal of a new trial. Held, that,
the facts alleged by the affidavits being material,
and a case having been shown which ought to be
investigated, the intervention must be allowed.
(Howarth v. Howarth.)...
Practice-Variation of settlements-Capital-Juris-
diction-22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 5-Appeal-Discre-
tion of judge.-A wife, who had obtained a divorce
from her husband, having applied for variation of
the settlements, the judge refused to give her any
part of the capital of the fund, which had all been
settled by the husband, although there were no
children of the marriage, and he gave her a por-
tion of the income. Held, by the Court of Appeal,
that his decision must be affirmed, as, although the
court had jurisdiction to deal with the capital, it
would not be for the benefit of the wife to give her
any part of it, and the court refused to interfere
with the discretion of the judge as to the amount
of income to be paid to him. (Ponsonby v. Pon-
sonby.)

...

DOMICILE.
Marriage between Englishwoman and Spaniard-
Separate use-Settlement of English property-
Death of wife without issue-Will-Spanish law

599

872

174

Municipal election-Electic
Four candidates elected
against-Mayor's allowan
against Practice Mur
1882.-At a municipal elec
in the office of town counc
respondents), and D. were
was subsequently presente
A., B., and C. on the gro
proper allowance by the m
nomination papers of ce
who were thereby prevente
An application by the resp
strike the petition off the f
D., to whose election the
applied was not made a resp
and that no relief could
under it, as it did not pray
whole, should be set aside,
Mathew, J. at chambers, the
therefrom to this court, wh
under the Municipal Corpora
tion might be presented a
any one or more of the ind
that it was not necessary to
them, or to seek to avoid the
and, therefore, to take the
would contravene the theory
which pointed directly to pr
against the election of any
Per totam Curiam: Where it
the face of an election petiti
be granted under it, the court
Act of 1882 to take it off
others, pets., v. Warren and
Parliament-County vote-Not

-

-Incorrect date in notice to
tion by overseers of list of ob
defect in notice by-Registr
notice of objection to claim fo
delivered on the 18th Aug. 18
and also to the overseers, u
Registration Act 1813 (6 Vict.
the claimant being correct in a
the notice to the overseers b
dated 18th Aug. 1880. The o
lished the claimant's name in
objected to, and it was found
revising barrister that he had
venienced or misled by the inco
that the omission of the correct
to the overseers was a defect w
notice invalid, and which the
right or power to waive. (F
Newman, resp.)

-

Freehold rentcharge-Grant
C., and D. to the use of A.,
Effect and operation of -
sion"-Statute of Uses (27 Hen.
Act 1832.-By deed of the 11th.
owner in fee of rentcharges issuin
lands, granted them to his three
D., their heirs and assigns, to t
A., B., C., and D., their heirs and
in equal one-fourth shares as ter
B., Č., and D. claimed to be inser
voters for the county in respect of

ON LAW.

Page 117

on of town councillors-
-Three only petitioned
ace of objections appealed
nicipal Corporations Act
ction to fill four vacancies
cillor, A., B., and C. itte
e elected, and a petition
ed against the election of
round of the alleged im
mayor of objections to the
ertain other candidates,
ed from going to the poll.
pondents for an order to
file, on the ground that
same objection equally
pondent to the petition,

therefore be granted
that the election, as s
having been refused by
ne respondents appealed
when it was Held, that,
rations Act 1882, a peti-
against the election of
ndividuals elected, and
→ petition against all of
he election as a whole;
he petition off the file
and spirit of the Act,
proceedings by petition
ny individual elected.
it is clearly shown on
tion that no relief can
rt has power under the
(Line and
E the âle.

H others, resps.) ...
otice of objection to
to overseers-Publica-
objections-Waiver of
stration Act 1813.-A

339

for a county vote was
1833 to the claimant
under sect. 7 of the
t. c. 18), the notice to
n all particulars, but
being, by oversight,
overseers duly pub.
in the list of persons
nd as a fact by the
had not been incon
correct date. Held,
ect date in the notice

396

which rendered the
e overseers had no
(Freeman, app., v.
nt of, by A. to B.,
A., B., C, and D.
Actual

posses-

en. 8, c. 10-Reform
h Jan. 1883, A., the
out of freehold

and

shares respectively, although no portion of the said
rentcharges had been paid to or received by either
of them before the last day of July 1883; and
their claims having been disallowed by the revising
barrister on the ground that, as there was no third
party intervening between them and the grantor,
they took their one-fourth shares by force of the
common law and the Statute of Uses did not apply,
it was, on appeal, therefrom: Held, that the grant
operated under the Statute of Uses, and that as A.,
not being a grantee to uses, took under the statute,
B., C., and D. took in the same way, and by force
of the statute were in the "actual possession" of
their shares from the date of the deed so as to be
entitled under the authority of Heelis v. Blaine
to be registered as county voters under sect. 26
of the Reform Act 1832. (Lowcock, app., v. The
Overseers of Broughton, resps.)

...page 399

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 1880.
Defect of machinery or plant-Negligence of em-
ployer. Plaintiff, a carpenter, was employed by
defendants, who were builders, and in the course
of his employment had to descend a ladder. A
scaffold, which was put up under the direction of
one of the defendants, rested on and was sup-
ported by the ladder. When plaintiff stepped on
the ladder it broke in two and he fell and was
injured. In an action to recover damages for the
injury the jury found that the ladder was insuffi-
cient for the purpose for which it was used. Held,
that there was evidence to go to the jury of a de-
fect in the condition of the machinery or plant
within the meaning of sect. 1 (1), and evidence of
the negligence of the employer within the meaning
of sect. 2 (1). (Cripps v. Judge and another.)
Omnibus conductor-Workman-Person engaged in
manual labour.-An omnibus conductor is not a
"workman" or person
engaged in manual
labour" within the meaning of the Employers and
Workmen Act 1875, s. 10. (Morgan v. The London
General Omnibus Company.)

66

ENDOWED SCHOOLS ACT 1869.
Powers of commissioners-Denominational school-
Evidence Founder.--The Charity Commissioners
have power under sect. 9 of the Endowed Schools
Act 1869 to direct by a scheme that endowments
should be no longer applied in carrying on a parti-
calar school, bat in exhibitions for the benefit of a
larger area of schools. (Re The Parochial Schools
of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch.)

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
Delivery order-Goods not paid for-Bills of Sale
Act 1878, s. 4-Ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness. Where the delivery order for goods was
deposited with bankers by way of security for an
advance, the said goods not having been paid for
by the pledgor, who subsequently became bank-
rupt: Held, that such a transaction was not
within the mischief of the Bills of Sale Act 1878,
9. 4 (Amendment Act 1882), and did not require
registration. (Re Hall; Ex parte Close.)
Deposit of deeds-Foreclosure or sale-Conveyancing
and Law of Property Act 1881.-An equitable
mortgagee by deposit of deeds applied under
Sect. 25, sub-sect. 2, of the Conveyancing Act 1881,
for an order for sale instead of foreclosure. There

791

182

213

305

795

ESTOPPEL.

Action in Probate Division-Compromise-Forgery
Judgment in Chancery Division-Revocation
probate Jurisdiction.-An action in the Proba
Division in which T. and G. propounded an earlie
and P. a later, will, was compromised, and b
consent verdict and judgment were taken establis
ing the earlier will. An action was afterward
commenced by P. in the Chancery Division,
which T. and G. were parties, to set aside the con
promise on the ground that the earlier will was
forgery. A jury returned a verdict that it was
forgery, and the compromise was set aside.
another action in the Probate Division for revoc
tion of the probate of the earlier will: Held, that'
and G. were estopped from denying the forger
(Priestman v. Thomas.)
...pa

EVIDENCE.

Admissibility-Voting paper-Signature-Ambiguit
-Evidence to explain.-A voting paper at th
election of aldermen under this section of th
Municipal Corporation Act 1882 was as follows
"I, the undersigned, F. M., vote for the followin
persons (names and addresses); signed, W. S
Held, that oral evidence was admissible to expla
the ambiguity. (Summers v. Moorhouse.)
Hearsay-Declaration of deceased member of famil
--When admissible to prove birth-Pedigree.-Th
declarations of deceased members of a famil
though admissible in cases of pedigree, as eviden
to prove pedigree, are not admissible to prove th
facts which constitute a pedigree, such as birth
death, or marriage, where the case is not obe
pedigree. In an action for goods sold, an affidav
made by the deceased father of the defendant i
another action, to which the plaintiff was not
party, stating the defendant's age was given i
evidence to support the defence of infancy. Hel
that the evidence was wrongly admitted, and ther
must be a new trial. (Haines v. Guthrie.)

EXECUTOR.

Creditor-Right to recover debt after standing by
Laches-Express authority-Devastavit.-A cred
tor of a deceased man, believing that the executor
who were authorised to carry on the business
the deceased by his will, had assets to meet hi
debt, allowed it to stand over, and received interes
on it. On the failure of the business he sued fo
the whole of the debt. It was submitted that
had lost the right to recover his debt. Held, tha
mere laches by a creditor in not compelling th
excutors to realise a testator's estate immediatel
for the purpose of paying his debts would no
deprive him of his right to sue the executors fo
devastavit, unless, by his conduct, or by his expres
authority, he has misled the executors, and s
allowed them, or induced them, to part with asset
which were, at the date of the death of the tests
tor, liable to, and sufficient to satisfy his clain
(Re Birch; Roe v. Birch.)
Devastavit-Acquiescence-Statute of Limitations-
Mortgage-Covenant for payment.-The onus
proving acquiescence in a devastavit is, by th
ordinary rule, on the person alleging it, and i
order to prove acquiescence he must show a stand
ing by with full knowledge of what was bein
done. The plaintiffs, who were mortgagees, com
piained that the defendant, the surviving executo
of the mortgagor, had been guilty of a devastav
in having administered the testator's estate withou
first paying off the mortgage debts, and the
claimed that he might be declared answerable fo
all moneys forming part of the testator's estat
received by him and not applied in payment o
the testator's debts, &c. The defendant allege
that the payments constituting the devastavit,
any, or the greater part of them, were made mor
than six years before the commencement of th
action, and he craved the benefit of the Statute o

Power to compromise claims-Disappointed legatee.
-Executors distributed their testator's residuary
estate among the persons they believed entitled
thereto. After distribution W. claimed to share in
the fund, but having a difficulty in procuring
evidence of her relationship, the executors com-
promised the claim for 101. W. subsequently
brought an administration action against the
executors, claiming the full amount of the legacy,
which was 1131.: Held, that the executors had
power under this section to compromise the claim,
and having done so, W. was precluded by her
acceptance from recovering. (Re Warren; Weedon
v. Beading.)
...page 561
Retainer by-Right of Judgment and specialty
debt. A testator having died on the 6th Sept. 1883,
on the 27th the official liquidator of a company,
to whom the testator was indebted as a contribu-
tory, obtained an order against him in the Palatine
Court for payment of 2251. in respect of a previous
call. On the 10th Oct. 1883 the liquidator_com-
menced an action for the administration of the
testator's estate, and on the 16th Oct. obtained an
order against the executors for the payment of the
2251. On the 24th Oct. H., one of the executors,
gave the liquidator notice of his claim to retain a
sum of 3061. 108. This sum was entered in the
accounts furnished in the administration action as
of the date of the 2nd Nov. 1883, and was claimed
in respect of a mortgage made by the testator to
two other persons and H., as trustees. Held, that
H. was not entitled to retain the 306l. 10s. in
respect of his specialty debt, but was bound by
the balance order to satisfy the debt of the liqui-
dator. (Re Hubback; International Marine
Hydropathic Company v. Hawes.)
Wilful default-Loss by agent-Onus probandi-22
& 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 31.-Where an executor or a
trustee properly employs an agent to collect money
belonging to the estate, and such money is lost by
the insolvency of the agent, the onus of proving
that the loss has occurred by the default of the
trustee or executor lies on the person who seeks to
make him liable for the loss. (Re Brier; Brier
v. Evison.)...

...

FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS ACT 1875.
Making and concurring in making false entry-
False memorandum handed by collector to em-
ployer's cash clerk-Memorandum copied by cash
clerk into cash-book.-B., a collector in the em-
ployment of N., collected on the 22nd Feb. from
Sheppard 81. 148. 10d. due to N. The ordinary
course of business was for B., at the end of each
day, to account to E., N.'s cash clerk, for moneys
collected during the day, E.'s duty being to enter
payments accounted for by B. in the cash-book.
On the evening of the 22nd Feb. B. gave E. a
slip of paper on which he had written, "Sheppard,
on account, 5l.," which E. copied into the cash-
book, believing it represented the whole amount
collected by B. from Sheppard. Held, that B. was
rightly convicted under sect. 1 of the Falsifica-
tion of Accounts Act 1875. (Reg. v. Butt.).

FIXTURES.

Machinery-Driving belts - Mortgage.-Plaintiffs,
who were mortgagees of certain works and plant,
sued defendant, the trustee in liquidation of the
mortgagor, to recover certain driving belts which
were included in the mortgage deed, and which
defendant had removed from the premises. Each
belt passed over two drums on different parts of
the machinery, and being joined at the ends, and
fitting tightly to the machine, communicated the
motion from one drum to the other. The belts
could be slipped off the drums, and would then
hang loose over the shaft, but they could not be
taken off the machines without cutting the belts,
or unfastening the joinings. The machines were
fixed to the premises. Held, that the belts, being
part of the machines, were fixed to the freehold, so
as to pass by the mortgage deed, and therefore
plaintiffs were entitled to recover. (Sheffield and
South Yorkshire Permanent Building Society v.
Harrison.)...

189

133

607

649

-

HIGHWA

County-Borough-Expense of:
County in which road
ways and Locomotives (Ame:
Highways Acts 1862 and
of Over Darwen in Lancashi
within the meaning of the Ac
separate court of quarter ses
ships or parts of townships c
boundary are assessed and cont
rate raised and charged upc
Blackburn. A road which cea
road in 1877 passing through
highway authority sued the
recover payment of one-half o
curred by the highway auth
ending 25th March 1883 in t
so much of the road as was
borough. Held, on a special
action, that the word "county
c. 77, s. 13, is used in a geogr
therefore the county of Lancaste
which the road was situate, an
the county authority, were lial
Aldermen, and Burgesses of the
Darwen v. The Justices of the P
of Lancaster.)
Local authority-Expenses of d
ment of solicitor by local boar
Highway Act 1835-The Public I
The U. Land Company, being de

RESHORE.

March 28, 1885.]

licence Compensation -
equity to arise from expen
ot fail merely on the ground
be secured has not been
?. erected a jetty on the fore-
of W. under a revocable
to use it for the purposes
wards, at the instance of the
he extended the jetty, and
> it, and it was for some time
ent for immigrants. Held
at of the court below), that
e irrevocable, and that the
ired by P. was

an estate

ich could be the subject of
cal statutes. (Plimmer .
›n.)...
... page Lis

T OF DEAN.
rfeiture when complete-
on for gale-Priority-Re-
of Dean Act 1838-Queen's
in application for a galei
st be made at a time when
Where a gale had become
ider sect. 29 of the Forest
n-working: Held, that the
plete nor the gale become
had intimated its intention
tre. Actual resumption of
n is not necessary to com-
a gale, and this indepen
Cemembrancer Act (22 & 23
es v. Young.)
DWILL.

wed to set up new business
ers-Agreement.-P. sold
in the property and busi
the court held to include
che agreement for sale pro-
-in should prevent P.from
of a potter at such place
eld, that P., who had set
ed to solicit the customers
gallay and Cotton, L.JJ.,
): The seller of the good-
precluded from soliciting
business unless there is an
ment by him not to do so.

HWAY.

311

⇒ of maintenance of road
ad is situate - High-
Amendment) Act 1878-
nd 1864.-The borough
ashire is a highway area
e Act of 1878, having no
sessions, and the town-
ps comprised within its
I contribute to a separate
upon the hundred of
ceased to be a turnpike
rough the borough, "the
the county authority to
alf of the expenses in-
authority for the year
in the maintenance of
was situate within the
ecial case stated in the
ounty" in 41 & 42 Vict.
geographical sense, and
caster was the county in
te, and the defendants,
e liable. (The Mayor,
of the Borough of Over
the Peace for the County
...630, 707, 739

66

certain public footways on their estate in the
parish of T., requested the T. Local Board of
Health to assent to such diversion and to take the
necessary steps to have the said footways legally
closed. The T. Local Board assented, and in-
structed their solicitors to take the necessary
steps, and, these having been duly taken, paid the
bill of costs presented by them in respect thereof,
and recovered the amount thereof summarily as
expenses" within the meaning of the 84th section
of the Act of 1835. Held, on case stated, that the
words of the 144th section of the Public Health
Act 1875"may be done by or to the surveyor of
the urban authority, or by or to such other person
as they may appoint," did not empower the local
board to employ a solicitor to do the ministerial
acts in question, and that therefore the solicitor's
charges were not "expenses" payable by the land
company under the 84th section of the Highway
Act 1835. (The United Land Company v. The
Tottenham Local Board.)
...page 361
Repair-Contribution from county-Turnpike trust
-Cesser before expiry-Highways and Locomotive
Amendment Act.-The trusts of a turnpike road
within a "highway area" expired in 1877, but the
road had in 1855 become vested by a local Act in
commissioners who were the highway authority for
the district, and the trustees had then ceased to
repair it. Held, notwithstanding that the road
had only ceased to be a turnpike road since the
expiration of the trusts, and that the highway
authority were entitled, under the Highways Loco-
motive Act 1878, s. 13, to recover from the county
authority half the expense of repairing. (Newton
Improvement Commissioners v. Justices of Lanca-
shire.)...

707

HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Separate estate-Agreement for separate use signed
by the husband alone-Statute of Frauds (29 Car.
2, c. 3), s. 7.—An agreement made between an in-
tended husband and wife before marriage, by
which agreement the husband renounces his marital
rights over the wife's real property, but which
agreement is signed by the husband alone, is not
sufficient to affect the fee simple of the wife with
a trust for her separate use. Such an agreement
is invalid as a declaration of trust of the fee, inas-
much as the husband has not such an estate as
will enable him to bind the fee, and therefore such
an agreement signed by him alone does not satisfy
the 7th section of the Statute of Frauds. There-
fore, upon the death of the wife during her
husband's lifetime without issue, her heir-at-law
and not her devisee will be entitled to the lands
of which she is seised in fee. (Dye v. Dye and
another.) ...
145

INFANT.

Advancement Contingent legacy.-A testator, who
died in 1883, by his will, dated in 1881, bequeathed
to his trustees 5000l. New Three per Cent. Annui-
ties upon trust to pay to A. the dividends thereof,
the same to be applied by him for the maintenance
and education of his two eldest children (a son and
daughter), and the survivor of them, during their
respective minorities; and subject thereto the
testator directed that such sum of annuities should
remain in trust for the children equally to be
divided between them, or for the survivor of them
living at the testator's decease, if either should die
in his lifetime, for their respective absolute use, the
share of the son, or the whole as the case might be,
to be an interest vested absolutely in him if and
when he should attain twenty-one, and the share of
the daughter, or the whole as the case might be, to
be an interest vested absolutely in her, for her
separate use, if and when she should attain that
age or be married, with benefit of survivorship
between them, as to each share, in case they should
be both living at the testator's death, until vested
adsolutely: and the testator declared that in case

[Index-

A

paid to A. the dividends of the sum of annu
and the whole thereof, in addition to moneys
own, were applied by him in the education
maintenance of the children, who were respect
about twenty and eighteen years of age.
also expended, out of his own pocket,
amounting to nearly 2001. in connection wit
advancement in life of the son, and in the pur
of necessaries for him. A.'s sole source of in
was a pension of about 2001. He had a fam
seven children to be educated and maintained
were in addition to and younger than the chi
referred to in the will. Under these circumsta
A. asked, by sunmons, that it might be dec
that the estate and interest of the son in the s
annuities stood charged with the payment o
sums expended by A. for the advancement i
and benefit of the son. Held, that the applic
must be refused, the evidence being insuffi
and unsatisfactory; and that the proper c
would have been to have applied for an order
Re Arbuckle (14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 538; 2 Set
edit. 726). (Ke Tanner.)
Custody-Father's common law right subjec
equity rule Habeas corpus - Judicature
1873. R., a yacht master, applied for
custody of his daughter, an infant aged
under the following circumstances: On
marriage with the mother of the child he
her that his former wife had left him and
to America more than seven years before,
died there. After the marriage the mother
informed that the former wife was alive, and
a letter had been received from her. She there
left R., taking the child of the marriage wit
to her parents, and continued to live with t
the child being then well cared for and
educated. An indictment preferred against I
bigamy was thrown out by the grand jury. I
that, as R.'s affidavit did not show that he
made any search for his former wife and faile
fiud her, the Court were not satisfied as to
validity of the marriage, and that, as R.'s oc
tion necessitated long absences from the cou
and he did not propose to provide any sui
fixed home for the child, and there being
affidavits (which he, however denied) that he
a man of loose character, the Court in the exe
of its discretion would not, under such cir
stances, order the child to be removed fro
custody of the mother, where it was not questi
that she was being well cared for and
educated. (Re Ethel Rowe, an Infant.) ...
Guardians-Maintenance of ward-Voucher of it
-A guardian who is also trustee cannot disch
himself from his duty as guardian to see tha
infant is properly maintained by paying over
income to his co-guardian, but where such guar
had paid over the income to his co-guardian
had maintained the infant the court held tha
guardian so paying was entitled to be allowed
was found to be the proper amount for the r
tenance of the infant on its being shown that
had been properly maintained and educated
out vouching the items of expenditure. Tri
allowed his costs in the absence of miscond
(Re Evans; Welch v. Channell.)
Legacies contingent on attaining twenty-o
Intermediate income - Maintenance Con
ancing and Law of Property Act 1881, s. 43
testator by his will gave legacies to classe
persons who should be living at his death
attain twenty-one, and he gave the residue c
estate to other persons not i'entical with 1
forming the classes. The persons forming
classes to whom these contingent legacies
given were not children of the testator,
persons to whom he was in loco parentis.
of them were infants at the date of his death.
question arose whether the executors ough
apply the income of the legacies to which
infants were contingently entitled for their n