PLEADING -DEMURRER WILL NOT BE SUSTAINED WHEN PART OF SEPARABLE DEMAND GOOD.-When in a count in a declaration special damages are laid, some grounds of which are good and some bad, a general demurrer to the entire count will not be sustained. The decisions are quite clear to the effect that where the plaintiff's claim is made up of separable demands, some of which are good and some bad, such a declaration will prevail against a general demurrer. Powdick v. Lyon, 11 East, 565, was a case of that character, the plaintiff demanding two several sums of money, one of which, on the face of his pleading, he failed to show was legally due to him; and on a demurrer to the whole declaration Lord Ellenborough said that "the demurrer was too large; it went to the whole of the plaintiff's demand in the declaration when it was clear that he was entitled to recover part of it;" and Bayley, J., stated the general rule thus: "If the sum demanded be divisible on the record as it appears to be, and there be no objection to one part of it, the demurrer which goes to the whole is bad." The same principle is applied where some of the counts in a declaration are good and some bad; or in an action of covenant where there are several breaches assigned, some of such assignments being well and others ill, and the demurrer is general; in such cases the plaintiff will prevail." Pinkney v. Inhabitants of East Hundred, 2 Saund. 378; Benbridge v. Day, 1 Salk. 218; Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Saund. 286; Martin v. Williams, 13 Johns. 264; Adams v. Willoughby, 6 id. 65; Whitney v. Crosby, 3 Caines, 89. Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Opinion by Beasley, C. J.

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS ABSTARCT

MARCH, 1881.*

ATTORNEY -AUTHORITY OF, TO COMPROMISE SUIT.— The attorneys of record for a judgment creditor, professing to act for and in his behalf, filed in the cause an order directing the clerk of the court to enter of record a release from the judgment of certain land of B., the judgment debtor, which had been sold and conveyed by B. to W. This release was entered in pursuance of an agreement with B. and W., by which the larger part of the purchase-money paid by W. for the land was paid over to the attorneys to be applied to the payment of the judgment. Subsequently another attorney entered his appearance for the judgment creditor, and directed execution to issue on the judgment, which was issued, but without any credit being given for the said payment, and the land purchased by W. was seized under the execution, that being the only property taken. Upon a motion to quash the execution, held, that the proof offered in support of the motion showed an express authority given by the client to the attorneys to enter the release of the land from the lien of the judgment, or that their action in the premises had been ratified by their client with knowledge of all the facts; and that upon this state of case the court could not do otherwise than quash the execution, and all that had been done under it. It is well settled in this State that an attorney as such has no power to compromise claims placed in his hands for collection, or in respect to which he may be employed to recover judgment. He can take nothing in satisfaction of the claim or judgment except money, nor can he receive a less sum than is really due thereon, without the express authority of his client obtained for the purpose; aud if he assume to act without such express authority, his acts, in making the compromise, or agreeing to take a less sum in satisfaction than is * To appear in 56 Maryland Reports.

really due, will not bind the client, unless the latter, with full knowledge of all the facts, has ratified what has been done by the attorney; though such ratification may be inferred from acquiescence, and from the facts and circumstances of the case. These propositions are plainly laid down by this court in the case of Maddox v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485; and from them it would appear clearly to follow that an attorney, under the ordinary employment to collect a claim by suit, or by suing out execution on judgment recovered, cannot release or postpone the lien on the lands of the debtor created by the judgment. And no belief on the part of the attorney, however honestly entertained, that the release or postponement would be for the benefit of the client, can supply the defect of authority to make such arrangement with the debtor, or others dealing with the debtor's property. Wilson v. Jennings, 3 Ohio St. 528. Fritchley v. Bosley Opinion by Alvey, J.

CONDITION --IN RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE—WHAT IS NOT VALIDITY OF.-W. H. C., in consideration of one dime and of natural love and affection, conveyed by deed certain leasehold property to his two sisters M. and E., to have and to hold the same unto the said M. and E. as tenants in common so long as they both shall live, and from and after the death of either of them, then unto the survivor so long as she shall live and no longer; or so long as they both shall remain unmarried; and from and after the marriage of either of them, then unto the one remaining unmarried, so long as she shall live and no longer." Held, that the purpose of the brother evidently was not to restrain the marriage or promote the celibacy of his sisters. but to give them a small property as a home or support, until they should severally marry and have husbands to maintain them; that there was nothing immoral or illegal in this purpose, and it was carried out by this deed without infringing any rule of law; and that the weight of authority fully sustained the validity of the grant. The doctrine that conditions in restraint of marriage are void was derived from the civil law, and though it still prevails and is everywhere recognized and enforced with greater or less strictness, some of the English judges in recent cases have suggested that the reason upon which the doctrine was originally founded has ceased to exist. Allen v. Jackson, L. R., 1 Ch. Div. 399; Jones v. Jones, L. R., 1 Q. B. Div. 279. But no case has yet gone to the extent of repudiating the doctrine altogether, though the tendency of modern decisions perhaps is not to extend it, nor to strive to bring within its operation cases which by fair and just construction fall under the well recognized distinctions and exceptions. One of these distinctions sustained by the great preponderance of authority is that between a limitation and a condition subsequent, or in other words, between the language by which the duration of an estate or interest is prescribed, and that by which an estate previously created is cut down, defeated or divested. In Heath v. Lewis, 3 McN. & G. 954, a testator bequeathed an annuity to an unmarried woman "during the term of her natural life if she shall so long remain unmarried." The aunuitant, after enjoying the annuity for some years, married, and the question was whether the annuity was determined by her marriage. Bruce, Lord J., said that this was a limitation as distinguished from a condition, and that the annuity ceased when the lady married. See also Morley v. Reynoldson, 2 Hare, 570; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255; Bellairs v. Bellairs, L. R., 18 Eq. Cas. 510; Webb v. Grace. 2 Phillips, 701. Arthur v. Cole. Opinion by Miller, J.

LEASE-RENT PAYABLE, SEVERABLE AND APPORTIONABLE BETWEEN LESSEE AND HIS GRANTEE.-W. executed to C. a lease of premises for ninety-nine

years, renewable, the lessee covenanting to pay a certain annual rent and all taxes. W. sued C. in covenant, and the breach alleged was the non-payment of rent accrued due and certain taxes. C. pleaded among other pleas, that prior to the alleged claims defendant conveyed all her interest in the premises to one L., in whose name the plaintiff thereafter rendered her bills for rent; and that afterward, and prior to any of the supposed breaches of covenant, plaintiff and L. jointly❘ conveyed part of the premises covered by the lease to V. in fee, in consideration of $2,500 paid to the plaintiff. On demurrer, held, that the rent was apportionable, and that plaintiff was entitled to sue in covenant for the whole rent and recover the part to which she was entitled. It was claimed that in Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 578, Lord Ellenborough held that "in covenant as between lessor and lessee, where the action is personal and upon a mere privity of contract, and on that account transitory as any other personal contract is, the rent is not apportionable." But this view has not been followed in the later decisions, but they have held with great unanimity that in such cases the rent is apportionable, so that now there seems to be little or no doubt upon the question. See Platt on Cov., 240; 2 Cruise Dig. 211; Platt on Leases, 132; 3 Kent Com. 469; Coke Litt., 539; Taylor Landl. & Ten. 364; Smith Landl. & Ten., 296, 297; Bliss v. Collins, 5 B. & Ald. 876; Reed v. Ward, 22 Penn. St. 144; Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 338; Twynam v. Pickard, 2 B. & Ald. 105; Crosby v. Loop, 13 Ill. 626. Where the rent is apportionable, an action by the lessor for his portion of the rent need not be limited to that part, but he may sue for the whole and recover as much as the jury may find that he is entitled to, and he will be barred as to the residue. Van Rensselaer's Ex'r v. Gallup, 5 Denio, 454. Worthington v. Cooke. Opinion by Grayson, J.

IOWA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

DECEMBER, 1881.

BOUNDARY ON STREAM WHEN ADJOINING OWNER HAS TITLE TO STREAM IS LOW-WATER MARK.- Where the boundary of land is a stream of water, the title to such stream being in the adjoining owner, the boundary line is low-water mark. Boundaries of land should be fixed and permanent, and capable of being readily ascertained with certainty. Low water in a stream makes a permanent and fixed line, which can be determined with greater certainty than the line of any other stage of water. Lands, as all other subjects of property are acquired and transferred with a view to the purposes for which they may be used. The land covered by a stream is useful on account of the water flowing in it. When acquired, the water is in contemplation of the parties to the transfer. The bed of the stream at low water constitutes the permanent water-course, and it must be presumed, when the stream is made a boundary, was in contemplation. The land between high and low water is susceptible of other uses than those connected with water. It may

be used for pasture or cultivation, and it ought not, therefore, to be regarded as a part of the stream. The following authorities support this conclusion. Other cases support contrary doctrine. Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369; Halsey v. McCormick, 13 N. Y. 296; S. C., 18 id. 147. See also, Cook v. McClure, 58 id. 437. Murphy v. Copeland. Opinion by Beck, J.

REAL ESTATE- FIXTURES SMUTTER IN GRIST MILL FIXTURE AS TO PURCHASER OF MILL.- A smutter was placed in a grist mill upon an agreement with the owners of the mill that it was to be used at a specified price per annum, and returned to its owner. It was used as an essential part of the machinery, but it was

not nailed to the building, but was held in position by braces from joists in the building, and it could be removed without materially injuring the building. Held, that while the smutter was not as between its owner and the owners of the mill a fixture and part of the realty, it was such as to purchasers of the mill at a judicial sale, and without notice, and the title to it passed to such purchasers. In Quinby v. Manhattan Cloth and Paper Co., 9 C. E. Green, 260, it is said: "The true criterion as to fixtures, to determine whether they are to be regarded as part of the realty or not, is not whether they may be detached and removed from the premises without injury to the freehold, although that, as is well understood, is oftentimes an important element in deciding the question. It is well established that whether property which is ordinarily treated as personal becomes annexed to and goes with the realty, as fixtures or otherwise, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. It appears from the facts as found by the court, that the smutter was placed in the mill in the usual manner, and that without it the mill, without change in its arrangement, could not grind buckwheat and rye. It was then, to all appearances, an essential and necessary part of the mill." In Gray v. Holdship, 17 S. & R. 413, the court say: "From the adjudged cases on this subject I think we are warranted in saying that every thing put into and forming part of a building or machinery for manufacturing purposes, and essential to the manufactory, is part of the freehold; the wheels of the mill, the stones, and even the bolting cloth are parts of the mill and of the freehold, and cannot be levied upon as personal property." In Farr v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 154, it was held that things personal in their nature, but fitted and prepared to be used with real estate, and essential to its beneficial enjoyment, being on the land at the time of its conveyance by deed, pass with the realty, and that by the conveyance of a saw-mill with the appurtenances, the mill chain, dogs and bars, being in their appropriate places at the time of the conveyance, passed to the grantee. In Farris v. Walker, 1 Bailey (S. C.), 540, it was held that a cotton-gin attached to the gears in the gin-house on a cotton plantation, passed by a conveyance of the land. See, also, Union Bank v. Emerson, 15 Mass. 152; Fryjatt v. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill, 116; Bringolf v. Muzzenmier, 20 Iowa, 513; Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 44 id. 57; Miller v. Plumb, 6 Cowen, 665; Wadleigh v. Janvien, 41 N. H 503; Powel v. Monson Brimfield Manuf. Co., 13 Mason, 459; Corliss v. McLagin, 29 Me. 115; Trull v. Fuller, 28 id. 545. The rule is the same whether the sale is by the owner or by a public officer, under the law. Price v. Brayton, 19 Iowa, 309; Farrar v. Chareffetete, 5 Denio, 527. Stillman v. Flenniken. Opinion by Day, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE INSANITY NOT A RIGHT.-The Iowa constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life or liberty of an individual, the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the same when demanded; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for his witnesses: and to have the assistance of counsel." Held, that this provision does not apply to adjudications of insanity. It is clear that such provision applies only to criminal prosecutions, or accusations for offenses against the criminal law, where it is sought to punish the offender by fine or imprisonment. The inquest of lunacy by a board of commissioners is in no sense a criminal proceeding. The restraint of an insane person is not designed as punishment for any act done. insane are by the law taken into the care and custody of the State for treatment for their unfortunate in

The

contract shall be completed only by delivery of policy." The application was forwarded to the home office, and in a few days a policy was returned to the agent which on its face provided, "This policy to take effect when countersigned by B. E. Tift, agent at Wheeling, West Virginia. The policy was never countersigned by Tift or delivered to McC. In about a month he died. Held, that no contract of insurance was consummated between the parties, and McC.'s administrator could not maintain a suit against the company for the policy or its amount. An application for insurance is a mere proposal which the company can accept, reject or modify, and until the minds of the parties meet by an agreement upon all the terms, and all the conditions required are performed, no contract arises. A condition that the contract shall not take effect except upon the delivery of the policy must be performed before the contract is complete. A condition that the policy is to take effect only when countersigned by "B. E. Tift, agent," must be complied with before the contract is consummated. That condition is a personal trust in the agent and cannot be delegated by him to another. A contract cannot bind the party proposing it until the acceptance of the other party is in some way actually or constructively communicated to him. West Virginia Supreme Ct., Nov. 26, 1881. Tingle v. Phænix Mutual Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Patton, J.

MARINE POLICY CONTRIBUTION— JURISDICTION— WAIVER.—(1) A policy of marine insurance, which contained a stipulation that in case of loss or misfortune the insurer would contribute ratably to expenses incurred by the assured or their agents in and about the recovery of the insured cargo, was issued by a corporation of the State of Connecticut, also doing business in the State of Ohio. The cargo was sunk in waters of the State of Michigan, and labor was expended in efforts to recover it. Held, that the breach of such stipulation on the part of the insurer constitutes a cause of action against the company, cognizable by the courts of this State. (2) After the filing of a petition on such cause of action and the issuing of a summons, which was returned served on the defendant by delivering a true and attested copy on an agent of the defendant, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action "for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction of the case, it appearing from the petition on file that said defendant is a foreign insurance company, and that no part of the alleged cause of action arose in this State." Held, that the filing of such motion was a voluntary appearance in the action and a waiver of any defect in the service of the summons. Ohio Sup. Ct., January Term, 1881. Handy v. Insurance Co. Opinion by McIlwain, J. (37 Ohio St. 369).

CRIMINAL LAW. .

LARCENY-OF GOODS OF DIFFERENT OWNERS-PLEADING—DUPLICITY.—A count in an indictment for larceny charged defendant with the stealing of goods, the property of E.; of other goods, the property of W.; and of other goods, the property of H.; at a certain time and place. Held, that the count could not be quashed for duplicity. It is well settled that distinct offenses cannot be joined in the same count. Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 1 Nor. 478; Commonwealth v. Bartilson, 4 id. 482; Kilrow v. Commonwealth, 8 id. 489. Duplicity in a declaration consists in joining in one count different grounds of action, of different natures or of the same nature, to enforce a single demand. Similar to this is duplicity in an indictment; it is the joinder of two or more distinct offenses in one count. The criminal law never permits this. But one offense may be committed at the same time and place to the injury

of two or more persons, and the offender may be indicted therefor. A man may be indicted for the battery of two or more persous, in the same count, or for a libel upon two or more persons, when the publication is one single act, without rendering the count bad for duplicity. In felonies also the indictment may charge the defendant in the same count with felonious acts with respect to several persons, if it was all one transaction. 1 Bish. Cr. Pro., §§ 189, 192, In Regina v. Giddins, 1 Car & Mar. 634. The indictment, consisting of only one count, charged the prisoners with assaulting G. P. and H. P., and stealing from G. P. two shillings and from H. P. one shilling and a hat. The defendants contended the felonies were distinct, and moved that the prosecutor be put to election which he would go upon; but it was ruled that the assaulting and robbing G. P. and H. P. at the same time constituted one transaction; the evidence was received and the defendants convicted. If a person shoot at two persons, intending to kill one, or regardless which he might kill, he may be convicted on an indictment charging a joint assault on both. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 12 Cush. 615. If the property of several persons be stolen at one time, the whole may be considered as one taking, and will amount to grand larceny. 2 Chit. Cr. L. 924. A count charging two distinct offenses will be quashed on the defendant's motion; but a count may join the larceny of several distinct articles belonging to different owners, when the time and place of the taking of each are the same. Whar. Cr. L., §§ 382, 391. In a recent well considered case it was held, "where several articles of property are stolen at the same time, the transaction being the same, the whole, although they belong to different owners, may be embraced in one count of the indictment, and the taking thereof charged as one offense." State v. Hennessy, 23 Ohio St. 339; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., May 2, 1882. Fulmer v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Opinion by the Court.

MURDER- - DRUNKENNESS AS DEFENSE.- A charge that voluntary drunkenness was no excuse for crime, and would not reduce the killing from murder to any lower grade of homicide, but that it was a fact that might be considered like any other fact, to shed light, if it could do so, on the transactions, goes as far as has been authorized by any of the rulings of this court. Georgia Sup. Ct., March 21, 1882. Hauvey v. State of Georgia. Opinion by Crawford, J.

OBSTRUCTING RAILROAD STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHAT CONSTITUTES OBSTRUCTION.-A statute of Minnesota provides thus: "Whoever shall willfully obstruct any engine or carriage passing upon any railroad, so as to endanger the safety of any person conveyed in or upon the same, or shall assist or aid therein, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding 20 years." Held, that one willfully placing an obstacle on a railway in such a manner that any train in passing may strike it, and of such a character that the safety of persons conveyed will be endangered if a train come in collision with it, is guilty of a violation of the statute, though no engine or carriage is actually obstructed by the obstacle. In Regina v. Bradford, Bell's Cr. Cas. 268, where the defendants wero indicted under that statute, they had placed across the railway a truck in such a manner that it might obstruct the passage of trains and endanger the safety of persons conveyed on them, but it was discovered and removed in time to prevent any collision. It was contended that to constitute the crime some engine or carriage must be absolutely obstructed. But the court held otherwise, and that to put obstructions on the railway in such manner as was likely to cause disaster to engines and carriages using it, and endanger the

safety of those conveyed, was within the statute, although no disaster actually resulted. When the character of disaster, such as the statute aims to prevent, and the utter depravity evinced by acts likely to produce such disasters are considered, this would seem to be the proper construction of such a statute. Certainly the moral guilt of one who places on a railway obstructions likely to produce such disaster is not lessened by the fact that through accident, or vigilance of those in charge of the railway or its trains, the disaster is averted. It is the character of the act, and not the actual consequence of it, which fixes its criminality. When the person has done the act from which, but for the interposition of some other agency than his, disaster is likely to follow, his crime, in morals, at any rate, is complete. Minnesota Sup. Ct., Nov. 14, 1881. State of Minnesota v. Kilty. Opinion by Gilfillan, C. J.

TRIAL-CHALLENGE IN MURDER CASE.-The Maryland statute relating to peremptory challenges does not prescribe the order in which challenges shall be made, or direct whether the State or the prisoner shall first exercise the right. Held, that it would seem therefore that the course of proceeding in this respect is left to the discretion of the trial court. In this case at a trial for murder, one of the panel of jurors was called, and being sworn and examined upon his voir dire, it was determined by the court that he was an impartial juror; the prisoner then moved the court to require the State to exercise its right of peremptory challenge before he should be required to exercise that right. But the court overruled the motion, and in conformity to its uniform practice, required the prisoner to exercise his right of peremptory challenge before the State was called on to exercise its right. Whereupon the prisoner excepted. Held, that this ruling furnished no cause for reversal. See as to the changes in the law of England on this subject of challenges, Regina v. Frost, 9 C. & P. 136; Mansel v. The Queen, 8 E. & B. 54. In Brandreth's case, 32 St. Tr. 771, the question arose whether the prisoner should be required to exercise his right of peremptory challenge, before the right of challenge was exercised by the crown, and after full argument it was decided, that according to the uniform practice the right must first be exercised by the prisoner. A similar decision had been made in Layer's Case, 16 St. Tr. 135. See also State v. Bone, 7 Jones' Law, 121; Jones v. State, 2 Blatch 475; State v. Hayes, 23 Mo. 287; State v. Steeley, 65 id 219. Maryland Court of Appeals, Febuary 11, 1881. Turpin v. State of Maryland. Opinion by Bartol. C. J. (55 Md. 462).

UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY-CONTENTS OF WARRANTPLEADING FACTS RENDERING ACT UNLAWFUL MUST BE STATED.-(1) A statute of Wisconsin declares that "any three or more persons who shall assemble in a violent or tumultuous manner to do an unlawful act, or being together, shall make any attempt or motion toward doing a lawful or unlawful act in a violent or tumultuous manner, to the terror or disturbance of others, shall be deemed an unlawful assembly," etc. A warrant for the arrest of B. and others described the complaint against them as charging them with having "assembled in a violent or tumultuous manner to do an unlawful act on Sunday on the premises of X. and Y., without authority from the owners thereof to the terror and disturbance of others." Held, that even if this does not specify the particular unlawful act intended, the warrant was not void for that reason. (2) An information which charges B. and others with having resisted a constable while engaged in the lawful execution of a criminal warrant, and then sets out the warrant as above described is sufficient, although the particular acts of resistance are not stated. In

general, where the fact alleged as a criminal offense is not in itself unlawful, but becomes so by reason of other facts, the latter must also be pleaded; but where enough is stated to constitute the crime, that is sufficient. See 2 Arch. Cr. Pl. 590, 591, 2 Whart. Cr. Law, 1535; 1 Russ. Cr. 387; Regina v. Gulston, 2 Ld. Raym. 1210; Regina v. Foley, 2 Salk. 593; State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196; Kilkelly v. State, 43 id. 604; Rice v. People, 15 Mich. 9; State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 9. In State v. Capp, 15 N. H. 212, it was contended that the indictment should have specified the several acts of resistance of the officer, but it was held unnecessary. In burglary with intent to commit the crime of larceny the larceny need not be technically set out. Joslyn v. Commonwealth, 6 Metc. 239, and Tully v. Commonwealth, 4 id. 357. And in breaking and entering in the night-time with intent to commit the crime of rape, the particulars of the rape need not be stated in the indictment. Commonwealth v. Doherty, 10 Cush. 52. In the case of burning property insured with intent to prejudice the insurer, it is unnecessary to allege the manner in which the prisoner attempted to do the act with such intent, but it is sufficient to allege generally that he set fire to the property with such intent. Mackesey v. People, 6 Park. Cr. 114. In assault with intent to commit murder, the means of effecting the criminal intent or the circumstances evincive of the design with which the act was done, are not necessary to be stated in the indictment. State v. Dent, 3 Gill. & J. 8, In conspiracy to defraud the United States the facts showing such intent need not be stated in the indictment. United States v. Ulrici, 3 Dill. 532. And to the same effect it is decided in United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360. Wisconsin Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 1882. Bonnville v. State of Wisconsin. Opinion by Orton, J.

NOTE S.

In Dagg v. Dagg, 51 L. J., N. S. 19, the plaintiff, a porter, sued a female cook in a hydropathic establishment for dissolution of a marriage founded on the following agreement: "This is to certify that whereas the undersigned parties do agree that they will marry, and that only to save the female of us from shaming her friends or telling a lie; and that the said marriage shall be no more thought of except to tell her friends that she is married (unless she should arrive at the following accomplishments, namely, piano, singing, reading, writing, speaking and deportment); and whereas these said accomplishments have in no way been sought after (much less mastered), therefore the aforesaid marriage shall be and is null and void; and whereas we agree that the male of us shall keep his harmonium in the aforesaid female's sitting-room, and agree that it shall be there no more than four months, and that from that time the aforesaid and undersigned shall be free in every respect whatsoever of the aforesaid female, as witness our hands, etc., Catherine L H. Jeffries, William Pritchard Dagg." Not even the "harmonium " could reconcile the parties to prolonged cohabitation, it seems.