shedding; nor that man seem other than a participator in murder who gives his applause to the murderer, and calls for prizes on his behalf." THE NOTES OF CASES. cover. | note was given merely to secure part payment of the money which A. stole, without a release of A., the same was based upon no sufficient consideration, and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to reThe court said: "The law requires that the consideration should be valuable to support an action to enforce an executory contract; but some loss or inconvenience to the promisee upon his entering into the contract, or some benefit to the promisor, is deemed a valuable consideration. Where a benefit is done to a third person at the request of the promisor, it is sufficient to support his promise. As where a person contemporaneously becomes surety for the debt, or for the performance of a duty of a third person, he renders himself liable thereupon. The consideration is the favor the surety receives from a compliance with his express or implied request that credit should be given to the principal. But unless the promise be contemporaneous with the original debt, and constitute the inducement thereto, it is not binding. A guaranty of a debt already contracted, or of a contract already made, without a new consideration, is void. Where there is a promise to pay the pre-existing debt of another person to his creditor, there must be a new consideration to support it, for the original consid HE case of Rowell v. Doyle, Massachusetts Supreme Court, October, 1881, Mass. L. Rep., is pertinent to the season and its pursuits. The plaintiffs are milk dealers, who supply the Boston market, and use large quantities of ice, which they cut on Chauncey pond, "a great pond" (of about 180 acres), and store on the edge of the pond. In February, 1880, they had cleared the snow from a large area of the ice on the pond, preparatory to cutting the ice, when the defendant cut several holes through the ice, about a foot each in diameter, for the purpose of fishing. Hence the suit. The court, Gray, C. J., observed: "The right of fishing, as well as the right of taking ice, in a great pond, is a public right, which every inhabitant who can obtain access to the pond without trespass may exercise, so long as he does not interfere with the reasonable exercise by others of these and like rights in the pond, and complies with any rules established by the Legislature or under its authority. West Roxbury v. Stod-eration of the principal's contract cannot be so exdard, 7 Allen, 158. The defendant, an inhabitant of the town, came upon the pond from the highway and fished at a time allowed by the regulations made by the town under the power conferred upon it by the Legislature. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441. And the case stated does not find, nor contain any facts tending to show, that he was fishing in an unreasonable manner, or without due regard to the lawful rights of others. The plaintiffs had no peculiar title or right in the pond by virtue of being lessees of an ice-house and land upon the shore. Hittinger v. Eames, 121 Mass. 539. They had the same right as others to cut and take ice which was the natural product of the pond; but they had no right, to the exclusion of other public uses, to the occupation of any part of the pond for the purpose by artificial means of increasing the thickness of the ice." In Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 629; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 439, it was held that no action would lie for taking fish from a small lake nearly surrounded by the plaintiff's land. The Massachusetts court held in Gage v. Steinkrans, April, 1881, that the right to cut ice on a great pond is common to all, and the adjoining owners have no peculiar rights therein. But in Peoples' Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229, it was held that an action of negligence would lie against the defendants for breaking up the plaintiff's ice-field in the Detroit by the swell of their boat running too near the same. In Conway v. Macfarlane, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, March 9, 1881, 11 W. N. C. 91, A. having been convicted of larceny, B. gave, before sentence, to C., the prosecutor, a note for a portion of the sum stolen from him by A. In a suit upon said note, brought by C. against B., held, that if the tended as to support the new promise. Bills of exchange and promissory notes differ from other simple contracts in this, that in an action on a bill or note a consideration is to be presumed until the contrary appear by evidence. The defendant may give proof of want of consideration, of failure of consideration, or that the consideration was illegal; and the only difference between a note or bill and any other contract, as between the immediate parties, is, that the burden of proof respecting consideration, in a certain sense is shifted." "If one person has been guilty of a wrongful act which would render him liable in damages to another, and he promise to pay the injured person a sum of money as a compensation, this is a mere gratuitous promise, unless made in consideration of the injured person releasing his right of action for such damages. Smart v. Chell, 7 Dowl. 781. That action was against an attorney who had neglected his client's cause, which negligence resulted in the client's compulsion to pay £14 for costs. Motion was made in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the declaration failed to show a consideration for the alleged promise, and judgment was arrested. Among other things, the court remarked: 'The declaration goes on to state another promise, that in consideration of the premises, the defendant promised to pay half the amount of those costs, and alleged a breach by non-payment of the £7. Now, no rule is more clear in law than that the consideration for a promise must move from the plaintiff; then I must see what this plaintiff has done or suffered, or what the defendant has gained; the detriment to the plaintiff must be the immediate consideration for the promise alleged. Suppose an assault had been committed, and an action of assumpsit was brought for non-payment of a sum agreed to be given for the injury done, and the declaration did not state a release of action for the assault. It is not therefore enough that there be a collateral consideration for the promise, but there must be an immediate consideration.'" Mercur and Sterrett, JJ., dissent, on the ground that the facts proved do not justify the application of the law as stated. ground that the defendant was not the owner or holder of the note, and therefore could not transfer the property in it. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BY TWO R., one of his clients, called on him there, and in presence of several others put a supposed case to him, and asked him, if such a case existed, would there be any liability? The attorney gave his opinion, and asked if the case put was a certain real transaction, and R. said it was. No such case was then pending. R. paid no fee, there was no general retainer, and the attorney was never engaged in the real case. The suposed case afterward arising, the attorney testified on the trial to the interview, and that he did not consider that R. was advising with WO recent decisions of the New York Court of Appeals are of interest on this important topic In Eagle Mowing and Reaping Machine Co. v. Shat- of evidence. In Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N. Y. 394; S. tuck, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Nov. 22, 1881, 10 | C., 36 Am. Rep. 627, the facts were as follows: A N. W. Rep. 690, it was held that where a debtor in-practicing attorney also carried on a liquor store. duces his creditor to take in settlement of the indebtedness the note of a third person, with such debtor's guaranty of its payment, not stating the consideration, this is, in effect, a promise by such debtor to pay his own debt in a particular manner, and is not within the statute of frauds. The court said: "At the time of the accounting and settlement of the defendants with the agent, the maker of the note in question was not indebted to the plaintiff, but to the defendants. The note was not given for property belonging to, or furnished by, the plaintiff, but for property belonging to, and fur-him as counsel at that time. Held, improper. The nished by, the defendants. The note at the time was the property of the defendants. The defendants being indebted to the plaintiff for money or notes taken for the plaintiff's machines, and by them converted to their own use, turned out the note in question, with the guaranty upon it, as their own property, in payment of their own debt. Are they to be discharged of their debt without being held liable on their guaranty? Does the case come within the language or meaning of the statute? Was the promise of the defendants any thing more than a promise to pay their own debt in the manner stated? We think it was not, and the case therefore comes clearly within the rule of Wyman v. Goodrich, 26 Wis. 21, where it was held that 'where the owner of a note, as part of the terms of sale thereof, guaranties its payment, his contract is not within the statute of frauds.' It was not the consideration of the note which was the basis of the promise of the defendants to the plaintiff, but the money or property of the plaintiff, which the defendants had converted to their own use, and which they undertook to pay by the transfer of the note with their guaranty upon it. It was in form a guaranty of the payment of the note, but the guaranty was in fact made in payment of their own debt. Such a case is neither within the letter nor spirit of the statute, as abundantly appears from the decisions of this court, and cases therein cited." In Putnam v. Farnham, 27 Wis. 187; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 459, a debtor orally promised to pay part of his debt by paying the debt of the creditor to a third person, to which arrangement the latter assented. Held, a valid promise. The principal case is sustained by Barker v. Scudder, 56 Mo. 272; Mobile and Girard R. Co. v. Jones, 57 Ga. 198; Malone v. Keever, 44 Penn. St. 107; Milks v. Rich, 80 N. Y. 269; S. C., 36 Am. Rep. 615. Dows v. Swett, 120 Mass. 322, which seems to the contrary, is distinguished by Mr. Browne (Stat. Frauds, § 165 a), on the court said: "The principle upon which these communications are protected from disclosure applies to every attempt to give them in evidence, without the assent thereto of the person making them. That principle is, that he who seeks aid or advice from a lawyer ought to be altogther free from the dread that his secrets will be uncovered; to the end that he may speak freely and fully all that is in his mind. Now this principle is not wholly kept, if what is thus said may be told without his assent, though to the immediate harm or help of another only. The disclosure is made, his secret is bruited, and he has it no longer in his power to stay it from use by any in strife with him, just as much when given in testimony against another as against him. It is not, indeed, put in evidence directly against him to his immediate harm, but that thing, the knowledge of which was confined to him and his adviser, has become matter of common knowledge, and may be the cause of his harm. The effect may not be so direct and immediate, yet it is a possible effect, and the foreseen possibility would press upon his lips, when in consultation with his legal adviser, nearly as heavily as if testimony of what he showed to his counsel could be called out in evidence against himself. A branch of the rule, to wit: that the communication is to be inviolate, though no suit be begun or contemplated, shows that though there is no present opportunity of the use of evidence of it against him, the communication is made under the seal of professional confidence. And it is but a further natural growth of the rule, that the communication is to be privileged from being put in evidence for or against another, lest it, by means of the knowledge of it thus given, be used to his harm for the sustaining or defense of a suit thereafter begun in which he may be made a party." In Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72, it was held that the common attorney of two or more parties, adverse in interest, cannot testify, in a suit between one of them and a third person, to communications made between them in his presence, while he was acting as such attorney in respect to the matter in question. The court declining to consider the question as it might arise in a suit between the parties (referring to Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330), said: "However this may be, we are of opinion that he cannot disclose such communication in a controversy between such parties and a third person. When parties, having diverse or hostile interests or claims which are the subject of controversy, unite in submitting the matter to a common attorney for his advice, they exhibit in the strongest manner their confidence in the attorney consulted. The law should encourage and not discourage such efforts for an amicable arrangement of differences, and public policy and the interests of justice are subserved by placing such communications under the seal of professional confidence to the extent at least of protecting them against disclosure by the attorney at the instance of third parties." It has been said that the rule which prohibits an attorney from disclosing professional communications does not arise from the moral obligation to preserve a secret confided to him, nor from the peculiar power of the court to regulate the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court, nor from any general grounds of public policy forbidding confidential communications to be disclosed. The rule is a mere extension of immunity of the party to his substitute, the attorney. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254. The same view was adopted by Selden, J., in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 341, where he said it was "clear that the priv-| ilege in question is not founded upon any idea of the sacredness of confidential communications, whether made to an attorney or any other person, nor upon any peculiar policy of the law which distinguishes the general business of an attorney from that of any other class in the community; but it was the result of that rule of the common law which excused parties from testifying in their own cases, and of the necessity, for the convenience of the public as well as the benefit of suitors, of having the business of the courts conducted by professional men." This view however was not adopted by the rest of the court, and was explicitly disapproved in Rost v. Wright, supra. The privilege extends to any representative of the attorney, in conference or correspondence. Brand v. Brand, 39 How. Pr. 193; Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 337; 20 Am. Dec. 699. And in accordance with the above rule, a communication made to an attorney's clerk in regard to a suit which the attorney is prosecuting for such client is privileged in the same manner as if made to the attorney in perSibley v. Waffle, 16 N. Y. 180. son. But it was held in Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. 574, that the privilege did not extend to a mere student at law in the attorney's office, not the attorney's clerk, although the client supposed he was an attorney. Nor does it extend to one not a lawyer, although the party supposed him to be a lawyer. Sample v. Frost, 10 Iowa, 266. It has been held that a party who offers himself as a witness on a trial cannot refuse to answer as to the confidential communications made to his counsel. Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 333. But this is an extreme case, and seems opposed to the weight of authority. Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 91; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 362; Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112; Barker v. Kuhn, 38 Iowa, 305; Hemenway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701; Bobo v. Bryson, 21 Ark. 387; State v. White, 19 Kans. 445; S. C., 27 A.n. Rep. 137, and note, 142. The privilege does not apply to third persons overhearing communications between attorney and client. Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray, 519; Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 337; Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172. Nor to the adverse party. Little v. McKeon, 1 Sandf. 607. Nor where both parties are present. Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 300 (so held by four judges against three, and by all the judges in Britton v. Lorenz, 45 id. 51). But this applies only to such communications as were made when both parties were actually present. Brand v. Brand, 39 How. Pr. 193. Nor does the privilege extend to statements made by a third person, at the instance of the party, to the attorney. Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss 153. The relation of attorney and client must exist at the time of testifying. Voluntary disclosures made by a former client after the relation has ceased, and not elicited by any artifice of the attorney, are not privileged, although substantially a reiteration of communications made while the relation existed, and therefore then privileged. Yordan v. Hess, 13 Johns. 492; Mandeville v. Guernsey, 38 Barb. 225. The relation must be strictly that of attorney and client. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254. But that relation need extend only to the particular matter; there need not be a general retainer. Earle v. Grout, 46 Vt. 113. Nor payment of fee. Cross v. Riggins, 50 Mo. 335. The privilege applies only to communications, and not to acts or transactions with third persons, although the attorney attends professionally. Coveney v. Tannahill, 1 Hill, 33; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54; Randell v. Yates, 48 Miss. 685. Nor to letters written by the attorney in pursuance of the client's instructions. Reg. v. Downer, 43 L. T. (N. S.) 445. The privilege however applies to documents belonging to a client in the lawyer's hands. It has been held that when a solicitor holds a document for his client, he cannot against the will of the client be compelled to produce it, even by a person who has an equal interest in it with the client. Newton v. Chaplin, 10 C. B. 356. If the attorney permits the papers held for the client to pass out of his hands, they may be put in evidence against the client by the party who holds them. But an attorney having papers of his client in his possession in court, which are required as evidence in the case, is not privileged from producing them at least for the purpose of identification. Mitchell v. Sheriff of New York, 7 Abb. Pr. 96. This however seems overruled by Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51. The rule extends to a bill in chancery sworn to but never filed. Burnham v. Roberts, 70 Ill. 19; Neal v. Patten, 47 Ga. 73. The privilege does not apply to cases where the attorney learned of the matters not as a professional man, but by personal observation, and where they were not communicated as secrets, though the client may have given the same information. Davis v. Waters, 9 M. & W. 611; Crosby v. Berger, 11 Pai. 377; Brandt v. Klein, 17 Johns. 335; Chillicothe R. R. v. Jameson, 48 Ill. 281. The privilege does not extend to cases where the advice was given with a view of breaking the law, for communications of this class counsel are bound to disclose. Bank v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 598; People v. Sheriff, 29 Barb. 622; Graham v. People, 63 id. 483. Communications made to an attorney at law, with a view of obtaining his assistance in the commission of a felony, or other crime malum in se, are not privileged. Bank v. Mersereau, supra; Peo- | ple v. Blakely, 4 Park. Cr. 176. In State v. Mewherter, 46 Iowa, 88, an attorney on the trial of the defendant for murder testified that the defendant consulted his firm in regard to a suit against the deceased, and during the consultation made threats against the deceased. It appearing that the threats in no manner pertained to the business of the consultation, held, that they were not privileged. But the privilege extends to communications made for the purpose of getting aid and advice in perpetrating an act not malum in se, such as a fraud on creditors. Bank v. Mersereau, supra; Gartside v. Outram, 26 L. J. Ch. 115; Charlton v. Coombs, 32 id. 284; Maxham v. Place, 46 Vt. 434. In order that the communications shall be privileged it is not necessary that they be made in a suit pending, or even in contemplation of one. If made for the purpose of obtaining the attorney's professional advice or skill they are privileged, and he has no right to disclose them without the consent of his client. Crosby v. Crosby, 2 Ch. Sent. 15. "The foundation of this rule," says Lord Chancellor Brougham, "is not on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts and in those matters." Learned, P. J., in Bacon v. Frisbie, 15 Hun, 28, says: "The object of the rule is evidently to enable persons to obtain legal advice on a free and full statement of facts, without the risk that the statement will be made evidence against them. And to effect that object it is necessary that every statement should be privileged which is made to an attorney or counsellor for the purpose on the part of the client of getting advice as to the law on the facts stated. The motive of the party who makes the statement and the character of the party who hears it make it privileged." The contrary doctrine was asserted by Selden, J., in a learned and elaborate opinion in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330, but none of the other judges concurred, and the case was decided on another ground. And in Britton v. Lorenz, 45 id. 57, Grover, J., said: "The rule deducible from the authorities is, that all communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether such advice relates to a suit pending, one contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid." And this was concurred in by all the judges. To the same effect, Minet v. Morgan, L. R., 8 Ch. 561. The attorney may disclose the communications when he has an interest in the matter, or the disclosure is necessary to protect his own personal rights. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254. And he must disclose them, where he is not only attorney but party, as when summoned as a garnishee, he is asked if he has not received money from his client to pay certain debts. Jeanes v. Fridenberg, 3 Penn. L. J. R. 199. The general rule in relation to the client's testifying to confidential communications is, that whatever the lawyer is precluded from testifying to, the client is protected from disclosing. Hemenway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701; Carnes v. Platt, 36 N. Y. 360; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 337; Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112. The note was discounted for the benefit of the drawers, and not being paid at maturity the bank sued the makers and indorsers upon it, and obtained judgment by default against them. Only part of the money so adjudged could be raised out of the property of the drawers of the note, and the indorser Johnson was obliged to pay the residue. Upon a claim being made by him that he and Ramsey were joint accommodation indorsers, a feigned issue was ordered to try that question, and npon that trial the said Jacob R. Johnson introduced evidence to show that he "indorsed the said promissory note at the request of the said John Ramsey, and under the agreement and promise of the *To appear in 14 Vroom's (42 N. J.) Reports. said John Ramsey to pay one-half of any moneys they, the said Jacob R. Johnson and John Ramsey, or either of them, should be afterward compelled to pay by indorsing said note for the said makers; that Johnson refused to sign the note as first indorser and payee until Mr. Ramsey promised to pay one-half of any moneys which might be recovered from both or either of them." It further appeared that this note was given to take up a similar note held by the bank, made by the same parties to the order of Jacob R. Johnson, and indorsed by him and Ramsey for the accommodation of the makers, but without any agreement as to the respective liabilities between the indorsers. The question presented for the advisory opinion of this court was whether the testimony relative to the alleged agreement above set forth was admissible. Argued at February term, 1881, before Beasley, Chief Justice, and Justices Depue, Scudder and Knapp. R. S. Kuhl, for plaintiff. J. N. Voorhees, for defendant. BEASLEY, C. J. This case presents for consideration, in one of its aspects, the question how far the written contract inherent in the indorsement of commercial paper, as between accommodation indorsers, can be controlled or affected by a contemporaneous oral agreement. The plaintiff in the present suit is the first indorser on this note, and has paid part of the sum mentioned in it, and he now seeks to compel the defendant, who is the next indorser below him, to contribute one-half of this outlay, on the ground that at the time they signed the paper such was the understanding between them. As they stand upon the note these are successive indorsements, and unexplained, and considered intrinsically, they import a primary liability in the plaintiff; and with respect to him an entire irresponsibility on the part of the defendant. This is the legal effect of the signatures as they appear on the back of the note; the inquiry is whether another force can be given to them by virtue of an agreement between these parties, entered into at the time of making such indorsements. In defining the legal rule on this general subject, Mr. Byles, in his treatise on Bills, page 90, correctly says that "no mere oral agreement can have any effect at law in contradicting the instrument, if cotemporaneous with the making of it." This is the ordinary principle applicable to every species of written contracts; and although in the main it throws its protection around the agreement embodied in commercial paper, still it cannot be denied that in this latter case it has sometimes been thought to be subject to certain unusual limitations. That such supposed limitations have the sanction of high judicial authority I think is manifest, though these exceptions to the general rule are not so numerous as is sometimes supposed. I have not perceived that in any English cases a different rule in this respect has been applied to commercial paper from that which protects the inviolability of other species of written undertakings. And such, too, is the general bent of the authorities in this country. Nevertheless, no one can look into the American decisions and text-books without being painfully impressed with the idea that very great confusion in the use of principles prevails with regard to this topic; but upon careful examination it will be found that this state of things is for the most part owing to mistake in the application of the law to particular facts, and not to any denial of the cardinal doctrine that these written commercial contracts, like other proofs of the same nature, are not liable to modification by inconsistent, contemporaneous, oral understandings. Occasionally a case can be met with in which it may be thought, and upon very satisfactory grounds, that the written contract has been altered by the extraneous evidence, but upon careful scrutiny it will be ascertained that such evi So dence has been sanctioned for the reason that in the judgment of the court it is not out of harmony with the agreement, as contained in the instrument. sometimes cases in which a want of consideration has been permitted to be shown have been regarded as exhibitions of instances of a departure from the rule in question, but it is plain that they do not evidence such a deviation, as the proof of such a defect is always, under ordinary circumstances, admissible, in order to invalidate a simple contract, though reduced to writing. In the same manner fraud and illegality are legitimate defenses to suits on all other instruments, as well as, under certain conditions, to those founded on bills or notes. And when the commercial contract intended to be committed to writing has been only partly expressed, then as in other similar cases the residue may be proved by extrinsic evidence. This last rule is pointedly exemplified in that class of cases in which a note has been indorsed in blank by a third party, before the payee has put his name upon it. In the courts of this State such an indorsement is held to carry with it so incomplete and uncertain a meaning as to be, on the principle just referred to, open to the explanation of oral evidence. This has been ruled and finally decided in the cases of Crozer v. Moore, Spence. 256; Watkins v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Dutcher, 84, and Chaddock v. Vanness, 6 Vroom, 517, and in all these cases the fundamental rule that a written contract, having a complete import, must speak exclusively for itself, was fully admitted. And even in those States in which, under the same conditions, a different result has been reached - and such has been the case in the State of New York and elsewhere- such result has rested on the consideration that this particular kind of indorsement expresses in its own terms, as affected by legal rules, a contract complete and intelligible, and on that account is not variable by the force of foreign testimony. It will be observed that neither of these lines of decisions is invasive of the rule under consideration. And it may be further remarked that in no jurisdiction has the rule that oral evidence is inadmissible thus to qualify a written contract, perfect with respect to its signification, been more uniformly and stringently enforced than within this State. The truth of this statement will conclusively appear by a reference to the cases collected in Stewart's Dig., p. 502, pl. 439. This being the established general rule, the question arises, how is this present offer of parol evidence to be legitimated? These parties, as has been stated, are accommodation indorsers, and the name of the one stands before the other on the back of this note. The first inquiry therefore is as to the legal effect of that collocation; does it form by settled rules of law an entire and definite understanding between these litigants? If it does, to make the oral agreement admissible, which is here sought to be superinduced, it must rest on some exceptional ground, as such proof would be plainly excluded by the operation of the general principle above expressed. In the case of Johnson v. Martinus, 4 Halst. 144, this precise question was before this court for consideration, and it was then explicitly held that an indorsement in blank does not constitute a complete written contract, and that therefore the understanding that subsisted between indorser and indorsee could be shown aliunde in a suit between them. But in the opinion read in the Court of Errors in the before-cited case of Chaddock v. Vanness, this decision was emphatically disapproved, and as such criticism was not dissented from by any member of the court, so far as I know, it is not to be regarded as an absolute authority. Intrinsically considered, it is difficult to see how it can sustain itself. It is founded on the broad doctrine that the usual blank indorsement on a note is inconclusive with respect to the terms of the contract between indorser |