sible." But he adds: "It must be conceded he knows right from wrong, good from evil, in the abstract; that he had sufficient power of self-control not to murder;" and "the theories of inspiration and impulse were only after-thoughts." IN NOTES OF CASES. 'N Seim v. State, 55 Md. 566, the defendants, the president, secretary, and treasurer of an incorporated club, called the " Concordia, were convicted of selling beer on Sunday. The club was not conducted for profit, but its purposes were described in its charter as follows: "The Concordia' shall be dedicated to the intellectual, moral and social improvement of its members, the refinement of their tastes, and the development of good feeling among them. In furtherance of these objects it shall afford them opportunities for scientific cultivation, and rational amusements, and shall place before them, as far as may be, the best models of musical and dramatic art." Lager beer would not seem to be calculated to further these objects, but the court held: "We conclude that the members of such associations as the 'Concordia' is admitted to be, who obtain refreshments and liquors at the club, by paying into the common fund the price fixed by the regulation of the society, cannot be said in any sense to buy them from the corporation, nor can the corporation be said to sell them to the members, within the meaning of the act of 1866. It is argued by the attorney-general that the liquors and other supplies are purchased by the corporation, and are consequently its property; and when furnished to a member it is sold to him, and if the sale is made on Sunday it is an offense within the act of 1866. But that act equally prohibits the sale of any article of merchandise whatsoever on Sunday, and if the argument of the appellee be sound, the society could not furnish a meal to a member on Sunday without violating the law and subjecting itself or its officers to the penalties prescribed by the act of 1866. We do not so construe the law. The society is not an ordinary corporation; but a voluntary association or club united for social purposes, each member must be elected, and each is joint-owne of the property and assets and entitled to the privileges of the society as long as he remains a member. Among these privileges is that of partaking of the provisions and refreshments provided for the use of the members. These are not sold to him by the corporation, but furnished to him by the steward upon his paying into the common fund what is equivalent to the cost of the article furnished, and what is so paid is expended in keeping up the supply for the use of the members. Such a transaction is not a barter or sale in the way of trade, and therefore not within the purview or meaning of the act of 1866." For some cases of attempted evasion of like sumptuary laws, by the formation of social clubs, see Rickart v. People, 79 Ill. 85; Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 81; Com. v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; all collected in note, 32 Am. Rep. 433. In Fox v. Hall, Missouri Supreme Court, October, 1881, 13 Rep. 147, it was held that a purchaser who takes a quit-claim deed without notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance of the same premises from the same grantor, gets valid title. The court said: "This precise question has never been passed upon by this court. It has been held in several cases that where one takes a title to land by quit-claim which in the hands of the grantor is subject to equities to which the recording act does not apply, the grantee by quit-claim will take the land subject to such equities. Stoffel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147; Stivers v. Horne, 62 id. 473; Mann v. Best, 62 id. 491. See also Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 232; Springer v. Bartle, 46 Iowa, 688. And in Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444, a quit-claim deed from one whose title had been transferred by adverse possession was held to pass no right as against the adverse occupant to whom such title had been so transferred, for the reason that such title by possession was not subject to the recording acts, and could not be recorded, and the grantee in the quit-claim deed took only what the grantor could lawfully convey. Numerous decisions lay down the rule that a bona fide purchaser of property who has failed to record his deed until after a judgment has been recovered against his vendor, but who records it prior to sale under the judgment, can hold it against the person purchasing under the judgment. Davis v. Ownsby, 14 Mo. 170; Valentine v. Havener, 20 id. 133; Stillwell v. McDonald, 39 id. 282; Potter v. McDowell, 43 id. 93; Reed v. Ownby, 44 id. 204; Black v. Long, 60 id. 181. These cases all proceed upon the theory that unless the conveyance of the judgment debtor be recorded before the sale under execution, the purchaser at such sale, if he have no actual notice of such conveyance, will acquire the title. We are of opinion that the principle established by the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar, and that a grantee for value in a quit-claim deed, with the exception above noted, acquires the same rights against an unrecorded deed of which he had no actual notice as a purchaser at execution sale. In Chapman v. Sims, 53 Miss. 154, this question is ably and learnedly discussed, and the same conclusion reached which is announed in this opinion. Similar rulings have been made in the States of Illinois and Iowa. Mc Connell v. Reed, 4 Scam. 117; Pettingill v. Devin, 35 Iowa, 353." In Brown v. Banner Coal and Oil Co., 97 Ill. 214; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 105, it was held likewise that a recorded unrestricted quit-claim deed takes precedence of a prior unrecorded warranty deed of the same premises by the same grantor, distinguishing McConnell v. Reed, supra. Pettingill v. Devin, supra, is to the same effect, being fonded on Mc Connell v. Reed, supra, and Rowe v. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154, the latter citing McConnell v. Reed. To the same effect, Graff v. Middleton, 43 Cal. 341; Mansfield v. Dyer, Mass. Sup. Ct., 11 Rep. 671. gers v. Burchard, 34 Tex. 441; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 283, and Marshall v. Roberts, 18 Minn. 405; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 201, are to the contrary. Chapman v. Sims, supra, holds that a quit-claim deed in a chain But Rod of title does not deprive the grantee who claims under it of the character of a bona fide purchaser, and is as effectual to convey title as one with general warranty. The Reporter's head note of the principal case seems to us to state exactly the converse of what is decided. The decision is correctly stated in 14 Cent. L. J. 31. In Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bangs, Michigan Supreme Court, Jan. 18, 1882, 11 N. W. Rep. 276, it was held that it is negligent in a passenger to leap from a train moving six miles an hour, for the purpose of getting off at a station where the train should but does not stop, although he does so to save anxiety to his mother who is expecting him, and although others have frequently jumped off trains going at that rate of speed. The court said: "We have reluctantly felt ourselves compelled to hold that in our judgment such conduct is beyond any question negligence, and that the jury should have been so instructed. The fact that many persons take the risk of leaving cars in motion does not make them any the less risks which they have no right to lay at the door of the railroad companies. No company can use effectively coercive powers to keep passengers from doing such things. All persons of sound mind must be held responsible for knowledge of the usual risks of such travelling. Every one is supposed to know that a fall beside a moving train is very likely to bring some part of the body or limbs in danger of being crushed. Every one is supposed to know that in jumping from a vehicle running six miles an hour or much less he stands a good many chances of falling or being unable to fully control his movements, and that falling near a train is always dangerous. No doubt every one who tries such an experiment persuades himself that he will escape, but it is impossible to suppose that any one of common sense does not know that there is danger. It is true that there are circumstances where it is not negligence to take a choice of risks or where an act is done without freedom of choice. But the common sense of mankind teaches us that no one has a right to risk life or limb merely to avoid inconvenience. Upon the facts in this case no one can doubt that the railway agents were wrong in not stopping at the station. If put to any inconvenience by being carried further, Bangs had a legal remedy for it. No doubt the vexation and anxiety would lead to some trouble of mind, but they cannot he held sufficient to justify running into bodily danger." See "Boarding and Leaving Railway Cars in motion," 23 Alb. Law Jour. 124, and note, 37 Am. Rep. 384. BURDEN OF PROOF OF A NEGATIVE. HE case of Goodwin v. Smith, 72 Ind. 113; S. C., St Am. Rep. 141, involves an interesting ques tion of the burden of proof of a negative. A statute enacted that a license to retail intoxicating liquors might be granted, provided the applicant be a fit person, and not in the habit of becoming intoxicated, but not otherwise. In an appeal by one whose application was refused, held, that the burden was on him to prove that he was a fit person and not in the habit of becoming intoxicated. The court observed: "The general rule, deducible from the authorities, may be thus stated: Whoever asserts a right dependent for its existence upon a negative, must establish the truth of the negative by a preponderance of the evidence. This must be the rule, or it must follow that rights, of which a negative forms an essential element, may be enforced without proof. This conclusion would be both illogical and unjust, and we are therefore authorized to infer the truth of its converse. Confusion has arisen from statements loosely made by text-writers, and sometimes by courts; but it will be found upon examination that wherever the question has been directly presented and considered the petitioner's right depends upon the truth of a it has been uniformly held that wherever negative, upon him is cast the onus probandi, except in cases where the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the adverse party." with care, "Among the cases applying the general rule, substantially as we have stated it, that where a negative is essential to the existence of the right, the party claiming the right has the burden, are those holding that in actions for malicious prosecutions the plaintiff must prove that there was no probable cause. Smith v. Zent, 59 Ind. 362; Carey v. Sheets, 67 id. 375; Cummings v. Parks, 2 id. 148; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 454. The same rule applies where the plaintiff sues for injuries arising from negligence in leaving dangerous excavations without protecting barriers; and it also applies in all cases where the claim is founded on a breach of duty in not repairing highways, for in all such cases a negative must be established. This is the rule in cases where the question is one of mutual negligence; the evidence must establish the negative proposition, that his own negligence did not proximately contribute. Hale v. Smith, 78 N. Y. 480; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 12. In Nash v. Hall, 4 Ind. 444, it was held that where a bill alleged that 'the defendant in the suit did not make a tender of a deed,' the burden was on the plaintiff. In that case it was said: 'Where the plaintiff grounds his right of action on a negative allegation, the establishment of which is an essential element in his case, he is bound to prove it, though negative in its terms.' The case of Smith v. Bettger, 68 Ind. 254; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 256, proceeds upon the same general doctrine; for it is there held that one who relies upon the negative allegation, that a negotiable promissory note was not taken in payment of a precedent debt, must prove his allegation. Where the action is against a tenant, and the breach assigned is that he did not repair, the onus is upon the plaintiff. Doe v. Rowlands, 9 C. & P. 734; Belcher v. McIntosh, 8 id. 720; Croft v. Lumley, 6 H. L. C. 672. The rule under mention is as old as the case of Berty v. Dormer, 12 Mod. 526, where it was recognized and enforced by Chief Justice Holt. In Conyers v. State, 50 Ga. 103; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 686, it was held * * that the State, in a prosecution for suffering a minor | ley v. McKee, 5 Cr. Circ. 298. In an action for the value of wood cut by defendant on the plaintiff's land, the defendant alleging that it was cut on the land of another, the plaintiff must show that it was not. Gilmore v. Wilbur, 18 Pick. 517. In an action by the owners of a toll-bridge to recover tolls, where they have exempted certain persons, they must prove that defendants were not exempt. Central Bridge Corporation v. Butler, 2 Gray, 130. In an action for attaching exempt household furniture, the plaintiff must prove that not enough was left to satisfy the statute. Gordon v. Clapp, 113 Mass. 333. In an action for freight on a charter-party, the declaration alleging the performance of all requisites, the issue being on unnecessary delay and deviation. Funcheon v. Harvey, 119 Mass. 469. In an action charging a want To this case the editor of the American Reports of proper care and diligence upon an agent in his has added the following note: "Wharton says (1 Ev., § 357): 'It may be stated as a test admitting of universal application, that whether the proposition be affirmative or negative, the party against whom judgment would be given, as to a particular issue, supposing no proof to be offered on either side, has on him, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, the burden of proof which he must satisfactorily sustain.' And at § 356: 'He who in a court of justice undertakes to establish a claim against another, or to set up a release from another's claim against himself, must produce the proof necessary to make good his contention. This proof may be either affirmative or negative. Whatever it is, it must be produced by the party who seeks forensically either to establish or to defeat a claim.' "In addition to the cases cited and explained in the principal case, the following are the main authorities illustrating this subject: Smith v. transaction of the principal's business. Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448, 456. In an action on contract, declared forfeited by the State, and alleged by the plaintiff to have been wrongly forfeited. State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7. Where a devise is set up as an execution of a power, and the validity of the allegation depends on the question whether the testator had any other real estate on which the devise could operate, the burden is on the party setting up the will. Doe v. Johnson, 7 M. & G. 1047. Tindal, C. J., said: 'Where a party seeks, from extrinsic circumstances, to give effect to an instrument, which, on the face of it, it would not have, it is incumbent on him to prove those circumstances, though involving the proof of a negative.' In an action by holder against surety of a promissory note, the defendant alleging notice to collect and neglect by the holder, the latter must prove that the note could not have been collected. Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Penn. St. 476. Where one files a bill to cancel a deed on the ground that it never was executed. Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292. "Where the burden of proof is on the defendant. Where in answer to an action for loss of imported goods by a carrier, the defendant averred that unless the goods were duly entered at the customhouse the importation was illegal and the contract of carriage void, the defendant must prove the nonentry. Sissons v. Dixon, 5 B. & C. 758. In an action against an actor for not performing at a licensed theater, according to contract, the want of license must be shown by the defendant. Rodwell v. Redge, 1 C. & P. 220. In an action on an insurance policy, where the defendant alleges the non-communication of a material fact on the application. Elkin v. JanWhen defendant pleads pay "Where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff averred that one who chartered his ship put on board a dangerous commodity without due notice to the captain. Williams v. East India Co., 3 East, 192. In an action for not building according to specification, the defendant answering that he did build according to specification, the plaintiff must show that he did not. Davies, 7 C. & P. 307. In an action on a charterparty for not loading a sufficient cargo, the defendant answering that he did load a sufficient cargo, the plaintiff must show that he did not. Ridgway v. Ewbank, 2 Moo. & Rob. 217. So in assumpsit for embossing calico in a workmanlike manner. Amos v. Hughes, 1 id. 464. In assumpsit for breach of warranty that a horse was sound. Osborn v. Thompson, 13 M. & W. 655. son, 9 C. & P. 337. In covenant for breach of covenant to occupy in a proper manner and keep in repair. Doe v. Rowlands, id. 734. In an action on a life insurance policy, where the defendant alleges a breach of the representation that the accused was in good health on the application. Geach v. Ingall, 14 M. & W. 95; Ashby v. Bates, 15 id. 589. In an action on a note signed by A. B. as agent of a corporation, the facts showing that it was not a corporate obligation must be shown by plaintiff. Brad ment. Hankin v. Squires, 5 Biss. 186; Adams v. Field, 25 Mich. 16; Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N. H. 186. Where to a plea of the Statute of Limitations the plaintiff replies that the accounts were merchants' accounts, and the defendant rejoins that they were not open and current. McLellan v. Crofton, 6 Me. 307. In an action for the price of goods, where the defendant relies upon a breach of warranty. Dorr v. Fisher, 1 Cush. 271. In an action on a promissory note, where defendant sets up that Pratt v. Langdon, 97 a note, the defendant inception, must prove Reeve v. Liverpool, etc., In a suit to enforce a con the consideration was illegal. Mass. 97. In an action on having shown fraud in its notice of it to the plaintiff. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 520. tract to pay for sheep, where defendant set up a breach of warranty that the sheep were not diseased. Milk v. Moore, 39 Ill. 584; S. P., Maltman v. Williamson, 69 id. 423. In an action on a note for medical services, the defendant alleging that the payee was not a licensed physician. Barton v. Sunderland, 5 Rich. 57. Where the plaintiff alleges that A. was at a certain time of sane mind, and defendant denies it. Sutton v. Sadler, 3 C. B. (U. S.) 87. (This is put on the ground that sanity is presumed.) Where there was a promise to pay a sum of money unless a certain quantity of oil should arrive at certain ports at a certain time. Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188. Where the defendant sets up a prior conviction in bar. Com. v. Daley, 4 Gray, 209. In an action against a common carrier for failure to transport, and he sets up an excuse for the failure. Lewis v. Smith, 107 Mass. 334. action by one for personal injury by a railroad company, through negligence, where the proofs showed that the car was thrown from the track, without plaintiff's fault, defendant must show himself without fault. In an Sullivan v. Phila., etc., R. Co., 30 Penn. St. 234; Zemp v. Wilmington, 9 Rich. 84. So of injury to goods. Ketchum v. Ex. Co., 52 Mo. 390; Steele v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247. In an action on a life insurance policy, where the complaint alleged that the death was not caused by the breach of any of the conditions or agreements in the policy, and the defendant denied this, and set up facts showing a breach of such conditions, the court said the allegation in the complaint was unnecessary and need not be proved. Murray v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., New York Court of Appeals, April, 1881." In an action by a passenger against a railroad company for an assault by its conductor, the burden of proof that the plaintiff was ejected for non-payment of fare is on defendant. St. John v. Eastern R. Co., 1 Allen, 544. MILLER, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff, who was the wife of Charles Mead, deceased, to recover damages sustained in her means of support by the death of her husband in consequence of intoxication produced by liquor sold to him by said defendant Isaac J. Stratton, at the hotel kept by him, of which the said Margaret M. Stratton, the wife of said Isaac J. Stratton, was the owner, and which it is claimed she rented to her husband, or permitted to be occupied as a hotel, knowing that intoxicating liquors were to be and had been sold upon said premises. The complaint alleges that in consequence of the acts of the defendants, stated and set forth, and in conse quence of the intoxication of the late husband of plaintiff, caused as aforesaid, plaintiff had been injured in her means of support and property. The essential facts established by the verdict were that the defendant Isaac J. Stratton was the keeper of the hotel, and the deed was given to his wife, who had general charge of the house, except the bar, but was cognizant of the fact that intoxicating liquors were sold there. That the deceased came to the house with a horse and buggy, drank intoxicating liquors several times there, and became so much intoxicated that he was helped into his buggy upon starting for home. That he must have fallen in his buggy, as he was found dead, with his knee caught tightly under the iron cross or foot bar, and his head over between the wheel and the wagon, so that his head was beaten by the spokes and otherwise injured, and that he left a wife and several children who were dependent upon him for support. The statute (chapter 646, Laws of 1873) under which this action is brought, provides that every husband, wife, etc., or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication * * *shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who shall, by selling or giving away the intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication, *** and any person or persons owning or renting, or permitting the occupation of any building or premises and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be sold therein, shall be liable severally or jointly with the person or persons selling * * for all damages sustained and for exemplary damages." The statute cited provides for a recovery by action for injuries to person or property, or means of support, without any restriction whatever. Both direct and consequential injuries are included, and it was evidently intended to create a cause of action unknown to the common law, and a new ground and right of action. Volans v. Owen, 74 N. Y. 526; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 337. The injury to the means of support was one of the main grounds of the action, and when the party is deprived of the usual means of maintenance, which he or she was accustomed to enjoy previously, by or in consequence of the intoxication, or the acts of the person intoxicated, the action can be maintained. Id. It is evident that the Legislature intended to go in such a case far beyond any thing known to the common law, and to provide a remedy for injuries occasioned by one who was instrumental in producing, or who caused such intoxication. While a statute of this character should not be enlarged, it should be interpreted, where the language is clear and explicit, according to its true intent and meaning, having in view the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. The evident object was to suppress the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, and to punish those who in any form furnished means of intoxication, by making them liable for damages which might arise which were caused by the parties who furnished such means. If the injury which had resulted to the deceased in consequence of his intoxication had disabled him for life, or to such an extent as to incapacitate him for labor, and for earning a support for his family, it would no doubt be embraced within the meaning and intent of the statute. That death ensued in consequence thereof furnishes much stronger ground for a claim for a loss of means of support, and a different rule in the latter case would make provision for the lesser and temporary injury, while that which was greatest and most serious would be without any remedy or means of redress. Such could not have been the intention of the law-makers and the statute was designed to embrace and most manifestly covers and includes all injuries produced by the intoxication and which legitimately result from the same. If it is an injury which can be repaired by damages, as that arising from a temporary disability, or one where death comes as a natural and legitimate consequence of the intoxication, a case is made out within the statute which entitles the injured party to recover such damages. The argument that in this case it was the remote cause, and not the natural and proximate cause of the act of the defendant, would apply with equal force if death had not followed, and we think has no point under the peculiar circumstances of this case. There are some decisions in the Supreme Court of this State which bear upon the subject. In Hayes v. Phelan, 4 Hun, 733, the opinion holds that the statute gave a right of action only in cases where it lies against the intoxicated person. This conclusion does not however appear to have been sustained by a majority of the judges constituting the General Term, and in a note to Dubois v. Miller, 5 Hun, 335, an opinion of James, J., is published, dissenting from the views expressed in Hayes v. Phelan, and it is stated that Boardman, J., concurred only in the result arrived at in the decision, and only two justices were present. In Bookmire v. Monaghan, 15 Hun, 16 (3d department), where the complaint asked damages only by reason of the death of plaintiff's husband, which it was alleged was caused by intoxication by liquors sold the deceased by the defendant, it was held that the complaint did not state a cause of action under the Civil Damage Act, and it was said that the court had theretofore decided in Hayes v. Phelan that such damages are not recoverable under the act of 1873. The same question arose in the Fourth Judicial Department in Jackson v. Brookins, 5 Hun, 530, and it was there held that where several persons become intoxicated and engage in an affray, in which one is killed, his widow may maintain an action against the person who sold the liquor which caused the intoxication, to recover damages sustained by her for the death of her husband. The some doctrine is upheld in Smith v. Reynolds, 8 Hun, 128. In Quain v. Russell, 8 id. 319, in the 3d department, it was held by a majority of the court that it was not essential to the existence of the cause of action under the Civil Damage Act, against the vendor of liquors, that an action should also be maintainable against the intoxicated person, and it is sufficient if the wife has been injured in her means of support through the iutoxication of the husband. The case of Hayes v. Phelan is referred to, and it is said that no such principle as is claimed in the last case was decided by the court. It will thus be seen that the decisions of the Supreme Court in this State are not entirely harmonious. In the State of Illinois it is held that the action will lie when death ensues. See Schroeder v. Crawford, 94 Ill. 857; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 235; Hackett v. Smelsby, 77 Ill. 109. The same rule is upheld in Nebraska, Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 409; and in the State of Iowa, Rafferty v. Beekman, 46 Iowa, 195. Some exceptions are made by the courts of Illinois, when the person intoxicated is killed in an affray, or when death results from exposure. Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 359; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 446. It is not necessary to decide whether these decisions are based on a sound principle, as no such question arises in the case at bar. Cases are also cited from Indiana which are claimed to be adverse to the views expressed. See Krack v. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517; Cotlier v. Early, 54 id. 559; Backus v. Dant, 55 id. 181. In Krack v. Heilman, supra, the person intoxicated was killed in au affray. The last two cases cited are somewhat analogous to the case at bar, but the decision of the court is not, we think, well supported in either of them. It is also held in Ohio that under the act in that State in relation to the sale of intoxicating liquors, for injury to the means of support in consequence of intoxication, which caused death, no recovery of damages can be had. Davis v. Justice, 31 Ohio, 359; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 514; Kirchner v. Myers, 35 Ohio, 85; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 398. We cannot concur in such an interpretation of the act in question, and for the reasons already stated are of the opinion that if the death of he deceased was a result necessarily following the intoxication, and was attributable to such intoxication, an action will lie to recover the damages arising to the means of support of the plaintiff by reason thereof. While thus holding it is not necessary to decide whether a person producing the intoxication would be liable when death ensued by reason of an affray caused thereby, or under different circumstances from those which are presented in the case at bar. Nor are we called upon to consider in this case the effect of the statute, so far as it affects the right of action of the children of the deceased for damages sustained by each of them, as that question is not now presented. The conclusion follows that there was no error committed by the judge upon the trial in any of his rulings in regard to the question considered. case. A claim is also made that the judge erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint, or to nonsuit the plaintiff as to the defendant Margaret M. Stratton. The title to the hotel was in her, and she lived there with her husband, having charge of the domestic arrangements in conducting the business of the hotel. There is evidence tending to show that she had knowledge that her husband was engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors, and that he intended to and did actually carry on and prosecute such business. Under the evidence it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether she had knowledge that the building was occupied and used by her husband for any such purpose. And this result was to be arrived at after due consideration of the relations existing between them and the circumstances surrounding the It cannot, we think, be claimed that as a matter of law the husband was in possession and that the wife was relieved from liability as the owner of the property, who had no knowledge of the sale of intoxicating liquors. Whatever his rights may have been at common law, if she was the owner and knew that the business of selling intoxicating liquors was conducted there, she cannot evade responsibility. The statute does not, as is claimed, provide that the person must not only own but rent the premises; but if there is either an "owning or renting," with knowledge, it is sufficient to create a liability. The proof of ownership was clear, and there was proof tending to show that the occupation was permitted with knowledge of the purpose of selling intoxicating drinks. The claim that Mrs. Stratton, even if she was the owner of the premises, does not come within the provisions of the statute so as to render her liable, is based upon the fact that she had the title when she and her husband went into possession, and that the act of the Legislature upon which this action is founded was passed afterward. The position is that the statute was not intended to be retroactive. The statute had been in operation some time when the sale of the liquors was made, and in the absence of direct proof, it can hardly be assumed that the original possession was to be and actually was continued without regard to any future change of the law or obligation of the parties, and |