1. As public highways. Although railroads owned and operated by private corporations under charters from the State, or under articles of incorporation gotten up under general incorporation laws providing therefor, and conferring in either case power upon such organizations to enforce the right of eminent domain as a means of facilitating the construction of their roads, are not public highways within the ordinary meaning of the term, yet in a legal sense, they are public highways of an improved kind; and the corporations erecting and operating them are bound to the State for the performance of certain duties to the public which they are created to discharge, and from the performance of which they may not absolve themselves, and to the benefits of which the public at large have a right on payment of the 1 Burlington & Mo. R. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112, 117; Central Military Tract R. R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541. They are quasi public—that is, to such an extent that the public interest is involved in their being rightfully located. Therefore, a contract to influence the location by personal benefit to the locator is void as against public policy. Holladay v. Davis, 5 Oregon, 40; Hol laday . Patterson, 5 Oregon, 177. And though built and operated by private corporations, they are in one sense public works. They are for the accommodation of the public, and are allowed and protected in their franchises by the public law. Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. R. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 564; S. C. 1 Am. Railway Cases, 350. ures thereon erected or situated.' And the ruling is that the rolling stock and appliances of the company, for the time being belonging to, in use upon, and essential to the working of the road, although movable in fact, are not so as regards the ordinary distinction between real and personal property. They are a part of the structure, as fixtures thereof, and are to be regarded as part of the realty; more especially so, when necessary to secure the rights of lien creditors.' Just as is the water that, for the time being, flows through and turns the machinery of a permanent mill, a part of the realty, by being a part of the locus in quo; and as are the doors of houses, and gates of farm enclosures, which are movable, to open and shut, for that is their function, and hanging on, and capable of being slipped off of hinges, are part of the realty, until removed therefrom with intent to their actual severance, without expectation of their return.' The question of permanency of a railroad is one partly of law and partly of fact, and is mainly dependent on the intention of the builders and the object of the erection, and as such is matter for decision of a jury, in jury cases, or for the court or chancellor, in cases determinable by the court. As, for instance, whether the structure be of a permanent main line, or side branches for temporary purposes." Whilst there is no doubt about the road structure itself, and permanent erections, houses and attachments, being real property, and whilst in the United States courts the ruling is the same in regard to rolling stock belonging to and used thereon, there is at the same time much diversity of rulings in the state courts as to the character of the rolling stock and appliances, but with a 1 2nd Blac., Chap. 2, pp. 17, 18; 1 Washo. on Real property, p. 3; Van Keuren and wife v. Cent. R. R. Co., 33 N. J. 165; S. C. 13 Am. R. W. R. 43. 1 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609; Palmer v. Forbes, 23 Ill. 301, 302; Coe v. McBrown, 22 Ind. 252; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. R. R. Co., 3 Dill. 412; Washburn on Real Property, Vol. 1, 3; Covey v. Pitts burg, Fort Wayne & Chicago R. R. Co., 3 Phil. Rep. 173; Youngman v. Elmira & Williamsport R. R. Co., 65 Penn. St., 278; Douglass v. Cline, 12 Bush, (K'y) 608; Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B. Mon. (K'y) 431. 2 Van Keuren and wife r. Cent. R. R. of N. Jersey, 38 N. J. 165; S. C. 13 Am. R. W. Reps. 43. decided preponderance of authorities that it is regarded as personal property when not influenced by statutory enactments. Of these latter, the case of Williamson, trustee, v. New Jersey Southern Railroad Company and others, decided in March, 1878, may be considered a leading and representative case.' 129 New Jersey Chancery, 311. Same case 15 Am. R. W. Reps. 572. 1. Its emanation and legal character. In treating of that class of corporations aggregate known as railroad corporations, the first subject of consideration is the charter. It is the life of the corporation; without it, there is no corporate entity.1 If that be taken away, then for all practical purposes the corporation is dead." It emanates from the sovereign power of the state, and is the source through which is granted the corporate franchise; that is, the right to become a corporation. It designates the name and purposes of the intended corporate body, and the sphere of action thereof is thereby limited to such purposes, and to the use of that name. Thus the charter being the foundation and source of the corporate entity, it results 12 Kent, 276, (2 Ed.); Bac. Abt., Title Corporation, (D.) 445. 2 Kent, 309, (2 Ed.) 32 Kent, 276,(2 Ed.); Buf. & N. York R. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100, 110; Bac. Abt., Corporation, (B.) & (D.) 445. 42 Kent, 298, 299, (2 Ed.); Head & Amory v. Providence Insurance Co., 2 Cranch, 127; Beaty v. The Lessee of Knowler, 4 Pet. 152; The State v. Stebbins, 1 Stew. (Alą.) 299; N. Y. 5 Micou et al. v. The Tallassee Bridge Co., 47 Ala. 652, 656; Gates v. McDaniel et al., 2 Stew. 211; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 146; Hoagland v. Cin. & Ft. Wayne R. R. Co., 18 Ind. 452. And if an existing |