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(c) In the Negotiable Instruments Law, as adopted in most of the States, it is provided that the negotiable character of the instrument is not affected by a provision which "waives the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor"-for example, a waiver of homestead or exemptions. No such provision is in the Kentucky Act. Such waiver is void, Moxley v. Ragan, 10 Bush (73 Ky.) 156, but probably does not destroy the negotiability of the instrument. Cf. Gaar v. Louisville Banking Co., supra.

§ 6.

Omission; Seal; Particular Money.-The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that:

1. It is not dated (a); or

2. Does not specify the value given, or that any value has been given therefor (b); or

3. Does not specify the place where it is drawn or the place where it is payable (c); or

4. Bears a seal; or

5. Designates a particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made (d).

But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any statute requiring in certain cases the nature of

the consideration to be stated in the instrument (e).

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 241. Norton, B. & N., 25, 72, 74. Randolph, Com. Paper, §§ 75, 178.

(a) Stout v. Cloud, 5 Litt. (15 Ky.) 205.

Section 17 provides that "where the instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of the time it was issued."

(b) The words, "value received" are not necessary. By section 50, a valuable consideration is presumed.

(c) Promissory notes are no longer required in Kentucky to be made payable at a bank in order to be negotiable. See section 184. As to filing blanks, see sections 13, 14.

(d) For example, "in greenbacks,"

Ledford v. Smith, 6 Bush (69 Ky.) 129;

or "in gold,"

Glass v. Pullen, Ib., 346.

(e) As to "Peddlers' Notes," see section 3, note (b).

§ 7. When Payable on Demand.-An instrument is payable on demand:

1. Where it is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight (a), or on presentation; or

2. In which no time for payment is expressed (b). Where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed

when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand.

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 209. Norton,
B. & N., 40, 41, 209, 341, 345.

(a) The distinctions formerly existing between instruments payable on demand and those payable at sight (for which see Daniel, Neg. Inst., sections 617, 619) are abolished by this statute.

(b) A note reading, "I promise to pay to the order of A. $2,000 at his office," is payable on demand, and in this respect can net be varied by oral evidence. McLeod v. Hunter, 63 N. Y. S., 153; 29 Misc. Rep., 558.

§ 8. When Payable to Order; to Whose Order it May be Drawn.-The instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order. It may be drawn payable to the order of:

1. A payee who is not maker, drawer, or drawee; or 2. The drawer or maker (a); or

3. The drawee; or

4. Two or more payees jointly; or

5. One or some of several payees (b); or

6. The holder of an office for the time being (c).

Where the instrument is payable to order, the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty (d).

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 223. Norton, B. & N., 59, 60, 61.

(a) A note payable to the order of the maker is not complete until indorsed by him. Kentucky Statutes, section 480. See post, section 184.

Pace v. Welmending, 12 Bush (75 Ky.) 142;

Bramblett v. Caldwell, 105 Ky., 202; 20 K. L. R., 1123; 48
S. W., 982. See section 184.

(b) For example, an instrument payable to A, B and C, or any of them, or any two of them.

Apart from the statute, an instrument payable to one or more of several payees was not negotiable, it being payable to any one of them only on the contingency of its not having been paid to any other of them. (Daniel Neg. Inst., 5th Ed., section 103.) This provision has changed the law of Kentucky.

(c) For example, an instrument payable to trustees of an association or their successor's in office. This provision changes the law of Kentucky. Apart from the statute, an instrument so payable was not negotiable. Daniel Neg. Inst. (5th Ed.) sec. 101.

(d) "A written obligation to a person or persons who, or some of whom, happen to be dead at the time of its execution, may be proceeded on by the representative of such person or by the survivor, as if it had been executed in the lifetime of such dead person or persons" (Ky. Stats., sec. 477). It does not follow, however, that a note, bill or check can be negotiated by such survivor or representative.

§ 9. When Payable to Bearer-The instrument is payable to bearer:

1. When it is expressed to be so payable; or

2. When it is payable to a person named therein or

bearer; or

3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable (a); or

4. When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person (b); or

5. When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank (c).

Eaton and Gilbert, Com.
& N., 59, 60, 63, 110.
§ 169.

Paper, 231. Norton, B.
Randolph, Com. Paper,

(a) An instrument payable to the "estate of A or order" is generally treated as payable to the personal representative of A. See Shaw v. Smith, 150 Mass., 166, 22 N. E., 887, 6 L. R. A., 348. In Lewisohn v. Kent & Stanley Co., 87 Hun., 257, such a note was treated as a note with a fictitious payee, and, therefore, when negotiated by the maker, payable to bearer.

(b) For example, an instrument payable to "cash," or to "sundries," or to "merchandise."

(c) As to what is an indorsement in blank, and its effect on negotiation, see section 34.

This provision applies only where the transfer of the instrument is by an indorsement in blank.

§ 10. Terms, When Sufficient.-The

negotiable

instrument need not follow the language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements thereof (a).

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 223.

(a) As to the construction of ambiguous instruments, see section 17.

§ 11. Date, Presumption as to.-When the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 246. Norton, B. & N., 72.

§ 12. Ante-dated and Post-dated Instruments.The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated or post-dated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered, acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery.

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 246. Norton, B. & N., 405.

§ 13. When Date may be Inserted. When an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be payable accordingly (a). The insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date.

Eaton and Gilbert, Com. Paper, 248. Norton, B. & N., 72.

(a) See section 14.

§ 14. Blanks, When may be Filled.-Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein (a). And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount (b). In order, however, that any such instru

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