will never be brought to submit to anything less. They will not respect nor cheerfully afford any assistance to a mere government for the support of officials and the encouragement of idlers. I verily believe that a majority of our people would almost as soon vote for the law of Draco, which made idleness a crime punishable with death, as to continue under the existing plague, the prevailing epidemic, the sweeping, increasing and destructive mania for office. Indeed, it might actually be more to their advantage to pay for the support of a standing army, with long muskets, and keep it well fed and under good discipline, than attempt to maintain a standing army of idlers, with merely long fingers and voracious appetites, and under no discipline at all.

Sir, it is an actual fact, that the whole political duty and power of our people, under the existing government, consists of nothing but the mere election of men into office. The whole vitality of this Constitution is but little more than a series of regulations for the election and support of officials, who are to act pretty much as they please, with but few restraints upon their conduct, and no sensible or certain means of punishing them for bad behavior in office. The idea seems to have been that the people would not elect men to office who would not well govern them. The idea ought to have been, that the sole object of electing any persons at all to office, is merely to provide facilities for the people to govern themselves. Indeed, this whole Constitution is interspersed with a weight of fogyism. The people are nowhere-in its active, living provisions— nowhere left free from the pest of office. They are distrusted. They are treated as inferiors. They are left to be moved and swayed by one of the most insidious and terrible curses of free government; I mean official influence.

RESUME.

Mr. President.-An humble, but honest and sincere effort has been made to point out only a portion of the defects in our Constitution, a majority of which we will, undoubtedly, all admit to be serious objections. I now beg leave to merely recapitulate them with brevity, in order that they may be brought again fresh to our recollection. They are these:

1st. That our Constitution was adopted before the real condition and wants of the country had been fully developed and made known, and consequently must, from the very nature of things, be less complete and beneficial than one which could be prepared with our present experience.

2d. That it imposes no checks upon the enormous sums which the Legislature can allow its favorites, under the guise of official services; whereby public offices are made the objects of speculation or profit rather than the mere performance of public duties. 3d. That it does not restrain a few citizens in the Legislature from selling, or otherwise disposing of, any or all of the public domain and property of the State, at such time, and upon such terms, as they may see fit to adopt, without being required, in any case whatever, to previously advise the people of their intentions, or to give them an opportunity to express their wishes with regard to the disposition of their property.

4th. That it enables the Legislature to create whole counties without allowing them one Representative in the Assembly; and limits the entire legislative representation of the State to a small number of individuals, not exceeding, perhaps, one half of the number which the public interests and security demand, at the present time, and being comparatively much less than is allowed every other State in the Union; whilst the gross sum now paid to the members of the Legislature need not be at all increased by doubling their numbers.

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5th. That it allows officers to be appointed by the Executive who ought to be elected by the people; and allows the Legislature, by a mere majority vote, to create new offices (however unnecessary) and fix the compensation of the incumbents.

6th. That it allows the Legislature to fix the pay of its own

members.

7th. That it allows the Legislature to continue in session for such length of time less than a year, as it sees fit, and at the same compensation during the whole period.

8th. That it allows the Legislature at each session to employ as many officers, clerks, attaches and servants as it chooses, and to fix their compensation; whereby such numbers have been employed, and at such rates, as to annually cause an expense nearly equaling the whole sum paid to the members of both houses of the Legislature.

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9th. That it imposes no checks whatever upon the sums the Legislature may expend and order to be expended, under the head of contingencies; whereby, through this and the other powers referred to, the expenses of the Government are at least three times greater than there is any actual necessity for.

10th. That it leaves the entire Finances of the State under the complete control of the Legislature, without any constitutional check, system or regulation whatever, leaving all the dif

ferent funds to be thrown into confusion; the moneys in one fund (however sacred the trust,) to be borrowed and expended through another fund; and appropriations of property to one fund for some specific object, to be taken by some other fund, at such price and upon such terms as the majority of a few persons, being the members of the Legislature, may see fit to direct. And in this and other ways, leaving the whole finances of the State continually upon a hazard.

11th. That it does not restrain the Legislature from passing purely local and private bills, of no general public utility or advantage, whereby its sessions have been uselessly prolonged, the public expenses unnecessarily increased, and the doors of the Legislature thrown open to invite partial, personal and corrupt legislation.

12th. That it does not create a direct responsibility between each individual legislator, and those whom he undertakes to represent; making no provision for as many Senatorial and Assembly districts, as there are members of each in the Legislature, whereby each neighborhood or certain number of citizens could have their own separate representatives, being singly and directly responsible to them for his official conduct, and more likely to be well known to them, and better acquainted with their situation and their wants.

13th. That its plan for punishing official misconduct in District Judges and other inferior State officers, only by indictment in the Assembly, and a judgment agreed to by two thirds of the members of the Senate, is contrary to democratic principles, enormously expensive, wholly unnecessary, and against public policy.

14th. Unconstitutional usurpation of power by the Supreme Court concerning juries before mentioned.

15th. That its provisions requiring that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation," is not merely useless, but seriously injurious; interfering, as it does, with the passage of laws of a general nature, to operate differently in different counties, according to their several different wants and necessities.

16th. That it permits each house of the Legislature to determine the elections of its own members, without any qualification of such right; whereby the people can be defeated in their own choice of a representative, and in spite of their own wishes another can be elected in his place, whenever a majority of the house to which he is elected may see fit, upon partisan or any other grounds, to exercise this power.

17th. That it prohibits any revision or amendment of a law, without repassing and reprinting the whole of the revised law or section amended, whereby the public expenses are greatly increased without any necessity, or actual public advantage.

18th. That it bestows upon only one man, and without any restraint or qualification, the monarchical power (more absolutely than is at present vested in the English Crown) of granting reprieves and pardons to criminals, after they have been duly and lawfully convicted by the unanimous approval of courts and juries.

19th. That it creates a Bureau of Education to be presided over by an independent officer, without making any provisions (in relation to that grandest object of human polities) rendering such an officer necessary; and without limiting the term of his office within reasonable and consistent bounds.

20th. That it requires "all laws, decrees, regulations and provisions which from their nature require publication," to be published in the Spanish language; whereby a great expense is unnecessarily entailed upon the country, without the power of diminishing it, so as only to comply with what our Spanish population really require in relation to this subject.

21st. That it does not effectually prohibit the Legislature from contracting civil debts or liabilities without the previous consent of the people, who pay them; nor restrain its vile powers of funding liabilities illegally and unjustifiably contracted, and thus forcing debts upon the people which they never assented to, nor were benefited by, nor were under any obligations to pay-either legal or moral.

22d. That it throws difficulties in the way of revising and changing the Constitution, which are unnecessary, impolitic, and inconsistent with the principles upon which the government is founded.

Sir, can any candid and intelligent men be found in the Legislature, or out of it, who will not admit that at least a majority of these objections to the Constitution are valid and important, as such? The people of other States have deemed it necessary to call conventions, and revise and change their constitutions, when not one quarter of the objections could be fairly stated against them which all must admit to exist against ours. have not stated numerous objections, which I believe radical and important; and doubtless some of those which I have deemed to be objections, others may be ready to defend. But it does seem to me wholly impossible for any one to honestly,

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candidly, and thoroughly investigate the subject, without being forced to admit that there are a great number of important defects in various parts of the Constitution, which require change and amendment; and that the least thing we can do, as legislators, if we care one straw about the views of the people, or the interests of this country, will be to submit the question to the people, for their superior advice and direction.

Now, sir, after the lapse of more than six years, under this Constitution, the first that was adopted in this country, and which we have found, by experience, to be full of defects, it seems to me it is high time for us to attempt its necessary amendment, in order that our people may enjoy the advantages of a government adapted to their real condition.

Sir, I do not believe there is one respectable citizen of California, here or elsewhere, who does not sincerely desire a thorough and complete reformation in our public affairs. But what cause, what propriety, what reason, is there for attempting a reformation, without commencing at the very place from whence nearly all our public evils flow? For my part, I have long and earnestly devoted myself to this subject with all the feeble powers which I possess, and with an earnest wish to hit upon some expedient for reforming our errors and removing our grievances, without any revision or change of the Constitution, except such as the Legislature ought to attempt. But, sir, it is in vain. The necessities of this country absolutely demand an entire revision and change of this Constitution. And I confidently believe that it is idle and useless to hope for the infinite blessings of a good government in this State, until a new Constitution shall be adopted.

Certainly reasons enough have been already stated, to convince any candid and unprejudiced member, that such revision and change is at least sufficiently necessary to render it his duty to submit the question of a convention to the people. If not, then, in the name of Heaven, what does he expect, in order that it shall ever become his duty to do so? Does he expect to wait until the people shall have learned to live in a state of anarchy, or shall have repudiated the government altogether? Or does he merely require still further reasons, in order to induce him to "think" that a revision and change of the entire Constitution is necessary? If he only require the latter, then I ask him, as a man, as a Californian, as an American, to turn