if the government were prudently and economically administered. And that they are perfectly right in this, is proved by reason and experience. Aside from merely prudential considerations, the healthfulness and well being of the government itself, demands economy and prudence in every department. An individual is not more certain to be ruined by prodigality, than is a government by extravagance. And all sums paid by government for things which are not really necessary for its efficient administration, are purely extravagances. They probably ought to be prohibited, as far as possible, by constitutional provisions. Perhaps sums ought to be fixed by the Constitution as the maximum of all official salaries and compensation, which could never be exceeded by fees or otherwise, in favor of any office whatsoever. At all events, offices should not be allowed to exist which oppress the people to enrich the occupants.

Under the present government the rule of official compensation is grossly unequal and almost universally exorbitant. The general organization of public offices is without any fixed system, and completely profligate. Officers requiring the least. ability, and those whose duties can all be performed by deputies, are often paid more than those which require the greatest efforts of mind, and the most constant application to their duties, and must rest with their whole weight upon the officers themselves. In my judgment the terms of office ought to be short, in order that none need be required to serve in them longer than they can afford to. And the profits of office should be absolutely trifling, in order that it may never be thought of as a means of livelihood. All that portion of population which looks to office, and not to useful industry for a livelihood, should be rendered incapable of obtaining a finer living by their indolence, than industry can afford to enjoy, by constant toil. As long as a people reward their officers only with money, they need never hope to have servants who love them, but only such as would use them. High salaries excite the cupidity of the selfish; low salaries awaken the patriotism of the good. High salaries cause all the crowds of men to rush for office; low salaries cause "the office to seek the man." Public gratitude goes further with all true men then merely their wages. When men receive no other reward than the payment of their necessary expenses, the people discover that they are willing to serve their country for its own sake, and cannot avoid feeling a greater respect and affection for their public

men. And the affections of the people are surer to command devotion to their services, than their mere pay with their abuse, however well laid on. The former satisfies good men, the latter is only agreeable to the bad.

Sir, our own experience should teach us that high salaries are not only against public economy, but also impolitic in other respects. No other government in the Union except this, has ever paid such enormous sums to its officials; and their services in this State seem to have been rendered, generally, for no other apparent object than to secure their pay. They have engendered no love for the country, but only a love for its offices. They have driven off patriotism and public spirit, and supplied their places with official gambling, and partisan immoralities. Aside from the officials connected with the revenue, the United States has always been handsomely served in this State, side by side with our own officers and under the same expenses, for about one half the compensation paid by us. In my opinion, taking all the State, county and local public offices together, a proper constitutional reform of this government could save for the people not less than one million dollars annually, and the public interests would, at the same time, be better attended to. If I am not mistaken in this (and if time would permit its discussion at length, I think it could be shown that I am not,) this consideration alone ought to be sufficient to warrant us in at least permitting the people to express their wishes as to whether they desire a Constitutional Convention or not.

The provision of the Constitution that" all laws, decrees, regulations and provisions, which from their nature require publication, shall be published in English and Spanish," is undoubtedly objectionable as a constitutional regulation. I believe no similar provision exists in the Constitution of any other American State except Louisiana. But even there it does not go to any such extent. It provides for publishing the Constitution and laws in another language, but nothing more. By fixing such a regulation in the Constitution, the Legislature is compelled to obey it to the fullest extent, and, in many instances, when no portion of our citizens are benefited in comparison to the expense which it entails upon all of them. It, therefore, often becomes unjust to comply with it, whilst a refusal to do so would be a disobedience to its express commands. All the public laws could be published in Spanish, but probably our fellow-citizens who are natives of this country, do not themselves consider it necessary that every private law, and every

official document requiring publication should be published in both Spanish and English. I do not think the Constitutional Convention of 1849 deserved the slightest censure for having adopted this provision at that time, but experience has proved that it is calculated to do more harm to all than good to anybody.

The provisions of the Constitution on the subject of taxation, which affects directly the interests and prosperity of every inhabitant of the State, are extremely meagre, and but little better than no regulations at all, on this all-important subject. They actually do not occupy four lines of the whole Constitution, and those simply declare that taxation shall be equal and uniform, without making the least provision to insure so just a result. They add that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, but they affix no limit to the amount of tax which may be imposed. These two brief declarations contain all the provisions of the Constitution regulating the imposition of taxes. We have learned by the most trying and severe experience that the Legislature of California ought not to be allowed the power to impose taxes when, how, and in what amounts they please, without the slightest constitutional restriction, or regulation. The amount and system of taxation, which has hitherto prevailed in this State, is not merely unequal and unjust; it is vicious and unmitigated oppression; it is complete and absolute tyranny, inflicted from year to year, and every year becoming more terrible and wholly insupportable. This Legislature may do what they please, but the next will think themselves capable of making improvements, and as long as the Constitution leaves this subject entirely with the Legislature, no settled rules, no fair, equal, just and established system of taxation can ever reasonably be hoped for. This portion of our Constitution is also of such immense importance to this country, that no unnecessary delay ought to be endured in accomplishing its complete and radical amendment. It would be needless to comment upon this subject, for every permanent citizen, and almost every inhabitant who has remained twelve months in this State, has no doubt discovered that its mode and plan of taxation is completely infamous. It has actually driven hundreds, and possibly thousands, of active business men out of the State altogether; and continually causes the most intense dissatisfaction.

The provisions of the Constitution concerning its general amendment or "revision and change," is not taken from the

Constitution of Iowa, which is more just. Indeed, justice to the Constitution of Iowa would, perhaps, require the acknowledgment that, had the Convention of 1849 adopted it entire, with the additional section which provides for "a system of county and town governments," it would have been all the better for this country; because, it must be confessed, that the few alterations which have been made, have not, taking them all together, amounted to the least improvement, and in some important respects they are worse than the original. Among these last, I allude particularly to the alterations in the judiciary, and the one now under consideration. The Constitution of Iowa does not require the consent of two thirds of the members of each House of the Legislature before the people can be allowed to vote for or against a Convention to amend their own Constitution. Constitutions are simply laws passed by the supreme Legislature of the State, its citizens themselves, in their original and supreme capacity. Upon what principle any small number of people, or any particular set of officials, are to be authorized and justified in preventing the people from the exercise of this right, at this age, and in this period of political progress, I do not understand. At this age, the whole people. are supposed to possess more intelligence than any mere assemblages sent out from their midst. Why should not they be consulted before the adoption of any law of vital and permanent interest to the people of the whole State? The laws that they will themselves approve they will never permit to be disobeyed. Certainly, nothing can be more unjust, unreasonable, and inconsistent, than to hold the people responsible for good government, and at the same time refuse to entrust them with every proper facility for amending its Constitution, and being themselves consulted with, as to its laws. To suppose that the few of us now assembled, or who may hereafter be assembled in these halls, are either more intelligent or more anxious for the happiness of the people than the people themselves, whom we but represent, is absurd. Every one of us have left men amongst our constituents who are our superiors in all respects.

GENERAL REMARKS-OFFICE IDLERS.

There are, nowadays, not merely hundreds, but thousands of men always remaining in the ranks of the people who are superior to those who attempt to direct and command them. There are not merely hundreds but thousands of men to be found here in the secluded walks of cities, and upon the plains, and in

the valleys, and amongst the hills and mountains, who have never been in office, and yet whose learning, ability, native greatness of soul, and pure sympathy for their fellow countrymen in this remote State, would put us all to the blush. The greatest loss that can occur to us, is the continual loss of the advice and direction of such men, merely because they hold no office. For my part, I believe sincerely that our government would be far more just, noble, powerful, successful and permanent, if it were far more democratic. I know of no reason whatever for distrusting the action of the people upon any measures of great public moment. Certainly, if they cannot all be trusted, the few who come out from amongst them, must be still less worthy of confidence. In a nation of freemen, so brave and generous, and universally intelligent as the Californians, I am confident that it is only necessary to appeal directly to their patriotism and good sense, in order to insure a most just, powerful and glorious government. The idea that such a people ought to be governed entirely by laws, made without any consultation with them, and without their previous knowledge of what they are to contain, but sprung upon them suddenly or in haste, and by a few persons (as is the custom in aristocratic and despotic governments), is certainly anti-democratic, and I cannot see why it is not actually unwise. At all events, the idea that the citizens of California ever can, or ever will be so governed, successfully, is, in my judgment, wholly improbable. The Californians are not "Old Fogies;" they believe that we can and ought to progress in the principles and science of government. They want no officials to set themselves up to govern them, and they never will submit to it. They want to govern themselves through their officials, and to make a convenience of the men they place in office, not to be made a convenience of by them. They want to use their officials themselves; they do not want to be used by them. They want a government which will afford citizens the opportunity to become as much renowned in the government, without office, as with it. They want to abate the terrible and destructive nuisances of office and office-seeking. The ermine no longer conceals from them that merely one or two ordinary individuals sit within, and law has no longer any such senseless terror as to deprive them of their reason, or prevent them from discovering the present false and absurd systems for making it. They will respect property, maintain order, and insist upon exact justice between man and man. But they want nothing else, and they