Senate than there is occasion for. All I desire is to prove to the satisfaction of members that a revision and change of our Constituton is necessary, and that if we really care anything for the welfare of this country, we will no longer delay the first step necessary to its accomplishment.

The measures which a Constitutional Convention ought to pass, and the kind of Constitution which would be best suited to the country, are matters which do not really belong to us to determine, and which do not require any expression on our part in order to support and pass the Bill under consideration. I do not, therefore, propose here to discuss, or even allude to them, unless in a few instances and in general terms.

Sir, perhaps no really intelligent man, and not even the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1849, so far as I am informed, pretend that experience has not discovered many vital defects in our Constitution. Indeed two thirds of the members of the last session of this body admitted such defects, and attempted to provide a remedy for a few of them by the slow, expensive, and most unsatisfactory mode of piece-meal amendments. And here I beg leave to digress a moment, in order to point out a few of the objections to such a mode of amending a Constitution which contains errors throughout the whole of it, and in nearly every article. In fact the errors in the Constitution itself, not referring to the omissions, may, perhaps, be justly and fairly indicated as follows: In the first article, two sections erroneous; in the second article, one section erroneous; in the third article, containing but one section, even that erroneous, in admitting of a false interpretation; in the fourth article, twelve sections erroneous; in the fifth article, two sections erroneous; in the sixth article, eleven out of the eighteen sections, erroneous. The seventh article is concerning the militia; the eighth concerning State debts; and the ninth concerning education, and they contain but eight sections altogether. The tenth article is one half erroneous; in the eleventh article, five sections erroneous; the twelfth article consists of but one section establishing the State boundary; the last article, or schedule, contains sixteen sections, of which thirteen are now obsolete, (being merely temporary provisions for the adoption of the Constitution, etc.,) and one of the remainder erroneous. I do not pretend to say that all will agree to this enumeration; I merely give my own opinion, as to that. But I believe any candid man, who is competent to judge, and has carefully examined the Constitution, will admit that there are relatively, at least as many objections to it as are indicated.

Now, in the first place on the score of economy, (which at best, is no argument in favor of legislative amendments, but only raises a question of policy,) it would actually cost the State more to make the required amendments by piece-meal, through the Legislature, than by calling a Constitutional Convention and having done with it at once. The members of a Constitutional Convention ought not to receive over three or four dollars per day. And the expenses of a Convention need not exceed one half or one third of the cost of each session of the Legislature. Indeed, in my opinion, $60,000 ought to cover the whole expense. And, by a proper constitutional reform, at least three times the necessary cost of a Convention could be saved every year, estimating the cost at $100,000. The first Constitutional Amendments which have ever yet been gotten through the Legislature, and which are still pending in this, its seventh session, and must be again passed here before they can be entrusted to the votes of the people, have probably already cost the State not less than $18,000 or $20,000 for the mere advertising alone, which the Constitution in such cases requires. And considering the time of the Legislature occupied in their passage, and the public time which must be again consumed and paid for, in getting them passed at this session, their actual public cost, in all, cannot, perhaps, be fairly estimated with certainty at less than $25,000 or $30,000, or about one half of the whole necessary expense of a Constitutional Convention.

And all this delay has elapsed, and this amount of public money been already expended for what? Why, sir, for three prominent amendments to the Constitution. The first providing that persons elected to the Legislature shall hold their offices for just double the time at present allowed by law. The second contains an antiquated and objectionable feature in providing for the revision of the Constitution. And the third provides that the oath of office shall require the officer to make oath that he has not fought a duel. Now, except the provision. in the second amendment, requiring every Constitutional Convention to submit the Constitution it may adopt to the people for their ratification, (which may be a wise provision, since there are many who seem to think it necessary,) but, except this, what individual can fail to regard these amendments as among the insignificant, and not among the most necessary? For one, I cannot discover that they are at all well calculated, or even designed, to relieve the public grievances, or accomplish any actual improvement in our government. Increasing the time of the State residence from one to two years, all will doubtless

approve, but I allude only to the other features of the amendments.

As for the first of these proposed amendments, ostensibly providing for biennial sessions of the Legislature, it might be a wise provision in an old country where its legislation had long been careful, and all its laws reduced to a system, and all its courts content to follow in the beaten paths of jurisprudence worn by the steady course of justice for ages past. Or it might be wise among the honest and good hearted people of inland and agricultural States. But in a country situated as this is at the present time, with a Constitution not otherwise adapted to, nor harmonizing with such an interpolation in its provisions, it is certainly questionable whether these provisions for biennial sessions of our Legislature are not actually well calculated to do more harm than good. I admit that the right to the Assembly to impeach, and of the Senate to try the impeachment of State officers, under a two third rule, is practically of no great effect. But I do not see why even this slight check against official bad conduct should be entirely removed, which will certainly be the case, to all intents and purposes, if this amendment be adopted in its present form, and be strictly observed. It does seem to me that at least the semblance of some punishment for bad conduct in State officers should be preserved, until some other way can be provided for the punishment of official offenses. Our existing government is not so planned that the Legislature has no duty to perform but the passage of laws. The Constitution expressly imposes other duties upon the Legislature, some of which may render it actually unwise to postpone its meetings to only once in two years, without any provision having been made for the performance of such duties in any other way except through both Houses of the Legislature.

The Constitution is founded upon the theory that the Assembly, whenever necessary, will inquire into the conduct of the State officers, and if justice seems to require it, will indict them, or any of them, for official bad conduct, and that the Senate will then perform the high judicial duty of trying and passing judgment upon such indictments. The whole body of our State judicial and executive officers, and some other State officers, can never be tried in any other manner whatever for any official negligence or bad conduct they may choose to be guilty of. Indeed, one of the very reasons why the sessions of the Legislature are required, by the Constitution, to be held

annually, is, in order that it may sit at least as often as once a year, as a sort of grand inquest upon the conduct of the other departments of the government, as well as for the passage and amendments of laws. These amendments which are now proposed, provide for the election of the members of the Legislature on the first Wednesday of September, 1857, the Assemblymen for two, and Senators for four years. This will bring their sessions only at such times as the new Governor and all the executive officers of the government receive power and enter upon the duties of their office. Consequently, whatever mischiefs they might ever be disposed to commit, would not be reached even with an impeachment, until after the term of their offices had actually expired. And the condition of the country could remain wholly unknown in the interim; for even the Governor is not required to communicate the condition of the State, except to the Legislature, in session. And the subordinate executive officers, or any of them, could, with impunity, refuse to report to the Governor, when there would be no redress except by calling an extra session. I do not desire to discuss this question here. I am endeavoring to prove that we must have a general reform before their introduction will not be certain to actually prove injurious instead of beneficial. Was there no occasion for the meeting of this present session of the Legislature? There was a session only last year, and has been one every year.

What good are we certain to accomplish, and what evil may we possibly commit by simply postponing the sessions of the Legislature, without making such other reforms and changes in the Constitution as are required, if you propose to introduce biennial sessions of the Legislature? Our public condition is generally thought bad enough now to last from one year to another. Are we certain that it will become more tolerable, by prolonging the times of its endurance, or merely attempting to lengthen the periods between its inflictions? Indeed, the adoption of the amendment, as it now stands, would afford no security against annual sessions. There is nothing to prevent the Legislature from continuing in session as long as they please during one year, and adjourning their session over to the next year. Judging from our past experience, there would be but little difficulty in leaving our public affairs in such a state, as to require annual sessions of the Legislature as now. And the same experience ought, perhaps, to teach us that such a result may be actually anticipated. It has proved to

be the case in some of the other States where biennial sessions of the Legislature have been attempted, and I know of no good reason for supposing it may not be done here. And if this should prove to be the case, the only effect of this amendment would be to double the term of office of every member of the Legislature to twice its present length. And, sir, if biennial sessions could be wisely interpolated into the present Constitution at all, what was the actual necessity of requiring members to hold their offices for two and four years? Would it not have been better to have provided for the election of all of them every two years? Does true wisdom dictate or public policy require, that legislators must hold their offices and remain independent of the people, for such a greatly increased length of time in California? But, sir, I see no evidence of statesmanship, or even of good judgment, in supposing that our difficulties must necessarily be lessened, in proportion to the length of time which shall intervene between the sessions of our Legislature. If I did, I would certainly be in favor of their meeting only once in a century. It certainly seems to me more rational, to conclude that it is the system itself which ought to be amended, and the power to do evil at all, which ought to be removed or lessened, and not the mere times of legislative sittings, which require to be regulated.

There is little care bestowed upon so great a subject as amending the Constitution.

The second leading amendment proposed by the Legislature, seems only intended to require a Constitutional Convention to submit the Constitution it might agree upon, to the people for their adoption or rejection, and not at once proclaim it to be the Constitution, without submitting it to the people at all. The amendment, so far as that object is concerned, can do no harm; although it can only be deemed necessary by those who can bring their minds to believe that any such monstrous usurpation would be attempted by any constitutional convention, composed of American citizens. But the objection to it to which I wish to call the attention of the Senate is this, that it proposes to continue the antiquated and anti-republican principle of requiring a vote of two thirds of the members of each House, before a law can be passed allowing the people even the right to vote upon the question, as to whether they wish a constitutional convention or not.

For my part, I do not understand how we can be sincere in our attachment to democratic principles, and, at the same time,