'the rule that an admitted or clearly established misapprehension of the law does not create a basis for the interference of courts of equity, resting on discretion, and to be exercise 1 only in the most unquestion ble and flagrant cases is certainly more in consonance with the best considered and best reasoned cases upon the point, both Englieh and American.' The same author says: 'We trust the principle, that cases may and do occur where couris of equity feel compelled to grant relief, upon the mere ground of the misapprehension of a clear rule of law, which has so long maintained its standing among the fundamental rules of equity jurisprudence, is yet destined to afford the basis of many wise and just decrees, without infringing the general rule that mistake of law is presumptsvely no sufficient ground of equitable interference.' In the case under consideration the alleged mistake is proven to the entire satisfaction of the court. It is equally clear that the assent of Keith to the insurance being made in his name was superinduced by the representation of the company's agent, that insurance, in that form, would fully protect the interest of the firm in the cotton. Assuming, as we must from the evidence, that this representation was not made with any intention to mislead or entrap the assured, it is, however, evident that Keith relied upon that representation, and, not unreasonably, relied also upon the larger experience and greater knowledge of the insurance agents in all matters concerning the proper mode of consummating, by written agreement, contracts of insurance according to the understanding of the parties. He trusted the insurance agents with the preparation of the written agreement which should correctly express the meaning of the contracting parties. He is not chargeable with negligence because he rested in the belief that the policy would be prepared in conformity with the contract. As soon as he had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel he discovered the mistake, and insisted upon the rights secured by the original agreement. A court of equity could not deny relief under such circumstances, without enabling the insurance company to obtain an unconscionable advantage through a mistake for which its agents were chiefly responsible. In all such cases, there being no laches on the part of the party in discovering and alleging the mistake, equity will lay hold of any additional circumstances, fully established, which will justify its interposition to prevem marked injustice being done. Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 82. In deciding, therefore, as we do, that the complainants are entitled to have the policy reformed in accordance with the original agreement, it is not perceived that we enlarge or depart, in any just sense, from the general and salutary rule that a mere mistake of law, stripped of all other circumstances, constitutes no ground for the reformation of written contracts." Snell v. Atlantic Fire and Marine Ins. Co. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Opinion by Mr. Justice HARLAN, Decree reversed.

Louis, and employed by defendant in that capacity for seven months, does not imply that there was a special contract for a year. The time for which he was hired, and the question of the power to discharge, are still open. And, where plaintiff was hired by a special agent with limited powers, the burden is on plaintiff to show the special contract, and the authority of the agent to make it. 2. The issue as to the authority of the special agent to employ general agents for a year could not be affected by testimony as to a custom of employing general agents of insurance companies. Evidence of a custom to employ such agents for one year and more was erroneously admitted against the objections of defendant. 3. The construction of the by-laws of a corporation is for the court, not for the jury. 4. Evidence of a recognition of plaintiff by defendant as its general agent did not tend to prove that he was employed by the year, or for a year. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Bougher v. Maryland Life Ins. Co.

APPEAL-REHEARING-PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. -1. One of several parties to a suit, though on the same side, may appeal without the concurrence of his coparties. 2. A motion for rehearing may be filed when exceptions to the report of a referee are overruled, and such motion has all the effect of a motion for a new trial in an ordinary case, and suspends the judgment until its decision. 3. Where sureties engaged for the faithful discharge of the duties of a book-keeper of a city bank, and the principal in the bond was employed in the double capacity of book-keeper and teller without the knowledge of the sureties, and whilst thus employed he made false entries in the books of the bank, by which erroneous payments of money made by him as teller were concealed, or in consequence of which they were made and loss accrued to the bank, it is immaterial whether the loss of the bank was caused by the wrong-doing of the employee as book-keeper, or by his wrong-doing as teller. In neither case, can the sureties be held, where it is found as a fact in the case that the offices of book-keeper and teller are quite distinct, and that those of a teller are more responsible, and that, as teller, the employee was afforded opportunities and exposed to temptations to take money of the bank, which, as book-keeper, he would not have had. The change imposed upon the sureties a risk which they did not undertake, and exonerated them from all liability on the bond. 4. To accept a surety known to be acting on a belief that there are no unusual circumstances by which his risk is materially increased, whilst the party thus accepting him knows that there are such circumstances, and withholds the knowledge from the surety, is a legal fraud by which the surety is discharged. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by Bakewell, J. Home Savings Bank v. Traube.

FIRE INSURANCE-CONDITION "KEEPING OR STORING."-1. A clause in an insurance policy against "keeping or using camphene, spirit gas, burning fluid, or chemical oils," is not violated by using a buruingfluid not in its nature like camphene or spirit gas. 2. The burthen of proof to show the character of the fluid used, and its similarity to those named in the same clause of the policy, is on the insurance company. 3. Keeping a burning fluid, the use of which is not, by the express terms of the policy prohibited, as a lightin moderate quantities, to fill the lamps used on the premises from day to day, is not "keeping or storing" the oil in a sense intended to be prohibited by those terms, nor was it so using the premises as to inthe risk" within the meaning of the pol. icy. 4. The case being tried, both on the pleadings and evidence, on the theory that there was a violation

crease

Judges.

CRIMINAL LAW RECORD MUST SHOW TWELVE JURORS PRESENT WHEN VERDICT IS RENDEREDINDICTMENT FOR EMBEZZLEMENT-SUFFICIENCY OF AVERMENTS-FACTS TAKING CASE OUT OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STATED. In 1876 defendant Myers was indicted under sec. 35, art. 2, ch. 42, Wag. stat., for embezzleing certain United States bonds, charged to have been received by him as agent of one Zumbro, and was convicted at February Term, 1878, of Newton Circuit Court, to which venue had been awarded. It appears from the record that only eleven jurors were present when the verdict of the jury was received by the court. Held, 1. This was a fatal defect, and the judgment must be reversed. State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470. 2. The bonds were described in the indictment as "certain United States five-twenty government bonds, which are valuable securities of the value of five thousand dollars." This is sufficient: a more particular description not being required by the statute. Wag. Stat., 1091, secs. 28, 30. Neither was it necessary to set out in detail the nature and purpose of the agency, the agency and the receipt of the bonds by the defendant in his capacity of agent being distinctly averred. The contract between defendant and owner of the bonds need not be set out, but such contract when proven must establish an agency within the meaning of the statute under which he was indicted, and not an ordinary bailment. 3. It appears from the record that the indictment was found more than three years after commission of offense charged, although the indictment alleges commission of offense within three years. The better practice in such cases is to allege the time of commission of offense, and set forth the facts which avoid the bar of the statutes of limitations as an excuse for not having preferred the indictment sooner, though it has been held that the offense may be alleged to have been committed within the time fixed by the statute, and that the facts which suspend the running of the statute may be proved at the trial. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-State v. Myers.

LANDLORD AND TENANT WORKING LAND OR PASTURING CATTLE FOR AN EQUAL SHARE OF PROFITS DOES NOT MAKE TENANT A COPARTNER WITH LANDLORD.-Plaintiff leased to defendant a farm, and by the contract of renting it was agreed that plaintiff was to furnish money sufficient to purchase stock enough to eat up the grain and produce raised by defendant on said farm, and that when any sale of such stock was made plaintiff was to be refunded the purchase price of same, and the balance was to be divided equally between the parties. The cattle

were not to be removed from Caldwell county. Plaintiff furnished the cattle, delivered them to defendant, who fed and took care of same, and threatening to remove and dispose of the cattle, was enjoined by plaintiff from so doing, which injunction was by the trial court on the bearing dissolved and plaintiff's petition dismissed. From this judgment plaintiff appeals, and the main and controlling question in the case was, whether the agreement as above stated entered into between plaintiff and defendant constituted them partners. Held, in the recent case of Donnell v. Harshe, 67 Mo. 170, the subject of partnerships and what constituted them was examined at some length as well as numerous authorities referred to, and the court there held that an agreement whereby the tenant was to cultivate the farm of his landlord on shares, the landlord and tenant each defraying one moiety of the expenses attendant on such cultivation, and sharing equally in the profits thereof, did not constitute a partnership. The only difference between that case and the present one is, that here, with money furnished by plaintiff, cattle are purchased to eat the produce raised on the farm. This fact does not distinguish it in principle from the one just cited. A mere participation in profit and loss does not necessarily constitute a partnership. In this case the agreement does not confer on each party power to manage the whole business and dispose of the whole property. The property in the cattle remained in plaintiff, and no right to dispose of them was conferred by the contract on defendant, nor to remove them from plaintiff's farm without his consent, and the case falls within the rule announced by Shepley, C. J., in Dwinel v. Stone, 30 Mo. 384. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by SHERWOOD, C. J. -Musser v. Brink.

ACTION-LAND CONTRACT-FINAL JUDGMENT.In an action to recover the balance due on a land contract, and to subject the land to sale for the payment thereof, the defendant, by cross-petition, set up an alleged cloud on the plaintiff's title to the land. The court, on the trial, made an entry, finding that the cloud had been removed; that the plaintiff had deposited with the clerk of the court deeds conveying a clear title; the amount due on the contract; and adjudging the defendant to pay the amount to the clerk within thirty days, and in default thereof that execution issue therefor; and on payment by defendant that the deed be delivered to him. The land was sold, and for the balance remaining due an execution was issued on the judgment and levied on other lands of the defendant, which were claimed by another party under a lien acquired after the rendition of said judgment. Held, that the entry so made was a final determination of the rights of the parties to the action, and was, therefore, a judgment within the meaning of section 370 of the code: and, being a final judgment against the debtor for the payment of money, under section 421, became a lien on his lands in the county where it was render

ed, superior to that subsequently acquired. Judg. ment reversed. Opinion by DAY, J.-Linsley v. Logan.

DEMURRER JUDICIAL NOTICE OF STATUTES RAILROADS-PENALTY.-1. A demurrer to a pleading admits only what is well pleaded therein. It does not admit a conclusion of law, unwarranted by the facts on which it is predicated. 2. Courts can not take judicial notice of a private or special statute, unless it be specially pleaded. And in pleading such a statute, or a right derived therefrom, it must, at least, be referred to by its title, and the day of its passage. 3. Special privileges conferred on a railroad company by a private charter, granted under the constitution of 1852, do not so inhere in the road constructed under such charter, as necessarily to pass to any corporation which may have acquired, under subsequent legislation, the right to operate the same. 4. The act of April 25, 1873, amendatory of the 13th section of the act of May 1, 1852 (O. L. v. 70, p. 161). which prohibits any corporation operating a railroad in this state from demanding and receiving for the transportation of passengers more than three cents per mile for a distance of more than eight miles, gives the party aggrieved a right to recover from such corporation a forfeiture of not less than twenty-five dollars for each case of overcharge. Judgment of the court of common pleas affirmed. Opinion by SCOTT, J.-Pitts., Cin. & St L. R. R. v. Moore.

BOOK NOTICE.

DIGEST OF THE NEVADA REPORTS, and Sawyer's Circuit Court Reports, with a table of cases Cited, Criticised, Commented upon, Affirmed and Overruled. By THOMAS P. HAWLEY, Chief Justice of the State of Nevada. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1878.

DIGEST OF THE LAW OF MINES AND MINERALS, and of all controversies incident to the subject-matter of Mining, comprising the cases in the English and American Reports, from the Year Books to the present time. By R. S. MORRISON, of the Colorado Bar. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1878.

The Nevada digest embraces the decisions of the twelve volumes of the Nevada state reports and the four volumes of Sawyer's United States Court reports. It is, consequently, not a very large work; the cases digested do not number one thousand, and the volume contains less than 450 pages. But it is a necessary result of the growth of decisions in that state, and, while being a work of great necessity in Nevada, will be useful for reference in other states. The Chief Justice of Nevada occupies a high place in that distinguished list of judges who, notwithstanding the work which is demanded of them, and which they so well perform upon the bench, find opportunities to undertake other labors, the benefit of which is shared by the profession.

Mr. Morrison's Digest is much more extensive. Though a not very much larger book than the one which we have just noticed, it is more compact. It embraces all the decisions on the law of mines and minerals, from the earliest time to the present dayfully 2,000 in all. Its plan and arrangement are very satisfactory; the cross references and index assisting the searcher very considerably. The work has been in preparation, we understand, for a long time, and that there has been no hurry in its preparation will be evident to any one who may use it, and is its best encomium. We are satisfied that it will prove a very useful compilation. Both of these digests are published by the well-known publishing-house of the Pacific

Coast, whose enterprise is carrying forward the most considerable legal publication of the day-the Ameri can Decisions. The volumes are well printed, and are bound in the usual style.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

ANSWERS.
No. 80.

[7 Cent. L. J. 460.]

B could not answer that he had property in his pos session belonging to A. He was simply indebted to A in the sum A had paid him for the wheat. The sale was not complete. There must have been either delivery or separation, in order to enable A to claim specific property. Young v. Austin, 6 Pick. 280, White v. Wilkins, 5 Taunt. 176; Lester v. East, 49 Ind. 588. Contra: Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East. 614, which is an earlier case declared erroneous. As to the civil law on this question, see Winschard's Pandects, { 390. I. & C.

JUDGE LOWELL, of Massachusetts, has been nominated by the President for United States Circuit Judge of the First Circuit.The United States Supreme Court will adjourn on the 24th inst., until the first Monday in January.-Pollock on Contracts, an English work of mark, is to be re-published in this country by Robert Clarke & Co., of Cincinnati. The American edition will be edited by G. H. Wald, Esq., one of the contributing editors of this JOURNAL.-Poore's Political Register, a book of authority as a law book for the political student, and a recent publication, contains a statement at once incorrect and inexcusable. Among the list of Chief Justices of the United States, after the name of Salmon P. Chase, appears the following: "George H. Williams, of Oregon, appointed by Grant in 1873, rejected; Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, appointed by Grant in 1873, rejected." Now, neither of these were ever Chief Justices; they were never confirmed; they were never even rejected, for their names were withdrawn before action by that body, on account of the unanimous opposition of the country. An apparent precedent for this may be found in the case of John Rutledge, whose name is always given and appears in the reports as the second Chief Justice; but he, though rejected by the Senate, presided at one term of the court, and delivered several opinions.The London Law Times comments on the somewhat curious fact that there should be no statute of limitations as to the time within which proceedings may be taken to set aside a will.

The Central Law Journal.

SAINT LOUIS, DECEMBER 27, 1878.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

[See HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS.]

ACCEPTANCE.

Acceptance of merchandise not presumed from refusal to take it at present, and a promise to send for it when needed, 419.

Nor of machinery put up for trial, from allowing it to stand for a time and occasionally using it. Ibid. ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

What amounts to "total disability" to transact business, 15.

What is "immediate notice" required by policy, 15. ACCOMPLICE.

(See CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.]

ACKNOWLEDGMENT,

[See DEEDS; HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS; MORTGAGES.]

ACTION.

If action be brought on special contract, there can be no recovery on quantum merui, 77.

Will not lie against a person for suborning a witness to swear falsely in a cause in another state, in consequence of which a judgment was given against the defendant in the latter state, contrary to the truth and justice of the case, 139,

On promise to pay "when able" can not be maintained without proof of ability to pay, 178.

Will lie against parties who entice a person into another state where he is arrested on civil process, though debt justly due, 203.

No right of action arises from void contracts of county court, 216.

Actions for harboring a wife, 230.

Can not be maintained for a constructive assault by infecting plaintiff with venereal disease where she consented to the unlawful connection. Hegarty v. Shine, 291.

Will lie against two or more persons who fraudulently induce plaintiff to leave his home and travel into an other state, 376.

Survival of causes of, 481.

ACT OF GOD.

[See CARRIERS.]

ADMINISTRATION.

[See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.] ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW.

Construction of United States statute of 1851, ch, 43, exempting ship owners from liability for loss by fire, 376. AFFIDAVIT.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] AGENCY.

Statement by plaintiffs in petition in bankruptcy against A that latter owed them debt sued on, not conclusive against their right to sue A's subsequently-discovered principal, 18.

Liability of agent to principal for negligence in executing orders, 22.

An agent has no right, as against his principal, to pledge his principal's property as security, or to transfer the same for goods bought for himself. Victor Sewing Machine Co. v. Heller, 86.

A person who deals with an agent knowing him only as agent to sell, without other powers, and receives the principal's property from the agent, will have no right to keep the same as against the principal. Ibid. The provisions of the Winconsin statute as to factors, etc. (L. 1863, ch. 91, sec. 3) construed, and a person who barters with an agent, held, not to be protected by its provisions. Ibid.

Liability of directors of company for fraud of agent, 194. Agent has no authority to receive payment in anything but money, 191.

Vol. 7-No. 26.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] ANCIENT LIGHTS.

[See EASEMENTS.]

ANNUITIES,

Executions against trust funds and annuities, 483. APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

[As to appeals from Justices of the Peace, see JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.]

Motions and instructions are not a part of the record, unless incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and a bill of exceptions which, instead of containing the motion passed upon by the court, has memoranda for the clerk, such as, "here insert it," or, "see page of the record," is a mere skeleton, and insufficient to bring the motion to the notice of the appellate court. City of Jefferson v. Opel. with note, 46.

Criticism and discussion of this case, 229.

Waere trial was had before pro tem. judge, latter proper party to sign and settle "case made," 117.

Where motion for non-suit has been granted for insuffi. cient reasons, if the record discloses any sufficient ground for it, non-suit will not be disturbed, 168.

Appeal in probate proceedings not severable, 179.
Abstract required by supreme court (III.), 214.

When cause is remanded by supreme court with specific directions, new trial on merits cannot be had, 217. Defective recital in or departure from statutory form of appeal bond, does not render it void, 257.

Costs expended in perfecting an appeal are costs of the supreme court, 262.

Duty of judge as to signing bill of exceptions; mandamus, 295.

Some points of practice relating to appeals and writs of error, 316.

Motion for a new trial and in arrest must be incorpora ted in oill of exceptions, 316.

In mandamus proceeding objection that there was no demand or refusal cannot be first made on appeal, 319. Effect of appeal by party not summoned, 319. Applicant may file his petition in error in district court without leave, 378.

Proceedings for modifying judgment (Ohio), 398. Bill of review and petition for rehearing under Ohio code, 393.

Abstract of evidence required in supreme court, 416. Objection that case is not triable de novo, and that no errors have been filed by appellant, must be urged on submission of case, and not ground for dismissing appeal, 416.

Order of probate court when not appealable (Ohio), 435. Appeal by stranger to record, 438.

When a court erroneously grants a new trial, a party duly excepting to such order may refuse to take part in subsequent proceedings, and, after final judgment against him, take advantage of such error in an appellate court. Blanchard v. Wolf, 445.

When such party participates in a subsequent trial, although it may have been granted erroneously, he thereby waives his right to complain of such error thereafter. Ibid.

These principles apply as well to the rulings of an intermediate appellate court (e. g., the general term) erroneously granting a new trial, as to the rulings of the trial court proper. Ibid.

Objections to evidence not embodied in motion for new trial, not noticed on hearing of appeal or writ of error, 479.

One of several parties to a suit, though on the same side, may appeal without concurrence of co-parties, 498. APPORTIONMENT.

A promise to pay in sawing and lumber will be apportioned equally where the parties cannot agree and neither has the right to fix the proportion, 419.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Arbitrators have power, under a general submission, to award costs, including their own fees, 375. Assessment of value of leasehold improvements by arbitrators, 456.

ARREST.

An arrest is not justified by the manner and appearance of a person on being accused of a crime, 419.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

[See also, INSOLVENT LAWS.]

When not effectual against non- consenting creditors, 235. ATTACHMENT.

Giving of bond does not prevent traverse of affidavit for attachment. Lehman v. Berdin, 269.

If attachment be not sustained, plaintiff, though he recover judgment, can not resort to bond to compel payment. Ibid.

Practice in proceeding for, under Ohio Code, 377. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

Attorney not liable for fees of sheriff for services rendered for client, 6.

Illinois statute authorizing parties to appear before justices of the peace, and conduct suits by their agents, does not ender such agents attorneys at law, so as to make privileged, communications made between a suitor and such agent, 101,

The lien of a lawyer on land for professional services, declared by order of the court in the case in which the services were rendered. is entitled to priority of satisfaction over the lien of a judgment-creditor of client acquired by subsequent decree of the chancery court, sale thereunder, and purchase of the land, where the bill to enforce the lawyer's lien is filed before the sale is confirmed. Brown v. Bigley, 110. Communications between attorney and client inadmissible unless offered in evidence by client, 196. The measure of value of legal services, 30%. Privilege of accused to have communication made to attorney protected from disclosure, not waived by becoming a witness in his own behalf, 316.

Liability of attorney for loss occasioned by disregarding instructions of client, 342.

Where judgment is confessed by attorney it will be good, though attorney did so without authority, 343. Suspension of attorney from practice; appeal does not restore him to rights of attorney during its pendency, 358.

Employment of attorney by state, not valid unless expressly authorized by law, 379.

Written agreements of attorneys, or those entered into in open court, will be enforced; oral agreements, made out of court, will not, 379.

Attorney's lien on land for services, when not allowed, 397.

A client is entitled to the personal services of his attorney upon the argument of his case. But the retainer of one member of a firm is a retainer of all, and, unless otherwise stipulated, the cause may be argued and conducted by any one of them, 419.

An attorney may be disbarred for wrongfully appropriating to his use money of a town, received by him as collector of taxes, 440.

Though a client may change his solicitor whenever he pleases, subject to the solicitor's lien, the lien doe not enable the solicitor to stay or delay the proceedings in the suit, 481.

AUCTIONEER.

Selling without disclosing name of owner liable upon an implied warranty of title, 192.

AWARD.

[See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.] BAILMENTS.

Horse hired to go to G, but driven further; loss; liability, 231.

BANKRUPTCY.

A composition in bankruptcy, under the act of June 22, 1874, does not operate as a satisfaction of debts fraudulently contracted, 1.

Powers of revocation and appointment to be exercised by the bankrupt, do not pass to the assignee under §§. 5044 and 5046 of the act. Jones v. Clifton, 89.

BANKRUPTCY-Continued.

Assignee in bankruptcy may sue a national bank for double the amount of usurious interest received by it from the bankrupt, an assignee in bankruptcy being within the term "legal representatives," as used in the 30th section of the bankrupt act, and the right of action given by said section being a "claim" or "debt," which passed to the assignee under the bankrupt law, 121.

Where a resolution of composition provides that the installments shall be secured by the notes of the debtor, a creditor who has proved his debt can not sue for his original debt in a state court, although the debtor has made default in payment of one of the installments. Deford v. Hewlett, with note by O. F. Bump, Esq., 149.

Lien of judgment destroyed by discharge in bankruptcy of judgment-debtor. Withers v. Stinson, 224. Creditor who has refused consent to discharge can not afterwards impeach the discharge on the ground of fraud, unless, at the time he gave such consent, he was not aware of the fraud, 262.

Debts not discharged by, 298.

Discharge in bankruptcy can not be collaterally attacked, 376.

The word "assembled," in bankruptcy amendment act, includes every creditor who appears at any session of the meeting and proves his claim, though when vote is taken he is not present, 435.

BANKS AND BANKING.

National bank located in New Jersey, but receiving deposits at office in Philadelphia, not liable to taxation in latter state, 21.

Jurisdiction of state courts in suits against national banks, 61.

A national bank is entitled to the same privileges, in regard to charging interest, as is extended to taté bauks of issue in the states in which it has been located, 96. Power of national banks to take mortgages on real estate, 97.

A mortgage to president of bank is a mortgage to the bank. Ibid.

Liability of national bank for taking usurious interest, 122. Liability of bank for payment of forged check, 137. Bank acting as collecting agent of another bank liable for loss which is the result of want of due diligence; illustration. First Nat. Bk. of Trinidad v. First Nat. Bk. of Denver, 170.

Power of banks to purchase notes (Kas.), 218.

A bank acting as the collecting agent of another bank, has, in absence of special authority or usage, no right to receive in payment anything but money; if it receives the check of the debtor on another bank, this is a conditional payment only, and it becomes the agent of the drawer of the check to receive the money thereon, and until the money is received the payment is not complete. Levi v. National Bank of Missouri, 249. Effect of certification of check; failure of collecting bank; right to collect and credit after suspension. Ibid. A national bank may, in Massachusetts, sue on promis sory note purchased by it. National Pemberton Bk. v. Porter, 324.

National banks not liable for special deposits, 342. Bank barred by representations of president, 379. BEQUESTS.

[See WILLS.]

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

[See APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.] BILLS AND NOTES.

[See NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER.] BONDS.

[See MUNICIPAL BONDS; OFFICIAL BONDS; SURETIES.] BOOK NOTICES.

Abbott's United States Digest, Vol. 8, 39.
Abridgment of New Jersey Laws, Honeyman, 40.
American Decisions, Vol. 3, 138; Vol. 4, 202; Vol. 5, 342.
Law, Hilliard, 480.

"" Introduction to, Walker's, Force, 399. Baxter's Tennessee Reports, Vol. 3, 280. Bay's Bench and Bar of Missouri, 359. Bellinger's Oregon Reports, Vol. 6,379. Bench and Bar of Missouri, Bay, 359. Berry's Missouri Appeal Reports. Vol. 3, 240. Bispham's Principles of Equity, 399. Blickensderfer's Law Students Review, 40. Bradwell's Examination Questions, 79. Brandt's Law of Suretyship and Guaranty, 299. Browne's Short Studies of Great Lawyers, 200. Brown's Nebraska Reports, Vol. 7, 879. Chaney's Michigan Reports, Vol. 34, 419. Code of Civil Procedure, Iowa, Stacy, 220.