to be allowed the set-off which is claimed; and my opinion is founded on the difference between the characters of factor and broker, and on the plain distinction between the cases cited and this. For even admitting it to be true that where two persons equally innocent are prejudiced by the deceit of a third, the person who has put the trust and confidence in the deceivers should not be the loser, I think the defendants are the persons who have in this case placed more than usual confidence in Coles and Co.," the plaintiff's brokers.

The decision of the Court of Exchequer in Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 M. & W. 211, in the year 1839; has been considered an authority for the proposition that the above usage is binding without notice. That, however, is not so, for it was there assumed that the usage was known and assented to by the assured. In delivering the judgment of the court, too, Lord Abinger was careful to point out that it was not to be considered that by its decision the court meant to overrule any case deciding that where a principal employs an agent to receive money, and pay it over to him, the agent does not thereby acquire any authority to pay a demand of his own upon the debtor, by a set-off in account with him.

"The court is of the opinion," said his Lordship, "that where an insurance broker or other mercantile agent has been employed to receive money for another in the general course of his business, and where the known general course of business is for the agent to keep a running account with the principal, and to credit him with sums which he may have received by credits in account with the debtors, with whom he also keeps running accounts, and not merely with moneys actually received, the rule laid down in those cases can not properly be applied; but it must be understood that where an account is bona fide settled according to that known usage, the original debtor is discharged, and the agent becomes the debtor according to the meaning and intention, and with the authority of the principal." It is very clear from the judgment that the court was fully of opinion that there was evidence that the assured was aware of the custom. Hence, however much this decision may appear to differ from any other, the principle upon which it turned is at one with the ratio decidendi of the authorities upon the subject.

The effect of the above usage was again discussed by the Common Pleas in Sweating v. Pearce, 7 C. B. N. S. 449, which was decided in 1859. There the plaintiff, a ship-builder in London, employed one W., an insurance broker, to effect a policy upon a ship at Lloyds, and, after the happening of a loss, gave the ship's papers for the purpose of enabling him to adjust the loss with the underwriters. The policy was effected in W.'s name, and he had retained possession of it. An adjustment having taken place, the loss was settled in accordance with the above usage. It was admitted that the usage was not known to the plaintiff, who had merely left the policy in W.'s hands for safe custody; but the jury found that it was generally known to merchants and ship-owners effecting insurances. The

verdict was entered for the plaintiffs, but a rule nisi to enter it for the defendant was granted, on the authority of Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 M. & W. 211, and some other cases. In showing cause it was argued for the plaintiff, on the authority of Russell v. Bangley, 4 B. & Ald. 398, that if the assured can, upon all the facts of the case, be shown to have been cognizant of the usage of settling losses in account at the time he procured the insurance to be effected, he is bound by it, but not otherwise; that, in short, the cases proceed not upon the usage of the particular market, but upon the presence or absence of knowledge. On the other hand, it was argued that Graves v. Legg, 2 H. & N. 210, is conclusive to show that one who employs an agent to make a contract in a particular market, must be taken to authorize him to make it subject to all the incidents of a contract entered into in that market, and that the true principle to be deduced from the cases is, that if the usage be general, the party is presumed to know it; but that, if it be a particular or local usage, his knowledge of it must be shown by evidence. In discharging the rule, the court, whilst admitting that while the policy remained in the hands of the brokers, the plaintiff was estopped from saying that it was not in his hands with authority to collect, held that Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Ad. 605, applied. In dealing with the case of Graves v. Legg, supra, Mr. Justice Williams observed that he was not inclined to dispute the proposition that, when a broker is employed to buy in a particular market, he is authorized to buy according to the usage of that market, but pointed out that Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793," is a distinct authority that the usuage at Lloyds is not such a general usage as to bind a person not acquainted with its existence." "It is not disputed," observes Mr. Justice Byles, "that the general rule of law is, that an authority to an agent to receive money implies that he is to receive it in cash. If the agent receives the money in cash, the probability is that he will hand it over to his principal; but if he is to be allowed to receive it by means of a settlement of accounts between himself and the debtor, he might not be able to pay it over; at all events it would very much diminish the chance of the principal ever receiving it; and upon that principle it has been held that the agent, as a general rule, can not receive payment in anything else but cash. Unless, therefore, there is some usage to control it, payment to the agent must be made in money.” His Lordship thought that the usage relied on was the usage of a particular place, or of a particular counting-house, and therefore could not be binding without notice.

In the most recent case upon the subject, viz., Pearson v. Scott, 38 L. T. N. S. 747, no attempt was made to impugn the principle that an agent, to receive payment, must receive it in cash, but it was contended that the defendant had no express notice of agency, and that, without such express notice, he was entitled to make payment by a settlement in account between himself and the agent. In that case the plaintiffs were executors. They instructed a solicitor to sell some stock and shares. He employed the defendant, a stock and share

broker, with whom he had at the time a current account for differences upon private speculative transactions on the Stock Exchange. The defendant sold the property, paid a part of the proceeds to the solicitor, and, by the latter's directions, placed the balance to his credit in the current account. The balance was never paid to the plaintiffs. The solicitor was a member of a firm. Dur

ing the transaction the firm wrote to the defendant, informing him that they had made the transfers in the name of certain of the plaintiffs. The main question for the court was whether this letter and the other circumstances put the defendant upon inquiry. Mr. Justice Fry, by whom the case was heard, having gone through the authorities, dwelt upon that of Bridges v. Garrett, L. R. 5 C. P. 451, where a fire, to which the plaintiff was entitled as lord of the manor, was paid to the deputy steward by a check drawn by the surrenderee on the surrenderee's bankers, and paid by the deputy steward into his own bank to which he owed money. There, however, the mode of receiving payment was within the agent's authority. It was also contended by the defendant in Pearson v. Scott, that this mode of payment by a settlement in account with the broker was sanctioned by the usage of the London Stock Exchange; but his Lordship, on the authority of the cases which have been already considered, held that such a usage was illegal in the absence of notice.-Law Times.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES-ADVANCEMENT-POLICY PAYABLE TO CHILD.-Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 11 Ch. L. N. 3. A policy of life insurance made payable to a child of the intestate should, in the distribution of the estate, be considered an advancement to that child of the value of the policy at the death of the intestate, the premiums paid subsequent to the first being considered, in the valuation of such policy, as advancements of so much money.

FIRE INSURANCE - CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS "ANY CHANGE IN TITLE"-"LEGAL PROCESS OR JUDICIAL DECREE."-Loy v. Home Ins. Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 7 Ins. L. J. 763. Respondent held a policy of insurance given by appellant upon her dwellinghouse and other property therein, containing the following clause: "If the property be sold or transferred, or any change take place in title or possession (except by reason of the death of the insured), whether by legal process or judicial decree, or voluntarily transfer or conveyance *this policy shall be void." Held, 1. The policy was not avoided by a mortgage upon the property after the issuance of the policy. 2. The foreclosure of such mortgage by advertisement and a sale of the mortgaged premises on such foreclosure, the period for redemption not having expired and no change having taken place in the possession, did not operate as "a sale, transfer, or change in title," within the meaning of the policy, so as to defeat a recovery for a loss accruing after the foreclosure sale, and before the expiration of the time of redemption. CORNELL, J.: "In our judgment nothing short of a complete transfer of the legal title comes within the prohibition of this stipulation. The mere creation of a lien or incumbrance upon the property insured can

not be regarded as affecting 'any change in title,' either in the legal sense, or according to the ordinary and popular understanding. 'In legal acceptation,' says Allen, J., in S. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 N. Y. 389, 'title has respect to that which is the the subject of ownership, and is that which is the foundation of ownership; and with a change of title the right of property, the ownership, passes.' As applied to real estate, it is defined to be 'the means whereby the owner of lands or other real property has the just and legal possession and enjoyment of it;' 'the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours.' Burr. Law Dict., vol. 2, p. 986. In this sense, which is used, a change in title is a change in ownership, also the ordinary and popular one in which the word is which carries the legal right of possession and property,'-and it is in this sense we must understand the word as having been used in this clause. Although, within the meaning of the registry laws, a mortgage of real estate is defined to be a conveyance, yet under our laws it is not deemed a conveyance in the sense of passing any estate or interest in lands, or transferring any legal title thereto. The only interest which a mortgagee acquires is a lien upon the land in the way of security, which, prior to the foreclosure of the right of redemption, is treated as personal property that goes to the administrator or executor, and not to the heirs. The legal title, with the right of possession, remains with the mortgagor until a completed foreclosure is had by sale, and the same becomes absolute by the expiration of the period of redemption. Until this time expires, the purchaser at the sale has only a chattel and equitable interest. He has no legal title to the lands, nor any conveyable estate therein. The character of his interest is the same as that of a mortgagee before foreclosure sale. Gen. Stats., p. 373, sec. 11; Ib., p. 540, sec. 11: Donnelly v. Simonton, 7 Minn. 167; Horton v. Miffitt, 14 Minn. 290. Neither is a foreclosure by advertisement 'legal process,' or a 'judicial decree.' The proceedings in this kind of a foreclosure are carried on wholly outside of court, and without the aid of its process or decree. It is obvious, then, that neither the giving of the mortgage nor the sale of the premises on foreclosure, the time for redemption not having expired, effected any change in title or possession, in respect to the property insured, and did not therefore avoid the policy."

CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE.-Hanson v. Donkersley, Supreme Court of Michigan, 6 Rep. 368. The liability of a stockholder for labor done for the corporation is not primary as is that of a principal, but is contingent as is that of a surety; therefore, where the debtor accepts the note of the corporation, thereby extending the time of the payment of his claim, the liability of the stockholder is extinguished. The case was this: The Morgan Iron Co. owed Hanson for labor and he took its note, thereby extending the time of payment. He afterwards recovered a judgment on the note, and execution being returned unsatisfied, he brought this action against D as a stockholder, under Comp. L. i 2852, which imposes upon stockholders an individual liability for labor done for the corporation, and allows it to be enforced after return of execution unsatisfied, or after the corporation has been declared bankrupt. The court below instructed the jury that, in suing the company on the note, the plaintiff treated the note as payment of the original claim, and he was thereby precluded from recovering against the stockholders and directed a verdict for defendant. CAMPBELL, J. This case is certainly not free from difficulty. But it seems to me that the liability of the individual members of corporations for their debts, under the statute upon which this suit was brought, can not, in any just sense, be called a primary liability. The debts which

they are called on to pay are in fact as they are expressly regarded in the Constitution-debts of the corporation. The statute is clear that the private parties shall not be called upon unless the corporation has failed to pay and legal remedies are exhausted, either by unsatisfied execution or by bankruptcy legally adjudged. The right of recovering contribution by legal action is only given where the payment made by the suing party is compulsory. He has no right to make payment without necessity, and, if he does so, he must seek redress in some other way. Comp. L. § 2852. The corporation is in law a different person from any of its members. A promise by a stockholder to pay a corporation debt is in every sense a promise to pay the debt of another. The case can not be different merely because the obligation is statutory. It may be that the statute could be so framed as to create a joint or a joint and several responsicility which could be legislated into a primary obligation. But where the corporation is not put into such relations, and the stockholder can not be called on until the remedy against the corporation has been tried and exhausted, it is entirely plain that they are not both original debtors, and that one is only collaterally liable, and is therefore in law a mere surety. It is still plainer where, as here, he has no right to pay in the first instance. The Constitution, by making stockholders "individually liable" for labor debts, does not thereby necessarily make them primarily liable. Bank corporators are made “individually liable" for bank debts contracted during their connection with the banks. Originally this was unlimited. Now it is limited. It would be impossible to regard this limited responsibility as a primary debt of the stockholders. It requires peculiar legislation to reach such cases at law at all. If the Constitution could be regarded as making them primary debtors, the remedy could not be euforced except in equity, unless in very peculiar cases, if it could be at all. Here the plaintiff sued expressly under a statute which treats the stockholder in all respects as a several surety, and he must, I think, be so treated in determining his responsibility. It can not be denied that if defendant is a surety, he was discharged from the debt for labor by taking the corporate note and giving time. In my view of the case no other question arises, and the judgment should be affirmed. MARSTON, J., dissented. He thought the stockholder primarily liable as a principal for all labor performed for the corporation; the liability was not in any sense contingent. 33 Mich. 261; 14 Cal. 265; 34 Ib. 504; 39 Ib. 646; 2 Denio, 119; 57 Barb. 484. Judgment affirmed.

farming implements, it is exempt from an execution issued on a judgment rendered on a promissory note given for the purchase money of such reaper and mower. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. Affirmed. All the justices concurring.-Voorhees v. Patterson.

ASSAULT-UNAUTHORIZED PAPERS WITH JURY.1. If one deliberately points and cocks a loaded pistol at another, who is a mere trespasser upon his lands, within a distance which the pistol will carry, and compels such trespasser, through fear of personal violence from the deadly weapon aimed at him, to leave the premises, he is guilty of an assault. 2. If the jury, in a prosecution for an assault, carry with them on retiring to consider of their verdict a paper having writing thereon, which is folded accidentally with the instructions in the case, and it is not shown that such unauthorized and detached paper has produced any improper influence on the jury, nor is it apparent from its contents that it could have influenced the finding of the jury, nor prejudiced the rights of the defendant: Held, not error for the district court to overrule a motion for a new trial based upon the reception and perusal of the paper by the jury. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. Affirmed. All the justices concurring.-State v. Taylor.

OFFICER'S RETURN-AMENDMENT.-An officer's return on a writ is, to say the least, as against him prima facie correct, and he should not be allowed to amend it until he makes it clear that there error in it, especially when the effect of the amendment is to diminish his own liability, and more especially when the party in whose favor the return was made, resting upon the faith of such return, would suffer loss by the amendment. 2. An officer is presumed to follow the law and obey the orders of the court, and this presumption will often turn the scale in a matter of conflicting testimony. Opinion by BREWER, J. Affirmed. Valentine, J., concurring: Horton, C. J., not sitting, having been of counsel in the case.-Smith v. Martin.

PLEADING-COMMON COUNTS.-1. After full performance by the plaintiff of the terms of an express contract, and when nothing remains unexecuted but the defendant's obligation to pay, the former may frame his cause of action upon the express stipulation of the contract, or he may rely upon the implied promise to make such payment, and to that end may resort to a petition identical with the ancient common counts. 2. In the latter case, notwithstanding the petition presents but a claim for the value of the work done, resort may be had to the contract as conclusive evidence of such value. 3. So also if changes are made by mutual consent from the original plan, the contract controls so far as it can be traced. Opinion by BREWER, J. Reversed. All the justices concurring.-Enslie v. City of Leavenworth.

EVIDENCE-IRREGULARITY.-1. In a criminal prosecution, where a letter, previously written and sent by the defendant to his wife, is not in the custody or control of either the defendant or his wife, nor in the custody or control of any agent or representative of either, but is in the custody and control of a third person who is the prosecuting witness in the case, such letter may be used as evidence in the case by the prosecution against the defendant. 2. In a criminal prosecution, where the court charges the jury in writing, but inadvertently fails for fifteen days to sign some of the instructions embodied in the charge, and fails to file the same among the papers in the case, but puts them in a safe place, and fifteen days afterwards produces them for the defendant to copy into a bill of exceptions, and the defendant so copies them into said bill of exceptions, and the bill is then allowed and signed by the judge, and the defendant then brings the case with said bill of exceptions to this court: Held, that al

EJECTMENT-ADVERSE POSSESSION-WHEN SUIT MUST BE BROUGHT AFTER REMOVAL OF DISABILITY. This was an action of ejectment. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings his writ of error. On trial defendant admitted plaintiff had good paper title, and to defeat a recovery relied solely on statute of limitations. Defendant's adverse possession began Januuary 1st, 1865. Plaintiff at that time was a minor, and became of age January 10th, 1870. Suit instituted October 18, 1875. Whether on facts stated, plaintiff was barred by statute of limitations, is the only question presented by the record. The first section of the statute of limitations (C. 191, Gen. Stat.) provides that all actions for recovery of lands, etc., shall be brought within ten years after right accrues, and the fourth section provides that persons laboring under the disabilities therein named (infancy being one) when cause of action accrues, may bring such action after the time so limited, and within three years after the disability is removed: provided, no action shall be maintained after twenty-four years after cause of action accrued. Held, the fourth section must be construed in connection with the first; and while the language employed is not as full and precise as it might be, the true meaning may fairly be declared to be, that when a right of action accrues to any person laboring under the disabilities mentioned, the period during which such disabilities continue, though more than ten years, shall not constitute a bar; but such persons may, within three years after removal of disability, and within twenty-four years after cause of action accrued, bring suit. If disability has existed for a period of less than ten years, such person must institute suit within three years after removal of disability, unless said three years, together with the period of such disability, are less than ten years; in which event such person is entitled to unexpired portion of ten years. When a party has the three years given by the fourth section, and the whole period of ten years given by the first section, the right of action is barred. In other words, when ten years have elapsed since the right of action accrued, and three of those years have been free from disability, the right of entry is barred. A like construction has been given to a similar statute in New York. Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 180; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cowen, 93 and 94; Wilson v. Betts, 4 Denio, 208-9. Affirmed. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Gray v. Yates.

EJECTMENT PROPER REMEDY FOR PRETERMITTED HEIRS TO RECOVER SHARES OF ANCESTOR'S EsTATE-CLAIM FOR IMPROVEMENTS BY ADVERSE OCCUPANT NOT ALLOWED Under a GeneRAL DENIAL. -Ejectment instituted in 1872 and judgment for plaintiffs. Answer of defendants was a general denial. Plaintiff's claimed as pretermitted heirs of their father,

Thos. McCracken, deceased. Defendant claimed under clause of last will of said Thomas, giving him the land in controversy, to be his absolute property after death of testator's wife, conditioned that defendant should support testator's son Miles, during his natural life. Testator died in 1859, and his widow in 1870. Defendant bad lived on the land some years prior to his father's death, and widow lived on farm till her death. Defendant took care of his parents in their lifetime, and of his brother Miles till his death. Defendant offered testimony, which was excluded, showing that at death of father each of plaintiffs had received some property from his estate, and that after death of father the defendant had made valuable improvements on the land to amount to $1,500. Held, 1. The evidence relating to advancements made to heirs and improvements made by defendant was inadmissible under the general issue, and was properly excluded. To be made available in this action, for any purpose, these facts should have been pleaded. 2. As defendant was in possession under his father until his death, and as he claimed title under the will after his death, he had no possession which could be considered adverse to plaintiffs until after death of his mother in 1870. 3. It is conceded plaintiffs are pretermitted heirs, but it is urged they can not maintain ejectment, but must proceed under the 47th section of statute of wills, or by bill in equity for contribution. There is no fixed rule in this state on this subject. Ejectment has been maintained by pretermitted heirs for shares of land of which their father died seized, in McCourtney v. Mathes, 47 Mo. 533, and Pounds v. Dale, 48 Mo. 270. The remedy afforded by the 47th section would be appropriate, perhaps, in all cases, but it is not apparent why, under certain circumstances, ejectment, partition or a bill in equity for contribution might not also be resorted to. See Hill v. Martin, 29 Mo. 78; Wetherall v. Harris, 51 Mo. 65; Schneider v. Koester, 54 Mo. 500. The present case was an ordinary action of ejectment between tenants in common. Petition was in usual form and answer a simple denial. The only question to be tried was legal rights of plaintiffs to be admitted to joint occupancy with defendants of the land in dispute. There was no question of advancement. or improvements in the case. Defendant may recover for his improvements, under provisions of statute regulating ejectment. Affirmed. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-McCracken v. McCracken.

PROMISSORY NOTE-CONTEMPORANEOUS PAROL AGREEMENT - UNSETTLED PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNT CAN NOT BE SET-OFF BY ONE PARTNER IN ACTION ON HIS NOTE.-This was an action on a promissory note against defendants as makers. Defendants answered, jointly setting out that prior to the time of the making of the note, plaintiff and the defendant (Shaw) entered into a co-partmership, and that plaintiff, to start the business, advanced to the defendant (Shaw) the sum for which the note was given, which defendant, with large sums of his own, paid out in the partnership business, and that it was understood that said sum should be left with said defendant as a permanent fund for said partnership, until it was finally settled Answer further averred that, on the day of the date of said note, plaintiff requested defendant (Shaw) to execute said note as a memorandum of the amount plaintiff had advanced, and that said note was executed at that time, not as an evidence of absolute indebtedness of defendant (Shaw), but as evidence of a contingent indebtedness, in event the said co-partnership should turn out prosperously; that the partnership was disastrous and unprofitable, and there had never been any settlement of the same; that after the execution of said note, defendant (Cranchler), at the request of plaintiff, signed the same as security, in the event that there should be anything coming to plaintiff on a final

settlement between him and defendant (Shaw), and plaintiff was to hold the note simply and solely as security for the amount in the event aforesaid; that defendant (Shaw) had paid $700 more than his share of losses of the firm; that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on said note until the settlement of the co-partnership, and asked that the $700 be set-off' against the note. Defense was stricken out, on motion, and judgment for plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest. Defendants appeal. Held, (1.) The note sued on was an absolute and unconditional promise to pay the sum of money therein specified, and defendants could not be heard to allege that, by a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement, the note was, in a certain contingency, not to be paid. To permit defendants to show a contemporaneous parol agreement that the note was only to be paid in event the affairs of the co-partnership should prove to be prosperous, would be to violate the well-established rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument. Smith v. Thomas, 29 Mo. 307; Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo. 266. It is conceded that where a part only of an entire contract is reduced to writing, the remainder may be proven by parol. Life Association v. Cravens, 60 Mo. 388. But in all such cases the parol contract must be consistent with, and not contradictory of, the written one. Bunce v. Beck, supra. Here defendants seek to contradict the writing, and to convert an absolute promise into a conditional one. (2.) Nor can the note in suit be treated as an escrow. In order to give it such effect, delivery must be made to a third person, and not to payee. Massman v. Holscher, 49 Mo. 87; Henshaw v. Dutton, 59 Mo. 139. (3.) An alleged indebtedness of a partner to his co-partner upon a settlement of co-partnership affairs, can not be pleaded as a set-off or counterclaim. Leabo v. Renshaw, 61 Mo. 292. One partner can not be said to be indebted to his co-partner, on partnership account, until there has been a settlement of copartnership affairs. Fenney v. Turner, 10 Mo. 207. (4.) Neither insolvency of plaintiff, nor any other ground for equitable relief, was alleged, and defendant (Shaw) neither stated nor prayed an account of co-partnership affairs, so as to warrant the court below in depriving plaintiff of his right to a judgment, until such rights could be ascertained and settled. Pope v. Solsman, 35 Mo. 362. Besides, the answer was a joint one, and defendant (Cranchler) had no interest in co-partnership of plaintiff, and his co-defendant (Shaw). Affirmed. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Jones v. Shaw.

statute provides that such instruments shall be acknowledged before a justice of the peace, etc. It also provides that if made by a resident of this state, the justice shall enter on his docket a memorandum of the acknowledgment, and the certificate is required to state that the instrument was acknowledged and 'entered by me.' The fourth section provides that when the instrument is acknowledged as therein provided, it may be admitted to record, etc. Is, then, the entry of this memorandum in the justice's docket a part of the acknowledgment, or if not, is it an essential requirement of the statute. The form of the justice's certificate in which he says 'and entered by me,' would seem to be conclusive that the general assembly intended the entry to constitute an essential part of the acknowledgment. This enactment was intended to provide a means of permitting the mortgagor to retain possession of the property. We presume the general assembly intended to protect third persons from the ready means such possession by the mortgagor afforded him for perpetrating frauds, by selling or pledging the property. Hence, they endeavored to afford ample facilities to acquire notice of any incumbrances that might exist. To hold that the

*

entry in a justice's docket is not essential would be a virtual refusal of the requirement. We are, therefore, of the opinion that appellee's mortgage was invalid as to appellant's claim." Reversed.-Koplin v. Ander

son.

ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE

BILL TO SET ASIDE DUTY OF ADMINISTRATOR TO BE PRESENT-LACHES OF COMPLAINT.-This was a bill in equity to set aside a sale of a certain piece of land made by an administrator of an estate. On the first hearing of the cause, the court decreed that the sale should be set aside, which was reversed by this court on appeal. 77 Ill. 47. In the original bill the only objection urged against the sale was that the administrator entered into an unlawful combination with two persons who attended the sale, which prevented competition in bidding; but after the cause was remanded, the bill was amended, and complainant set up as a further ground of relief that the sale was made in the absence of an administrator by an agent. CRAIG, J., says: "The law is well settled that the authority given an administrator to make sale of lands to pay debts is a personal trust which the administrator has no power to delegate to another. He has the right to employ any auctioneer to make the sale, but it is his duty to be present and direct, superintend and control the sale. 72 Ill. 232; 40 Ill. 368. Had the objection now urged been made within a reasonable time, it might have been regarded with more favor; but the sale was reported to the court, approved, and the administrator executed a deed conveying the premises to the purchaser, no objection having been made by complainant. The sale was made as early as 1861, but the complainant made no objection to it until 1869, when he filed the original bill; and even then he does not attack the sale for the reason that the administrator was not present. No objection of this character is heard until 1876, when the bill is amended. A delay of fifteen years after the sale was made and confirmed before relief is asked of a court of equity is such inexcusable laches as must condemn complainant's claim. See 23 Ill. 503." Affirmed.-Kellogg v. Wilson.

ORDINANCE LICENSING PACKING HOUSES-POWER OF POLICE RESTRAINT OUTSIDE CITY LIMITS. The city of Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting any person, company or corporation within the city, or within a mile of the city limits, from engaging in the business of slaughtering animals for food, or packing them for market, or rendering the offal, bones, etc., of any dead animal matter, etc., until