whether the defendant's men had used reasonable care to secure the flap. His direction implies that in that case only would the intervention of a third party causing the injury be a defense.

The cases of Hughes v. Macfie and others, and Abbott v. Macfie and others, 12 W. R. 315, 2 H. & C. 744, two actions arising out of the same circum stances, and tried in the Passage Court at Liverpool, though at variance with some of the foregoing so far as relates to the effect of the plaintiff's right to recover where his own act as a trespasser has contributed to the injury of which he complains, is in accordance with them as respects the defendant's liability for his own act where that act is the primary cause, though the act of another may have led to the immediate result. The defendants had a cellar opening to the street; their men had taken up the flap of the cellar for the purpose of lowering casks into it, and having reared it against the wall nearly upright, with its lower face on which there were crossbars towards the street, had gone away. The plaintiff, in one of the actions, a child of five years old, got upon the crossbars of the flap, and in jumping off them brought down the flap on himself and another child (the plaintiff in the other action), and both were injured. It was held that, while the plaintiff, whose act had caused the flap to fall, could not recover, the other plaintiff who had been injured could, provided he had not been playing with the other so as to be a joint actor with him.

Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, is another striking case, as there the plaintiff was undoubtedly a trespasser. The defendant being the owner of a garden, which was at some distance from his dwelling-house, and which was subject to depredations, had set in it without notice a spring gun for the protection of his property. The plaintiff, who was not aware that a spring gun was set in the garden, in order to catch a peafowl, the property of a neighbor, which had escaped into the garden, got over the wall, and, his foot coming into contact with the wire, which communicated with the gun, the latter went off and, injured him. It was held, though his own act had been the immediate cause of the gun going off, yet that the unlawful act of the defendant in setting it, rendered the latter liable for the consequences.

In the course of the discussion a similar case of Jay v. Whitfield, 3 B. & Ald. 308, was mentioned, tried before Richards, C.B., in which the plaintiff, who trespassed upon premises in order to cut a stick, and had been similarly injured, had recover substantial damages, and no attempt had been made to disturb the verdict.

In Hill v. The New River Company, 9 B. & S. 303; 16 W. R. C. L. Dig. 73, the defendant created a nuisance in a public highway by allowing a stream of water to spout up open and unfenced in the road. The plaintiff's horses, passing along the road with his carriage, took fright at the water thus spouting up, and screwed to the other side of the road. It so happened that there was in the road an open ditch or cutting which had been made by contractors who were constructing a sewer, and which had been left unfenced and un

guarded, which it ought not to have been. Into this ditch, or cutting, owing to its being unfenced, the horses fell and injured themselves and the carriage. It was contended that the remedy, if any, was against the contractor; but it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover against the company.

In Burrows v. The March Gas and Coke Company, 20 W. R. 493, L. R. 7 Ex. Ch. 96, it was held in the Exchequer Chamber, affirming a judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that where, through a breach of contract by the defendants in not serving the plaintiff with a proper pipe to convey gas from their main into his premises, an escape of gas had taken place, whereupon the servant of a gasfitter at work on the premises having gone into the part of the premises where the escape had occurred with a lighted candle, and examining the pipe with the candle in his hand, an explosion took place by which the premises were injured, the defendants were held liable, though the explosion had been immediately caused by the imprudence of the gasfitter's man in examining the pipe with a lighted candle in his hand.

In Collins v. The Middle Level Commissioners, 17 W. R. 929, L. R. 4 C. P. 279, the defendants were bound under an act of parliament to construct a cut with proper walls, gates and sluices to keep out the water of a tidal river, and also a culvert under the cut to carry off the drainage of the land lying east of the cut, and to keep the same open at all times. In consequence of the defective construction of the gates and sluices, the water of the river flowed into the cut and bursting its western bank flooded the adjoining lands. The plaintiff and other proprietors on the eastern side closed their culvert and so protected their lands, but the proprietors on the western side, to lessen the evil to themselves, reopened the culvert, and so increased the overflow on the plaintiff's land, and caused injury to it. The defendants sought to ascribe the injury to the act of the western proprietors in removing the obstruction which those on the other side had placed at the culvert, but it was held that the negligence of the defendants was the substantial cause of the mischief. "The defendants," says Mr. Justice Montague Smith, "cannot excuse themselves from the natural consequences of their negligence by reason of the act, whether rightful or wrongful, of those who removed the obstructions placed in the culvert, under the circumstances found in this case." "The primary and substantial cause of the injury," says Mr. Justice Brett, "was the negligence of the defendants, and it is not competent to them to say that they are absolved from the consequences of their wrongful act by what the plaintiff or some one else did. I do not see how the defendants can excuse themselves by urging that the plaintiff was prevented by other wrongdoers from preventing part of the injury."

The case of Harrison v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 12 W, R. 1081, 3 H. & C. 231, belongs to the same class. The defendants were bound under an act of parliament to maintain a delph or drain with banks for carrying off water

for the protection of the adjoining lands. At the same time, certain commissioners appointed under an act of parliament were bound to maintain the navigation of the river Witham, with which the delph communicated. There having been an extraordinary fall of rain, the water in the delph rose nearly to the height of its banks, when one of them gave way and caused the damage of which the plaintiff complained. It was found that the bank of the delph was not in a proper condition, but it was also found, and it was on this that the defendants relied as a defense, that the breaking of the bank had been caused by the water in it having been penned back owing to the neglect of the commissioners to maintain in a proper state certain works which it was their duty to keep up under their act. Nevertheless the defendants were held liable.

These authorities would appear to be sufficient to maintain the plaintiff's right of action under the circumstances of this case. It must, however, be admitted that in one or two recent cases the courts have shown a disposition to confine the liability arising from unlawful acts, negligence, or omission of duty within narrower limits, by holding a defendant liable for those consequences only which, in the ordinary course of things, were likely to arise, and which might therefore reasonably be expected to arise, or which it was contemplated by the parties might arise from such acts, negligence, or omissions.

In Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, Lord Chief Baron Pollock says: "I entertain considerable doubt whether a person who is guilty of negligence is responsible for all the consequences which may under any circumstances arise, and in respect of mischief which could by no possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would have anticipated.

Acting on this principle, the Court of Common Pleas, in a recent case of Sharp v. Powell, 20 W. R. 584, L. R. 7 C. P. 253, held that the action would not lie where the injury, though arising from the unlawful act of the defendant, could not have been reasonably expected to follow from it. The defendant had, contrary to the provisions of the Police Act, washed a van in the street, and suffered the water used for the purpose to flow down a gutter towards a sewer at some little distance. The weather being frosty, a grating through which the water flowing down the gutter passed into the sewer had become frozen over, in consequence of which the water sent down by the defendant, instead of passing into the sewer spread over the street and had been frozen, rendering the street slippery. The plaintiff's horse coming along fell in consequence, and was injured. It was held that, as there was nothing to show that the defendant was aware of the obstruction of the grating, and as the stoppage of the water was not the necessary or probable consequence of the defendant's act, he was not responsible for what had happened. Lord Chief Justice Bovill there says: 66 No doubt one who commits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary consequences which are likely to result therefrom; but, generally speaking, he is not lia

ble for damage which is not the natural or ordinary consequence of such an act, unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable means of knowing, that consequences not usually resulting from the act are, by reason of some existing cause, likely to intervene so as to occasion damage to a third person. Where there is no reason to expect it, and no knowledge in the person doing the wrongful act that such a state of things exists as to render the damage probable, if injury does result to a third person it is generally considered that the wrongful act is not the proximate cause of the injury, so as to render the wrong-doer liable to an action." And Grove, J., said: "I am entirely of the same opinion. I think the act of the defendant was not the ordinary or proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff's horse, or within the ordinary consequences which the defendant may be presumed to have contemplated, or for which he is responsible. The expression, 'natural' consequence, which has been used in so many cases, and which I myself have no doubt often used, by no means conveys to the mind an adequate notion of what is meant; 'probable' would perhaps be a better expression. If, on the present occasion, the water had been allowed to accumulate round the spot where the washing of the van took place, and had there frozen obviously within the sight of the defendant, and the plaintiff's horse had fallen there, I should have been inclined to think that the defendant would have been responsible for the consequences which had resulted." And Mr. Justice Keating said: "The damage did not immediately flow from the wrongful act of the defendant nor was such a probable or likely result as to make him responsible for it. The natural consequence, if that be a correct expression, of the wrongful act of the defendant would have been that the water would under ordinary circumstances have flowed along the gutter or channel, and so down the grating to the sewer. The stoppage and accumulation of the water was caused by ice or other obstruction at the drain, not shown to have been known to the defendant, and for which he was in no degree responsible. That being so, it would obviously be unreasonable to trace the damage indirectly back to the defendant."

We acquiesce in the doctrine thus laid down as applicable to the circumstances of the particular case, but we doubt its applicability to the present, which appears to us to come within the principle of Scott v. Shepherd and Dixon v. Bell, and the later cases to which we have referred. At the same time it appears to us that the case before us will stand the test thus said to be the true one. For a man who unlawfully places an obstruction across either a public or private way may anticipate the removal of the obstruction by some one entitled to use the way, as a thing likely to happen; and if this should be done the probability is that the obstruction so removed will, instead of being carried away altogether, be placed somewhere near; thus, if the obstruction be to the carriage way, it will very likely be placed, as was the case here, on the footpath. If the obstruction be a dangerous one, wheresoever placed, it may, as

was also the case here, become a source of danger from which, should injury to an innocent party occur, the original author of the mischief should be held responsible. Moreover, we are of opinion that, if a person places a dangerous obstruction in a highway, or in a private road, over which persons have a right of way, he is bound to take all necessary precaution to protect persons exercising their right of way, and that if he neglect to do so, he is liable for the consequences. It is unnecessary to consider how the matter would have stood had the plaintiff been a trespasser. The case of Mangan v. Atterton, 4 H. & C. 388, L. R. 1 Exch. 239, was cited before us as a strong authority in favor of the defendant. The defendant had there exposed, in a public market place, a machine for crushing oil cake, without its being thrown out of gear, or the handle being fastened, or any person having the care of it. The plaintiff, a boy of four years of age, returning from school with his brother, a boy of seven, and some other boys, stopped at the machine. One of the boys began to turn the handle; the plaintiff, at the suggestion of his brother, placed his hands on the cogs of the wheels, and, the machine being put in motion, three of his fingers were crushed. It was held by the Court of Exchequer that the defendant was not liable, first, because there was no negligence on the part of the defendant, or if there was such negligence it was too remote; secondly, because the injury was caused by the act of the boy who turned the handle, and of the plaintiff himself who was a trespasser. With the latter ground of the de cision we have in the present case nothing to do, otherwise we should have to consider whether it should prevail against the cases cited with which it is obviously in conflict. If the decision as to negligence is in conflict with our judgment in this case, we can only say that we do not acquiesce in it. It appears to us that a man who leaves in a public place, along which persons, amongst them children, have to pass, a dangerous machine which may be fatal to anyone who touches it, without any precaution against mischief, is not only guilty of negligence, but of negligence of a very reprehensible character. And not the less so because the imprudent and unauthorized act of another may be necessary to realize the mischief to which the unlawful act or negligence of the defendant has given occasion. But, be this as it may, the case can not govern the present; for the decision proceeded expressly on the ground that there had been no default in the defendant. Here it can not be disputed that the act of the defendant was unlawful.

On the whole, we are of opinion, both on principle and authority, that the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment.

JUDGMENT for the plaintiff.

MR. SAMUEL HAND, of Albany, has been appointed to the vacancy in the New York Court of Appeals, caused by the death of Judge Allen.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

COMMON CARRIER-BILL OF LADING-EXEMPTION. -Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis & Charleston R. R. Court of Appeals of New York, 7 Ins. L. J. 547. Opinion by RAPALLO, J. 1. Cotton was shipped by a railroad company, and after its delivery, but before the cotton had started on its destination, a bill of lading was given which exempted the carrier from loss by fire. Insurance was effected by the shipper, and the bill of lading delivered to the insurer. Held, in an action by the insurer against the carrier, that the plaintiff was subject to any defense that would be available against the shipper; and in the absence of negligence the bill of lading exempted the carrier from liability. 2. The bill of lading having been accepted without objection, was the contract, and the shipper could not resort to an alleged prior oral agreement; he was bound to know its contents. To take the case out of this rule, it would be necessary to show that the goods had passed beyond the shipper's control before the bill of lading was delivered.

NEGLIGENCE-MASTER AND SERVANT-MINING OPERATIONS-FELLOW-SERVANTS.-Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Jones. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 5 W. N. 436. Opinion by MERCUR, J. 1. In order to bring a case within the rule that a master is not responsible for an injury happening to a servant through the negligence of a fellow-servant, it is not necessary that the injured and the negligent servants should be engaged in the same particular work; it is sufficient if the general scope of their employment be the same. 2. A "driver boss" was killed in a coal mine, by an explosion caused by the negligence (if any negligence there was) of the "mining boss," who had given an order to reduce the supply of fresh air. Held, that the two were fellow-servants within the meaning of the rule, and that the owner of the mine was not responsible. 3. To prove contributory negligence, testimony is admissible to show that the deceased, at the time of his death, was in a position which he had been warned, and himself had warned others, was dangerous. Mullen v. Steamship Co., 28 Sm. 25, 1 W. N. 218, explained.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE CONDITIONS- NOTICELyon v. Ry. Pass. Ins. Co. Supreme Court of Iowa, 7 Ins. L. J. 491. Opinion by DAY, C.J. 1. The policy provided that insured might recover for accidental injuries only which totally disabled, and prevented him from the transaction of all kinds of business. Held, that an instruction that the plaintiff might recover, thongh able to do some parts of the accustomed work pertaining to his business, so long as he could not, to some extent, do all parts and engage in all the employments of it, was erroneous. 2. An instruction that the ability of the insured to engage in some business or occupation would not prevent recovery unless it was one which he was qualified to engage in as an occupation, and transact in the ordinary way, was erroneous; such partial disability does not entitle to indemnity. 3. The policy, after stating the conditions of the company's liability, adds: "Provided that, in the event of bodily injury or death insured against, by reason of which a claim for loss may be made under this contract, immediate notice shall be given, etc." Held, that the liability of the company is contingent on such notice being given, and an instruction that a failure to give such notice in the time provided, will not prevent recovery, unless it prevented the company from properly investigating the loss, was erroneous. 4. Where notice was delayed for a month, but it appeared that insured was under treatment nine weeks, the question of due diligence was for the jury; and a refusal to instruct as a matter of law, that it had not been exercised, was not rror.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS REGULATING TRADES- Ex parte Frank-Supreme Court of California, 1 Cal. Leg. Rec. 225. Opinion by CROCKETT, J.-1. A municipal corporation is the creature of the statute, invested with such power and capacity only as is conferred by the statute, or passed by necessary implication. 2. In construing the words of the grant, the whole chapter and the general legislation of the state respecting the matter must be consulted in order to determine whether, by the terms "license and regulate," it was intended to authorize licenses for purposes of revenue. Acting on this rule of interpretation, it is held that the act giving power "to license and regulate trades, callings and employment as the public good may require to be licensed and regulated," confers power to exact license fees for purposes of revenue. 3. But an ordinance passed under a general authority of this nature must be-(1), reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the state. (2), it must not be oppressive; (3), it must be impartial, fair and general; (4), it may regulate, but must not restrain trade or contravene public policy. 4. One Frank was convicted of a misdemeanor, for violation of what is known as the "Sample seller's ordinance," and being restrained of his liberty upon process issued upon the judgment of conviction, was before the court on a writ of habeas corpus. The ordinance provides in effect that any person who shall sell or solicit for the sale or purchase of any goods, wares, merchandise, etc., without at the time having the goods at or in the city and county of San Francisco, or a bill of lading of a common carrier, showing the goods are in transitu to said city and county, shall pay a license of $2,000 per quarter for every $250,000 of business done, and then establishes other proportions. But the ordinance provides also for licensing other persons for buying and selling the same character of goods that are within the corporate limits of said city and county, fixing the fees at $100 per quarter for the same amount of business. Held, that the ordinance is flagrantly unjust, oppressive, unequal and partial. It contravenes public policy, and obstructs commercial intercourse between the principal seaport city of the state and the interior, and is in restraint of trade, and is, therefore, inoperative and void.

SOME RECENT FOREIGN DECISIONS.

PRACTICE-TRIAL-DEPOSITION-ILLNESS-Queen v. Wellings, English High Court, 26 W. R. 592.-Pregnancy alone may be a source of "illness" within the meaning of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, §17, such as to give the presiding judge discretionary power to admit in evidence in a prosecution the deposition of a witness who is unable to travel in consequence of her approaching confinement.

CUSTOM BAD IN LAW.-Bradburn v. Foley, English High Court, C. P. Div. 17. Alb. L. J. 483.-A custom that the outgoing tenant of a farm shall look exclusively to the incoming tenant, where there is one, and not to the landlord for compensation for the seeds, acts of husbandry, tillages, etc., is so unreasonable, uncertain and prejudicial to the interests of both landlords and tenants as to be bad in law.

CHARITABLE BEQUEST-GIFT TO "POOREST OF MY KINDRED "-CONSTRUCTION-APPLICATION OF SURPLUS.-Atty.-Gen. v. Duke of Northumberland, English High Court, Chy. Div., 26 W. R. 586.-A gift "for the relief and use of the poorest of my kindred " must, to be a charitable gift, be construed as a gift for the benefit of those who are really poor and not of those who are the least wealthy. Held, accordingly,

that after providing for the relief of the needy kindred of the testator, the surplus was applicable to charitable objects generally. Gillman v. Taylor, 21 W. R. 823, L. R. 16 Eq. 581, discussed.

TRADE-MARKS-INJUNCTION-MUSICAL PUBLICATION-FRAUDULENT IMITATION OF TITLE.-Metzler v. Wood, English High Court, Chy. Div., 26 W. R. 577. -The plaintiffs were the proprietors of an elementary musical work, called "Hemy's Royal Modern Tutor for the Pianoforte." The defendants, who had purchased the plates of an old pianoforte tutor, called "Jousse's Royal Standard Pinaforte Tutor," employed Mr. Hemy, the editor of the plaintiff's work, to re-edit it, and called the new edition "Hemy's New and Revised Edition of Jousse's Royal Standard Pianoforte Tutor," the name "Hemy" being at the head of the title-page, and in characters much more conspicuous than the word "Jousse's." Held, (affirming the decision of Malins, V. C.), that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, on the ground that the title-page of the defendant's work's was a fraudulent imitation of that of the plaintiff, and calculated to deceive the publie.

JURISDICTION-DOMICIL- ABANDONMENT — TEMPORARY RESIDENCE IN ENGLAND-SUIT FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS-SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION.-Forebrace v. Forebrace, English High Court, Probate and Divorce Division, 26 W. R. 613.1. The 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 42, gives the court no power to order service out of the jurisdiction of a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. 2. A wife's domicil is that of her husband, and her remedy for matrimonial wrongs must, as a general rule, be sought in the courts of that domicil; and, therefore, the wife of a man not domiciled in England can not maintain a suit for restitution of conjugal rights if her husband has left the jurisdiction before the commencement of the proceedings. 3. A, a native of Barbados, was for many years an officer in the English army, and served with his regiment in England and Scotland, and in various places abroad. His son, B, was born in 1828, in England, where the regiment was then stationed. In 1841 A retired from the army, and went with his wife and children to Australia where he resided until his death,in 1856. B lived with A till the death of the latter and remained in Australia for ten years longer. In 1858 he was married at Melbourne to C, who was a native of Australia, and in 1866, he cane with C and his children to England, where he resided for several years, but without establishing himself in a permanent home, the bulk of his property being still in Australia. In 1869 he presented a petition for dissolution of marriage, on the ground of C's adultery; the petition was ultimately dismissed, and he soon afterwards left England. After his departure, С commenced a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, and B appeared under protest. Held, that neither A nor B had ever a quired a domicil in England; that A hav ing acquired an Australian domicil, and B having as a minor acquired his father's domicil of choice and afterwards continued it by his own act, the domicil of the latter was in Australia; that B had never abandoned such domicil; and that, after B had left England, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain C's petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Yelverton v. Yelverton, 8 W. R. 134, 1 S. & T. 574, followed.

DIGEST OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

October Term, 1877.

MARRIAGE STATUTORY REQUISITES DO NOT TAKE AWAY COMMON LAW RIGHT.-1. A statute may take away the common law right of marriage, but there is

always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention, unless clearly expressed. 2. Such formal provisions as regulate the requirements of the marriage ceremony, may be construed as merely directory, instead of being treated as destructive of the common law right to form the marriage relation by words of present assent.-Meister v. Meister. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Mr. Justice STRONG. Reported in full 10 Ch. L. N. 315.

CONFISCATION LAW NOT RETROACTIVE.-In May, 1862, C., who was a member of the Confederate Congress, and engaged in armed hostility to the United States within the Confederate lines, conveyed to plaintiff, his son, also within the Confederate lines and engaged in hostility to the United States, certain real estate situate in the city of New Orleans, then within the Federal lines. Subsequently, and under authority of the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, the property was confiscated in proceedings against C., and sold by the United States Marshal. Held, 1. That the confiscation act mentioned did not authorize proceedings for acts committed before its passage. 2. That transfers of property between those in hostility to the government before its passage were not valid. 3. That the proceedings could not affect the interest of C. in the property at the time the act was passed, and that the proceedings did not invalidate the title of plaintiff to the property acquired by transfer from C. in May, 1862. -Conrad v. Waples. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. Opinion by Mr. Justice FIELD. Reported in full 17 Alb. L. J. 484.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE PROHIBITORY LAWS AFFECTING CORPORATIONS.-A statute of Massachusetts, passed in 1809, providing for the chartering of manufacturing corporations, contained this: "Provided, always, that the legislature may from time to time, upon due notice to any corporation, make further provisions and regulations for the management of the business of the corporation and for the government thereof, or wholly repeal any act or part thereof establishing any corporation, as shall be deemed expedient." In 1828 the Boston Beer Company was incorporated, "for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties in the city of Boston," and the act of incorporation, which was passed by the Legislature of Massachusetts, provided that said company" for that purpose shall have all the power and privileges, and be subject to all the duties and requirements contained in" the act of 1809 mentioned. In 1829 the act of 1809 was repealed, with this provision: "But this repeal shall not affect the existing rights of any person, or the existing or future liabilities of any corporation, or any members of any corporation now established, until such corporation shall have adopted this act, and complied with the provisions herein contained." Held, that the repeal of the act of 1809 by the act of 1829 was not a revocation or surrender by the State of Massachusetts of the reserved power to repeal the charters of corporations, and the passage of an act forbidding the manufacture and sale of malt liquors, was not an act impairing an obligation of a contract with the company mentioned, and was not in violation of the Federal Constitution.-Boston Beer Co. v. Commonwealth. In error to the Superior Court of Massachusetts. Opinion by Mr. Justice BRADLEY. Reported in full 17 Alb. L. J. 487.

OUTSIDE of the bench, the legal offices in England are numerous, easy and fat. A professional witness testifying before a commission concerning the duties of an office, the incumbent of which has just diedsalary, $6,000-said: "The Record and Writ Clerk does nothing whatever; he sits in an inner room in the office, and takes a few affidavits occasionally; but a great part of his time is employed in reading the newspaper."

TAXES PARTIES-INTEREST.-This was a suit for unpaid taxes. A rehearing of the case was had, at which time objectors appeared and contested the validity of the tax. The court say; "It does not appear from anything in the records, or any extrinsic evi dence, that any one of the objectors have any interest in the property assessed, against which judgment is brought for unpaid taxes. Having no interest in the subject of the taxes, the objectors can not be permitted to contest the taxes levied. It is not a matter that concerns them, unless they have some interest as owner or otherwise in the property assessed. Such facts must be made to appear before their objections will be considered." Affirmed. Burbank v. The People ex rel.

INDICTMENT-RAPE-EVIDENCE.-This was an indictment for rape alleged to have been committed by defendant. On the trial, a witness was asked, "Have you not heard people say that he (alluding to the defendant) was a gambler?" The witness answered in the affirmative. Again, when the defendant gave evidence in his own behalf, he was compelled, over objections, to state that he had visited houses of ill-fame, and had connection with the inmates, and also that he had played cards for money. SCHOLFIELD, C. J.: "Evidence of prior misconduct is never admissible in a criminal trial, unless it be to prove prior malice towards an individual, or guilty knowledge, neither of which can have pertinency in cases like the present. And particular acts of misconduct are never admissible in rebuttal of proof of defendant's good character. McCarty v. The People, 51 Ill. 231. Nor can it be said this evidence was admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's reputation as a witness only, although not for the purpose of proving the offense charged. The reputation of a witness can not be impeached by proof of particular acts-it must be by proving his general reputation for truth and veracity to be bad. 11 Ill. 367; 82 Ill. 579. Reversed and remanded.-The People v. Gifford.

INDICTMENT LARCENY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. This was an indictment for a larceny alleged to have been committed on January 21, 1866. The indictment was found in 1876. The statute of limitations in force in 1866 provided that no person shall be prosecuted or tried for larceny, "unless the indictment for the same shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the offense shall have been committed, provided that nothing herein contained shall extend to any person fleeing from justice." There was no allegation that defendant had been fleeing from justice: Held, that under that statute the count Was clearly bad, unless that statute be rendered inoperative by subsequent legislation, DICKEY, J.: "In the Revised Statutes of 1874 there is a repealing statute covering the former criminal code and laws of limitation, and at the end thereof it is provided, when any. limitation law has been revised by this or the 27th General Assembly, and the former limitation law rerepealed, such repeal shall not be construed so as to stop the running of any statute, but the time shall be construed as if such repeal had not been made