Sitting in ligence. 2. The next position taken by the defendant is that the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff, by his own negligence, contributed to the accident. The fact relied upon is that the plaintiff was sitting in a chair. It is said that a chair was a dangerous thing to chair not consit in in such a place, and that the plaintiff should tributory neghave avoided it, especially as abundant sitting accommodations had been provided by stationary seats around the side of the car. It is not to be denied, we think, that, in case of any sudden and violent propulsion of the caboose, a chair, not fastened to the floor or otherwise secured, was less safe than the seats around the sides; but it is not easy to discover what the chair was in the car for if not as a seat. We think that the plaintiff was justified in inferring that it was placed there as a seat, and, if so, that the defendant would so manage its train in switching as not to throw a passenger or any other person from the chair upon the stove. We cannot say that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. duced by inju 3. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff for the purpose of showing that the injury which he received upon his nose had produced catarrh. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant them in finding that the plain- Catarrh intiff's catarrh was caused by the injury complained ry-Evidence. of. The court refused to so instruct, and the defendant assigns the refusal as error. The plaintiff testified that the injury was followed by catarrh, and that he had never had catarrh before. One Dr. Eberle was examined as a witness, and was asked whether an injury upon the nose might produce catarrh, and, if so, how. To this he answered: "It might by progression. Any inflammatory action of the membrane may produce catarrh. A lacerated wound of the cartilaginous portion of the nose adjoining the nasal bones would produce inflammatory action." Another physician who had made an examination of the plaintiff's nose testified that he found it in a highly inflamed condition. Another physician testified that he found inflammation producing sanguinous discharge. All testified, however, that they had never known a case where catarrh had been produced by an injury to the surface of the nose, and one testified that the books gave no instance where catarrh was known to so originate, but he testified that the books say that there may be such a result. If the plaintiff received an injury which, according to the physicians and the books, might produce catarrh, and the plaintiff never had catarrh before, but had it soon afterwards, we think that there was some ground for an inference that the plaintiff's catarrh was caused by the injury, and we do not think that the court would have been justified in giving the instruction asked. Same-In to cause of ca tarrh. 4. The court instructed the jury that an expert opinion that a certain result may possibly follow from a certain cause, that is, that such result is merely possible, and not the ordinary or usual consequence of like condistructions as tions, does not, in the absence of proved fact or circumstances tending to that end, contribute sufficient evidence that such exceptional or possible result did in fact follow in the given case. It is insisted that the verdict is contrary to this instruction. But, in our opinion, we cannot so hold. In addition to the evidence of the experts and the books, there was the proven fact that the plaintiff never had catarrh before, and did have it soon afterwards. Besides it does not appear that the jury found that the catarrh was caused by the injury, nor allowed any damages on account of the plaintiff's catarrh. It should seem, indeed, from the amount of the verdict, that they did not. The amount was only $395, and there was evidence that the plaintiff sustained considerable injury independent of the matter of the catarrh. 5. The defendant assigns as error the overruling of an objection interposed to a certain question asked an Expert testiexpert witness by the plaintiff. This question mony. is in these words: "State whether a blow upon the nose which was sufficient to break the bones would probably excite inflammatory action of any membrane of the nose?" The witness answered, "Most certainly." The objection urged in argument is that there was no evidence that any bones in the plaintiff's nose were broken. That objec tion, however, does not appear to have been specifically made upon the trial. The objection there made was that the question was irrelevant, immaterial, and leading, and that the witness had already testified upon the subject. There was nothing in this which would necessarily suggest the objection now urged, and we cannot say that the court erred in not sustaining the objection. medical books. 6. The defendant assigns as error the admission in evidence of an extract from a medical work on Diseases of Extracts from the Throat and Nose. The extract is in these words: "Purulent inflammation of the nasal mucus membrane in exceedingly rare cases may be simply an aggravation of the ordinary catarrh. It may likewise result from injuries." The objection urged is that the statement is too indefinite; but we cannot say that it has no bearing upon the question at issue. If it has some bearing, the indefiniteness of the statement, it appears to us, goes to its value or weight as evidence, rather than its admissibility. We see no error, and the judgment must be affirmed. Injury to Passenger Caused by Sudden Jolt of Car in which He is Riding. -See Lakin v. Oregon Pac. R. Co., ante, p. 500; Bartholomew v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 154; Harris v. Hannibal & St. Jo. R. Co., 27 Ib. 216; Wallace v. Western N. Car. R. Co., post, 553. SOUTH SIDE PASSENGER R. Co. V. TRICH AND WIFE. (Pennsylvania Supreme Court.) Passenger Personal Injuries-Negligence Proximate Cause. If the undisputed evidence shows that a passenger, who attempted to take a car, safely reached the step, remained there for a short distance, and was jerked from it upon the street owing to the driver whipping his horses to avoid collision with a runaway horse and buggy, safely alighted upon her feet, and immediately thereafter was struck by the runaway, being struck by the runaway, and not being jerked from the step of the car, was the proximate cause of the injury, and such passenger has no cause of action against the car company. ERROR to Court of Common Pleas No. 2, Allegheny County. Actions by Mr. and Mrs. Trich against the South Side Passenger R. Co. to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Trich. Mrs. Trich and her father signalled a car belonging to defendant, which was coming up Third avenue, Pittsburg, the car, in common with the other cars used by the defendant, was what is known as a "bob-tailed car, with a driver, but without any conductor. Mrs. Trich got upon the car platform and took hold of the rail, when the car started. She remained there until the car reached the middle of Smithfield street, a distance of about 60 or 70 feet from the place where Mrs. Trich entered it. The driver, seeing a runaway horse and buggy approaching down Smithfield street, whipped up his horses to avoid a collision. As a consequence, the horses caused the car to jolt, and Mrs. Trich was jerked off the platform, and alighted on her feet in the street, uninjured. Immediately afterward she was struck by the run away horse, knocked down and injured. The defendant's attorney requested the court to direct the jury that, even if there was negligence on the part of the driver in starting too soon, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries. to Mrs. Trich; but the court refused to do so, the jury entered a verdict in both actions against the defendant, which plaintiff brings error to review. John Dalzell and Geo. B. Gordon for plaintiff in error. GREEN, J.-There is no manner of question as to what was the actual and immediate cause of the injury inflicted upon Mrs. Trich. It was an entirely undisputed fact that she was struck and injured by a runaway horse and buggy. All the witnesses who saw the occurrence so testi Evidence as to accident. fied. Thus, Mr. McCully, the father of Mrs. Trich, who was present with her at the time, and was examined on her behalf, after describing her attempt to get on the car, and saying that she was bounced off, adds: "A moment or two afterwards, here comes a runaway horse and buggy down the street, and the shaft, I suppose it was, caught her under the arm, and dragged her to the street crossing, and she fell away. The only other witness examined for the plaintiff as to the facts of the occurrence, M. M. Harrington, testified: "There is a banking building there on the corner, and I saw the lady fall,-fall off; and when she fell, to the best of my knowledge, she kind of threw herself back this way, and there was a phaeton or buggy of some kind running, a horse running down the street with a buggy,-and it struck her, and they picked her up, and carried her into Mr. Johnson's drug store." There was no contradiction of this testimony. But one other witness, Mrs. Vrailing, examined by the defendant, testified to the fact of the injury, and she also said it was done by the buggy striking the woman. The learned court below, in the charge, said: "The evidence seems to me to preponderate very largely in favor of the fact that the immediate force which caused the injury to this woman was the runaway horse." This was an understatement of the testimony which might have led the jury to suppose that there was an open question, with a preponderance of evidence only as to whether it was the runaway horse and buggy which inflicted the injury. The defendant had presented a point stating that it was the undisputed evidence that Mrs. Trich was injured by being struck by a runaway horse, so that the question was directly before the court. view of that circumstance, we think the court should have specifically so charged, and not left it as an open question for In the jury to determine, with a mere expression of opinion that the evidence preponderated in that direction. Assuming, then, as we do, that it was the undisputed evidence that the injury was inflicted by the runaway horse and buggy, the only remaining question is whether it cause of in was the duty of the court to declare whether this Whether runwas the proximate cause of the injury. The point away was presented by the defendant asked for such an instruction, but the court refused it, saying it was a jury. question for the jury under the evidence. In this we think there was error. In the case of West Mahanoy v. Watson, 112 Pa. St. 574, we reversed the court below for making just such an answer to just such a point; and upon a review of the facts of the case we held that they did not constitute an instance of proximate cause as against the defendant, and therefore decided that the defendant's point should have been affirmed, which took the case from the jury. Mr. Justice Paxson, in delivering the opinion, said: "While it is undoubtedly true, as a general proposition, that the question of proximate cause is for the jury, yet it has been repeatedly held that where there are no disputed facts the court may determine it." It is sufficient to refer to Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85 Pa. St. 292. In that case this court, following Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353, and Railroad Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373, laid down the rule as to proximate cause as follows: "In determining what is proximate cause, the true rule is that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence; such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act." Applying this rule to the facts of the present case, can it be said that the injury of Mrs. Trich was the natural and probable consequeuce of the car-driver's negligence in urging his horses to a faster gait? We think not. There was not a particle of evidence to show that runaway horses and vehicles were frequently, or indeed ever, seen upon Smithfield street, where this accident occurred. There was no evidence upon that subject. It was certainly not a natural consequence of a person being upon that street that he would be struck by a runaway horse. Nor is there the slightest reason for saying that it would be a probable consequence. The utmost that can be said would be that such a consequence might possibly happen. But things or results which are only possible cannot be spoken of as either probable or natural; for the latter are those things or events which are likely to happen, and which for that reason should be fore |