limited, like the statute of Elizabeth, to occupiers, and removes the difficulty which was felt in R. v. St. Luke's and R. v. St. Bartholomew's. Here it is found expressly that the corporation of London are the landlords; and, by the Act of 50 Geo. 3, c. 189, the corporation are required to grant a lease to trustees, for the governors of Bethlehem Hospital, which lease was granted. Here, therefore, the trustees are lessees; and, by the express terms of the statute, may be rated. The 28th clause of the same Act is supposed to afford an answer to this argument. It is set out in the case, and provides that no settlement shall be gained by occupancy, &c. in any of the charitable institutions, the existence of which in the parish, without contributing to the burdens thereof, is recited in the preamble to the clause; but when that Act passed, Bethlehem Hospital was not situate in that parish, and the object of the clause was, to prevent charitable institutions which then existed in the parish, and were exempt from rates, from imposing additional burdens thereon. If the intention had been to exempt from rateability all charitable institutions which might in future be established in the parish, that intention would have been clearly expressed. [PATTESON, J.-But if the 1st clause makes every institution rateable, then it applies to those which in sec. 28 are recited to be exempt.] The 1st clause, in clear and explicit terms, imposes the liability; and the 28th section does not expressly or clearly remove it. The words of the 1st clause are even more extensive than those of the local Act (10 Geo. 3, c. 75), under which the lessee of a private box in Drury-lane Theatre was held rateable for the occupation thereof, although the proprietors were rated for the theatre generally. (Reg. v. St. Martin's, 3 Q. B. 204.) [PATTESON, J.—If you look to the 2nd section of this local Act, you will see a provision that, in a certain event, owners shall be deemed to be occupiers, and be rated; but it is impossible that that can apply to all owners.] The words in the 1st section. are large enough, "use, occupy, possess, or enjoy." [PATTESON, J.-They are all possessory words.] The 2nd section provides, that the parish officers may compound with the landlords, owners, or lessees of small tenements; and if they should refuse to do so, then they may be deemed to be the occupiers, and be rated. [PATTESON, J.-Lessee there means, not the actual occupier, but an intermediate beneficial occupier.] The clause, however, is limited in its application to the case of small tenements. [PATTESON, J.-The 28th clause, in its terms, does include charitable institutions afterwards established. But the recital limits it; and as in the 1st section the legislature uses much larger words than those of the statute of Elizabeth, the only reasonable inference is, that they intended to include other cases.

Watson and Wallinger, contrà.-The cases of Rex v. St. Luke's and Rex v. St. Bartholomew's govern this. This hospital is a royal and public charity; which is now, for the first time, sought to be rated. In the charter of Henry the Eighth it is called, "our house or hospital;" and probably belonged to one of the greater monasteries, until the time of their dissolution, when it fell into the hands of the Crown. The custody and government of it is given to the corporation of London; lands are vested in trustees for its support; and the corporation are strictly bound, both by the statute of 50 Geo. 3, c. 189, and by their own covenants, to use it for no other purposes than those of its original foundation, viz. the cure and maintenance of lunatics. For any breach of that trust, the trustees are liable to information by the Attorney-General. (The Attorney-General v. Christ's Hospital, 1 Russ. & M. 626.) That is one distinction between public and private charities. If the purposes are general and public, that is, open to all,-the charity is public, and the Attorney-General sues; if private, then only the persons interested can sue. Rex v. St. Giles, York,

and Reg. v. Sterry, which have been cited, are cases of private charities, and therefore distinguishable. But it is argued, that the payments made by some of the patients deprive it of exemption, either as a charitable or public institution; but these payments are for the food and clothing only of a particular class of patients, not coming under the more immediate object of the charity. The hospital is for the cure of lunatics; and as many indigent lunatics as it will hold are constantly maintained, without any charge, until pronounced incurable. The addition of the incurable ward, into which the patients are received upon making small payments for food and clothing, can make no difference in the rateability. The governors can never receive any benefit from the institution, nor can it ever be used for any other purpose. All these circumstances distinguish the case widely from Rex v. St. Giles, York, and Reg. v. Sterry. [WIGHTMAN, J.-Suppose that in Reg. v. Sterry, the 12. paid by the scholars had been for meat and clothing only, and that the education and lodging had been purely charitable.] That would have made a very material difference in the case; but the great distinction between that and the present case is, that that was clearly a private charity, whereas this is the case of a public and royal hospital. [WIGHTMAN, J.-Has the Crown any authority over it?] No; the government is committed to the corporation of London. [WIGHTMAN, J.-Then is not the prerogative gone?] It is a public charity, for any breach of trust in which the Attorney-General would sue. [WIGHTMAN, J.-So of any public charity, whether of royal or private origin. LORD DENMAN, C. J.-Certainly.] Reg. v. Sterry was a private charity for a Quakers' school. [WIGHTMAN, J.-Would it be public, if the money were left to trustees for a school for all who could pay 12. a year? LORD DENMAN, C. J.-The appellants may say that this is a charity open to all who have clothes on, and who pay for their medicine; but then Mr. Chambers says, that that is not the case here, because the trustees exercise a discretion and control.] There must be regulations for the government of such an institution. [LORD DENMAN, C. J.-It strikes me that there may be a distinction between this case and that of an institution established by a mere voluntary act of charity, because the Crown has, by virtue of its prerogative, the care of lunatics, and may have established this hospital, and rendered it exempt from parochial rates, in the exercise of that prerogative.] Rex v. St. Giles, York, was the case of a private lunatic asylum, to which that observation would not apply. [LORD DENMAN, C. J.-But, as a charitable institution, it is difficult to distinguish that case from the present, for all the funds were applied to the charity.] The application of the money makes no difference; the question is, whether the party rated has a beneficial occupation. [PATTESON, J.-In Rex v. St. Giles, York, some of the patients paid more than they cost.] Yes, profit was made; and, however good the application of it, those who made the profit were rateable. [PATTESON, J.-In the present case the hospital provides the patients house-room and medical care without any charge.] It supplies every thing which is peculiarly necessary for persons in their unhappy condition. With regard to the criminal ward, it may be said to be in the actual possession of the Crown; for although it stands upon ground belonging to the corporation, and is managed by the governors of Bethlehem, it was erected by the government, and is maintained by the government, and all criminal lunatics are at the disposal of the Crown for safe custody. (Stat. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 2.) Money, therefore, is received from the government on account of these patients also; but the receipt of money is not the test, because there are many cases in which the subject-matter is productive of a money return, and yet not rateable; for example, the trus

tees of dock estates, who received large rates, wholly applicable to the construction of docks and basins in a great public harbour (Rex v. The Inhabitants of Liverpool, 7 B. & C. 61); the trustees of a river navigation, where all surplus of rates was applicable only to the repair of the public bridges of a county, and the like (Rex v. The Trustees of Weaver Navigation, 7 B. & C. 70, note c); and the municipal corporation of a borough, receiving dues applicable, under 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 92, to certain specified public purposes, and the surplus to be applied, under the direction of the town-council, for the public benefit of the inhabitants and the improvement of the borough (Reg. v. Exminster, 12 Ad. & E. 2; Reg. v. The Mayor, &c. of Liverpool, 9 Ad. & E. 435), were held not rateable. And in the last case, Lord Denman, C. J., referring to the decision in Rex v. The Trustees of Weaver Navigation, said that the Court held that the repairing and maintaining bridges and highways were public purposes, and that as no part of the moneys received could be applied to private purposes, they were therefore not rateable in the hands of the trustees." Reg. v. The Justices of Worcestershire (11 Ad. & E. 57), where the justices were held not rateable for their occupation of the judges' lodgings, is to the same effect. [LORD DENMAN, C. J. mentioned the case of Reg. v. Shepherd (1 Q. B. 170).] That was the case of Wakefield house of correction, where money was earned by the labour of the prisoners on the treadmill, &c. ; but the justices were held not rateable in respect of the treadmill and work-rooms. In the Taunton Market case (Reg. v. Badcock, 6 Q. B. 787; 1 New Mag. Cas. 207), the true principle is thus laid down: "To make rateability there must be occupation beneficial in its nature, that is, of a subject-matter producing a valuable return, though not necessarily profitable in any given year, on a balance struck of profit and loss. When such an occupation is established, the occupier is rateable in respect of it, unless he is merely a trustee for the public, receiving no individual benefit, except in common with and as one of the public. In such a case the law does not regard him as the occupier, but the public whom he represents;" and this case falls precisely within the terms of that exemption. The rules of the hospital exclude no class of persons. They expressly provide that "all poor lunatics," subject to some necessary regulations, are to be admitted; and the regulations themselves apply to everybody, as does the charity. It is, therefore, according to all the decisions, a public hospital, and, for the purpose of rating, that is the same as if it were a royal hospital; the two terms are said to be synonymous in Reg. v. Shee (4 Q. B. 2, 16), in which case a question arose as to the rateability of the exhibition-rooms of the Royal Academy, in Somerset House; and the decision of the Court that they were not rateable, although producing a large revenue, was founded upon the consideration that the objects of the institution were "merely national and public." In Lord Amherst v. Lord Somers (2 T. R. 372), stables rented by the colonel of a regiment, by order of the Crown, for the use of the regiment, were held not rateable; and the marginal note is, "The possessions of the Crown or of the public are not rateable." The case of Chelsea Hospital (Neave v. Weather, 3 Q. B. 984) is also very much in point. [WIGHTMAN, J.-The freehold of Chelsea Hospital is in the Crown.] The judgment was founded upon the fact that there was no rateable occupier; but even if it turned upon its being a royal hospital, so is Bethlehem, and it is so called, not only in the charter, but in numerous modern statutes. Statute 2 & 3 Wm. 4, c. 107, s. 62 (relating to lunatics) provides that it shall not extend to "the royal hospital of Bethlehem," or to any building adjacent thereto for criminal lunatics; and (sec. 63) that it shall not extend to public hospitals generally. The previous Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 41) on the same subject had con

tained a similar clause; and the last lunatic Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 116) also enacts, that it shall not extend to "the royal hospital of Bethlehem." The stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22 (for consolidating the Queen's Bench, Fleet, and Marshalsea prisons, and for regulating the Queen's Prison) requires the removal of the lunatic prisoners to "the royal hospital of Bethlehem," which is bound to seceive them. Secondly, great reliance is placed upon the local Act (50 Geo. 3, c. 45, s. 1); it certainly amplifies the language of the statute of Elizabeth, but the meaning is the same. The words cannot receive a strict interpretation, for otherwise, under the word "lessee," any person having an outstanding term would be rateable; only the beneficial holders of property can be intended. Rex v. Field (5 T. R. 587, 592), where the Philanthropic Institution was held not rateable, was the case of an assessment under a local Act, containing very similar words; and there Mr. Justice Buller said, “One of the arguments is founded on the construction of this Act of Parliament (31 Geo. 2, c. 45). The counsel have endeavoured to make a distinction between 'inhabitants' and 'occupiers,' and it has been contended, that as the word inhabit' is, in legal import, more comprehensive than occupy,' it was used in this statute to signify persons who were not occupiers. But this argument proves too much, for inhabitants, according to Lord Coke's reading on the Statute of Bridges, includes persons who have estates, though living elsewhere. But I think that the word or in this statute should be read and, the four terms, inhabit, hold, occupy, or enjoy,' being used to express the same thing." The case of Rex v. St. Martin's (3 Q. B. 204) was decided upon the effect of the word tenement in another local Act. But in the present case, sec. 28 of the local Act removes all doubt. It recites, that there are in the parish many charitable institutions "which do not contribute to the exigencies thereof;" and enacts, that "no settlement shall be gained by occupation, residence, hiring and service, or apprenticeship, in any of the public schools, hospitals, asylums, or other charitable institutions now, or which shall hereafter be, situated or established within the said parish." It assumes, therefore, that such charitable institutions thereafter to be established would be exempt from rateability, as well as those then existing in the parish, and affords a decisive answer to the argument founded on the 1st section.

Chambers, in reply.-To give exemption on the ground of royal prerogative, the premises must be in the personal occupation of the Crown, as was held in the case of Hampton Court Palace (Reg. v. Ponsonby, 3 Q. B. 14); and was the fact in the case of the Exhibition Rooms of the Royal Academy, Somerset House (Reg. v. Shee, 4 Q. B. 2); but although this hospital may have acquired the name of "the Royal Hospital," as certain of the theatres are called "Theatres Royal," no part of the property belongs to the Crown. [PATTESON, J.-Does not the criminal ward?] The mere building does; but the ground belongs to the corporation. Under various Acts of Parliament, the Crown has the power of converting Bethlehem Hospital into a prison for criminal lunatics; they are, therefore, sent there by the Crown, and contribute to the funds of the hospital, but the management of them is left entirely with the officers of the institution.

(a) See judgment at the end of the next case.

Cur. adv. vult. (a)

SAME V. SAME.

Re BRIDEWELL HOUSE OF OCCUPATIONS.

UPON appeal by the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of the city of

London, as governors of the possessions, revenues, and goods of the Hospital of Edward the Sixth of Christ, Bridewell, and St. Thomas the Apostle, against a rate for the relief of the poor of the parish of St. George the Martyr, Southwark, made (1st Jan. 1845) upon them as occupiers of the House of Occupations situate in the said parish, and purporting to be made by virtue of a certain Act of Parliament, &c. (50 Geo. 3, c. 45), (a) the Court of Quarter Sessions allowed the appeal, subject to the opinion of this Court upon the following case :

1. Setting out the first section of the said Act, as in the case of Bethlehem Hospital.

2. The House of Occupations, in respect of which the appellants were rated, is an appendage to, or a part of, the hospital of Bridewell, as hereinafter mentioned, of which hospital the appellants are the governors.

3. The hospital of Bridewell is situate in the city of London, and the House of Occupations is situate in St. George's Fields, in the respondent parish, and contiguous to Bethlehem Hospital, and in the borough of Southwark.

4. Bridewell Hospital was instituted for the purpose of harbouring, correcting, reclaiming, and employing destitute persons and vagabonds, as by the charter of Edward the Sixth and deed of settlement hereunto annexed appears, and is still so used.

5. By the said letters patent of Edward the Sixth, dated the 26th of June, 1552, Bridewell Hospital was granted to the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of London, and their successors, and they were thereby empowered to send and commit such destitute persons and vagabonds to the House of Occupations in Bridewell, and to make rules for the good government of such persons therein, who should be forced to practise and exercise themselves in honest and profitable sciences and occupations; and the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of London, and their successors, were empowered and directed to make all manner of decrees, convenient and honest ordinances, statutes, and rules, for the good government of the poor in Bridewell.

6. By the said deed of settlement of June 12, 1552, made between King Edward the Sixth and the mayor, commonalty, and citizens, the said mayor, commonalty, and citizens are to set up and erect a House of Occupations as therein mentioned.

7. By lease, dated 1st of August, 1828 (a copy whereof is inserted in the appendix of this case), a portion of the lands contiguous to Bethlehem Hospital was demised to trustees for the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of London, as governors of Bridewell; and the House of Occupations was erected thereupon.

8. The House of Occupations is used for the reception of destitute persons, youths, and vagabonds of both sexes, from any place whatever, found within the city of London, the county of Middlesex, or a portion of the county of Surrey, for the purposes specified in the charter, and such persons are all maintained entirely at the charge of Bridewell Hospital.

9. These destitute persons are employed by the governors of Bridewell Hospital, as directed by the charter, in learning and exercising honest sciences

(a) See the case of Bethlehem Hospital, antè, p. 247.