many places bordered with trees, offering excellent ambuscades, and affording opportunities for the militia to pursue a guerrilla warfare, at which they were becoming adepts. Should he have moved in one column on a single road the narrowness of the way would have prevented a marching formation of over four files front. An army of fifteen thousand men with its batteries, baggage, and supply-trains, even if kept continually closed up, would stretch out at least six miles. Such a force, however, could not be prevented, owing to stoppages and accidents, from lengthening, so that it would be safe to say he would have been offering to the adversary an exposed flank of over eight miles. A forced march could not be made; the arms and kits of the English soldiers weighed fifty pounds, those of the Hessians much more; this, together with being encumbered with long trains, would have prevented a day's march averaging more than twelve miles. Thus five days would be consumed in reaching Philadelphia were the marching continuous, which was, of course, not to be expected. The calamities that would result from such a movement must be apparent to all-they certainly were to Howe. With Washington hanging on his right flank and rear,—with Sullivan, who had been largely reinforced by militia, harassing his left flank,-with the entire line of march through a hostile country teeming with an armed population, the most severe losses would have been unavoidable. Like a scotched snake that drags its wounded length, the army would have left behind a trail of blood. Marching in two divisions by parallel roads would have but divided the difficulties and invited destruction to at least one of the columns. Howe was not willing to make the attempt until he had beaten Washington; after that, he proposed to turn his attention to Sullivan, and thus clear the way for his advance.

With the approach of the English all was stir and bustle in the American camp. The army paraded on the hillside, prepared to receive the enemy should an attack be attempted, but declining to abandon its strong position for the uncertainties of an engagement on the plain below. So the adversaries confronted and watched each other for five days, the British entrenching themselves somewhat, throwing up earth-works at Millstone and Middlebush. Meanwhile the militia flew to arms,

WASHINGTON AND HOWE FACE EACH OTHER.

419

and distributed in small squads made the stay of the enemy as uncomfortable as possible. Marksmen lurked behind the trees, or lay concealed under the fences. Unhappy the lot of the redcoat who wandered too far from camp-the forager who straggled too far from his party-or the picket who occupied a too extended line. Morgan's men were also ubiquitous; like so many wasps they stung the foe at every turn. Joseph Clarke of the continental army, in speaking of the conduct of the militia on this occasion, recites in his diary:—

They turned out with such a spirit as will do them honor to the latest ages. Never did the Jerseys appear more universally unanimous to oppose the enemy; they turned out young and old, great and small, rich and poor. Scarcely a man that could carry a musket was left at home. This soon struck a panic into the enemy, for they could scarcely stir from their camp but they were cut off.

Howe continued to manœuvre in front of the Americans hoping to bring on a general action, but Washington was too wise to permit his raw troops to cope with this veteran force unless it should be in the strong position he occupied. Some of the junior generals, quite willing to test the mettle of the new army, were eager for the fray; among them Brigadier Anthony Wayne, an officer who was full of nervous energy and who always felt within himself the potentiality of great deeds. He urged that at least some side-stroke should be attempted, and on the sixteenth of June, dating his letter from Mount Pleasant, he thus wrote to his division commander, General Lincoln :

The prisoners just brought in are a corporal and a private belonging to the 1st Reg. of foot-guards. They say there is an encampment of the enemy on this side of Raritan, which is confirmed by a deserter from the 28th, who says there are still five Reg's yet at Brunswick, three on the other side of the river, and two on this, just below the new bridge. One of them, the 26th, is very weak. Can't we beat up their quarters before sunrise? I am confident we can, my people are all ready to move at a moment's notice. The light horseman will await your orders.

The commander-in-chief, however, would not permit any movement to be made; his desires were all accomplished in barring the enemy's southern progress. On the nineteenth of June, Howe, despairing of attaining his purposes, suddenly retired with his army to New Brunswick. Three days later, on Sunday the twenty-second, the British entirely evacuated that place, retreating to Perth Amboy. Greene's division, strengthened by

Wayne's brigade and Morgan's riflemen, had been dispatched down the right bank of the Raritan to harass the foe in the rear. Muhlenberg led the advance, which circumstance offers excellent evidence as to the estimation in which the parson-soldier was held by his chiefs. In a pursuing column it is in the van, and in a retreating force it is at the rear, that the best generals are always placed. This expedition considerably hastened the departure of the British from New Brunswick, its field-pieces and riflemen causing them much annoyance. The pursuit continued as far as Piscataway without doing much damage, as the rear of the retreating column was strongly and ably guarded by Cornwallis. It was expected that Sullivan and Maxwell would have coöperated with this movement; Sullivan's orders came too late, and Maxwell did not receive his at all. Had these two divisions come to Greene's assistance the enemy's main body would probably have received severe punishment, and much wanton destruction of property prevented, for the British line of retreat was marked by blazing homesteads.

When Howe fell back to Amboy, Washington, in order to be within supporting distance of Greene, moved with the main army to Quibbletown,-now New Market. Historians are not agreed upon the question whether in retiring to Amboy the former really intended to evacuate the state, or whether it was a feint made to tempt Washington from his strong position. Howe's report of these operations states that his troops were ready to cross to Staten Island, when discovery was made that the American army had advanced from Middlebrook;-that he then determined to renew the attempt to bring on an action. This can hardly be considered the best of evidence, for it was not uncommon for the British general to so fashion his reports as to convey impressions calculated to serve what he might happen at the time to consider his best interests. Be this as it may, on Thursday the twentysixth Howe hurriedly marched in the direction of Westfield, hoping to push around to the rear of the Americans, and thus prevent their again reaching the heights. But Washington was too alert to be the victim of such strategy. The movement was in two divisions, one, under Cornwallis, by way of Woodbridge toward Scotch Plains, the other, under Howe, to Metuchen; there the latter general expected to join the extreme left of the first

FIGHTING NEAR PLAINFIELD.

421

column and then swing around the rear of the main American army, it being intended that the right of the combined British forces should stretch to and guard the mountain passes. It was thus that Washington was to be trapped.

Nothing of the kind was effected. Morgan was soon hovering on Cornwallis's flank, and at Woodbridge a spirited engagement cost him a considerable number of men. When near Plainfield a force under Lord Stirling still further disputed the British advance, but after a sharp fight was obliged to retire to the mountains, though not until Cornwallis's plans had been effectually defeated. Stirling having prevented that general from reaching the heights it was useless for Howe to threaten Washington's front. The main American army was thus enabled to return in safety to Middlebrook. Cornwallis and his men, exhausted by rapid marching and the extreme heat, moved on in the direction of Westfield where they rested till the next afternoon. The column was then put in motion for Rahway where it again encamped. During the march Morgan's troops and a body of light-horse assailed the enemy mercilessly on their flanks and rear, as they did the following day when the column was again pushing toward Amboy. It was not till then that the two British divisions came together. Colonel Morgan's tireless services merited and received much commendation from the army, and special mention of his bravery was made by Washington in dispatches to congress. His riflemen had been on continuous duty day and night since the nineteenth, when the enemy retired from Millstone, and his men, animated with the dash and spirit of their leader, had vied with each other in valorous deeds. In the vari ous skirmishes occurring after Howe resumed the offensive the Americans lost in killed, wounded and missing about two hundred men, while the casualities of the British did not exceed onethird of that number. But the advantage lay by all odds on the side of the continental army, as it had completely frustrated the designs of the enemy.

On Monday, the thirtieth of June, Howe and his army crossed to Staten Island on the pontoon bridge constructed at New Brunswick for use on the Delaware, bidding for that year a final adieu to the Jerseys. Napoleon defines the art of war as the talent of being stronger than the enemy at a given moment. The result

of the game played between Washington and Howe showed that, however true this may be when opposing masses meet face to face for a supreme effort, there are surely exceptions to the rule when the elements of tactics and strategy enter into the contest. At such times the number of men is not invariably the standard of effective strength; a most important factor must be considered -the genius of the respective leaders. Herein lies the secret of the checkmate received by the British. There is no doubt that General Howe ascribed great importance to the measures he had taken to tempt the American army from its stronghold, and thus bring on a general engagement. He had concentrated a force much greater in numbers and hoped to win the day by the superiority of his battalions. The withdrawal of his army to Staten Island was an acknowledgment of the frustration of his entire plan-he had been foiled in all his manœuvres and outgeneraled in every movement.

Thus ended the first invasion of New Jersey. Seven months occupation of the state by a thoroughly-equipped foreign army had resulted in nothing. The undisciplined forces of the Americans—through the genius of their leader and the spirit animating officers and men-had defeated every effort made by the enemy to penetrate beyond the Delaware, and most of the time had restricted them to the vicinity of the Raritan. Soon after crossing to Staten Island the British embarked on two hundred and seventy transports that were lying in the Lower bay. What Howe would next do was now the question in the American camp. Washington was at a loss whether to continue in Somerset, so as to move quickly toward Pennsylvania should the British sail for the Delaware capes, or whether to march to the Highlands of the Hudson, fearing that the enemy might ascend the North river in order to combine with Burgoyne. There was at least no reason for longer perching on Middlebrook heights. Early on the morning of the second of July was heard the shout and din of breaking camp. Huts were dismantled, baggage-wagons were loaded and guns limbered. Soon the woods about Chimney Rock were echoing for the last time that year to drum-beats for assembly, and the men, with knapsacks packed and strapped, were hurrying to their different companies. Horses, ready saddled, pawed the ground in front of officers' quarters, and