Prince Ito, Marquis Inouye, Count Okuma, Count Itagaki-often spoken of as the 'Rousseau of Japan' and several others. The first five, however, were pre-eminent at the moment when Korea sent her offensive message. . . . In Saigo's eyes an oversea war offered the only chance of saving the samurai [as the empire's only soldiers], since the conscription law had not yet produced any trustworthy soldiers. He therefore voted to draw the sword at once, and in this he obtained the support of several influential men who burned to avenge the nation's disgrace. On the other hand, those in favour of peace insisted that the country must not venture to engage in a foreign war during the era of radical transition. The discussion was carried to the Emperor's presence; the peace-party prevailed, and Saigo with three other Cabinet ministers resigned. . . . Before these curious conditions bore any practical fruit, Japan found it necessary to send a military expedition to Formosa. That island was claimed as part of China's domains, but it was not administered by her effectively, and its inhabitants showed great barbarity in their treatment of castaways from the Ryukyu, or Loochoo, Islands. The Chinese Government's plain function was to punish these acts of cruelty, but as the Peking statesmen showed no disposition to discharge their duty in that respect, Japan took the law into her own hands. A double purpose was thus served. For the expedition to Formosa furnished employment for the Satsuma samurai, and, at the same time, assured the Ryukyu islanders that Japan was prepared to protect them. After a long interchange of despatches the Tokyo Government sent an ambassador to Peking, and a peaceful solution was found in the payment of a small indemnity, and the recognition of Formosa as a part of the Middle Kingdom. [See also FORMOSA: 1874-1910.]-The Formosan expedition took place in 1874, and, in the fall of 1875, a Korean fort opened fire on a Japanese warship which was engaged in surveying the coast. Such an insult could not be tamely endured. Japan marshalled an imposing number of warships and transports, but, following the example set in her own case by Commodore Perry, she employed this flotilla to intimidate Korea into signing a treaty of amity and commerce and opening certain ports to foreign trade. Thus, Korea was drawn from her hereditary isolation, and to Japan fell the credit of having become an instrument for extending the principle of universal intercourse which she had herself so stoutly opposed during two and a half centuries. It was a clever coup, but it earned little credit with the samurai. They regarded such a settlement as derogatory to their country. It was at this stage that the Tokyo Government felt itself strong enough to resort to conclusive measures in the cases of the samurai. Three years had now passed since the wearing of swords had been declared optional and since a scheme for the voluntary commutation of the samurai's pensions had been elaborated. The leaders of progress felt that the time had now come to make these measures compulsory, and, accordingly, two edicts were issued in that sense. The edicts, especially their financial provisions, imposed a heavy sacrifice. But it is very noticeable that the momentary question evoked no protests. It was to the loss of their swords that a number of samurai objected strenuously. . . . It has already been shown that the sovereign's socalled coronation oath did not contemplate a national assembly in the Western sense of the term. The first assembly convened in obedience to the oath consisted of nobles and samurai only, and was found to be a virtually useless body.

Not till 1873, when Itagaki Taisuke, seceding from the Cabinet on account of the Korean complication, became a warm advocate of appealing national questions to an elective assembly, did the people at large come to understand what was involved in such an institution. Thenceforth Itagaki became the centre of a more or less enthusiastic group of men advocating a parliamentary system, some from sincere motives, and others from a conviction that their failure to obtain posts was in a manner due to the oligarchical form of their country's polity. When the Satsuma rebellion broke out,... this band of Tosa agitators memorialized the Government, charging it with administering affairs in despite of public opinion; with ignoring popular rights, and with levelling down instead of up, since the samurai had been reduced to the class of commoners, whereas the latter should have been educated to the standard of the former. But the statesmen in power insisted that the nation was not yet ready to enjoy constitutional privileges. They did not, indeed, labour under any delusion as to the ultimate direction in which their reforms tended, but they were determined to move gradually, not precipitately. They had already (1874) arranged for the convention of an annual assembly of prefects who should act as channels of communication between the central authorities and the people in the provinces. This was designed to be the embryo of representative institutions, though obviously it bore that character in a very limited degree only. In the following year (1875), the second step was taken by organizing a Senate (Genro-in), which consisted of official nominees and was charged with the duty of discussing and revising laws and ordinances prior to their promulgation. But it had no power of initiative, and its credit in the eyes of the nation was more or less injured by the fact that its members consisted for the most part of men for whom no posts could be found in the administration and who, without some steadying influence, might have been drawn into the current of discontent. At this stage, an event occurred which probably moved the Government to greater expedition. In the spring of 1878, the great statesman, Okubo Toshimitsu, who had acted . . . a prominent part on the stage of the reformation drama, was assassinated. His slayers were avowedly sympathizers of Saigo, but in their statement of motives they assigned as their principal incentive the Government's failure to establish representative institutions. They belonged to a province far removed from Satsuma, and their explanation of the murder showed that they had little knowledge of Saigo's real sentiments. But the nation saw in them champions of a constitutional form of government, and the authorities appreciated the necessity of greater expedition. Thus, two months after Okubo's death, the establishment of elective assemblies in the prefectures and cities was proclaimed. . . . [The] . . . principal function [of these assemblies] were to determine the amount and object of local taxes; to audit the accounts for the previous year; and to petition the Central Government, should that seem expedient. These assemblies represented the foundations of genuinely representative institutions, for although they lacked legislative power, they discharged parliamentary functions in other respects. In fact, they served as excellent training schools for the future Diet. But this did not at all satisfy Itagaki and his followers. They had now persuaded themselves that without a national assembly it would be impossible to oust the clique of clansmen who monopolized the prizes of power. Accordingly, Itagaki organized an association called

on

Jiyu-to (Liberals), the first political party in Japan. Between the men in office and these visionary agitators a time of friction, more or less severe, ensued. The Government withheld from the people the privileges of free speech and public meeting, so that the press and the platform found themselves in frequent collision with the police. Thus, little by little, the Liberals came to be regarded as victims of official tyranny, so that they constantly obtained fresh adherents."-F. Brinkley, History of the Japanese people, pp. 682-685, 689-690.-Some scores of the Samurai attacked the castle of Kumamoto, "killed or wounded three hundred of the garrison, and then died by their own hands. Here and there throughout the Empire a few equally vain protests were raised, and finally the Satsuma Samurai took the field. This insurrection in the south severely taxed the resources of the Central Government. The Satsuma samurai were led by Saigo Takomori, but it has always been claimed for him that he undertook the command, not for the purpose of overthrowing the Meiji Government, but in the hope of restraining his followers. Ultimately, however, he seems to have been swept away by the tide of their enthusiasm. The insurgents numbered some forty thousand; they all belonged to the samurai class, were fully trained in Occidental tactics, and were equipped with rifles and field-guns. Their avowed purpose was to restore the military class to its old position, and to insure to it all the posts in the army and the navy. Fighting began on January 29, 1877, and ended on September 24th of the same year. All the rebel leaders fell in battle or died by their own hands. During these eight months of warfare, the Government put sixty-six thousand men into the field, and the casualties both sides totalled thirty-five thousand, or thirtythree per cent. of the whole."-F. Brinkley, History of the Japanese people, pp. 685-686."Ever since his retirement from office, and his withdrawal to his native province in 1873, the elder Saigo had remained in Kagoshima, the chief town of Satsuma. Here he had established an institution which, in order to disguise its object, was called a 'private school.' In reality it was a military college. In its central quarters in that town, and in branches elsewhere, the youth of the clan received a military training. By this time much uneasiness prevailed. Public apprehension found free expression in the Press, which said that the nation was divided into two parties, one being for the Government, the other for Satsuma, and asked what could be done to preserve peace. . . . Early in 1877 the rebellion broke out. Some excitement had been caused in Satsuma by the rumour of a plot to murder Saigo, and the Government thought it prudent to endeavour to remove a part at least of the stores in the Kagoshima arsenal. The execution of this plan was prevented by cadets of the 'private school,' and an officer sent from Tokio in the middle of January to arrange matters met with a hostile reception, and was obliged to return without landing. War was now certain."-J. H. Gubbins, Making of modern Japan, p. 130.-"In August 1883 Ito Hirobumi returned from Europe and set himself to the task of drawing up a Constitution and of remodelling the Cabinet system. Ito had remained abroad about eighteen months for the investigation of political institutions in the West. His longest sojourn was in Germany. It is said that while he was there he became a great admirer of Prince Bismarck, and attentively studied the administrative methods of that eminent statesman and the Prussian bureaucracy. His first step towards the

JAPAN, 1868-1894

establishment of a constitutional régime was the rehabilitation of the nobility. . . . In July 1884, the new orders of nobility-prince, marquis, count, viscount, and baron-were instituted by Ito's advice after Western fashion and conferred upon the old Court nobles and ex-feudal chiefs according to their old ranks; while those who had rendered signal service in the Restoration were raised to the rank of the nobility. The number of peers then created, old and new together, was 505. This rehabilitation of the nobility was a great success, and Ito's popularity was overwhelmingly increased among the nobles and the official class. His next step was the remodelling of the Cabinet system, so that it might suit the working of the Constitution which he then contemplated. Hitherto, the administrative business of the government had been considerably confused, there being no clear division between the various departments, so that the work

of one department often overlapped that of another. Yet one departmental Minister was almost independent of the other, and no Minister was responsible for the entire administration of State. The Premier, or Daijo Daijin, issued all important laws and notifications, but he did not direct the policy of the State. Under the new Cabinet system the Minister President (Naikaku sori Daijin) was, like the Chancellor of Germany, responsible for the entire administration of the State, while all departmental Ministers were subjected to his direct guidance and at the same time accountable for all the affairs of their own departments. Ito himself became the first Minister President under the new Cabinet system. Another great reform then brought forward by Ito was the introduction of the Civil Service examination system for official appointments. Hitherto official appointments

had been largely a matter of personal favour; it had been hardly possible for any one to attain a high official position without much wire-pulling. This was one source of discontent among the political agitators, and from it they drew much political capital in attacking the government. The reform, though it had no direct reference to the new constitutional system of government, then under contemplation, had a deterrent effect upon official favouritism, and led to great improvements in the machinery of administration. . . . On December 25, 1887, the Peace Preservation Law (Hoan Jorei) was promulgated, the most repressive measure ever enacted since the Restoration. Under this Act all secret meetings and associations were strictly prohibited, and any person who violated this was punished by one month to two years' imprisonment, with in addition a fine of from 10 to 100 yen. . . . But it must be kept in mind that the government adopted this exceptionally harsh measure chiefly because it desired to suppress public criticism on the treaty question. Indeed, in Japan criticism of foreign policy is always severely treated by the government; while the people themselves are extremely sensitive on the subject of national prestige. It seems that the government was fully conscious of the unusual severity of the measure and aware of the aggravation of popular irritation. Therefore, as a means of reconciliation, the government invited Count Okuma, who had invariably sided with the people, to take the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and reopen the negotiations for Treaty Revision. Okuma accepted the invitation and returned to office in February 1888. Meanwhile the government steadily prepared for the opening of the constitutional régime. On 28th April [1888] the Privy Council (Sumitsuin) was established as an advisory board to the sovereign. On the 30th, Ito resigned his post of Minister President in favour of Kuroda, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and became the President of the newly-created Privy Council, so that he might preside over the deliberations of the draft Constitution, which had been compiled under his direction, and was just then about to be submitted to the Privy Council for approval and final completion. The Constitution was approved by the Privy Council after consideration and sanctioned by the Emperor."-G. E. Uyehara, Political development of Japan, pp. 100-101, 104-105.-"It may indeed be asserted that during the decade immediately prior to the opening of the national assembly, an anti-Government propaganda incessantly preached from the platform and in the press.' The Tokyo statesmen, however, were not at all discouraged. They proceeded with their reforms unflinchingly. . . . The civil and penal laws were codified. The finances were placed on a sound footing. A national bank with a network of subordinate institutions was established. The foundations of a strong mercantile marine were laid. A system of postal saving-banks was instituted. [See POSTAL SAVINGS BANKS: 1875.] Extensive schemes of harbour improvement, roads, and riparian works were planned and put into operation. The portals of the civil service were made accessible solely by competitive examination. [See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: Japan.] A legion of students was sent westward to complete their education, and the country's foreign affairs were managed with comparative skill."-F. Brinkley, History of the Japanese people, p. 691.-"On February 11, 1889, the constitution was promulgated. With its accompaniment of important laws of election, finance, organization of the Houses, and local government, this document was the greatest constructive produc

was

tion of Ito's life. By the gift of the constitution the Emperor, in some degree voluntarily, began the breaking of the road to national self-government, and placed within popular reach privileges and responsibilities great indeed to a people hitherto unaccustomed to representative government. Not that the people received the controlling power. Rather the foundations were laid upon which an edifice of representative government might later be raised. It then remained for legal and extralegal forces to rear the superstructure and to establish the institutions of self-rule. Something of this has subsequently been accomplished and much still remains to be accomplished. Amendments to the constitution not only require Imperial sanction; they must be proposed to the Diet by Imperial order. Debate upon them cannot be begun unless two-thirds of the members of the House are present, and passage requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of those present. No amendment may be proposed during a regency. . . . As a written document the Japanese constitution is a model of brevity and clear expression. It is also remarkable for the skill with which, while appearing to establish many new and democratic forms, it preserved old and autocratic facts. If we are justified in assuming that Japan will press forward to attain Western responsible government, Ito's constitution must be regarded as a master instrument for the transitional period. It expresses the political concepts of the Genro; it preserves authority that can be relied upon until such time as another authority can be developed and trained to take its place. [For text of the constitution, see JAPAN, CONSTITUTION OF.] We find in the Japanese character and traditions the explanation of the matter-of-fact way in which the people have accepted the work of the leaders in their constitutional development. The skill with which the Ruling House and the Dynasty have retained the loyalty of the people and led the classes and factions as one united nation through the vicissitudes of fundamental change without revolution all but baffles Western comprehension. We can to some extent, however, understand the results of these forces and we cannot fail to admire the spirit of coöperation, of working together for the great national interests, which the Japanese have exhibited."-S. K. Hornbeck, Contemporary politics in the Far East, pp. 130, 144-145.

ALSO IN: W. W. McLaren, Political history of Japan during Meiji era.

1871-1873.-Organization of national education.-Establishment of Department of Education.-Educational code. See EDUCATION: Modern developments: 20th century: General education: Japan: Primary.

1871-1883.-Introduction of system of conscription.-Reorganization of army. See MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 35.

1876.-Treaty with Korea. See KOREA: 1866

1894.

1876.-Founding of Imperial Engineering College.-Art department. See EDUCATION, ART: Modern: Japan.

1880.-Criminal Code, and Code of Criminal Procedure. See CODES: 1880.

1894.-Chilean arrangement for sale of the Esmeralda through Ecuador. See ECUADOR: 1888-1899.

1894-1895.-War with China. See CHINA: 1894

1895.

1894-1895.-Effect of Chino-Japanese War on international status of Japan.-The war with China, which was declared in August, 1894, resulted in victory for Japan. "On 18th April, 1895,

the Chinese agreed to accept the terms imposed by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. . . . Never was the victory of one Power over another more strikingly complete, and never was a complete victory more clearly reflected in the terms of Peace. At one bound Japan had advanced to the foremost place in the Far East. The explanation of that victory must be sought in the astounding revolution which in the preceding quarter of a century had been accomplished in that country. . . . But a Europeanised Japan was now confronted by the jealousy and hostility of the European Powers. The rapidity and completeness of Japan's victory over China seemed to threaten the political equilibrium in the Far East. Russia was, of course, the Power primarily concerned by Japan's conquest of Southern Manchuria, upon which Russia had herself always looked with envious eyes. Germany and France were in this matter temporarily in accord with Russia and with each other, and the three European Powers insisted that Japan must not be permitted permanently to occupy the territories on the mainland of China, ceded to her by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The possession of Port Arthur, so it was contended, would dominate Pekin, and so would prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Japan, therefore, yielding ostensibly to 'the dictates of magnanimity' but in reality to stern necessity, accepted the advice of the three Powers and surrendered Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. She received as a solatium an increased indemnity, but no money could compensate for the loss of her territorial acquisition, and she withdrew, only to cherish in her heart a bitter animosity against the Power which had been primarily instrumental in robbing her of the fruits of victory, and to prepare for the struggle à outrance which was bound sooner or later, to come."-J. A. Marriott, Europe and beyond, pp. 174-176.-See also CHINA: 1894-1895; SHIMONOSEKI, TREATY OF.The Chino-Japanese war opened the eyes of the foreigner to the fact that, at all events as far as strategy was concerned, the Japanese had really profited by their studies. The complete and overwhelming success of the Japanese, however, came as such a shock to the average foreigner that he has been wont to date the progress of Japan from that time only, and to ignore the steady and conscientious educational 'grind' which the people of that country had been undergoing at the hands of their European and American instructors quietly and unostentatiously for the five-and-twenty years which preceded that event. We are told that before the war the Japanese were diffident, gentle and courteous to the foreigner, that they recognised his superiority, and so on. Now it is said that at the present day they have lost all these qualities, and that they are bumptious and selfassertive. The fact of the matter is that, until the war took place, the Japanese had not had an opportunity of demonstrating either to themselves or to the world in general the headway they had made... As victorious countries go, Japan behaved, even immediately after the war, with wonderful clear-headedness and tact. Excesses she may have committed-excesses of exuberance, excesses of speech, and excesses of expenditure-but she did not lose her head, and, on the whole, her behavior after her victory was exemplary."-S. Ransome, Japan in transition, pp. 179-181.

1894-1912.-Political development during first era of foreign expansion.-Struggle for ministry responsible to the people.-Death of Emperor Mutsuhito (Meiji Tenno), 1912.-"The Sino-Japanese War... [made Japan] once more

JAPAN, 1894-1912

a military nation. When civil affairs were of paramount importance, none could rival Ito in influence. But with war came the opportunity of Yamagata, the arch-militarist, the genius of the army, who then became the active head of the bureaucracy. Hitherto he had been simply a soldier. Now, taking advantage of the patriotic spirit aroused by the war, he rose to the position of greatest power in the nation. Yamagata himself did not remain long in a position of supremacy. But he ruled for years from the background (from his position as an Elder Statesman) placing his puppets in office.... [At the opening of the war, Ito was premier. But even with the aid of an Imperial edict ordering party peace, he was unable to overcome opposition and] decided to compromise. He gave Itagaki, leader of the Tiyu-to, an important place in his cabinet and thus won the support of that party. At this

point, too, the Sino-Japanese war made necessary a truce in the internal political conflict. After the war, Matsukata became premier again in September, 1896. Following the example of Ito, he compromised with a party. He flirted with the Kaishin-to and gave Okuma a cabinet position. The opposition of the Tiyu-to, which had a plurality though not a majority in the House, was not enough to embarrass him more than slightly. Ito succeeded Matsukata in January, 1898, with the support of the Tiyu-to. After five months, however, the party deserted him and for this and other reasons he resigned. Then in July, 1898, the bureaucrats tried an experiment. They permitted the party leaders to form a cabinet. Okuma they made premier and Itagaki minister of home affairs, and the government was known as the Wai-Han, a combination of the initials of these two men. In the House of Representatives the Jiyu-to [liberals] and the Kaishin-to (now known as the Shimpo-to [pro

He

'gressives]) consolidated under the name Kensei-to [constitutionalists]. They did their best to get on without the bureaucrats and to open the way for party government, but they could not succeed. After five months, two groups in the Kensei-to found that they could not get along together, and the scheme was wrecked. Yamagata now resumed the premiership in November, 1898. could not resume his former complete antagonism to the parties. He chose as his allies the Jiyu-to group of the Kensei-to and made with them a bargain which did much to align the political parties in Japan on the side of the growing class of capitalists. He refused to permit the party men to participate in the work of the government and he maintained the rig.d civil service rules which kept the administration in the hands of the machine bureaucrats; but he permitted the parties to participate in the graft associated

MARQUIS SAIONJI

soon as the bureaucrats saw this coming they would dissolve the House and order a new election. . . . The bureaucrats did not scruple to use bribery and coercion in further support of their cause. At this period the officials were the wealthiest class, and they easily succeeded in bribing members of the lower house and candidates for office. Then, too, by taking advantage of their control of the police, they could force the people in the local election districts to vote for the right man or suffer for insubordination. In spite of all this, the Japanese people clung to their idealism, and the political parties increased in influence. Prince Ito himself, seeing how difficult it had become to succeed in politics without the support of the parties, changed his views and became himself the founder of a party, the Seiyukai, in 1900. This introduced a period of compromise between the bureaucrats and the parties. At this stage (the opening of the twentieth century) Prince Katsura, the protégé of Yamagata, was the chief leader of the bureaucrats. Although he was a general, Katsura was not intolerant of the parties, and he entered into an agreement with the Seiyukai whereby he alternated in the premiership with the Seiyukai leader, Marquis Saionji [1906-1913]. The compromise was successful. At this period the party men sought to invade the field of the bureaucracy by amending the civil service laws, but this the bureaucrats refused to permit. The ambition of the party men was satisfied by an alliance with the capitalists, just then rising to power. The bureaucrats permitted the alliance and even cooperated with the party men to the extent of granting government subsidies to the corporations of which the party men became directors. In 1901 the first Japanese Social Democratic Party was founded by S. Katayama, I. Abe and K. K. Kawakami, who . . . is. well known

as a writer on Japanese affairs. The party was immediately dissolved by the bureaucratic government, which thereafter saw to it that no radicals or laborites were permitted to start political action. The socialists then proceeded to spread their propaganda by means of secret societies. They saw that there was no hope for them in politics, and they were therefore driven to thoughts of direct action. During the RussoJapanese War (1904-5) these societies carried on an active pacifist agitation. They managed to publish a daily, which was constantly being suppressed. They got in touch with the Russian revolutionists, with whom they exchanged resolutions hoping that both sides would lose the war. They gained a number of converts in Japan, no doubt, but the opposition of the government and the loyalty of the population was too strong for them. Shortly after the close of the war a group of anarchists and nihilists, led by Denjiro Kotoku, attempted to assassinate the Emperor. This outrageous act, which shocked the entire nation, caused the government to inaugurate a complete suppression of everything resembling socialism. All radical books were strictly suppressed and no one dared, thereafter, to call himself a socialist.. [In 1912] came the death of the Emperor Meiji [Mutsuhito] . . . and the succession of the Emperor Taisho [Yoshihito]. The bureaucrats at that time were forced temporarily into the background, and the parties took over the reins of government. This fact gave rise to the term Taisho Revolution, applied to the events of that period by some students, who consider that the death knell of the bureaucrats was then sounded."-U. Iwasaki, Working

with local improvements and with subsidies, and he tolerated connections between party leaders and favored industries. . . . Over a long period of years the bureaucrats found themselves struggling against a growing tendency toward democracy. It will be interesting to follow the evolution of their method of combat, for conditions have changed since the early Meiji period, and methods have changed also. . . . They did not lack skill,

in fighting their enemies of the lower house. They pressed to the utmost their autocratic interpretation of the constitution, declaring that since the Emperor has the sole right to appoint the ministers, the lower house has no right to criticise his choice. Bureaucratic premiers repeating this theory, ignored votes of lack of confidence. The only recourse remaining to the House of Representatives was a direct petition to the Emperor to remove the offending official.

As