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Japan.... Over the supporting class of peasantry was the ruling class of 'samurai,' numbering, with their families, probably less than two million souls. Like the peasants of the villages, the sworded men under the one suzerain (shogun) and the nearly three hundred baròйs (daimyo) of this period were, in ways different from the peasants but upon principle similar to those of their governance, granted a large measure of autonomy, and yet were controlled by a carefully built system of responsibility and paternalism. The barons of the fiefs ('han') were practically absolute princes in their respective territories, but any flagrant case of misgovernment on their part, or of internal dissension or family scandal, or an act of disobedience to the 'shogun,' was swiftly and sternly punished by the latter's council. Likewise, the retainers of each baron, who were well organized for the enforcement of discipline and responsibility, enjoyed large freedom in the management of their own followers; yet they were accountable to their lord, not only for failures in their duties or disgrace to their honor, but also for any serious error in the conduct of their own household. . . . The han, like the fief in the feudal history of Europe, was essentially territorial . . . In the relation between the lord and the bulk of the people of the han, . . . or in the relation between the people themselves, there was and could be no semblance of any actual or traditional tie of blood. To call a han a clan is to confuse two radically different forms of social evolution and social organization." -K. Asakawa, Some of the contributions of feudal Japan to the new Japan (Journal of Race Development, July, 1912).

her shores. As to the former danger, the United States had dispatched some few gunboats to cruise in the whaling districts for the protection of her citizens. Commodore Porter was one of the officers who were sent out for this purpose, and he could recommend no better means of security to American whalers than bringing Japan into amicable relations with his country. To this effect, he addressed a letter to Secretary Monroe in 1815. This was the year that a squadron was sent to the Mediterranean under Decatur and a treaty was signed with Algiers. Why should not another squadron be sent westward to Japan? The proposal seemed about to be put into effect and the commodore was to be sent as the envoy with a frigate and two sloops of war. In the meantime the whaling industry made steady progress. In 1822 as many as 24 whaling vessels anchored at one time in the harbor of Honolulu. About this time, not only on the seas but also on land, the United States was expanding with great strides, and it is no wonder that J. Q. Adams should urge that it was the duty of Christian nations to open Japan, and that it was the duty of Japan to respond to the demands of the world, as no nation had a right to withhold its quota from the general progress of mankind. Still no official step was taken; indeed nothing definite was planned until under his successor, Andrew Jackson, it was suggested in 1832 that Mr. Edmund Roberts should be appointed as a special agent to negotiate treaties with oriental courts. But again nothing came of the plan. . . . It was chiefly in the interest of whaling that the Hon. Zadoc Pratt, of Prattsville, Orange County, N. Y., Member of Congress and chairman of the Select Committee on Statistics, laid before the House a report in 1855 concerning the advisability of taking prompt action by sending an embassy to Japan and Korea. The next year Commodore Biddle was appointed to lead an expedition with a fleet consisting of the Columbus and the Vincennes. He was provided with a letter from President Polk to the Emperor of Japan. The object of this expedition was to ascertain whether the ports of Japan were accessible. The commodore arrived safe and well in the Bay of Yeddo, and opened communications, which continued for 10 tedious days, at the end of which, on receipt of the following anonymous note, he left: The object of this communication is to explain the reasons why we refuse to trade with foreigners who come to this country across the ocean for that purpose. This has been the habit of our nation from time immemorial. In all cases of a similar kind that have occurred, we have positively refused to trade. Foreigners have come to us from various quarters, but have always been received in the same way. In taking this course with regard to you, we only pursue our accustomed policy. We can make no distinction between different foreign nations-we treat them all alike-and you, as Americans, must receive the same answer with the rest. It will be of no use to renew the attempt, as all applications of the kind, however numerous they may be, will be steadily rejected. We are aware that our customs are in this respect different from those of some other countries, but every nation has a right to manage its affairs in its own way. The trade carried on with the Dutch at Nagasaki is not to be regarded as furnishing a precedent for trade with other foreign nations. The place is one of few inhabitants and very little business, and the whole affair is of no importance. In conclusion, we have to say that the Emperor positively refuses the permission you desire. He earnestly advises you to depart immediately, and

The

1797-1854.-First American contact.-Influence of whaling industry in creating demand for opening of the country.-Commodore Perry. -Effect of Perry's arrival on internal politics. "In 1797 an American ship, the Eliza, of New York, Capt. Stewart, made a voyage to Nagasaki. This was perhaps the first time that the American flag was seen in . . . [Japanese] waters. Eliza repeated her voyages for several succeeding years, but on no occasion, except the last, did she come on her own initiative. She was hired by the Dutch in Batavia, who, afraid of the English Navy in the Indian Seas in the days when Holland was under French rule, dared not make their regular visit to Japan. When Capt. Stewart made his last voyage in 1803 he attempted to open trade on his own responsibility, but was not successful. In 1799 an American ship, the Franklyn, Capt. James Devereux, made its way to Japan, sailing under Dutch colors. The next year there came, also under the charter of the East India Company, a Salem ship, Capt. John Derby. . . [American] fishing had been practically wiped out during the Revolution; but in the first quarter of the nineteenth century whaling became a profitable means of investment. It was not a new industry, having been carried on prior to the Revolution; but its importance grew after the War of 1812. In eager pursuit of prey the American whalers soon rounded Cape Horn, and their 'black ships' could be counted by scores-in a few years by hundreds -between the Hawaiian Islands and Japan. As yet, however, they were exposed to dangers of manifold kinds, notably to the depredations of their English rivals and to the mercy of storms and waves. The danger accruing from the latter source could not well be avoided unless they had friendly havens, but such there was none, as Japan, far from affording shelter, carried the logic of exclusion to its extreme conclusion, by treating as criminals whosoever drifted by misfortune to

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to consult your own safety by not appearing again upon our coast.' Commodore Biddle's mission was worse than a mere failure. It had the effect of lowering the dignity of his country in the mind of the oriental. . . . Intelligent interest was now aroused afresh in the question of opening Japan. In the year 1848, Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury, called public attention to Japan, highly advanced in civilization, containing fifty millions of people, separated but two weeks by steam from our western coast. Its commerce,' he continues, 'can be secured to us by persevering and peaceful efforts.' During the next year, Aaron Haight Palmer, of New York, who had accumulated what was at that time a vast amount of information as to oriental nations, in his capacity as director of the American and Foreign Agency of New York (1830-1847), saw the great necessity of establishing commercial relations with the East, and sent memorials upon the subject to the President and the Secretary of State. He was backed by memorials from the principal merchants of New York and Baltimore. In his letter to Secretary Clayton, on the plan of opening Japan, he recommends four measures to be followed: (1) To demand full and ample indemnity for the shipwrecked American seamen who were unjustly treated; (2) to insist upon the proper care of any American who might from any misfortune repair to the coast of Japan; (3) to enforce the opening of ports for commerce and for the establishment of consulates; (4) to claim the privilege of establishing coaling stations, and also the right of whaling without molestation. Mr. Palmer says that, in the event of noncompliance with the above on the part of the Shogun, a strict blockade of Yeddo Bay should be established."I. Nitobe, Japanese nation, pp. 131-139.-"About this time, a newspaper article concerning some Japanese waifs who had been picked up at sea by the barque Auckland-Captain Jennings-and brought to San Francisco, attracted the attention of Commodore Aulick. He submitted a proposal to the government that it should take advantage of this incident to open commercial relations with the Empire, or at least to manifest the friendly feelings of the country. This proposal was made on the 9th of May, 1851. Daniel Webster was then Secretary of State, and in him Aulick found a ready friend. . . . Clothed with full power to negotiate and sign treaties, and furnished with a letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor, Commodore Aulick was on the eve of departure when for some reason he was prevented. the project which began at his suggestion was obstructed when it was about to be accomplished, and another man, perhaps better fitted for the undertaking, entered into his labors. . . . Commodore [Matthew Calbraith] Perry shared the belief in the expediency of sending a special mission for the purpose. When Commodore Aulick was recalled, Perry proposed to the U. S. Government an immediate expedition. The proposal was accepted, and an expedition on the most liberal scale was resolved upon. He was invested with extraordinary powers, naval and diplomatic. The East India and China Seas and Japan were the official designation of the field of service, but the real object in view was the establishment of a coal depot in Japan. The public announcement of the resolution was followed by applications from all quarters of Christendom for permission to accompany the expedition; all these were, however, refused on prudential grounds. . . . Impatient of the delay caused by the tardy preparations of his vessels, Perry sailed from Norfolk on the 24th of November, 1852, with

Thus

JAPAN, 1797-1854

one ship, the Mississippi, leaving the rest to follow as soon as ready. . . . The Mississippi . . touching at several ports on her way, reached Loo Choo in May, where the squadron united. . . . In the afternoon of the 8th of July, 1853, the squadron entered the Bay of Yedo in martial order, and about 5 o'clock in the evening was anchored off the town of Uraga. No sooner had 'the black ships of the evil mien' made their entry into the Bay, than the signal guns were fired, followed by the discharge of rockets; then were seen on the shore companies of soldiers moving from garrison to garrison. The popular commotion in Yedo at the news of 'a foreign invasion' was beyond description. The whole city was in an uproar. In all directions were seen mothers flying with children in their arms, and men with mothers on their backs. Rumors of an immediate action, exaggerated each time they were communicated from mouth to mouth, added horror to the horrorstricken."-I. Nitobe, Intercourse between United States and Japan, ch. 2.

"The appearance of American warships in the bay of Yedo was a mighty shock. Hitherto the alarms of foreign attack had meant but little to the country at large, for it was a long cry to Hakodate or Nagasaki; but now within a day's march of the city of Yedo lay the black hulks of a formidable fleet whose admiral refused to retire until a treaty was signed. Rècollection of the Tartar armada flashed through the minds of our grandfathers. Was the samurai to be intimidated in his own waters? . . . The historic spirit that had been smoldering in our national consciousness only waited for this moment to burst forth in a fiery expression of unity. Custom and formalism were alike forgotten in this hour of common danger, and for the first time in two hundred years the daimios were asked by the Tokuwara government to deliberate over a matter of state. For the first time in seven centuries the Shogun sent a special envoy to the Mikado to consult about the policy of the empire, and for the first time in the history of our nation, the high and the low alike were invited to offer suggestions as to what steps should be taken for the protection of the ancestral land. . . . Had it not been for the timely arrival of the American Embassy and the determined attitude which it took in regard to Japan's relations with the outside world, we might have entered upon an era of internal discord culminating in a civil war far worse than anything that preceded the Restoration of 1868." Okakuro-Kakuzo, Awakening of Japan, pp. 110-113.-"As the squadron dropped anchor, it was surrounded by junks and boats of all sorts, but there was no hostile sign shown. A document in French was handed on board, which proved to be a warning to any foreign vessel not to come nearer. The next day was spent in informal conference between the local officials of Uraga and the subordinate officers of the squadron. It was Commodore Perry's policy to behave with as much reserve and exclusiveness as the Japanese diplomats had done and would do. He would neither see, nor talk with, any except the highest dignitary of the realm. Meanwhile, the governor of Uraga came on board and was received by captains and lieutenants. He declared that the laws forbade any foreign communication to be held elsewhere than Nagasaki; but to Nagasaki the squadron would never go. The vexed governor would send to Yedo for further instructions, and the 12th was fixed as a day for another conference. Any exchange of thought was either in the Dutch language, for which interpreters were

provided on both sides, or in Chinese, through Dr. S. Wells Williams, and afterward in Japanese, through Manjiro Nakahama. . . . On the 12th, the Governor of Uraga again appeared on board and insisted on the squadron's leaving the Yedo Bay for Nagasaki, where the President's letter would be duly received through the Dutch or the Chinese. This the Commodore firmly refused to do. It was therefore decided at the court of Yedo that the letter be received at Kurihama, a few miles from the town of Uraga. This procedure was, in the language of the commissioners, 'in opposition to the Japanese law;' but, on the ground that 'the Admiral, in his quality as Ambassador of the President, would be insulted by any other course,' the original of Mr. Fillmore's letter to the Japanese Emperor, enclosed in a golden box of one thousand dollars in value, was delivered on the 14th of July to the commissioners appointed by the Shogun. . . . Fortunately for Japan, the disturbed state of affairs in China made it prudent for Perry to repair to the ports of that country, which he did as though he had consulted solely

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the diplomatic convenience of [Japan]. He left word that he would come the ensuing spring for . . . [an] answer. . . . It was the Taiping Rebellion which called for Perry's presence in China. The American merchants had large interests at stake there-their property in Shanghai alone amounting, it is said, to $1,200,000.... While in China, Commodore Perry found that the Russian and French admirals, who were staying in Shanghai, contemplated a near visit to Japan. That he might not give any advantage to them, he left Macao earlier than he had intended, and, on the 13th of February, found himself again in the Bay of Yedo, with a stately fleet of eight ships. As the place where the conference had been held at the previous visit was out of the reach of gun-shot from the anchorage, Perry expressed a desire of holding negotiations in Yedo, a request impossible for the Japanese to comply with. After some hesitation, the suburb Kanagawa was mutually agreed upon as a suitable site, and there a temporary building was accordingly erected for the transaction of the business. On the 8th of May, Commodore Perry, arrayed in the paraphernalia befitting his rank, was ushered in to the house. The reply of the Shogun to the President's letter was now given the purport of wb ich vas, decidedly

in word but reluctantly in spirit, in favor of friendly intercourse. Conferences were repeated in the middle and latter part of the month, and after many evasions and equivocations, deliberations and delays, invitations to banquets and exchanges of presents, at last, on Friday, the 31st of May, the formal treaty was signed; a synopsis of which is here presented: 1. Peace and friendship. 2. Ports of Shimoda and Hakodate open to American ships, and necessary provisions to be supplied them. 3. Relief to shipwrecked people; expenses thereof not to be refunded. 4. Americans to be free as in other countries, but amenable to just laws. 5. Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate not to be subject to restrictions; free to go about within defined limits. 6. Careful deliberation in transacting business which affects the welfare of either party. 7. Trade in open ports subject to local regulations. 8. Wood, water, provisions, coal, etc., to be procured through Japanese officers only. 9. Most-favored nation clause. 10. U. S. ships restricted to ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, except when forced by stress of weather. 11. U. S. Consuls or agents to reside at Shimoda. 12. Ratifications to be exchanged within eighteen months. . . . His labors at an end, Perry bade the last farewell to Japan and started on his home-bound voyage. This was in June, 1854. . . . No sooner had Perry left, carrying off the trophy of peaceful victory-the treaty (though the Yedo government was in no enjoyment of peaceful rest), than the Russian Admiral Pontiatine appeared in Nagasaki. He urged that the same privileges be granted his country as were allowed the Americans. Soon, the English Rear Admiral, Sir James Stirling, arrives at the same harbor, very kindly to notify the government that there may be some fighting in Japanese waters between Russians and his countrymen."-I. Nitobe, Intercourse between the United States and Japan, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: F. L. Hawks, Narrative of the expedition under Commodore Perry.-W. E. Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, ch. 27-33.

"The immediate effect of the arrival of the American Embassy was to reconsolidate the fastwaning power of the Tokugawa government. Putting in abeyance all minor matters of dispute, the entire nation looked to the Shogun, as the representative of all existing authority, to lead the forces of Japan against what was regarded as a Western invasion. Thus the Tokugawa government was given a new lease of life and its final overthrow postponed for fifteen years, during which time ultra-reformists were kept from running riot and the nation was given a chance to prepare itself for the momentous change which was to come. Had the Tokugawas better understood their own position, they might under this new condition of affairs, have retained their power for an indefinite period of time. . . . At the time of the first American Embassy the reigning Shogun, twelfth of his line, was a young and weak prince who had, however, in the person of Abe-Isenokami, an able prime minister who showed a remarkable grasp of the situation and inaugurated that enlightened policy to which Japan owes her present position. The real significance of his acts has been quite obscured beneath a mass of conflicting criticism and the ignominy which attaches to the statesmen of a fallen dynasty. Even his negotiation of a treaty of amity with Commodore Perry in the face of a dissenting majority has been minimized by his detractors, yet it was this treaty which first brought us in touch with the rest of the world. . . . It is not to be supposed that Abe-Isenokami realized the full importance of foreign intercourse, or even

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welcomed it. Like other men of his time, he merely considered it as a necessary evil. His knowledge of the West was but scanty, and he left the burden of treating with the Americans to his minister of foreign affairs, Hotta-Bitchiunokami, who later succeeded to the premiership after the death of Abe. He recognized nevertheless how necessary it was for Japan to acquire Western knowledge, so that she might be able to defend herself against foreign invasion. This he was at length able to impress upon the Tokugawa authorities, and the warlike daimios were prevailed upon to keep quiet during his lifetime. He opened, under government patronage, a school in which various branches of foreign science were for the first time openly taught; the present Imperial University of Tokio is a development from this school. Hitherto the pursuit of foreign knowledge except that of medicine had been interdicted, and students had been obliged to do their work in secret and under great difficulties. Now, however, any one who proved himself worthy was promoted and encouraged in his work, while our soldiers were trained in the Dutch and French systems of drill. Both warships and merchant vessels were ordered from Holland, and young samurai were sent to study their construction and management; this was the beginning of the present Japanese navy. The prohibition against building ships beyond a certain size was revoked, and many daimios, like those of Mito and Satsuma, vied in constructing them. The main idea of AbeIsenokami seemed to have been to consolidate the Tokugawa rule on a new basis. He appears to have appreciated the fact that a great change had come over the nation, and that the fast-decaying prestige of the Tokugawa government could be saved from complete destruction only by the assimilation of new energy. It was his intention to make the shogunate the center of all the forces that moved the empire. It was with this idea that he initiated the custom of approaching the Mikado and the assembly of daimios on all questions of state."-Okakura-Kakuzo, Awakening of Japan, pp. 113-114, 120-125.

1857-1862-Negotiations between the Shogun and occidental powers.-"The United States Government were as fortunate in the selection of their first representative in Japan [Townsend Harris, who was appointed consul-general in 1857], as they had been in their choice of Commodore Perry. The task which confronted him was one of peculiar difficulty, for he was the first foreign agent to deal on equal terms with the Government of Japan.

.. Like Perry, he had brought a letter from the President of the United States. This he was determined to present to the Tycoon [Shogun] himself, and he requested an audience at Yedo for this purpose. . . . He was also anxious to make some further arrangements in respect to residence and trade, in amplification of Perry's treaty [1854]. ... In June, 1857, he was able to report the signature of a convention opening Nagasaki (the port which Perry [in 1854] had thought it prudent to overlook) to American vessels, conceding the right of residence at Shimoda and Hakodaté, providing for the appointment of a vice-consul at the latter port, regulating the question of the exchange of American and Japanese currency, and affirming the principle of exterritoriality. Four months later he was received in audience by the Tycoon. Long before his visit to Yedo the United States representative had recognized the desirability of concluding a convention with Japan on a much wider basis than that covered by the Perry Treaty, even when amplified by his

JAPAN, 1857-1862

own convention of June, 1857. Accordingly on his arrival there he at once opened negotiations with the Japanese ministers on this subject. He found them more open to persuasion than before. ... The terms of the new treaty were finally settled in February, 1858, but it was decided to refer it before signature to Kioto for the approval of the Throne. . . . [The court party and the Daimyos were opposed to foreign influence, and the messenger who was sent to Kioto with the treaty returned with it unsigned. Soon, however, news was received of the termination of the war in China, and the imminence of a visit from British and French ambassadors to Japan, in order to negotiate treaties. The United States Minister at once proceeded] to Kanagawa, and urged from there by letter the necessity for the immediate signature of the treaty. His representations, assisted by the presence of li Kanon no Kami at the head of affairs, had the desired effect, and

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without waiting any longer for consent from Kioto, the treaty was signed at Kanagawa on board the American man-of-war on July 29. The ice having been broken, other treaties followed in rapid succession, all on the same general lines, thus proving the correctness of the opinion given by Harris that what was satisfactory to the United States would be acceptable to other powers. The Dutch signed theirs on the 18th of August, the Russians on the 19th, the British on the 26th, and the French on the 7th of October. The British treaty was negotiated at Yedo by Lord Elgin. All four followed more or less closely the lines of the American convention. . . . The new features of these treaties, which served as a model for later conventions, were the opening of additional ports, the establishment of a tariff, and the introduction of tonnage dues; the concession of the right of travel anywhere in Japan to diplomatic agents and consul-generals; the obligation, on the side of foreigners, to refrain from erecting fortifications or places of strength, and, on the Japanese side, to refrain from enclosing the foreign residential area.... In other respects they merely confirmed,

or amplified, the provisions of earlier arrangements. ... The concession of exterritoriality was more explicitly defined, and was made to apply to civil as well as criminal jurisdiction; and the prohibition of the importation of opium, mentioned in previous Dutch and Russian treaties, was confirmed. . . . It was only after these earlier agreements had been amplified and expanded by the treaties of 1858, to which a fifth power, France, became also a party; after provision had been made for the residence of foreigners in treaty ports, within reach of domestic markets, for trade regulations, and for a tariff, that the way was finally cleared for the development of foreign intercourse and trade. The year 1858 is, therefore, an important date in the history of Japan's foreign relations."-J. H. Gubbins, Progress of Japan, pp. 69-71, 73-75.-See also MISSIONS, CHRISTIAN: Japan. "The Shogunate Court at last decided its foreign policy, and Senior Minister Naosuke Ii, a man of strong will, concluded the treaties without asking for imperial sanction. This fact made the loyalists furious, and gathering in Kyoto, the capital of Old Japan, they began bitterly to criticize the Shogunate's foreign policy and the arbitrariness of Minister Ii. Thereupon Ii started a wholesale execution of the prominent loyalists, and also punished a large number of high officials both of the Imperial and the Shogunate courts who had opposed his actions. He of course, became an object of hatred to thousands of loyalists and foreign exclusionists, and on March 3, 1860, he was attacked by band of zealots on his way to the Shogunate Court and was assassinated. Regardless of li's death, the foreign policy of the government was not changed. On January 15, 1862, Masanobu Ando, li's successor in the Senior Minister's office, was also attacked by assassins, but he escaped. Thus the more difficult the foreign relations grew, the bitterer the internal conflict became; and execution's and assassinations were daily happenings."-K. Kawabe, Press and politics in Japan, PP. 26-27.—"[Toshimitsu] Okubo's first plan as a unionist in order to do away with the Yedo system and duarchy, was to unite the landless Court Nobles, in Kyoto, with the Daimios or territorial barons, in the Government. Only by degrees did the vision of a supreme imperialism dawn on this superb intellect, while the abolition of feudalism, even as an idea, came only after foreigners had been long on the soil. The final issue of the Revolution of 1868 was not only a woeful disappointment to the Samurai, and even to Okubo's co-workers, Saigo and others [see below: 18681894], but became a horrible and wholly unforeseen abyss. To put down the opposition, of those who started the original movement of 1868 cost the Mikado the shedding of tenfold more of the blood of his subjects than the Revolution itself, with its battles and sieges. These various influences, the revivals of native and Chinese learning, of pure Shinto, of the Confucian philosophy of Chu Hi (1130-1200), with the doctrines of the Chinese thinker Oyomei (1472-1528), and the critical inquiries of the Historical School becoming more potent as knowledge increased, would in all probability, without foreign contact, making a new world of opinion, have ripened into action, even to the overthrow of the existing system and the creation of a new State. Along with the researches of the Shintoists and the work of the Mito scholars, who produced a massive historical library, proceeded the private investigations into native history by such men as Rai Sanyo, who helped to create the political opinions of Japanese gentlemen in the nineteenth century. Added to

these were the patriots who hated the Yedo tyranny and longed to find truth in the world at large. The story of these prisoners of the spirit, whose pinions of desire beat in vain against the bars of the gaol, is full of pathetic incident. A whole library in the vernacular has photographed the experiences of those who were the morning stars of the full day dawn of 1868. Ever shining is the name of Yoshida Shoin, who foresaw the day of Perry's coming, waited long, travelled much, and at risk of life mounted the deck of the American war steamer Mississippi at midnight, with his coat stuffed with materials for taking notes of what he should see in the countries of the great world outside. Arrested, imprisoned, but afterward released, he became the teacher of the Marquis Ito and Count Inouye, two relentlessly aggressive prophets of the new dispensation in Japan. Others hoped that Japan might become as England and have representative government, and more than one such prisoner of hope suffered incarceration or death, because of his opinions or acts. Even subterranean Christianity had its martyrs. A large and powerful party, both literary and theological, taught as the political ideal of the nation the restoration of the Mikado to the supreme authority which he had enjoyed seven centuries before, with Shinto as an engine of state. The members of the Satsuma, Choshiu, Tosa and other clans that had never been really conquered but had only yielded in compromise and were but nominally obedient to the Shogun greedily fed their minds upon this idea. Moreover each clansman found this pretext a most convenient mantle under which to hide his own personal ambitions and his yearnings for the supremacy of his own clan. President Millard Fillmore's constructive statesmanship on behalf of the United States and his interposition in the affairs of Japan saved the Empire from civil war. In 1852 everything seemed ready for an explosion from within, which might have so weakened resources as to cripple the nation for modern life, or called in foreign aggression, as in the case of Java, India and China."-W. E. Griffis, Mikado, pp. 62-65.

1863-1868.-Shimonoseki affair.-Fall of shogunate and restoration of the emperor.-Reversal of anti-foreign attitude of imperial court and Satsuma and Choshu clans.-"The knowledge of the outer world possessed by the Court of Yedo, though not extensive, was sufficient to assure the Shogun and his advisers that it was vain to refuse what the Western powers claimed. The Court of Kyoto had had no means of acquiring even this modicum of worldly wisdom. According to its view, Japan, 'the land of the gods,' should never be polluted by outsiders, the ports should be closed again, and the 'barbarians' expelled at any hazard. What specially tended to complicate matters at this crisis was the independent action of certain daimyos. One of them, the Prince of Choshu, acting, as is believed, under secret instructions from the Court of Kyoto, fired on ships belonging to Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States-this, too, at the very moment (1863) when the Shogun's government

was doing its utmost to effect by diplomacy the departure of the foreigners whom it had been driven to admit a few years before. The consequence of this act was what is called 'the Shimonoseki Affair,' namely, the bombardment of Shimonoseki, Choshu's chief sea-port, by the combined fleets of the powers that had been insulted, and the exaction of an indemnity of $3,000,000."-R. H. Chamberlain, Things Japanese, pp. 143, 160."One undesigned benefit resulted from the Shi

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