teeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity.'

2

The old Monroe Doctrine was blending in with the new PanAmericanism. The Pan-American policy proposed by Secretary Blaine in the 1880's contemplated not only friendly relations, and Pan-American conferences, but also a Pan-American customs union and a Pan-American railway, and common weights, measures and coinage. His plan was never realized in its entirety, but at least a periodic conference of diplomatic representatives the Pan-American Conference-was instituted, and later a "Union of American States," maintaining a bureau at Washington. Pan-Americanism developed mainly as an interchange of diplomatic amenities, of reciprocal assurances of goodwill, rather than as the sort of economic federation Blaine had conceived. The idea prevailed that the United States and the Latin-American republics should be a group of states cemented together by periodic conferences, by friendship, by a mutual regard for the peace of the Western Hemisphere. In this connection, it may be noted that the United States increasingly assumed the rôle of arbitrator in disputes between Latin-American neighbors-between Costa Rica and Panama, between Chile and Peru, etc. What would happen if two South-American nations should refer a dispute to the World Court, and one of them refuse to accept the decision, and resort to force, thereby incurring the penalties prescribed under the Covenant, is an interesting and not altogether academic question; for such an incident would perhaps involve European intervention, contrary to twentieth-century versions of the Monroe Doctrine.5

1 See Alvarez, op. cit., for this (p. 559) and kindred declarations. 'Robertson, op. cit., pp. 392 ff.

'At a meeting of the Pan-American Commercial Congress in December, 1925, Mr. Frederic Hudd, representing Canada, expressed the hope that Canada would henceforth participate in all such conferences, and the belief that no conception of Pan-America could be complete that did not include Canada. Although it was promptly pointed out that Mr. Hudd had no authority to pledge Canada's allegiance to Pan-Americanism, nevertheless the incident may serve as a suggestion that Pan-Americanism without the great Dominion is incomplete if not anomalous. Canada, it may be remarked, is the largest single field of American foreign investment and has attracted about one-fourth of all capital exported from the United States. See Dunn, op. cit., pp. 57 ff., and Nearing and Freeman, op. cit., pp. 19-29, on American financial interests in Canada. To my mind they demonstrate that financial and commercial interests do not necessarily imply political imperialism. Robertson, op. cit., ch. 10.

"On the other hand, article 21 of the Covenant gives the Monroe Doctrine

Another significant phase of American policy is the principle that in Latin America orderly constitutional government must be maintained, as against revolutions and dictatorships. This was a basic principle in Wilson's Mexican policy. It was expressed by Wilson in his speech of Jan. 6, 1916, when he advocated an agreement: "That no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out on its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments. It was reiterated by Mr. Hughes as Secretary of State. It would mean a ban on revolutions. It means that the United States insists on the practice of its own principle of constitutional government, whether the other American states are qualified for it or not. Yet, oddly enough, it has been disregarded by the United States in Haiti and Santo Domingo where American marines have on occasion exercised a purely military dictatorship; Wilson aided the Constitutionalist revolution in Mexico; and no consistent attempt has been made to censor revolutions in South America. In a word, the principle is not to be taken too literally.

As regards economic matters, the affiliations of South America prior to the Great War were chiefly with Europe, particularly with England, for British capital built the South American railways, and British, German, and French shippers handled most of South America's foreign trade. It has been estimated that before the Great War about one-fifth of British overseas investments were in Latin-America, and that the British holdings in South America amounted to about three billion dollars. But the war enabled the United States to obtain a larger share of South American commerce, and New York rivaled London as financial capital of South America.

The National City Bank, and others, established many branches in Hispanic America. North American investors bought South American bonds, and sought South American concessions. Consider, for example, the case of Peru, to whose Government an American syndicate in 1925 loaned $7,500,000 at seven and onehalf per cent interest. The New Jersey Standard Oil, operating a status in international law. It reads: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

through the International Petroleum Co., Ltd., gained control over eighty per cent of the oil production of the country. In 1925 the capital invested in Peru by the Standard Oil, the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, the American Smelting and Refining Co., the Vanadium Corporation of America, and other American concerns, amounted to about $100,000,000-a fairly considerable and rapidly increasing sum, although it was only one-third of the total foreign capital invested in Peru. It was estimated that the new South American loans and investments floated in the New York money market during the year 1926 would amount to no less than $400,000,000.1

Toward the colossus of the north, some South American nations had long felt suspicion bordering on hostility. They resented the assumption by the United States of the rôle of protector and spokesman for the New World; they were irritated by the condescension with which North Americans so frequently dealt with South American affairs; above all they were provoked by the "imperialism" of the United States in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. One eminent Latin-American publicist wrote: "To save themselves from Yankee imperialism the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance, or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere the Americans of the North are feared." This is no doubt exaggerated: it represented the attitude of extremists; yet in its way it indicates the reaction of Latin American nationalism against North American imperialism.3

Hoping to overcome hostile opinion in South America Wilson proposed the new version of the Monroe Doctrine which has already been mentioned, and (on Oct. 27, 1913) solemnly declared "that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest"; and Secretary Hughes repeatedly proclaimed that the United States had no imperialist aspirations; and indefatigable publicists have urged the substitution of a mutual guaranty for the Monroe Doctrine; and much propaganda has been directed toward the conquest of South American friendship. The substitution of Pan-American intervention for United States intervention, and of international

New York Times, Dec. 17, 1925.

2F. Garcia Calderon, Latin America, p. 298.

Consult representative opinions in Alvarez, op. cit., Part II.

financial receiverships for United States financial protectorates, in the region between the equator and the United States, would perhaps keep order there more effectively, and conciliate South America, and therefore aid American trade with South America. But such a substitution will be possible only when public opinion in the United States divests itself of the spirit of domination, discards the "big stick" along with "dollar diplomacy" and learns to treat Latin American nations as associates rather than protégés. The great obstacle is not material interests, but a psychological factor, national pride, and national pride is the mother of imperialism.

CHAPTER XVII

NATIONALISM VERSUS IMPERIALISM IN EUROPE

THE SURVIVAL OF THE WEAK

WERE imperialism sheer, ruthless greed-nothing more, nothing less-the smaller and weaker nations of Europe, like those of Africa and Asia, would doubtless have been swallowed up by insatiable Great Powers. That many of these impotent small nations have been permitted to remain independent is a fact of the utmost significance for any analysis of the psychology of imperialism. And that there has been a marked tendency of late toward imperialist domination of certain areas of Europe, is not less significant. These two facts require explanation.

There are really a surprising number of small nations in Europe, utterly incapable of defending themselves against any serious aggression on the part of a Great Power. In 1914 there were twenty-one such states, too small or too weak to resist a Great Power.1 Only a few of these, namely Andorra, San Marino, the Holy See, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, and Monaco, could be described as falling under the shadow of any Great Power; the other fifteen were independent. And some were tempting morsels. Belgium's rich coal resources could not be defended by a Belgian army which in peace boasted only 50,000 men and in war a potential 350,000-a tenth of the force France or Germany could exert. Sweden's treasure of high-grade iron

Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Serbia, Turkey-in-Europe. Since the Great War, Montenegro and Serbia have been merged with Yugoslav lands taken from Austria-Hungary to form the Serb, Croat and Slovene State; and the following have been added to the list of smaller states-Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland. The Free City of Danzig, the internationalized Saar Basin, quasi-independent Iceland, and the new Irish Free State might possibly be included, but are not, because the first two are under the control of the League, and the second pair are under at least the suzerainty of Denmark and Great Britain, respectively.