Canton under
This was one

The first important breach in the wall of exclusiveness was made by the Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-42, often called the Opium War. A commissioner of the Chinese government, Lin Tse Hsi, determined to put an instant end to the opium trade, demanded that the British merchants at Canton surrender the stocks of opium which they had there for sale. When the British refused, he put the British community in quarantine, and brought it almost to starvation. immediate cause of the war. Moreover, British sailors in quest of excitement had happened to kill a Chinese; Commissioner Lin had demanded the surrender of the murderer; the British had refused; Lin threatened to make the arrest by force; and the British naval squadron opened fire on the Chinese fleet, in November, 1839. This was the immediate occasion of the war. The real issue was the commercial open door. Much to Commissioner Lin's surprise, the "barbarians" upon whom he looked with ineffable contempt proved amazingly powerful in war. British warships easily captured several cities on the Chinese coast, and the terms of peace were dictated by the British, in the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, and supplementary agreements.2

China paid an indemnity. Five Chinese cities-Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Foochow and Ningpo-were to be "treaty ports," in which British and other foreign merchants could freely trade and reside and erect their warehouses. Near Canton, the small island of Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain, in order that British merchants might have a secure place for warehouses and residences. Moreover, British citizens residing in the "Treaty Ports" were to be subject to British rather than Chinese law, and were to be judged by British consuls. This exemption of foreigners from the laws of the country is called "extraterritoriality"; it is difficult to see how Europeans could have resided in China without some such arrangement, for Chinese law and Chinese punishments were incomprehensible and seemed barbarous to foreigners.3 One other important pro'State Papers, XXIX, pp. 879-1069; XXX, pp. 4 ff., esp. pp. 20-1; compare Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire, I, chs. 9-10. Ibid., XXX, pp. 389 ff.

3 Chinese patriots are now eager to abolish extraterritoriality as a restriction on Chinese sovereignty and a reflection on Chinese courts and laws. An international conference met in January 1926 to discuss this problem. See discussion in American Relations with China (Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), pp. 49 ff.

vision of the peace settlement was that British goods imported into China would no longer be subject to arbitrary exactions, but to a fixed customs tariff, the rate of which was later settled at five per cent ad valorem. Thus China lost the right to regulate her own tariff.

The Nanking Treaty and its supplements were inspired, clearly, by a British desire for free access to the Chinese market, but not by latter-day imperialism. Great Britain could have taken a large slice of territory; she was content with the tiny island of Hongkong. She could have asked for exclusive privileges; she was willing that other nations enjoy the same rights. By separate treaties with China, the United States and France in 1844, and other Powers in later years, obtained the same rights that England enjoyed in the Treaty Ports.1

Three results of this first step toward opening China are worth noting. First, European trade with China increased marvelously, thereby intensifying the European interest in China.2 Second, the treaty port privileges made it safer for European missionaries to work in China. Incidentally, there was in the fifties a great rebellion, the Taiping Rebellion, led by a pretender who had been converted to Christianity. The feelings of the Chinese emperor may easily be imagined. Third, the contact of European merchants and missionaries inevitably produced friction and conflict. In the Treaty Ports, the Europeans lived in peril, surrounded by a hostile Chinese population. Chinese officials were arrogant and overbearing. A French missionary was executed on the charge of stirring up rebellion. A ship flying the British flag was boarded by Chinese officials who sought to arrest one of the Chinese crew, a murderer. The latter incident led to a second Anglo-Chinese War in 1857, and France, too, made war on China. Again China was defeated, and to save the capital from capture the Chinese government hastily made peace, by the Treaty of Tientsin (1858),* promising (1) to throw open additional treaty ports, (2) to permit trade on the Yangtse River and travel in the interior, (3) to permit a

3

Malloy, U. S. Treaties, 1, p. 196; State Papers, 34, p. 1298. See list of treaties in China Year Book.

The export of Chinese tea increased from about 42 million lbs. per annum before 1842 to over 100 millions in the 1850s.

Morse, op. cit., I, chs. 16, 20-22.

State Papers, 48, p. 47.

British ambassador or minister to reside at Peking, (4) to revise the 1843 schedule of customs duties, which now amounted to more than five per cent since prices had dropped, and which the British wished to restore to an effective five per cent, and (5) to refrain from molesting Christian missionaries and converts. The last point was quaintly phrased: "The Christian religion, as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities. . . ." France, United States and Russia promptly received similar rights by treaties made at Tientsin in 1858.1

When a British minister started up the Peiho River to Peking, to get the Treaty of Tientsin ratified by the emperor, he found a chain stretched across the river, and his ships were bombarded. This, of course, was from the European point of view an outrage. English and French forces were sent to punish the outrage; Peking was attacked; and the imperial summer palace was burned. Unable to resist such European methods of persuasion, the Chinese emperor now confirmed the Tientsin treaties, added an indemnity, and gave Great Britain a small area on the mainland near Hongkong, for the expanding British commercial community there.2

During the Chinese conflict with England and France, Russia had been represented to the Chinese as the protector and friend of China. As a reward, Russia received (by treaties of 1858 and 1860) all Chinese territory north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River-a vast region which became the Maritime Province of Russian Siberia. The Russian aggression was inspired partly by the expansion of Russian colonization from Siberia into the Amur valley, and partly by the traditional Russian desire for an ice-free port. In the annexed territory Russia found an admirable harbor, which became the port and naval base of Vladivostok, free of ice during many months of the year. The other European powers, however, were less interested in territorial expansion, at this time; they wanted simply the open door, and they were willing that it should be equally open

1 Ibid., 48, p. 606; 51, p. 637; 53, p. 966.

Ibid., 50, p. 10.

Ibid., 50, pp. 964, 970.

for all. What they wanted, and what they had obtained between 1840 and 1860, may be summarized as (1) the right to trade at certain "treaty ports"; (2) a fixed, low tariff; (3) extraterritorial rights; (4) toleration for missionaries.

Compare the case of China with that of Japan. Japan likewise had been a hermit nation, with doors closed to Europe; Japan likewise was forced to admit foreigners and their trade; but the results were very different.

When

Not England, but the United States took the initiative with Japan. Like other nations, the United States had resented the refusal of Japan to permit trade or to receive diplomatic envoys, but the Americans had a special grievance. Occasionally American whaling vessels were shipwrecked on the Japanese coast, and the sailors were imprisoned, sometimes tortured. Hoping to stop this sort of thing, and at the same time to open up the island empire for American trade as China had been opened, President Fillmore in 1853 sent Commodore Perry with a letter addressed to the ruler of Japan, and many presents, typical of Western civilization-firearms, a toy railway, telegraph instruments, books, champagne, and "many barrels of whiskey."1 Perry's four warships steamed into Tokyo Bay, black smoke pouring from their funnels, the Japanese were terrified at the strange sight, and fled to their temples to pray for deliverance. But Perry landed, interviewed the officials, expressed his desire to conclude a treaty, and, on being refused, announced that after they had time to think it over he would return for an answer, with more warships. True to his word, he came back in 1854 with ten ships, and obtained a treaty allowing American ships to anchor in two Japanese ports and obtain provisions, and promising hospitable treatment of shipwrecked sailors. Immediately afterward, the United States sent as consul-general to Japan Townsend Harris, a man of such independence that he refused to crawl on his hands and knees-as had been the custom-before the Japanese ruler, and of such ability that he soon negotiated treaties granting Americans many new privileges and

'Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, ch. 5, for this and other interesting details; Perry, The United States Japan Expedition; Sen. Exec. Doc., 34, 33d Congress, 2d Session; T. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, ch. 14.