ON THE PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, WITH SOME PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLEADINGS IN THAT COURT. BY EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, F. R. S. BARRISTER AT LAW. VOLUME II. FROM THE LONDON EDITION. HARRISBURG, PA.: PUBLISHED BY I. G. M'KINLEY & J. M. G. LESCURE. NORTH THIRD STREET 1846. ADVERTISEMENT. THE AUTHOR regrets to announce, that he has found it impossible, without materially interfering with the plan of the treatise, to complete it within the limits which he originally proposed, and that he has been obliged to extend it to a third volume, which will be published as speedily as possible. He avails himself of the present opportunity, to notice an inaccuracy, which has inadvertantly crept into a passage in a former part of this work, and to which his attention has been drawn by a note of Mr. Cooper's, in the last number of his reports, (C. P. Cooper's Reports, part III. p. 460.) The inaccuracy alluded to, will be found in the first volume of the present treatise, (p. 539,) and consists in a miscalculation of the time allowed to a plaintiff under the New Orders to except to an answer and to procure an order to amend. The passage in which it occurs, was introduced for the purpose of explaining the grounds upon which the 26th Order of December, 1833, was founded: and the mistake consists in the Author having assumed, that the difficulty which the above order was intended to obviate, would arise in a case in which the answer should be filed on the 30th of November. (Vide ante, vol. 1, p. 539.) Whereas the case assumed, ought to have been one in which the answer, would, under the 4th Order of 1828, be deemed complete on the 30th of November, in which case, the difficulty intended to be obviated would have arisen, (which the Author admits would not have been the case, as Mr. Cooper has clearly pointed out, had the answer been filed on that day.) If the answer had been filed so as to be deemed complete on the 30th of November, in that case, under the Orders as they stood prior to December, 1833, the plaintiff would, supposing no vacation had intervened, have had till the 1st day of Hilary Term following, for filing his exceptions; but as a vacation would have intervened of, say, three weeks, those three weeks would, under the 19th Order, as amended in 1830, have been added to the time allowed for excepting, which, by that means, would have been prolonged to the 1st of February. In the meantime, however, the defendant under the 13th Order, of 1828, would have been in a situation to move to dismiss the Bill on the 25th of January, i. e., a week before the time allowed the plaintiff by the 4th Order, for delivering exceptions had elapsed, which the Author apprehends was one of the difficulties which the 26th Order, of 1833, was intended to remedy. The author begs also to acknowledge the justice of Mr. Cooper's observation, with regard to Swinfen v. Swinfen, 3 Sim. 384, (cited vol. 1, p. 539,) and that the difficulty, in that case, did not arise under the amended Orders of 1828, but under the original Orders, as they stood prior to such amendments. LINCOLN'S-INN, February 22, 1840. |