[Wilkinson vs. Leland and others.]

tion at the common law, in deeds between private persons. It is said that the act uses the appropriate words of a deed of confirmation, "ratify and confirm;" and that a confirmation at the common law will not make valid a void estate or act, but only one which is voidable. It is in our judgment wholly unnecessary to enter upon any examination of this doctrine of the common law, some of which is of great nicety and strictness; because the present is not an act between private persons having interests and rights to be operated upon by the terms of their deed. This is a legislative act, and is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon its face. Every technical rule, as to the construction or force of particular terms, must yield to the clear expression of the paramount will of the legislature. It cannot be doubted that an act of parliament may by terms of confirmation make valid a void thing, if such is its intent. The cases cited in Plowden, 399, in Comyn's Dig. Confirmation, D; and in 1 Roll. Abridg. 583, are directly in point. The only question then is, what is the intent of the legislature in the act of 1792? Is it merely to confirm a void act, so as to leave it void, that is to confirm it in its infirmity? or is it to give general validity and efficacy to the thing done? We think there is no reasonable doubt of its real object and intent. It was to confirm the sale made by the executrix, so as to pass the title of her testator to the purchasers. The prayer of the petition, as recited in the act, was, that the legislature would “ ratify and confirm the sale aforesaid, which was made by a deed executed by the executrix, &c." The object was a ratification of the sale, and not a mere ratification of the formal execution of the deed. The language of the act is "on due consideration whereof it is enacted, &c. that the prayer of the said petitioner be granted, and that the deed be, and the same is hereby ratified and confirmed, so far as respects the conveyance of any right or interest in the estate mentioned in said deed, which belonged to the said Jonathan Jenckes at the time of his decease." It purports therefore to grant the prayer, which asks a confirmation of the sale, and confirms the deed, as a conveyance of the right and interest of

[Wilkinson vs. Leland and others.]

the testator. It is not an act of confirmation by the owner of the estate; but an act of confirmation of the sale and conveyance, by the legislature in its sovereign capacity.

We are therefore all of opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought to be reversed, and that the cause be remanded with directions to the court to award a venire facias de novo.

CLAUDIUS F. LE GRAND, APPELLANT vs. NICHOLas Darnall, Ap

PELLEE.

The act of the legislature of Maryland, passed in 1796, ch. 47, sec. 13, declares "that all persons capable in law to make a valid will and testament, may grant freedom to, and effect the manumission of any slave or slaves belonging to such person or persons, by his, her, or their last will and testament, and such manumission of any slave or slaves may be made to take effect at the death of the testator or testators, or at such other period as may be limited in such last will and testament; provided always, that no manumission by last will and testament shall be effectual to give freedom to any slave or slaves, if the same shall be to the prejudice of creditors, nor unless the said slave or slaves shall be under the age of forty-five years, and able to work and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood at the time the freedom given shall commence.” The time of freedom of the appellee in this case, commenced when he was about eleven years old. Held, that his manumission by will was valid. The court of appeals of Maryland, has decided that a devise of property real or personal by a master to his slave, entitles the slave to his freedom by necessary implication. This Court entertains the same opinion. [670]

APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Maryland.

The facts of the case appear on the argument of the counsel for the appellee, and in the opinion of the Court.

Mr Taney, for the appellant, submitted the case without argument; stating, that it had been brought up merely on account of its great importance, to the appellee; which rendered it desirable that the opinion of the supreme court should be had on the matters in controversy.

Mr Stewart, for the appellee.

The case presented by the bill, answers and depositions, is as follows.

Bennett Darnall, of Ann Arundel county, in the state of Maryland, by his will dated August 4th, 1810, devised to his son, Nicholas Darnall, the defendant in this case, certain lands lying in the county and state aforesaid.

The mother of the said Nicholas was the slave of the testator, and Nicholas was born a slave to his father.

[Le Grand vs. Darnall.]

Bennett Darnall, in his will, refers to two deeds of manumission executed by him, one in 1805 and the other in 1810, in both of which it seems Nicholas was included with other slaves designed to be emancipated by these deeds. By some omission, neither of these deeds are exhibited.

The testator made two codicils to his will, the last of which is dated January 20th, 1814, and was proved before the register of wills, January 31st, 1814. Bennett Darnall must therefore have died in. January 1814. Nicholas Darnall, the defendant, sold the land referred to in the proceedings, to Le Grand the complainant, and it appears by the agreements exhibited with the bill, that at the time the contract was first made, neither party supposed there was any question about the title. But afterwards, it seems, doubts were suggested to Darnall, which he communicated to Le Grand, and the agreements above mentioned were thereupon made with full knowledge on both sides of the supposed defect in the title, and were framed with reference to it.

Le Grand gave his notes for the purchase money, according to the agreement and a suit was brought, on one of them, and judgment recovered in the circuit court for the district of Maryland; whereupon he filed his bill in that court, praying an injunction on the ground that Darnall was unable to convey him a good title to the land.

The defect supposed to exist, and alleged in the bill, is this; that Darnall was not more than ten years of age at the time of his father's death, and at that tender age was unable to work and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood, and was incapable therefore of receiving manumission by the laws of Maryland.

The answer of Nicholas Darnall insists that he was, at the time of the testator's death, able to work and gain a sufficient livelihood and maintenance.

Four witnesses were examined.

John Mercer and Robert Welch prove that Nicholas was about eleven years of age at the time of his father's death, and describe him as a fine, healthy, intelligent boy, able by his work to maintain himself. Dr James Stewart and Samuel VOL. II.-1 Í

[Le Grand vs. Darnall.]

Moore state that boys of eleven years of age in Maryland are able to support themselves by their own labour, and specify the kind of work in which they may be usefully employed.

Upon this answer and evidence, the Court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.

It is proper to say, that the whole of these proceedings have been amicable; that Le Grand is willing to pay if his title is a safe one, and that Darnall does not wish Le Grand to pay unless he can make a good title to him.

By the act of 1796, chap. 67, sec. 13, slaves may be manumitted in Maryland by last will; provided they be under forty-five years of age, and able to work and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood; at the time the freedom given shall commence.

In the case of Hall vs. Mullin, 5 Harris & Johns. 190, the court of appeals have decided that a devise of property real or personal, by a master to his slave, entitles the slave. to his freedom, by necessary implication.

Under this decision, the will of Bennett Darnall gave freedom to Nicholas, provided he was in a condition to receive it at the testator's death. The omission therefore to produce the deeds of manumission is not material. If they are regarded as not proved, or as not effective for the purpose intended, still the defendant may rely on his title under the will.

In the case of Hamilton vs. Cragg, 6 Harris & Johns. 16, it was held that an infant slave (only three years of age at 'the time of the death of the testator who attempted to manumit him), unable to gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood, could not be manumitted. It was this decision that created the doubt in regard to the title of Nicholas Darnall; for until that case was decided, it had been generally supposed that this provision in the statute was intended to guard against the manumission of slaves who, although under fortyfive years of age, were suffering under incurable diseases or constitutional infirmities which would most probably always disable them from maintaining themselves by their own labour, and make them a charge upon the public. It had