9. Indian Allotment-Curtesy. Where a Choctaw Indian woman, who
was duly enrolled and was residing with her husband and infant
son upon lands which she had selected and was entitled to as
her allotment, died before making formal application and receiv
ing patents, but after her death patents were issued to her for
said lands, under the Arkansas statute then in force in the In-
dian Territory her husband is entitled to a life estate in said lands
by curtesy. Bridges v. Wright...
10. Restricted Homestead Allotment-Validity of Lease. Where a valid
lease by a Chickasaw citizen of his restricted homestead allot-
ment is made for agricultural purposes, and before it expires
another lease for agricultural purposes is made to the same les-
sees for a period of one year, to commence in the future, the last
lease, not being approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
is void. Apple v. Pierce..
11. Agricultural Lease-Failure to Record-Effect on Validity. Where
a written agricultural lease of a full-blood Chickasaw Indian
for a term of one year (1911) covered both homestead and sur-
plus, same is not void because it was never recorded in the of
fice of the register of deeds. Idem.....
12. Proof of Age of Allottee - Census Card-Enrollment Records.
Where a properly certified "census card" is admitted in evidence
without objection as the "enrollment record," it is conclusive evi-
dence of the age of the allottee therein named as to transactions
subsequent to the taking effect of the Act of Congress approved
May 27, 1908 (chap. 199, 35 Stat. 312). Davenport v. Mitchell.
13. Same.
In an action involving the title to an Indian allotment un-
der conveyances executed since the Act of Congress approved
May 27, 1908 (chap. 199, 35 Stat. 312), became effective, the en-
rollment records, including the evidence had before the Commis-
sion to the Five Civilized Tribes upon the application for en-
rollment, are conclusive as to the age of such allottee. Scott v.
Cover.
11. Same-Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence, in an action involving
the title to an Indian allotment conveyed since Act Congress
May 27, 1908, held to show that plaintiff was 18 years old when
she executed the deed from which she sought release and to sus
tain judgment for defendant. Idem...
INDORSEMENT-See "Bills and Notes." 7.
INFANTS-See "Cancellation of Instruments"; "Guardian and Ward";
"Indians," 7, 8.
1. Property and Conveyances—Statutes.
Under the statutes of Ar-
kansas, in force in Indian Territory March 2, 1906. a male person
under the age of 21 was incompetent to mortgage, convey or make
any contract relating to real estate. Jefferson v. Gallagher......
2. Service of Process. Under the express provision of Comp. Laws
1909, sec. 5611 (Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 4721), service upon a minor
under 14 must be upon him and upon his guardian or father, or
upon his mother or the person having his care and control, but
service upon a minor above 14 years is sufficient. Idem......
3. Same-Waiver. An infant cannot waive the issuance and service
of summons, nor can his guardian, guardian ad litem, or attorney
waive it for him, and no person can appear for an infant until
he is brought into court according to law. Idem....
INHERITANCE See "Descent and Distribution."
INJUNCTION-See "Execution"; "Schools and School Districts."
INNOCENT PURCHASERS-See "Bills and Notes." ·
INSOLVENCY-See "Bankruptcy."
INSTRUCTIONS-See "Appeal and Error," 2, 4, 45-49; "Conspiracy”;
"Damages"; "Fraud"; "Sales"; "Trial."
INSURANCE-See "Pleading," 2.
1. Life Policy-Limitation of Time for Suit-Waiver. The limitation
clause of an insurance policy issued in the Indian Territory held
not a condition precedent to liability on the policy, but to merely
fix a limitation of time within which suit could be commenced
after death of insured, which could be waived by the insurer
or pleaded as a defense. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward
2. Same-Estoppel. A clause prohibiting waiver of any condition of
the policy unless in writing, signed by an officer of the company.
held not to refer to conduct of the company's general counsel, who
by promise of settlement induced claimant to defer suit until ex-
piration of the time limit prescribed by the policy. Idem. . . . . .
Accident Policy Construction-Double Indemnity. In an action
upon an accident policy providing a double indemnity for any
bodily injury caused solely by external, violent or accidental
means, while the policy is in force, and while the insured is in or
on a public conveyance provided by a common carrier for the
regular transportation of passengers, it is not necessary for a
recovery of the double indemnity that the accident for which
recovery is had be the result of the operation or construction of
the conveyance provided by such common carrier, if all the other
conditions involving the double indemnity be properly estab-
lished. American Fidelity Co. of Montpelier, Vt., v. Echols . . . . . .
4. Fire Policy — Book-Warranty Clause-- Substantial Compliance.
Negligence of insured's bookkeeper whereby a journal was de-
stroyed by fire held such a slight technical violation of a promis-
sory warranty to keep and produce a complete set of books that
it should not work a forfeiture. Dickey v. Springfield Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. of Springfield, Mass..
Failure of insured to keep a separate cash account of his
transactions held not to preclude recovery, where the inventory
in evidence, together with statement of sales made thereafter and
additions to the stock, furnished unquestioned data from which to
ascertain the loss. Idem.....
6. Same. Substantial compliance with a clause, requiring that insured
keep a set of books, is insufficient. Idem...
7. Iron-Safe Clause Compliance. Substantial compliance with an
iron-safe clause is sufficient. Idem... . . .
8. Same. The purpose of an iron-safe clause was accomplished where
insured produced data from which the value could be ascer-
tained, and kept books showing the firm's business, though he
failed to produce the books because they were destroyed by fire
at a place where he had a right to keep them. Idem...
Unliquidated Damages. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
damages, where it is necessary for a judgment on verdict to be
had in order to ascertain the amount of same. City of Chickasha
v. Hollingsworth
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-See "Carriers"; "Master and Servant."
8, 9.
INTERVENERS-See "Appeal and Error," 41; “Jury."
INTOXICATING LIQUORS—See “Appeal and Error," 41; “Jury.”
Search and Seizure-Procedure-Complaint. Where less than one-half
gallon of liquor, and other property mentioned in Sess. Laws
1907-08, chap. 69, art. 3. secs. 5, 6, as amended by Sess. Laws
1911, chap. 70, secs. 9, 10. are seized without first filing a com-
plaint, it must appear that the alleged statutory violation oc-
curred in presence of the officer making the seizure; otherwise
the property must be released. Bogan v. State....
JUDGMENT See "Appeal and Error"; "Champerty and Maintenance";
"Conspiracy"; "Costs"; "Execution"; "Guardian and Ward";
"Indians," 2; "Jury"; "Justices of the Peace," 6-8; “Landlord
and Tenant."
1. Requisites in General. To the validity of a judgment it is requisite
that it should have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the parties, of the general subject-matter, and of the particular
matter which the judgment professes to decide. Jefferson v.
Gallagher
2. Requisites-Jurisdiction-Collateral Attack. A judgment rendered
without jurisdiction of the person is null and void, and may be
shown to be void in a collateral, as well as a direct, proceeding.
by extrinsic evidence as well as by the record itself. Idem..
3. Vacation-Fraud-Direct Attack. An action to vacate judgments on
the ground of fraud, under the language of the petition and as
shown by the records in the case, held a direct attack upon such
judgments. Idem......
4. Vacation Power of Court. Courts of general jurisdiction have in-
herent power to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial on ac-
count of prejudicial error at the same term of court at which
said judgment is rendered. Scanland v. Board of Com'rs of Ot-
tawa County
5. Merger and Bar-Parties Concluded.
Where one files a suit to
quiet his title to real estate, and summons is duly issued and
served, and answer of defendant is filed asserting ownership of
the property, and the plaintiff in said action conveys his title to
another, and the action is not dismissed or parties substituted.
but the cause proceeds as filed, and judgment is rendered therein
in favor of the defendant upon the issues, the judgment thus ren-
dered is a bar to an action subsequently brought by the purchaser
upon the same state of facts and seeking the same relief. Scott
v. Wise-Autry Stock Co...
6. Assignment of Judgment-Vacation on Motion and Notice. The
jurisdiction of a county court to strike an assignment of a judg-
ment for fraud may be invoked by motion and notice. Leonard
v. Ross
7. Satisfaction-Vacation. The jurisdiction of a county court to va-
cate a satisfaction of a judgment may be invoked by motion and
notice. Idem.
8. Revival-Time for Proceeding. Order to revive judgment in name
of representatives or successors of plaintiff cannot be made with-
out defendant's consent after one year from time order might
first have been made. Jones v. Nye... . .
9. Suit on Dormant Judgment-Limitation. Personal representatives
of owner of judgment which has become dormant by death of
creditor may sue on dormant judgment without having it re-
vived under Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 5294. Idem.......
10. Same. Suit on dormant judgment, without revival thereof, by per-
sonal representatives of owner, must be commenced within time
for revivor.
JUDICIAL NOTICE-See "Evidence," 1.
JUDICIAL SALES-See "Guardian and Ward"; "Homestead"; "In-
JURISDICTION—See “Courts"; "Judgment."
JURY-See "Appeal and Error," 41.
1. Right to Jury Trial-Hearing on Application to Strike Assignment
or Satisfaction of Judgment. The court and not a jury tries the
issues of fact arising on a hearing of an application to strike
the assignment of a judgment and satisfaction thereof from
the record. Leonard v. Ross.
2. Search Warrant—Interpleader—Jury Trial. Under secs. 5 and 6 of
art. 3, chap. 69, Laws 1907-08, as amended by secs. 9 and 10 of
chap. 70 of the Sess. Laws of Oklahoma for the year 1911, where
a party appears and enters an interplea claiming title to the
property seized, and further answers that said property was not
in any manner kept or possessed with the intention of violating
any of the provisions of said act, said party so appearing on
demand is entitled to a trial of the issue of facts thus raised
by a jury. Bogan v. State..
1. Nature of Office-Scope of Authority. A justice of the peace court
is one of limited jurisdiction, and the authority to be exercised
by the justice is derived from the statute. Jeffries v. Newblock.
2. Attachment-Affidavit-Amendment. Where an attachment affi-
davit in justice court imperfectly stated a statutory ground for
attachment, it was not error to permit the affidavit to be
amended. Ranson v. Capron Hardware Co.......
3. Same-Grounds of Attachment-Effect of Denial. In justice court.
defendant's denial of the ground of attachment alleged in the af-
fidavit raises an issue of fact as to whether the ground existed.
Idem.
4. Pleading-Construction. Pleadings in a justice court are more lib-
erally construed in favor of the pleader than in courts of rec-
ord. Idem
5. Findings of Fact-Conclusiveness on Appeal. A finding of a justice
of the peace on an issue of fact as to whether a ground of at-
tachment existed will not be disturbed if supported by evidence.
Idem
6. Judgment-Default-Vacation. A justice of the peace can vacate a
judgment by default under the provisions of the statute (sec.
5459, Rev. Laws 1910). Jeffries v. Newblock
7. Same. In order for a justice of the peace to vacate a judgment
by default, the application therefor must be filed within the time
named by the statute, and if filed after that time, the justice has
no jurisdiction to grant the relief. Idem...
8. Same-Appeal-Jurisdiction of Appellate Court.
district court from an order of the justice refusing to vacate a
judgment rendered by default where application was filed there-
for after the expiration of ten days from date of judgment can-
not invest the district court with jurisdiction to vacate said judg.
ment. Idem
9. Appeal-Dismissal-Deposit for Costs. The action of the county
court in dismissing an appeal from a justice's court. for failure of
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