tion in the case. There is evidence sufficient to show that Mr. Snyder was the general manager of appellant, the railway company; but direct evidence that, as general manager, he had authority to bind the company by such a contract, is wanting. The fact that the druggist, physician, and one of the nurses were paid by the company is some evidence of his authority as to the contracts with them, but it is hardly sufficient, of itself, upon which to base a recovery in favor of appellee. As there is no direct evidence of such authority having been delegated to the general manager by the corporation, so there is no direct evidence as to what his duties as general manager were, from which his authority might be inferred. Can we presume, from the title "general manager,' that the duties and powers of the general manager were sufficiently comprehensive to include contracts for the nursing of a person wounded upon appellant's road? The term "general manager" of a corporation, according to the ordinary meaning of the term, indicates one who has the general direction and control of the affairs of the corporation, as contradistinguished from one who may have the management of some particular branch of the business. There is no class of business of anything like the magnitude of the railroad business of to-day, that is so open to common observation, and of which the general public know so much. The terms road-master, section boss, couductor, station agent, superintendent, and general manager are terms familiar to the whole people, and the public has, in the main, a correct understanding of the ordinary duties of these several classes of officers, agents, and employees, and that their duties and powers are limited to the keeping-up of the road, rolling-stock, etc., and operating the road in the transportation of freight and passengers. We should have to shut our eyes to the most common observation to hold that the courts will not presume that the "general manager" of a railway has authority to bind the corporation by contracts for medical and other services to an injured employee, passenger, or other person wounded on the road by any agency of the company.

Different section bosses or road-masters may have different duties imposed upon them, and may be clothed with different powers, by different corporations. The same, probably, may be said of superintendents. Possibly the same may be said of "general managers,' but this term indicates a general control and direction of all matters connected with the operation of the road, and, until the contrary is shown, the presumption ought to be indulged by the courts that such an officer has authority to care for the wounded persons above mentioned. In many cases it would be difficult to have action by the board of directors; and in many cases, if prompt and efficient measures were not adopted, the corporation might be subjected to additional damages. It has been held that the courts will take notice of the duties and powers of cashiers

of banks. Farmers', etc., Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 457.

In the case of Sturges v. Bank of Circleville, 11 Ohio St. 153, the court said: "It is not claimed that the respective duties of the board of directors, president, and cashier, in the exercise of the franchises of the bank, are prescribed by the charter. So far, therefore, as the limitation of the appropriate duties of the cashier depends upon his office, we can only have respect to the ordinary and well-understood duties of that officer in determining his powers. A cashier is defined to be one who has charge of money, or who superintends the books, payments, and receipts of a bank or moneyed institution. His actual powers and duties, like those of all other agents, may be more or less qualified, restricted, or enlarged by the corporation, institution, or party for whom he acts. But in this case, there being nothing to show any restriction or qualification of his powers in that regard, the duties of the cashier may reasonably be understood to extend to the buying and selling and negotiating bills of exchange, checks, and promissory notes, as well as to that of borrowing money, as the agent of the bank," etc. These cases were cited approvingly in the case of Tousey v. Taw, 19 Ind. 212. If the courts may thus take notice of the duties and powers of cashiers of banks, we can think of no reason why they should not presume, from the title, that general managers of railways have power and authority to bind the corporation by a contract such as that under discussion.

In the case of New Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301, it was held that the corporation wasli able upon a contract for fencing the road, made by a general superintendent of the corporation. There seems to have been no evidence of his duties other than could be inferred from the title general superintendent. The court said: "He was the general superintendent of the road, and, of course, the general agent of the company, and, as such, it may be fairly presumed that he was clothed with authority to bind his principal in contracts relative to the safe and effective operations of the road. Railroad companies, in all cases, contract through their agents. The law makes it their interest to fence their track. ... And upon whom, more than such general agent, would the duty of making a contract similar to the one in suit appropriately rest? In the absence of conflicting evidence, we are not allowed to avoid the conclusion that the agent, in this instance, acted within the scope of his authority." We have many cases of what may be presumed by the courts, and of what they will take notice without proof.

The following are not directly in point upon the exact question under examination, but they are analogous, and serve to throw light upon it: Carmon v. State, 18 Ind. 450; Ward v. Colyhan, 30 Ind. 395; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399; Hipes v. Cochran, 13

Ind. 175; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stephens, 28 Ind. 429; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Case, 15 Ind. 42; Ross v. Boswell, 60 Ind. 235; Abshire v. Mather, 27 Ind. 381; Abel v. Alexander, 45 Ind. 523; Eagan v. State, 53 Ind. 162; Schlicht v. State, 56 Ind. 173; Wiles v. State, 33 Ind. 206; State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; Board, etc., v. May, 67 Ind. 562; United States Ex. Co. v. Keefer, 59 Ind. 263; Buell v. State, 72 Ind. 523; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 496; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 581; Stout v. State, 96 Ind. 407; Myers v. State, 93 Ind. 251.

In the case of Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reisner, supra, without proof of the duties and powers of the general agent, the company was held liable upon his contract with a hotel-keeper for board and attendance to a brakeman, injured while working for the company. It was said: "In the case of a general agency, the principal holds out the agent to the public as having unlimited authority as to all his business. When the witness testified that Hyde was the general agent of the road at Atchison, he thereby gave evidence that the railroad company held out to the public such person as its agent in all its business and employment. In other words, the general agent of the company is virtually the corporation itself. General manager and general agent are synonymous terms." The same doctrine was held in the case of Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reecher, supra.

The case of Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rodrigues, supra, was an action to recover for nursing an injured employee. The nurse was employed by the local station agent, who, by letter, notified the general superintendent of the road of the employment. To this letter there was no answer, nor was the employment otherwise disapproved. When the bill was presented the general superintendent said that he would pay reasonable charges, and based his objection only upon the amount of the bill. It was held that this amounted to a ratification of the contract by the agent, and bound the company. In speaking of the general superintendent, the court said: "As his title implies, he has a general superintendence of the business affairs of the road, and we deem it but a reasonable inference to conclude that this was within the scope of these powers, and that when exercised, the company must be held liable." Because the regula tions are not open to the public, it would be unreasonable to require positive proof of such authority.

The case of Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pierce, supra, was an action by a surgeon to recover for amputating the leg of an employee injured while at work for the company. The facts of the employment and report to the general superintendent were almost identical with the case last above. It was held that the company was liable, upon the ground of ratification. There was no proof of the duties or powers of the general superintendent. The court seems to have presumed from the title of his office that he had authority to bind the company for such surgical services.

The case of Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morris, 67 Ill. 295, was similar, except that the action was to recover for nursing and care, and the employment was by the conductor, who reported to the general officers. It was held that there was a ratification of the employment, and that the eompany was liable.

Under a similar state of facts, a like ruling was made in the case of Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 82 Ill. 73. In the case of Pacific R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 19 Kan. 256, it was held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be presumed that the general superintendent of a railway has authority to employ physicians and surgeons to attend an employee injured while working for the company, and hence power to ratify an employment by agents, who had no such authority. This case went further than we need go here, and announced a proposition that we need not now approve or disapprove, viz., that the same presumption should be indulged as to a division superintendent, upon whose division the injury occurred. The company was held liable upon the ground that the employment was ratified by the superintendent. The evidence of ratification was much weaker than in the case before us.

The doctrine of the above cases is fully sustained by the case of Southgate v. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 89, and the case of American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, 9 Paige, 496, therein cited. Upon the general doctrine of what the courts take notice without proof, see Best, Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 253; Wharton, Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 330 et seq., and cases cited.

GENERAL MANA-
GER TO RATIFY
CONTRACT FOR
NURSING.

Applying the doctrine of the above authorities to the cases beAUTHORITY or fore us, it must be held that the general manager had authority to make the contract with appellee, and henec authority to ratify the contract as made by the roadmaster; and that he did so ratify it and thus made the corporation liable. There is no evidence as to how Barnett was injured; but inasmuch as the general manager ratified contracts for taking care of him, and the company paid for such service (except the claim of appellee), it should be presumed-there being no evidence to the contrary-that the injury was so inflicted as that the contract for his care was not ultra vires. See Board, etc., v. Slatter, 52 Ind. 171; City of Anderson v. O'Connor, 98 Ind. 168.

There is nothing in the evidence that would justify us in reversing the judgment because of an excessive recovery.

We have given to the questions involved in this case a thorough and extended examination, not on account of the amount involved, but on account of the importance of the questions. As we find no available error in the record, the judgment is affirmed with costs.

Agency-Evidence, Acts and Declaration of Agent Inadmissible.Plaintiff sued the railway company for the price of ties sold by him to a contractor, plaintiff undertaking to show that the contractor was agent of

the company. Held, that the acts and declarations of the contractor were inadmissible to prove such agency. Clanton v. Des Moines, O. & S. R. R. Co., Iowa, October 23, 1885.

NELSON

v.

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL R. R. Co.

(60 Wisconsin Reports, 320.)

A locomotive engineer is not bound, at all hazards, to comprehend fully all the results of changes in the running time of trains made by a new timetable, and is not necessarily guilty of negligence in running his train contrary to the rules of such time-table on the first trip after it takes effect.

The length of time given to such engineer to examine the new time-table, his recent severe and protracted labors upon the road, his state of health and the fact that he had applied to be relieved from duty on such trip, the previous manner of running trains, and his understanding of the changes, are all pertinent to the issue of negligence.

Evasiveness or surplusage in the answers to questions submitted for a special verdict, if they could not possibly prejudice the appellant, will not work a reversal of the judgment.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Racine County.

The plaintiff was for several years a locomotive engineer in the service of the defendant company. Having been discharged from such service, he brought this action to recover an unpaid balance alleged to be due him for wages, and claimed $185.75, and interest from March 1, 1881.

The answer of the company admits the service, but denies the indebtedness. It also contains a counter-claim for damages suffered by the company by the alleged negligence of the plaintiff to an amount exceeding the plaintiff's demand. The damages claimed were the result of a collision between the train on which the plaintiff was employed, known as train No. 7, and another train, designated as No. 38, which occurred under the following circum

stances:

Previous to Sunday, February 20, 1881, under the railway timetable then in force, train No. 38 left Savanna, on the Mississippi river, going east, at 11.55 P.M., except Sundays. Train No. 7 left Freeport, Illinois, going west, daily, in the evening. These trains ran upon the Racine & Southwestern division of the defendant's railway, and met at an intermediate station called Hickory Grove on each night except Sundays. No. 38 had the right of way, and hence No. 7 waited for it at Hickory Grove on the nights