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CONFISCATION.

A person who engaged in the rebellion, and whose real estate has been sold under the acts of Congress of August 6, 1861, and July 17, 1862, in pursuance of a judicial decree of confiscation, forfeits thereby its use during life; but such decree and sale does not work a divestiture of title, and he has afterwards the right to execute a mortgage or conveyance of the same property; which, however, will only take effect on the termination of the life of the original owner. Wallach v. Van Riswick, Chicago L. N., March 21, 1874.

COMMON CARRIERS.

RESTRICTING LIABILITY. When a clause in the receipt given by an express company restricts the liability of the company to $50, unless the value of the package is stated in the receipt, such sum is the limit of recovery for a single package in case of loss where no value is stated. Oppenheimer v. U. S. Express Co., Albany L. J., March 21, 1874.

CONTRACT.

1. A CONTRACT TO BUILD A VESSEL is a contract to be performed on land, and falling within the ordinary common law and belongs to state jurisdiction, and a state has a right to give a lien against her for work and materials entering into her construction. New Schooner Maggie Cain v. Shakespeare, Leg. Chron., March 21, 1874.

2. PRESUMPTION. An executory contract, made by one claiming the benefits of a preemption law of 1841, before making proof and payment as a preëmptor, to convey land upon receipt of a patent from the United States, cannot be enforced. Hutson v. Walker, Pac. Law Rep., March 10, 1874.

See USURY, 2.

COPYRIGHT.

1. COPYRIGHT AT COMMON LAW. The right of an author or his assignee to the exclusive use of his literary productions exists at common law, independently of all statutes. Isaacs v. Daly, Cent. L. J., March

19, 1874.

2. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS. Such being the case, the state courts have jurisdiction to protect literary property. The act of Congress of July 8, 1870, affords an additional remedy merely, and does not affect the preexisting jurisdiction. Ib.

3. INFRINGEMENT. TITLE OF PLAY. The mere fact that a dramatic composition bears the same title as a prior dramatic composition, does not, if this circumstance is wholly accidental, and if the compositions are in other respects dissimilar, constitute the latter composition an infringement of the copyright of the proprietor of the former. 1b.

EJECTMENT.

1. SQUATTERS. - The owner of the fee can maintain ejectment against a squatter who has neither claim nor color of title. Sykes v. Hayes, Chicago L. N., March 14, 1874.

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2. Where the squatter had admitted title in the plaintiff's grantor, it is not necessary that the plaintiff produce other evidence of title than the conveyance from his grantor. Ib.

3. LEGAL TITLE.The legal title in ejectment must prevail. Vallejo Land Asso. v. Viera, Pac. Law Rep., March 10, 1874.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 8.

EQUITY.

1. NECESSARY PARTIES IN EQUITY. - To a bill by a junior mortgagee against a mortgagor or his assignee in bankruptcy, prior incumbrancers are necessary parties, where there is substantial doubt as to the amounts which are due them or as to the property covered by their liens. Sutherland v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, &c. Co., Cent. L. J., March 12, 1874. 2. SALES IN EQUITY OF DOUBTFUL INTEREST. A court of equity will in no instance expose for sale an interest capable of being reduced to a certainty, where any doubt exists as to its character and extent. lb.

3. CHANCERY PRACTICE. - FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE. Where a subsequent incumbrancer is already impleaded by a prior one, a subsequent original bill, on his part, will not be sustained to foreclose his mortgage. Full relief may be granted in the first suit, either with or without a cross-bill, as exigencies exist. Ib.

4. WHEN INDEPENDENT SUITS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. When property is in the hands of a receiver, no party having interest therein; and much less will active parties be permitted, without leave of court, to seek an enforcement of their right, by an original suit. Such leave will in no case be granted where the relief sought is competent in the pending litigation. 15.

5. SEPARATE SUIT BY MORTGAGE TRUSTEE. Where a subsequent mortgage trustee, who had appeared and submitted to a receiver of the estate, resigned his trust pendente lite, and his successor, without leave, filed an original bill of foreclosure, it was held to be unnecessary and unwarranted. Such suit would be permanently stayed on summary application, or, upon answer and proofs, dismissed at the hearing. The rights of such successor need not be noticed in the original suit, as he would be bound by the decree. Ib.

6. CHANCERY PLEADING. OFFICE OF CROSS-BILL. Where matters are germane to and connected with the subject of a suit, they may be introduced by cross-bill, although new and not mentioned in the original bill. lb.

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7. MANDAMUS. In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, a mandamus against an officer of the government abates on his death or retirement from office. His successor in office cannot be brought in by way of amendment of the proceeding, or on an order for the substitution of parties. United States v. Boutwell, Leg. Gazette, March 20, 1874.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

EVIDENCE.

1. PAROL EVIDENCE. On the vacation of an alley which appeared never to have been actually opened, and by which plaintiff's property was

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bounded, parol evidence cannot be admitted to prove plaintiff's ownership and conveyance of the alley as a lot. Meyers v. Robinson, Leg. Int., March 13, 1874.

2. CROSS-EXAMINATION. Although a greater latitude is allowable in the cross-examination of a party who places himself on the stand, than in that of other witnesses, still, where the cross-examination is directed to matters not inquired about in the principal examination, its course and extent is very largely subject to the control of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion; and the exercise of that discretion is not reviewable on a writ of error. Rea v. Missouri, Int. Rev. Rec., March 21, 1874.

3. OBJECTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE must be specifically taken at the trial. Gardiner v. Schmaelzle, Pac. Law Rep., March 10, 1874.

4. POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL LAND. Where the plaintiff in ejectment claimed title to a lot of land under a deed executed by authority of a power of attorney to sell "all lots now unsold." Held, that the power of attorney was admissible in evidence without proof that the lot was unsold. Ib.

FEDERAL COURT.

POWER OF FEDERAL COURT TO ORDER SUIT TO BE INSTITUTED IN STATE COURT. The late decision in Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551, denying the power of the district court to invade the jurisdiction of a state tribunal, where property is in its actual custody, under proceedings commenced anterior to the bankruptcy, does not deny the power of the circuit court to order all matters pending therein to be adjudicated in an original suit, subsequently commenced in such court, by an assignee in bankruptcy. It is a mere question of practice and convenience. That the property is in the hands of the court and receiver constitutes no exception to the rule. Sutherland v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, &c. Co., Cent. L. J., March 12,

1874.

See SUPREME COURT.

INSURANCE.

1. LIFE INSURANCE. INSURABLE INTEREST. That Parker was a creditor of McKenty, and had such an insurable interest as would entitle him to recover in a suit against the company had it refused payment to him. McKenty v. Universal Life Insurance Co., Chicago L. N., March 14, 1874.

2. NOT CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY. That the better opinion is that policies of life insurance are not like fire and marine insurance contracts of indemnity. The agreement is that upon the death of the party whose life is insured, it will pay to the person named in the policy a certain amount therein specified. Ib.

3. SUIT BY ADMINISTRATRIX. This suit was brought by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased, whose life was insured, to recover the surplus over and above the amount paid Parker, the creditor, by the company; Parker was paid all that he claimed on the death of McKenty,

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and gave a receipt in full and surrendered the policy: Held, that the plaintiff could not recover under an assignment from Parker to her, after he had been paid by the company the full amount he claimed. Ib. See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 10, 12.

INTERNAL REVENUE LAW.

1. PROMISSORY NOTE. On a criminal information for issuing without a stamp, and with intent to evade the provisions of the internal revenue act of 1866, the following instrument :

IRON CLIFFS COMPANY.

[Five. NEGAUNEE, Mich., Jan. 30, 1870.

Pay to the order of E. B. Isham, supt., or bearer,

FIVE DOLLARS,

.

Value received, and charge to account of

E. B. ISHAM.

To CHARLES J. CANDA, Esq., New York. Countersigned: E. S. GREEN, Clerk. Held, That the instrument was, in form, a draft or order for the payment of money drawn upon another than a banker or trust company, and not subject to the stamp duties imposed upon a promissory note. The United States v. Isham, Int. Rev. Rec., March 14, 1874.

2. SUITS BY GOVERNMENT.-The government is not prohibited by anything contained in the act of July 13, 1866, from employing any common law remedy for the collection of its dues. The rule that statutory remedies exclude the common law remedy is for others not for the government, it being settled that so much of the royal prerogative as belonged to the king in his capacity of parens patriæ, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political state as it does into the principles of the British Constitution, which establishes the principle that the king is not bound by any act of parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular words. Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, Int. Rev. Rec., March 21, 1874.

See BANKS, 3.

JUROR.

DISQUALIFICATION OF. A juror, who has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, which it would take some evidence to remove, is disqualified. Staup v. Commonwealth, Leg. Int., March 20, 1874.

LEASE.

SURETY. A was surety on a lease renewable from year to year, and having given six months' notice that he would not continue surety after the end of the current year; held, that he having died in the mean time, his estate was not liable for any rent in arrear after that date. Estate of De Silver, Leg. Int., March 20, 1874.

LICENSE.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3.

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LIEN.

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MECHANIC'S LIEN. Under the act of February 17, 1858, a lien was filed for a patent hoisting and dumping cage, against the entire leasehold estate of a colliery.

Held, That the act of assembly gave the mechanic no such lien. It confines the lien clearly to the interest of the lessees in the improvement and machinery upon which his labor and services were bestowed. St. Clair Coal Co. v. Martz, Leg. Chron., March 21, 1874.

LIFE INSURANCE.

See INSURANCE, 1, 2, 3; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 10, 12.

LIMITATIONS.

1. STATUTE FIXING BAR WHERE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ALREADY ACCRUED. On the 16th day of March, 1869, the Legislature of Georgia passed an act providing that all suits of whatever nature, in which the cause of action accrued prior to the 1st day of June, 1865, should be barred, unless brought by the 1st day of January, 1870. The period thus allowed for bringing suits was nine months and fifteen days. This is held to be a reasonable period in ordinary cases. Marsh v. Burroughs, Cent. L. J., March 12, 1874.

2. TWELVE MONTHS' EXEMPTION IN FAVOR OF ADMINISTRATORS. -By the Georgia Code, § 2548, an administrator is not liable to suit until one year from the date of his qualification. It is held that this exemption is not repealed by the act of March 16, 1869. If the latter act had such an effect, it would probably be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States; but as it does not, it is a valid enactment. Ib.

3. COMPUTATION OF TIME UNDER THE TWO STATUTES. In computing the time which will bar an action, with reference to these two statutes, it is held that the administrator is entitled, first, to the one year's exemption allowed by § 2548 of the Code, and then that the creditor of the estate is entitled to the nine months and fifteen days of the act of March 16, 1869, added thereto, in which to bring his suit, although the time within which suit may be brought may thereby be extended beyond the 1st day of January, 1870. lb.

4. CONSTRUCTION OF. In construing a statute of limitations, it must, so far as it affects rights of action in existence when the statute is passed, be held, in the absence of a contrary provision, to begin when the cause of action is first subjected to its operation. Sohn v. Waterson, Leg. Gazette, March 20, 1874.

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5. TIME THE STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN. Hence when a right of action accrued in 1854, and a statute of limitations passed in 1859 barred all actions of its kind not " commenced within two years next after the cause or right of such action shall have accrued: " Held, that the cause of action began to run from the date of the statute, and that suit might have been brought any time within two years from that date, and accordingly, that the statute had not summarily cut off existing rights, thus making itself unconstitutional. Ib.