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money, had taken the position of an outside party; in other words, that he had, as to the money, ceased to be the treasurer of the company. Scammon v. Kimball, Ib. Affirmed on appeal, Chicago L. N., January 17, 1874.

See ADMIRALTY 2, 3, 4; BANKRUPTCY, 8.

MARRIED WOMAN.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MARSHAL.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

WHAT RISKS ASSUMED BY SERVANT ENGAGED IN DANGEROUS EMPLOYMENT.-B., who was a carpenter, was employed by R. to go in a boat, upon a submerged lot owned by him; and do certain work of his trade. While there at work, a shot was fired from a house on an adjacent lot, which wounded B., hence his action for damages. It appeared that R. knew his possession of the lot was resisted and a resort to arms was imminent at any moment. He did not inform B. of this fact, and the latter had no reason to believe he was going into danger when employed to do the work.

Held, R. was liable. The risk B. legally agreed to take was such as was necessarily incident to his employment.

R. could have relieved himself of responsibility by informing B. of the facts of the danger.

The concealment of facts, or the failure to state them by employer to employé, which would tend to expose any hidden and unusual danger to be encountered in the course of the employment, to a degree beyond that which the employment fairly imports, renders the employer liable for injuries resulting therefrom to the employé. Baxter v. Roberts, Am. L. R., January, 1874.

MORTGAGE.

1. A MASTER CANNOT GO behind the decree of foreclosure in distributing a fund raised by the sale. He must distribute it to the parties entitled under the decree. Rice v. So. Penna. &c. Co., Legal Int., January 2, 1874; S. C., Legal Gazette, January 2, 1874.

2. A MORTGAGE MADE TO SECURE the payment of certain bonds is made for the benefit of the bondholders only, and no one can have an interest in the mortgage except as a bondholder.

Creditors cannot inquire into the good faith of a transaction by the company, unless it covers a fraud intended to affect them. Ib.

See BANKRUPTCY, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.

Where an inexperienced agent was left in charge of a train of cars, for the purpose of loading the cars with oil, and through his ignorance or unskilful management a collision occurred between one of the cars and

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the locomotive, resulting in a fire which burned plaintiff's house, the railroad company was held responsible for his acts. Oil Creek, &c. Co. v. Keighron, Legal Gazette, January 9, 1874; S. C., Legal Int., January 16, 1874.

NOTICE.

See BANKRUPTCY, 5.

NOTORIETY.

See POSSESSION.

POLICE POWER OF STATE.

See TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY.

POSSESSION.

BY MARRIED WOMAN UNDER PAROL GIFT. A married woman to whom possession of land is delivered under a parol gift, and who occupies the land uninterruptedly, adversely, and exclusively as her own for fifteen years, thereby acquires a complete title in herself, subject to an estate by curtesy in her husband, where the husband, although living with her, claims no independent, exclusive occupation in himself. Clark v. Gilbert, Am. L. R., January, 1874.

NOTORIETY. - Possession taken under a parol gift is adverse in the donee against the donor, and if continued for fifteen years perfects the title of the donee as against the donor. The donor in such case not only knows that the possession is adverse, but intends it to be so, and there is no occasion for any notoriety. Notoriety is only important where the adverse character of the possession is to be brought home to the owner by presumption. 1b.

IN U. S. COURTS.

PRACTICE.

-Persons cannot be made parties to a bill in equity in the U. S. courts, by designating them by a fictitious name in the introductory part of the bill and in the prayer for process.

A service of subpoena upon persons so designated is void.

An appearance does not cure such defects in the writ and its service, or make such persons parties on the record. Ky. &c. Co. v. Day, Chicago L. N., January 17, 1874.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

PRESUMPTION FROM LAPSE OF TIME.

See ADMINISTRATOR'S ACCOUNT.

RATIFICATION.

See CORPORATION, 1; BANKRUPTCY, 10.

SET-OFF.

NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTE, &c. &c. - A non-negotiable note payable on demand was executed to F. by the defendant. Fourteen years later the

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note was transferred and delivered by F. to the plaintiff in part payment of a debt, and the plaintiff brought suit in his own name thereon under the statute authorizing a suit to be brought. At the time the plaintiff took the note of F. the defendant had for several years had a claim on book against F. greater than the note. The plaintiff knew this, and had shortly before been present at a meeting of F. and the defendant at which they had attempted to adjust their mutual claims, and at which F. had told him that he intended to apply the note in part payment of his indebtedness to the defendant. He also knew that the defendant expected such application to be made. The application however was not actually made at the time, the parties separating without having agreed as to the exact balance due. Whether the defendant could set off his claim against the note in the suit, quære. The authorities both English and American are in conflict and confusion upon the point.

Whether or not such set-off could be made in an ordinary case, yet here the plaintiff must be regarded as having taken the note with full knowledge of an understanding of the parties that it should be applied upon the book account of the plaintiff, and therefore as having taken it subject to the right of the defendant to make the set-off.

It was not found in terms that F. was insolvent at the time the set-off was sought to be made, but it appeared that the defendant had obtained judgment against F. more than a year before for the amount; that the debt had then been of several years' standing, and that the execution obtained upon the judgment had never been collected. Held, that it might reasonably be inferred that F. had not the means of payment or that they were beyond the reach of legal process. Fitch v. Gates, Am. L. R., January, 1874.

See CORPORATION, 2..

SPRING GUN.

INJURY TO TRESPASSER. - Defendant set a spring gun to protect his vineyard from trespassers; plaintiff entered the premises without permission of defendant, with the intention of taking grapes, without notice or knowledge of his spring gun, and was wounded by it. Held, that he is entitled to recover for the damages sustained by reason of the wound, in an action against defendant. Hooker v. Miller, Western Jurist, January, 1874.

STATE TAXATION.

NO CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS PROHIBIT a state tax upon the property of an agent of the government merely because it is the property of such an agent. A contrary doctrine would greatly embarrass the States in the collection of their necessary revenue without a corresponding advantage to the United States. U. Š. R. R. v. Peniston, Legal Int., January 2, 1874; S. C., Legal Gazette, January 16, 1874.

STORE-KEEPER.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

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STOCKHOLDER.

RELATIONS OF STOCKHOLDER indebted to insolvent corporation for unpaid shares considered. Sawyer v. Hoag, Chicago L. N., January 17, 1874.

TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY.

POLICE POWER. Before private property can be taken or charged, even under the police power of the state, there must be an adjudication by some tribunal authorized by law, upon the facts which render the taking proper. City of Phila. v. Scott, Legal Int., January 9, 1874.

FRAUDULENT COMBINATION.

TAX SALE.

Where the bidders at a tax sale form a ring, and each takes a bid and piece of land as his turn comes, such sale is void; and land so purchased and afterwards conveyed by tax deed cannot be held by such purchaser as against the owner. Easton v. Mawhinney, Western Jurist, January, 1874.

TITLE.

CLOUD UPON. EQUITY JURISDICTION TO REMOVE. The orator alleged in his bill that R., his ward, was the owner of a farm in F. and had a homestead therein, and that he was adjudged a bankrupt, and the defendant appointed his assignee, and that said homestead was decreed to R. by the court of bankruptcy; that R. absconded, and the orator was appointed his guardian; that the defendant thereafterwards obtained judgment by default against R., before a justice of the peace, without the service of process, notice, or recognizance for review, and levied his execution upon, and set off, said homestead; that it was the duty of the orator, as such guardian, to sell said homestead for the support of R.'s family, but that said levy and set-off hindered and impeded his selling the same, and constituted a cloud upon the title thereof; and prayed that said cloud be removed. The answer averred that the court of bankruptcy adjudged that R. had a homestead interest in said farm; that the defendant's claim upon which said judgment was founded was anterior to the acquisition of said homestead, and that said homestead was not exempt from said levy and set-off. The case was heard on bill and answer. Held, that the case was not one for the interposition of a court of equity. Rooney v. Soule, Am. L. R., January, 1874.

TITLE OF ACT.

The act of January 2, 1871, entitled "A further supplement to the act incorporating the city of Harrisburg, in the county of Dauphin, passed April 9, 1869," is defective in title, contains several distinct subjects, and is unconstitutional and void. In re State Street, Legal Chronicle, January 3, 1874.

TRESPASSER.

See SPRING GUN.

TRUST DEED.

See BANKRUPTCY, 10.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

WAR.

RULE APPLIED IN RESPECT TO PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF A STATE IN REBELLION. While the existence of war closes the courts of each belligerent to the citzens of the other, it does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process.

Before the late civil war certain citizens of California and Illinois had brought suit in the circuit court of the United States in Texas against citizens of that State to quiet the title of the complainants to a tract of land there situated, and prevent harassing and vexatious litigation from a multiplicity of suits. On the 20th of June, 1866, a final decree was entered in that suit, the circuit court being then open in Texas, and active hostilities having there ceased, although the proclamation of the President announcing the close of the war in that State was not made until the 20th of August afterwards:

Held, that the complainants had a right to proceed in the circuit court of the United States to protect their property situated in Texas from seizure, invasion, or disturbance by citizens of that State, so soon as that court was opened, whether official proclamation was made or not of the cessation of hostilities. Masterson v. Howard, Chicago L. N., January 10, 1874.

See INSURANCE, 8.

WILL.

1. CONSTRUCTION.- Where a will provides that an executor is "to have the control and management of all the affairs of the farm devised, and of keeping together the property during the life of the widow, and keep her provided for so long as she shall live or remain his widow, and to sell and dispose of such property as may be in the judgment of the executor necessary, from time to time, in the management of the farm and for the comfortable support of the widow, and as soon as she ceases to be his widow the property is to be sold and the proceeds divided equally among his children and heirs, the same as at her death," &c., upon an election by the widow not to take under the will, upon the application of one of the heirs, an inquest was awarded. In re Birth, Legal Chronicle, January 3, 1874.

2. A DEVISE OF REAL ESTATE to the son of the testator, and “in case my son should die without leaving any issue, "" then the real estate to be sold," &c.: held, that the son took a defeasible estate, which terminated at his death. Hickman v. Blackmore, Legal Gazette, January 16, 1874.