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pal election, was chosen assessor of Anamosa, and gave bond and took the oath of office as required by law. Both of these assessors were voted for by all the electors of the township, including those who lived within the limits of the town of Anamosa. From 1863 until after the assessment of the taxes in question, it was the custom of the assessor of Anamosa to list the land outside the town, the land in controversy among others, and no objection had ever been made. Held, that the assessments so made were void. Burley v. Fisher, West. Jur., June, 1874.

BANKRUPTCY.

1. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.- A creditor opposed the discharge of a voluntary petitioner and was overruled by the district court, whereupon he filed a petition of appeal to the circuit court, and the decree below was affirmed. Upon appeal to the supreme court, it was held that the case could not go beyond the circuit court. Coit v. Robinson & Chamberlain, Leg. Gazette, June 12, 1874.

2. ABSCONDING DEBTOR. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. — A bankrupt absconded and was subsequently proceeded against by petition of creditors and duly adjudged a bankrupt. His wife, who remained in the State, was dispossessed of the homestead by the assignee. It appearing that the homestead in question was owned by the bankrupt, and occupied by his family after he had absconded, it was ordered that the same be restored to the wife. In re Pratt, Cent. L. J., June 11, 1874.

CIRCULAR.

SENDING CIRCULAR. OFFER TO SELL. The defendants sent to plaintiffs a circular stating "Our present price for blue seat springs is," &c. Upon receipt of the circular, three days after it was mailed, plaintiff or dered a reasonable number of springs which defendants did not deliver. Subsequently plaintiff sued for breach of the contract. The court instructed the jury that sending the circular was an offer to sell at the price stated, which, having been accepted by plaintiff, a contract was entered into for the infraction of which defendants were liable. Hall v. Kimbark, Chicago L. N., June 13, 1874.

CONFISCATION ACT.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER, ETC. The proceedings under sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Confiscation Act are proceedings in rem. Discussion of the act and of the practice thereunder by Mr. Justice Strong, writing for the supreme court of the United States. U. S. v. Executor of Slidell et al. Chicago L. N., May 30, 1874.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

1. SPECIAL ACT. -INTEREST WHERE DEBT IS PAYABLE ELSEWHERE THAN WHERE MADE. - A railroad company was incorporated in Ohio by special act, one section of which provided that the company should have power, on the credit of the company, to borrow money, not exceeding in amount the amount of capital stock by this act authorized, and at a rate not exceeding seven per cent. per annum ; and, for the purpose of perfect

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ing said loan, the directors of said company shall have power, in the name of the company, to make and execute such bonds, promissory notes, or other evidences of debt, and payable at such times and places as shall be agreed upon by the respective parties so contracting, which made transferable and redeemable, in such form and at such times and places as may be therein designated.

may be

Subsequently, by another special act, the city of Cincinnati was authorized to loan the said railroad company a sum of money "upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as might be determined upon by the city council." A loan was accordingly duly made to the company, the council taking the company's bonds bearing interest at six per cent. and payable in New York, but reserving interest at the rate of seven per cent., six per cent. being the legal rate. Held, that the city was authorized to make the loan. H. & C. R. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, Am. Law Rec., June, 1874. 2. ADOPTION OF STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE. When the legislature of a state adopts the statute of another state it adopts, also, the constructions previously given it by the courts of such state, unless such constructions are clearly untenable. Streater v. The People, Mo. West. Jur., June, 1874.

CONTRACT.

See CIRCULAR; EVIDENCE, 4; MISTAKE; MORTGAGE.

CORPORATION.

LIABILITY OF OFFICES OF, AS TRUSTEES.—In respect to the property of the corporation, whether it be land, money, securities, capital stock, or other property held by the corporation, and the management of its business, the directors are trustees for the stockholders. The relation of trustee and cestui que trust exists wherever the action of the directors affects the whole body of the stockholders.

IN THE PURCHASE OF STOCK by a director from the holder, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist, as in such case the stock is wholly beyond the dominion and control of the director, and he has no duty to discharge in reference to it other than the duty devolving upon him to manage prudently the affairs and property of the corporation itself. Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds, Am. Law. Reg., June, 1874.

COUNTERFEIT NOTE.

Where it ap

DILIGENCE IN ASCERTAINING CHARACTER OF NOTE. peared that the plaintiff had kept a treasury note, that he alleged to be counterfeit, upon his person for five months without attempting to ascertain the true nature of the note, although cognizant of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry, it was held that he could not recover, the lack of diligence being sufficient to debar his right of action. Atwood v. Cornwall, Am. Law Reg., April, 1874.

See EVIDENCE, 1.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY is a circumstance of weight,

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but is not enough of itself to warrant a conviction. People v. Noregea, Pac. Law Rep., May 5, 1874.

2. RECEIVING MONEY known to have been obtained by robbery does not constitute robbery. People v. Shepardson, Pac. Law Rep., May 12,

1874.

3. MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. — The court charged the jury as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that the killing was unlawful, accompanied with malice, but not deliberate and premeditated, your verdict will be murder in the second degree." Held, not to be error. People v. Doyell, Pac. Law Rep., May 5, 1874.

4. CHARGE OF COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES. · HOMICIDE. — Counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge: "If, under the instructions given you, you shall find that the wood in dispute between the defendant and the deceased, at the time of the killing, was the property of the defendant, then the defendant was not required by law to deliver or give up the possession of said wood to Black, the deceased, in order to prevent such personal conflict as might be necessary to defend his possession; but, on the contrary, the defendant had a right to defend his possession of said wood against any forcible attempt of Black to take it from him, and, if necessary for that purpose, had a right to kill Black; for the owner of personal property in his possession has a right to use such force as is necessary to prevent the forcible taking of it from his possession by one not entitled to the possession of it."

The court gave the instruction as asked, with the addition following: "If, however, the alleged trespass is unaccompanied by any felonious attempt, the law does not admit the force of the provocation to be sufficient to warrant the owner to make use, in repelling the trespass, of a deadly weapon; and if, under such circumstances, the owner of the property with a deadly weapon slays the trespasser, the owner is guilty of mur der."

The defendant excepts to that portion of the instruction added by the court, because it declares that nothing short of an attempt to commit a felony can be admitted as a sufficient provocation to reduce the homicide below murder. Held, that the instruction, as originally drawn, assumed that the defendant was acting in self-defence, with full possession of his faculties and control of his temper. It was addressed to the question of justification, and not to the gross provocation and irresistible passion which enter into the definition of manslaughter. The proviso, added by the court, simply announced that, in a certain event, the defendant would still be guilty of murder, notwithstanding the general proposition contained in the instruction as prepared by counsel.

ESTOPPEL.

MUNICIPAL OFFICERS are powerless to bind the public so as to work an estoppel. Clements v. Hamilton County, Am. Law Rec., June, 1874. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.

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tent to testify as experts to determine the genuineness of a treasury note. The opinions of persons through whose hands it has passed may, however, be inadmissible. Atwood v. Cornwall, Am. Law. Reg., April, 1874.

2. OPINIONS AS TO QUALITY are incompetent, unless there be fraud or warranty. Whitaker v. Eastwick, Leg. Int., May 22, 1874.

3. EJECTION FROM CAR ON RAILROAD. OFFER TO PAY UPON SURRENDER OF TICKET. A party purchased a ticket to a particular place, before arriving at which he voluntarily left the train without informing the conductor of any intention to continue the journey to the place named on the ticket. Several days afterward he attempted to ride upon the ticket to the place named, upon another train, the conductor of which took up the ticket and put the party off. In an action for damages, the exclusion of evidence that the party offered to pay upon a surrender of his ticket was held to be error. Vankirk v. Penn. R. R. Co., Leg. Gazette, May 29, 1874.

4. DECLARATIONS OF TICKET AGENT AFTER SALE OF TICKET. Evidence of the declarations of a ticket agent as to a party's right to ride upon a ticket which the agent had sold, held to be inadmissible as evidence of a contract, but not inadmissible as evidence of the good faith of the party in his claim to ride upon the ticket. Ib.

5. PARTY ON RAILROAD PERMITTED TO RIDE PAST STATIONS. PUTTING PARTY OFF BETWEEN STATIONS. The conductor having suffered the plaintiff to ride past several stations before ejecting him, and then having put him out, remote from any shelter, and in a severe storm; it was held, that those circumstances might be considered by the jury in deciding whether the conductor intentionally selected an inhospitable spot, or whether it happened to be the locality of the plaintiff's persistent refusal to pay. 16.

6. AFFIRMATIVE PROOF TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENT STATEMENTS OUT OF COURT. When an attempt is made to impeach a witness by proving former contradictory statements, he may be supported by evidence that he has made to other persons declarations consistent with his testimony. Such is the law of Indiana, and perhaps of Pennsylvania and North Carolina. In New York, as in England, after much uncertainty, the rule seems now to be settled that such evidence is ordinarily inadmissible; and in others of the states it is rejected. The best elementary writers reach the conclusion that the evidence is to be received only in exceptional cases. People v. Doyell, Pac. Law. Rep., May 5, 1874. 7. DECLARATIONS OF DECEASED PARTY. A shipmaster and owner procured a marine insurance policy upon his one quarter of his vessel "on account of whom it may concern; loss payable to himself. The vessel was lost during the voyage covered by the policy, with the master and all on board. The plaintiff, a creditor of the deceased master, brought this action upon the policy, claiming that it was obtained for his benefit. He introduced testimony of the declarations of the deceased that if the plaintiff would make him a loan he would secure him by a policy on this vessel; and subsequent declarations that the loan had been made to him by the plaintiff, and that he had secured the plaintiff by procuring a policy for his benefit. Held, that this testimony was inadmissible without proof that the deceased was acting as plaintiff's agent in effecting the insurance,

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and that the declarations themselves were not competent for this purpose. Sleeper v. Union Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., June, 1874.

8. LEGAL PRACTITIONERS are competent as experts to prove the regularity of a judgment obtained in one state in a trial in another. v. Clark, West. Jur., June, 1874.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 4; INSURANCE, 1, 2.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.

Crafts

1. THE MISSISSIPPI STATUTE of 1865 held to be unconstitutional in so far as it applies to debts created before its passage. Lasly v. Phipps, Am. Law Reg., April, 1874.

2. CONSTRUCTION of the Homestead Act of Missouri, and discussion of the nature of homestead exemptions and the laws which relate thereto. Volger v. Montgomery, Am. Law Reg., April, 1874.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. HUSBAND NOT COMPETENT WITNESS. — In Wisconsin the husband is not competent as a witness for his wife; this incompetency rests on grounds of public policy, and is not removed by the statute removing the disqualification of interest. In re Jones, Chicago L. N., May 16, 1874.

2. SECURITIES TAKEN IN WIFE'S NAME will not pass to her as her separate property, if they were so drawn simply for convenience: it must clearly appear that they were intended as a settlement upon her. Where such securities are used and collected by the husband with the wife's consent, this conduct disproves the claim that they were intended as a settlement upon her.

The wife having allowed the husband to enjoy the credit of such securities and their proceeds, cannot afterwards claim them as against creditors who have trusted him on the faith of such apparent ownership. Ib.

3. ESTOPPEL.-If the wife joins the husband when embarrassed in conveying his property to their children, making no claims for herself, she cannot afterwards set up a claim when such conveyances are about to be set aside. Ib.

4. CREDIBILITY OF WIFE'S TESTIMONY. — Where the wife's testimony is defective and contradictory, particularly about the most material matters, her statements as to the amount of her claim should be looked upon with suspicion. Ib.

5. OPERATION OF PROPERTY ACT ON VESTED RIGHTS. — A note given to the wife for money loaned by her while unmarried, and prior to the passage of the Married Woman's Property Act, passes to the husband under the common law rule, and his vested interest therein cannot be abrogated by any subsequent act of the legislature; and though he receives the money thereon she cannot prove the amount against him as a debt in bankruptcy. 1b.

6. RECEIPT OF INCOME OF WIFE'S ESTATE. - A married woman may bestow upon her husband the income of her separate estate; and where the husband, with the consent of the wife, is in the habit of receiving such income and profits, her voluntary choice to thus dispose of them for the