Vol. I.] NOTES OF NEW BOOKS. [No. 7. NOTICE OF SALES of bankrupt's property. How made, 4. PREFERENCES. Section 35 of original act amended in respect of time in which preferences shall be void, 10. Section 35 of original act amended to explain intent, &c., 11. PROCEEDINGS. Amendment of sections 40, 41, and 42 of original act, 13, 14, 15. Petition must be filed in involuntary cases within six months after act of bankruptcy, 12. In involuntary cases, 12. PROOF OF CLAIM. Amendment of section 21 of original act, 7. In involuntary cases, 12. May be made before notary public, 20. PROPERTY OF BANKRUPT. Šale thereof; of the duties imposed upon the assignee, &c., 4. REAL ESTATE OF BANKRUPT. How may be sold, 4. RECEIVER. May be directed by court to carry on business of bankrupt, 1. Shall make annual report, and what it shall contain, 19. Shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor for violation of section 19, 19. SALES. Of property of bankrupt. How made, &c., 4. Court shall have supervisory power over, 4. SET-OFF. Amendment of section 20 of original act in respect of, 6. STATE COURT. Legal debt not in excess of $500, may be collected in, by order of the bankruptcy court, 2. SUPREME COURT, U. S. Shall make new rules for carrying out provisions of amendatory act, 18, 19. NOTES OF NEW BOOKS. IN the preparation and publication of the Statutes of Illinois for the session of 1873-74, WM. L. GROSS, Esq., has achieved as pronounced a success as can be found in the history of American law book making. The legislature rose on the 30th of March and the volume was ready for delivery by the first of June, while the laws it contained went into force on the first of July. The book embraces what is tantamount to nearly a thousand ordinary pages, and from first to last gives evidence of conscientious and intelligent labor. It has honest marginal notes, a full index and other essentials, all well done, and is, mechanically, unexceptionable. Its production, under the circumstances, is a happy vindication of American enterprise. THE PROFESSION will be gratified to learn that Messrs. W. H. & O. H. Morrison, of Washington, are about to bring out a continuation of Curtis's Decisions, to be edited by Mr. Justice Miller. A WORK on extraordinary remedies, including Mandamus, by Jas. L. High, Esq., will shortly be issued by Messrs. Callaghan & Co. of Chicago. MESSRS. BAKER, VOORHIS & Co. of New York have ready an enlarged and revised edition, the sixth, of Sedgwick on Damages. The same house have in preparation a new edition of Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutes, with notes by John Norton Pomeroy, LL. D. JOHN D. PARSONS, Esq., of Albany, announces a work on Nuisances, by H. G. Wood, Esq. THE AMERICAN LAW TIMES. NEW SERIES.-AUGUST, 1874.- VOL. I., No. 8. DIGEST OF CASES PUBLISHED IN EXTENSO IN LATE ISSUES OF AMERICAN LEGAL PERI ASSESSMENT BY OFFICER IRREGULARLY ELECTED. Certain land situated in Fairview Township was sold for the taxes of 1867 to defendant, and a deed made therefor. As the law then stood, in addition to township assessors, there was chosen by each incorporated town at its municipal election an assessor, who listed all property within its limits. The township assessors were elected at the general election for state and county officers. The incorporated town of Anamosa is in Fairview Township. At the general election of 1866, one Arnold was elected assessor of Fairview Township, and one Dott, at the same election, and not at a munici VOL. I. 9 Vol. I.] DIGEST OF CASES. [No. 8. pal election, was chosen assessor of Anamosa, and gave bond and took the oath of office as required by law. Both of these assessors were voted for by all the electors of the township, including those who lived within the limits of the town of Anamosa. From 1863 until after the assessment of the taxes in question, it was the custom of the assessor of Anamosa to list the land outside the town, the land in controversy among others, and no objection had ever been made. Held, that the assessments so made were void. Burley v. Fisher, West. Jur., June, 1874. BANKRUPTCY. 1. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. A creditor opposed the discharge of a voluntary petitioner and was overruled by the district court, whereupon he filed a petition of appeal to the circuit court, and the decree below was affirmed. Upon appeal to the supreme court, it was held that the case could not go beyond the circuit court. Coit v. Robinson & Chamberlain, Leg. Gazette, June 12, 1874. 2. ABSCONDING DEBTOR. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. A bankrupt absconded and was subsequently proceeded against by petition of creditors and duly adjudged a bankrupt. His wife, who remained in the State, was dispossessed of the homestead by the assignee. It appearing that the homestead in question was owned by the bankrupt, and occupied by his family after he had absconded, it was ordered that the same be restored to the wife. In re Pratt, Cent. L. J., June 11, 1874. CIRCULAR. SENDING CIRCULAR. OFFER TO SELL. The defendants sent to plaintiffs a circular stating "Our present price for blue seat springs is," &c. Upon receipt of the circular, three days after it was mailed, plaintiff ordered a reasonable number of springs which defendants did not deliver. Subsequently plaintiff sued for breach of the contract. The court instructed the jury that sending the circular was an offer to sell at the price stated, which, having been accepted by plaintiff, a contract was entered into for the infraction of which defendants were liable. Hall v. Kimbark, Chicago L. N., June 13, 1874. CONFISCATION ACT. PROCEEDINGS UNDER, ETC. The proceedings under sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Confiscation Act are proceedings in rem. Discussion of the act and of the practice thereunder by Mr. Justice Strong, writing for the supreme court of the United States. U. S. v. Executor of Slidell et al. Chicago L. N., May 30, 1874. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. 1. SPECIAL ACT. -INTEREST WHERE DEBT IS PAYABLE ELSEWHERE THAN WHERE MADE. -A railroad company was incorporated in Ohio by special act, one section of which provided that the company should have power, on the credit of the company, to borrow money, not exceeding in amount the amount of capital stock by this act authorized, and at a rate not exceeding seven per cent. per annum; and, for the purpose of perfect Vol. I.] DIGEST OF CASES. [No. 8. ing said loan, the directors of said company shall have power, in the name of the company, to make and execute such bonds, promissory notes, or other evidences of debt, and payable at such times and places as shall be agreed upon by the respective parties so contracting, which . . may be made transferable and redeemable, in such form and at such times and places as may be therein designated. Subsequently, by another special act, the city of Cincinnati was authorized to loan the said railroad company a sum of money "upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as might be determined upon by the city council." A loan was accordingly duly made to the company, the council taking the company's bonds bearing interest at six per cent. and payable in New York, but reserving interest at the rate of seven per cent., six per cent. being the legal rate. Held, that the city was authorized to make the loan. H. & C. R. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, Am. Law Rec., June, 1874. 2. ADOPTION OF STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE. When the legislature of a state adopts the statute of another state it adopts, also, the constructions previously given it by the courts of such state, unless such constructions are clearly untenable. Streater v. The People, Mo. West. Jur., June, 1874. CONTRACT. See CIRCULAR; EVIDENCE, 4; MISTAKE; MORTGAGE. CORPORATION. In respect to the property LIABILITY OF OFFICES OF, AS TRUSTEES. of the corporation, whether it be land, money, securities, capital stock, or other property held by the corporation, and the management of its business, the directors are trustees for the stockholders. The relation of trustee and cestui que trust exists wherever the action of the directors affects the whole body of the stockholders. IN THE PURCHASE OF STOCK by a director from the holder, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist, as in such case the stock is wholly beyond the dominion and control of the director, and he has no duty to discharge in reference to it other than the duty devolving upon him to manage prudently the affairs and property of the corporation itself. Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds, Am. Law. Reg., June, 1874. COUNTERFEIT NOTE. - DILIGENCE IN ASCERTAINING CHARACTER OF NOTE. Where it appeared that the plaintiff had kept a treasury note, that he alleged to be counterfeit, upon his person for five months without attempting to ascertain the true nature of the note, although cognizant of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry, it was held that he could not recover, the lack of diligence being sufficient to debar his right of action. Atwood v. Cornwall, Am. Law Reg., April, 1874. See EVIDENCE, 1. CRIMINAL LAW. 1. POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY is a circumstance of weight, Vol. I.] DIGEST OF CASES. [No. 8. but is not enough of itself to warrant a conviction. People v. Noregea, Pac. Law Rep., May 5, 1874. 2. RECEIVING MONEY known to have been obtained by robbery does not constitute robbery. People v. Shepardson, Pac. Law Rep., May 12, 1874. 3. MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. — The court charged the jury as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that the killing was unlawful, accompanied with malice, but not deliberate and premeditated, your verdict will be murder in the second degree." Held, not to be error. People v. Doyell, Pac. Law Rep., May 5, 1874. 4. CHARGE OF COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES. HOMICIDE. - Counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge: "If, under the instructions given you, you shall find that the wood in dispute between the defendant and the deceased, at the time of the killing, was the property of the defendant, then the defendant was not required by law to deliver or give up the possession of said wood to Black, the deceased, in order to prevent such personal conflict as might be necessary to defend his possession; but, on the contrary, the defendant had a right to defend his possession of said wood against any forcible attempt of Black to take it from him, and, if necessary for that purpose, had a right to kill Black; for the owner of personal property in his possession has a right to use such force as is necessary to prevent the forcible taking of it from his possession by one not entitled to the possession of it." The court gave the instruction as asked, with the addition following: "If, however, the alleged trespass is unaccompanied by any felonious attempt, the law does not admit the force of the provocation to be sufficient to warrant the owner to make use, in repelling the trespass, of a deadly weapon; and if, under such circumstances, the owner of the property with a deadly weapon slays the trespasser, the owner is guilty of murder.” The defendant excepts to that portion of the instruction added by the court, because it declares that nothing short of an attempt to commit a felony can be admitted as a sufficient provocation to reduce the homicide below murder. Held, that the instruction, as originally drawn, assumed that the defendant was acting in self-defence, with full possession of his faculties and control of his temper. It was addressed to the question of justification, and not to the gross provocation and irresistible passion which enter into the definition of manslaughter. The proviso, added by the court, simply announced that, in a certain event, the defendant would still be guilty of murder, notwithstanding the general proposition contained in the instruction as prepared by counsel. ESTOPPEL. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS are powerless to bind the public so as to work an estoppel. Clements v. Hamilton County, Am. Law Rec., June, 1874. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3. EVIDENCE. 1. AS TO GENUINENESS OF TREASURY NOTE. - Bankers are compe |