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deposited is in a proper state, so that the thing deposited may be reasonably safe in it;
absolutely safe. Ib.
no difference in his liability. Ib.
the carriages were placed under a shed on defendant's premises, a charge being made
invalidate a judgment and levy on his property when the debt is due and he has no
defence. Wilson v. Bank of St Paul, 1.
to prevent the judgment and levy, and a failure to do so is not sufficient evidence of
the bankrupt law. Ib.
the debtor, his judgment and levy upon his property are not, therefore, void, and are
no violation of the act. Ib.
ruptcy, though commenced within four months after levy of the execution or rendition
of the judgment. Ib.
where there exists some equitable consideration or agreement between the parties
which would render it unjust not to allow a set-off. Gray v. Rollo, 195.
one of them and a third person, the two claims are not subject to set-off under the
bankrupt act, being neither mutual debts nor (without more) mutual credits. Ib.
off the debt against his separate indebtedness to the bankrupt, because each joint
this would be unjust to the other joint creditor. Ib.
company. B and C held policies in this company which became due in consequence
been contracted without any reference to each other. Ib.
rights, title, or prerogatives, unless expressly included within the terms of the law.
General discussion of the requirements of the bankrupt act by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD.
U. S. v. Herron, 274. 10. The amendatory bankruptcy act of March 3, 1873, is unconstitutional, in that it is
not uniform in its operation. In re Deckert, 336. 11. Under the amendatory bankruptcy act of June 22, 1874, the petition of creditors in
involuntary cases must show affirmatively a compliance with the provisions of the act as to number and amount of claims of creditors. In re Scammon, 372. 12. In cases pending at the time of the passage of the act the petition may be amended
and made to contain the allegations of the requisite number and amount. 16. 13. The petition must also contain a jurisdictional allegation. And the amended peti
tion should be sworn to as if it were an original paper. Ib. 14. The naked allegation that the number and amount of creditors required have joined
in the petition is not sufficient, even though it be admitted by the debtor that the
allegation is true. The court must be satisfied of the facts as they exist. Ib. 15. In involuntary cases where the petition has been duly filed prior to the passage of the
act of June 22, 1874, it must be so amended as to show affirmatively that the requisite number of creditors, representing the prescribed amount, have joined therein. Otherwise there can be no adjudication. The petition must contain an allegation that the prescribed number and amount have joined, and the court must be satisfied by affirmative evidence of the truth of such allegation. The fact that there was a default prior to the passage of the act of June 22, 1874, which, at the time it took place, entitled the petitioning creditors to an adjudication, is of no moment. In re Scull, 416. 16. The averment that the debtor suffered his property to be taken is not sufficient. It
must be averred that he procured it to be taken. Ib. 17. The signature by a judge of his initials to a memorandum on the petition prior to
June 22, will not warrant the signing of an order of adjudication afterward nunc pro tunc. In re Hill, 421, 18. In involuntary cases the petition must contain a proper allegation as to the requisite
number and amount of petitioning creditors. The admission of the debtor that the terms of the law have been complied with will not dispense with such allegation. There can be no adjudication except it be made and shown to be true to the satisfac
tion of the court. In re Keeler, 422. 19. In a state whose statute law makes a married woman living apart from her husband
liable to be sued as if sole, she may be adjudged bankrupt. In re Lyons, 167. 20. The ninth section of the amendatory bankruptcy act of June 22, 1874, is applicable _to cases which were pending at the time of its passage. In re Griffiths, 476. To the contrary see In re Franke, 476.
See HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, 1 ; JUDGMENT Note.
BILLS AND NOTES. 1. The defendant made a promissory note payable to the plaintiff to which this clause was added : “ And we agree also to pay an attorney's fee of ten per cent. if this note is collected by suit." The note having been put in suit, held that the stipulated ten per cent. could be recovered, and that it was not in the nature of a penalty, but of
liquidated damages. McIntyre v. Cagley, 104. 2. The holder of a promissory note executed a written instrument by which he agreed with the maker to extend the time of payment, which written instrument contained the following clause : “ Provided further, that no delay of demand shall interfere with any claim I may have upon the indorsers of said note.” Held, on a suit against the indorser upon the note, that his liability was not discharged by such agreement. Hager
v. Hill, 139. 3. Complainants, a bank, discounted a note the amount of which was placed to A's credit.
Prior to the maturity of the note A drew his check on complainants for an amount less than had been credited to his account, which check was purchased by defendants, and upon being presented payment thereof was refused Defendants having brought an action at law upon the check, complainants filed their bill for an injunction to restrain the same. Held, that there could be no injunction ; that the check was in effect an assignment of the amount necessary to pay it, and that no right of equitable set-off existed in respect of the note, as against the holders of the check. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. City Natl Bank of Grand Rapids, 386.
See HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, 1.
BOARD OF BROKERS. 1. Where under the articles of association of a board of stock brokers, a member cannot
transfer his seat to a party not elected and approved by the board ; and where, upon the insolvency of a member, his rights as such are forfeited, and the board is authorized to dispose of his seat, and apply the proceeds to the payment of his indebtedness to other members of the board to the exclusion of all others, only the residue of the proceeds of the sale, after paying all the liabilities provided for in said articles of asso
ciation, is assets of such insolvent member. Hyde v. Woods, 354. 2. Under such articles, F., a member, failed to meet his engagements in the board, Au
gust 24, 1872, and being indebted in a large amount to sundry members, on that day assigned his seat in the board to W., with authority to sell and pay the proceeds to his various creditors in the board. With the assent of the board, W., sold the seat to T., who was elected by the board, for ten thousand dollars, and, with the approval of the board, paid the entire proceeds pro-ratably to F.'s creditors, who were co-members. October 1st, 1872, F. was adjudged a bankrupt on petition of a general creditor filed September 18th, 1872. After said sale and payment, an assignee having been appointed, he brought suit against W. to recover said sum of ten thousand dollars. Held, That the assignee was only entitled to the residue after the payment of F.'s liabilities to the co-members provided for in the articles of association, and there being no surplus, he was not entitled to recover. Ib.
BOND. 1. Held : that a surety upon a bond delivered by the obligor to the obligee, the face of
which is such as to excite no suspicion, is estopped to deny the validity of the same on
the ground of an antecedent agreement touching the delivery. Nash v. Fugate, 69. 2. A signed a bond as surety, and delivered it to the principal obligor upon condition that
it was not to be delivered to the obligee unless signed in like manner by others. Obligor delivered the bond to obligee without other signatures, and it contained no evidence of the existence of the condition made by A: Held, that A was estopped to deny as against the obligee that it was his deed. 16.
CLOUD ON TITLE.
COMMON CARRIER. 1. Held: That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsi.
bility when such exemption is not just and reasonable. N. Y. C.R. R. v. Lockwood, 21. 2. That it is not just and reasonable for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from
responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants. Tb. 3. That these rules apply both to carriers of goods and carriers of passengers for hire,
and with special force to the latter. Ib. 4. That a drover travelling on a pass, such as was given in this case, for the purpose of
taking care of his stock on the train, is a passenger for hire. Ib. 5. A common carrier who has limited his responsibility by contract is not liable for loss
occasioned by a cause against which he has stipulated with the shipper, unless it arises from his own negligence or that of his agents. He cannot be held for a loss which results from an employment of the vehicles of another over which he has no control, if he has exercised reasonable care in selecting such as he might properly make use of, and the shipper has agreed to exempt him from liability in case of loss by reason of the acts of those in charge of such vehicles. Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express Co. 451.
6. A common carrier may by contract so limit his liability as to be responsible only as an
See NEGLIGENCE; RAILROAD.
even if such investment was approved by a court having charge of the settlement of
Supervisors of Knox Co. v. Davis, 461.
the judges of election." 16.
to the fourteenth amendment of that instrument. Bartemeyer v. The State, 200.
citizens of the United States which by that amendment the states were forbidden to
time a law was passed by the state absolutely prohibiting any sale of it, it would be a
stitution -“nor shall any state . ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
v. Flood, 204.
education of children of African or Indian descent, and excluding them from schools
where white children are educated, is not obnoxious to constitutional objection. Ib.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
to grant to a corporation such an exemption from the operation of the general law ap-
Ins. Co. 80.
deed upon a tax sale, and further provides that such deed shall be primâ facie evidence
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judg.
re Robinson, 326.
cerning contempts of court," limits the power of the circuit and district courts of the
decree, or command of the courts. Ib.
the punishment which may be inflicted by the courts of the United States for con-
sworn; evidence was introduced and the case was submitted to the jury on the 30th of
therefore operated as a verdict of acquittal. People v. Cage, 127.
again on trial had a right to introduce evidence of the above facts under the plea of not
advice of the council, may grant a pardon of an offence after a verdict of guilty, and
v. Lockwood, 141.
ments, and orders during the existence of the term at which they are first made ; but