N. Y. 582; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Kean v. Davis, 1 Zabr. 683; Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208; 1 Dan. on Neg. Instr., § 455d; Burlingame v. Brewster, 79 Ill. 515; 22 Am. Rep. 177, and note. United States Circ. Ct., New Jersey. Exchange National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Third National Bank of New York. Opinion by McKennan, C. J., 4 Fed. Rep. 20. fendant notice thereof in writing, the policy should be -RECITALS IN OMISSION OF NEGOTIABLE WORDS -DECISIONS OF STATE COURTS ON COMMERCIAL LAWBONA FIDE HOLDER.—(1) Neither the fact that a note is payable to an administrator, nor that it recites that it was for value received, "being for a part of the third payment on the Goree plantation, as per agreement of the fourteenth February, 1874," destroys its negotiability, or subjects it to the conditions of that agreement. It is well settled that a note omitting the word " or order," is not negotiable unless it contains other words of like import; but this has been changed in Tennessee by statute, and neither those nor any equivalent words are necessary. (2) While no decision or statute of a State restricting or impairing the rights and remedies secured to the citizens of the several States under the general commercial law, or divesting the Federal courts of their cognizance of those rights and remedies, is binding on those courts, statutes which enlarge the commercial law will be enforced. They are not confined to the commercial law as it exists outside such statutes. (3) Nothing less than actual knowledge of the facts relied on to establish the de-effect, such as he would have had if he had taken a deed fense of a failure of consideration, or bad faith, can defeat the right of a bona fide holder for value to recover ou a negotiable note. Mere knowledge of suspicious circumstances, which, if followed up by inquiry, would develop the fact, is not sufficient in the Federal courts, although the rule is otherwise in Tennessce. The facts in this case would not, it seems, defeat the recovery in the Tennessee State courts; certainly not in this court. Burchett v. Stocock, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545; Bailey v. Rawley, 1 Swan, 295; Baxter v. Stewart, 4 Sneed, 213; Ryland v. Brown, 2 Head, 270; Merritt v. Duncan, 7 Heisk. 156; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. - Wolf v. Tyler, 1 Heisk. 313; Muir v. Jenkins, 2 Cranch's C. C. 18; Gerard v. La Corte, 1 Dall. 194; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Keary v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, id. 89; Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517; Dromgoole v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, 2 id. 241; 1 Am. Law Rev. (N. S.) 211, 226; Gregg v. Weston, 7 Biss. 360; Oates v. Nat. Bk., 100 U. S. 239; Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10. United States Circ. Ct., W. D. Tennessee, Oct. 13, 1880. Bank of Sherman v. Apperson & Co. Opinion by Hammond, D. J., 4 Fed. Rep. 25. of law is settled that a direction in the policy that the money, if it becomes due, is to be paid to a designated person, does not alter the agreement of insurance in any respect, except in the one particular of appointing a denominated person to receive such payment. It is still the owner of the premises who is insured, and the continued validity of the policy is dependent upon the performance by him of the conditions embraced in it. Martin v. Franklin Insurance Co., 9 Vroom, 140. New Jersey Supreme Court, June term, 1880. Warbasse v. Sussex County Mutual Insurance Co. Opinion by Beasley, C. J. CONDITIONS AS TO ALIENATION AND OTHER IN in common form and executed a mortgage back; and Held, that under the circumstances of the case, q. v., LIFE INSURANCE - DECLARATIONS OF INSURED TO CONTRADICT REPRESENTATIONS.-A policy of insurance upon the life of C. was issued on joint application of himself and wife for her sole benefit. In answer to a question in the application, C. stated that he had had no sickness or disease during the seven years then last past. It was stipulated in the policy that if the statements in the application were not in all respects true, the policy should become void. Held, in an action by the wife upon the policy, the declarations of C. made prior to the application, and tending to show that said statement was, to his knowledge, untrue, are incompetent. Ohio Supreme Court, Nov. 30, 1880. Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cheever. Opinion by Boynton, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. COPYRIGHT-TITLE USED SIMILAR TO ONE OF OLD BOOK OUT OF CIRCULATION.- The Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict. ch. 45), protects the property in the title of a book as being its distinctive part. Consequently, where a novel had been published in weekly parts in the plaintiff's serial, under the title of "Splendid Misery," the publication commencing in 1874, it was held, that the subsequent publication of another novel under the same title in the defendant's weekly paper of a different class, ought to be restrained by injunction. The fact that the same title had been used for a novel published in 1801, but long since gone out of ordinary circulation, was held not to constitute a bar to the relief prayed for. Kelley v. Bylas, 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 467, distinguished, Ch. Div. Nov. 9, 1880. Dicks v. Yates. Opinion by Boem, V. C., 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 470. * INSURANCE-ACCIDENT POLICY-DEATH BY DROWNING WHILE IN FIT OF APOPLEXY.- By a policy of insurance, defendants agreed to pay to the representatives of W. 1000l. if "the insured shall sustain any personal injury caused by accidental, external, and visible means within theentin of this policy and the provisions and conditions thereof, and the direct effect of such injury shall occasion the death of the insured * **" The policy provided "that the insured shall not be entitled to make any claim under this policy for any injury by any accident unless such injury shall be caused by some outward and visible means, of which proof satisfactory to the directors can be furnished; and that this insurance shall not extend **** to any injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease *or to any death arising from disease, although such death may have been accelerated by accident." The insured, whilst crossing a stream, was seized with an epileptic fit, fell and was drowned. He did not sustain any personal injury to occasion death other than drowning. In an action by his executrix on the policy, held (affirming the judgment of the Exchequer Division), that the death was within the words of the policy, and that defendants were not protected by the proviso, and therefore were liable. Max v. Railway Ass. Co., 4 L. T. Rep. (N. S.), 833, Ct. of Appeal Nov. 29, 1880. Winspear v. Accident Insurance Co., limited. Opinion by Lord Coleridge, C. J., 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.), 459. * * * WILL WHEN GIFT INVALID FOR UNCERTAINTY OF BENEFICIARIES.- A will must be construed according to its natural meaning, without any regard to the effect which that meaning may have according to the law of perpetnities, and afterward that law must be applied. If a gift be to a class, an unascertained number of whom are beyond the limits in the way of remoteness, the whole is void. A testator gave a fund in trust for W. M. for life, and after his death in trust for all his children who should attain twenty-one, and the issue of such of them as should die under that age leaving issue, which issue should afterward attain the age of twenty-one or die under that age leaving issue living at his, her, or their decease or deceases respectively." Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that these words were words of description, describing the issue who were to take, and that the whole bequest was void for remoteness, the gift to the children not being capable of being severed from that to the remoter issue. Smith v. Smith L. Rep. 5, ch. 342, and Hale v. Hale, 3 Ch. Div. 643; 35 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 933, approved and followed. Re Moseley's Trusts, L. Rep. 11 Eq. 499; 24 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 260, disapproved. Cases referred to Riley v. Garnett, 3 De G. & Sm. 629; Muskett v. Eaton, L. R., 1 Ch. Div. 435; Doe v. Nowell, 1 M. & S. 327; Bosaston's case, 3 Rep. 19; Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132; Broomfield v. Crowder, 1 B. & P. (N. R.) 313; Catlin v. Browne, 11 Hare, 372; Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox, 324; Bentick v. Duke of Portland, L. R., 7 Ch. Div. 693; Dungamon v. Smith 12 Cl. & F. 546; Fetling v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 279; House of Lords, July 8, 1880. Pearks v. Moseley. Opinions by Lord Ch. Selborne and Lords Penzance and Blackburn, 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 449. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. 101ST UNITED STATES REPORTS, United States, p. 1.-The provision in the National Bank Act, that all banks shall be taxed on the amount of the notes of any municipal corporation paid out by them, is constitutional. Bowditch v. Boston, p. 16.A statute and ordinance make a city liable for the value of any building destroyed to prevent the spreading of a fire, if a joint order for such destruction is signed by the chief engineer of the fire department and two other engineers, all present. Held, that the city was not liable on an order signed only by the chief engineer, when absent. Missouri v. Lewis, p. 22.— The act giving the St. Louis Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction of appeals in certain counties, to the exclusion of the Supreme Court, is constitutional. The Florida, p. 37.- A Confederate steamer, captured by a United States vessel in a neutral port, where she had resorted for provisions and repair, and afterwards sunk and lost by accident, is not subject to libel by the captain of the captor as prize of war. National Bank v. Hall, p. 43.-B. authorized a bank to cash his agent's drafts on him for live stock sold by him on commission. Subsequently B. wrote the bank that he would pay drafts only on actual consignments in transit to arrive with the drafts, and cancelled the agent's former letters of credit. The cashier wrote in reply that the | bank had never knowingly advanced on stock to come in, and thereafter would exact a bill of lading. Without requiring bills of lading, the bank in good faith continued to cash the agent's drafts, which B. paid. The agent absconding with the proceeds of such drafts, B. sued the bank for the money. Held, that he could not recover, the letters constituting no contract. Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, p. 31.- Letters or figures, denoting quality ouly, are not a trade-mark. Baker v. Selden, p. 99.-A system of book-keeping cannot be copyright. See 21 Alb. L. J. 168. Meguire v. Corwine, p. 108.-A. agreed that if B. would procure his appointment as special counsel for the government in certain causes against them, and aid him in the defense, he would pay him one-half the fee which he should receive from the government. Held, void as against public policy. Pelton v. National Bank, p. 143.The systematic and international valuation by State taxing officers of all moneyed capital, except shares of National Banks, far below its true value, while such shares are assessed at their full value, is a violation of the National Banking Act. See 21 Alb. L. J. 232. Cummings v. National Bank, p. 153.-To the like effect. See 21 Alb. L. J. 228. People's Bank v. National Bank, P. 181.-A National bank may guarantee a note, and is estopped to deny such guaranty by its vice-president. where it retains and enjoys the proceeds. Terry v. Little, p. 216.-The proper remedy to enforce the individual liability of stockholders of a bank is a suit in equity by or for all the creditors. May v. Sloan, p. 231.-"Trade" is not limited to barter, but includes general commerce and traffic. Bank of America v, Banks, p. 240.-A married woman is not estopped to deny a recital, in a deed of trust of her separate estate, that it is given to secure her indebtedness. Harris, p. 370.-A power to sell and exchange lands includes the power of partition. Baker v. Humphrey, p. 494.-An attorney employed by both parties to an agreement for purchase of lands for $8,000, discovered a defect in the title, concealed it from one, and secretly agreeing with the other, procured a quit-claim to his own brother for $25. Held, that the grantee must convey to the injured party on receiving his purchasemoney. See 22 Alb. L. J. 51. Shaw v. Railroad Co., p. 557.-A bona fide purchaser of a lost or stolen bill of lading, regularly indorsed, is not protected. Stone v. Mississippi, p. 814.-A lottery company's charter is subject to be rescinded by a subsequent constitutional Phelps v. THIS volume, the 10th of Otto, published by Little, prohibition of the lottery business. See 22 Alb. L. J. Brown and Company, of Boston, contains the fol lowing cases of general interest: National Bank v. 8. The cases are all of October term, 1879. There are a considerable number of town bond cases. 83D NORTH CAROLINA REPORTS. From advance sheets sent us by Mr. Keenan, the reporter, we find that the 83d North Carolina Reports will contain the following cases of general interest: Nicholson v. Cox, p. 44.- Jurisdiction of the person of a married woman is acquired by her written admission of service of the summons. Gooch v. McGee, p. 59.Where a public corporation, in exercise of a delegated right of eminent domain, acquires real estate necessary for its use, such real estate can only be sold on execution against the corporation, subject to the performance of the duties and obligations of the corporation. Davis v. Davis, p. 71.— A tenant in possession cannot resist an action for recovery of the premises after the THE NOTES. IE current number of the Journal du Droit International Privé contains the following articles: International private law, or the conflict of law from the termination of the lease, by showing superior title in himself or another. Cotten v. Willoughby, p. 75.— A mortgage of a growing crop is valid. Simmons v. Tay-historical point of view, particularly in England, by lor, p. 148.- In an action for trespass on land, a nonresident defendant, sued with residents, may remove the cause to the Federal court so far as he is concerned. Howard v. Steamship Co., p. 158.- Plaintiff consigned freight by defendant's boats to W. at G. By arrangement between W.'s agent and defendant, of which plaintiff was ignorant, defendant landed the freight on the river bank near W.'s house, and not at G. W. refused to pay charges and take the freight, and defendant subsequently permitted another, unauthorized by W., to take it on paying charges. The plaintiff had no notice of the disposition of the freight. Held, that plaintiff could recover the value. Turner v. Gaither, p. 357.- An infant may avoid his bond for money's loaned him by his father's administrator, to enable him to acquire a professional education, and his mere acknowledgment of the debt, after majority, without an express promise to pay, will not amount to ratification. Bank v. Perkins, p. 377.— The usage of a particular bank, known and acted upon by its customers, to discount bills without presenting them for payment, may be shown to excuse the omission to present. Green v. Greensboro Female College, p. 449.- Payment of interest on a note by the principal maker, before maturity, takes the note out of the operation of the statute of limitations as to a surety upon the note. State v. Jones, p. 605.-A womam, aiding and abetting a man in an attempt to commit a rape, is guilty as a principal. State v. Holland, p. 624.-A conviction may be maintained upon the unsupported testimony of an accomplice. All the decisions in this volume are of June Term, 1880. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS Prof. F. Harrison; the Legal condition of strangers in Sweden, by P. Dareste; the Stock exchange of London (legislation, rules, and jurisprudence), by E. Guillard; the Execution in France of judgments rendered by mixed tribunals of Egypt, by P. Fanchille; Divorce in Switzerland, by Prof. E. Sehr. We have received advance sheets of Dr. Wharton's introductory chapter of the second edition of his Conflict of Laws. Also Judge Westbrook's opinion as to the right of the People to restrain the Long Island and Atlantic Avenue Railroad Companies from the use of steam on Atlantic avenue, Brooklyn. Also the Manufacturing Corporation Act of 1848, with all the amendments, together with notes and forms, by John F. Baker, published by Diossy & Co. of New York city. The December number of the American Law Register has an article on Liability of quasi and municipal corporation and their officers for negligence; the case of Roussillon v. Roussillon concerning contracts in restraint of trade, with a note by Edmund II. Bennett; the case of Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Covington & Cincinnati Ry. Co., concerning the occupation of streets and highways by a horse railway, with a noto by A. G. Simrall; and the case of Bradley v. Bauder, concerning taxation of shares of a foreign corporation, Canada Law Journal has commenced the publication with a note by A. J. Marvin. -With this year the of a new series, fortnightly instead of monthly, and materially enlarged in size and number of pages, and improved in appearance and in quality and variety of contents. We also remark the first number of a new-comer, the Canadian Law Times, a neatly printed monthly of octavo size. The new enterprise starts off well, with intelligent articles on the Law of Allegiance, and Does a power of sale imply a power to mort THE following decisions were handed down, Tuesday, gage? and a copious digest of green voor did not January 18, 1881: Judgment affirmed with costs-IIazard v. Fiske; Stephens v. Fox; Risley v. Phoenix National Bank of New York; The Merchants' National Bank of Whitehall v. Hall; Van Giessen v. Bridgford (Anneke Jantz title); Rowland v. The Mayor, etc., of New York; Kidd v. McCormick; Garwood v. The New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.; Ford v. Provident Savings Life Society of New York; Douglass v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co.; Henry v. Brady; Johnson v. Grove and Bailey; Minick v. City of Troy; Clark v. Woodruff. Judgment affirmed - McCarney v. The People; Hope v. The People; People ex rel. Phelps v. Court of Oyer and Terminer of New York; Cowley v. The People; Eckhart v. The People. · -Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event-Scheffer v. Dietz; Guiterman v. The Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co.; Sibbard v. The Bethlehem Iron Co.; Alexander v. Caldwell; Byrne v. The New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. -Order affirmed with costs-In re Marsh; Wiggin v. Howard; Schenck v. Sewell. Order affirmed and The Times is welcome, although Mr. Vennor predict it. The London Law Journal, under the title of "Atmospheric Influence," says: "Mr. John T. Wheelwright, a rising young lawyer of Boston, says of Chief Justice Gray, his head rises above perpetual hair.'—Albany Law Journal." Our contemporary has evidently read "air" for "hair." We think the baldness may fairly be attributed to hatmospheric pressure.-Prof. Amos' new book on Remedies for Warfare, is dedicated to his wife. We asked a high and presumably grave judge of this State if he thought there was a covert satire in this dedication. "Yes," he replied, "feme covert." Let no one after this revile us for punning.-Judge Ames, of the Massachusetts Supreme Court has resigned, and it is rumored that Judge Soule will soon follow. The President has been dining sent is recorded, which is something remarkable in the Supreme Bench. All concurred; at least, no disthem.- -The Hon. George Brent, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, died on the 6th inst. at his residence in Charles county, Maryland. The Albany Law Journal. OUR ALBANY, JANUARY 29, 1881. CURRENT TOPICS. UR esteemed and able contemporary, the Virginia Law Journal, replying to our remarks on the policy of Virginia and the views of our contemporary in respect to the property of married women, the right of the accused to testify in his own behalf, and the Codes of Civil Procedure, explains that its strictures in regard to the first matter were based on the peculiar imperfections of the Virginia acts. It says they "were drawn by one who was never either married or had studied law," and that it is almost impossible to find out what they mean. The two latter are solid objections, certainly, but as to the first it is not so clear. Would it for instance be any objection to a law permitting the accused to testify in his own behalf, that it was drawn by one who had never been on trial for crime? Our con temporary continues: "But apart from our own statutes, we do not hesitate to express our utter repugnance to all such acts. Revelation teaches us that God made man and wife one. Revelation is always abreast of the times;' and whenever legislation attempts to step beyond the boundary lines defined by it (as we think the tendency of all these acts is), it must be pernicious in its effects on society." We believe revelation nowhere says the husband shall absorb the wife's property, or be responsible for her ante-nuptial debts. And if they are "one," why give the male component any superior right of property?— why not let the wife hold the purse-strings, if she desires, as she generally does in France, the thriftiest of nations? Or why not let the "one" hold the property in common? Or why not let each component hold its own? The trouble with our friend's unit is that it leans always and decidedly toward the husband, and the wife is left a cipher. Marriage unity in regard to property means that the husband shall have it all. The writer in the Journal also says that he is convinced, by presiding three years over a criminal court, of the impolicy of the statutes allowing the accused to testify. We think his experience differs from that of the majority of magistrates of criminal courts. We should like to poll the bench on this subject. Our good friend concludes: "We are gratified at the pleasant manner in which our contemporary is always pleased to refer to us, and we assure it of our very highest appreciation and consideration. But we do not think it has the right to draw the conclusion, that 'Virginia is not abreast of enacted elsewhere." Our community used to think like our contemporary in these matters, but believe they have improved the old state of affairs. Doubtless we should enjoy living in Virginia, on some accounts, but as, unlike the draftsman of the Virginia Married Woman's Act, we have studied law, we think we should prefer the New York legal practice and procedure, especially so if we should chance to be accused of crime. Again, unlike the draftsman of the Virginia Married Woman's Act, we are married, and we fear that our partner would justly object to our friend's views of marriage unity in respect to property. 6 The Kentucky Law Reporter says: "It is almost needless to say that we place a high estimate on the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. Every one does who is acquainted with it. Yet it is sometimes caught napping. It failed, for instance, to perceive the goodnatured sarcasm couched in our late note on the jury system of the present day. It declares our suggestion impracticable and that is decidedly our own opinion of it. It then sets forth its own theory thus: We simply need greater intelligence in jurors, and a less arbitrary demand for unanimity.' Perhaps so; but is not the demand for 'greater intelligence' as 'impolitic' as any suggestion can be? In fact, we believe in the abolition of the jury system altogether as a remediless absurdity. When judges were arbitrarily appointed by arbitrary tyrants and courts were organized purposely to convict all persons under accusation by the crown, it meant something to be tried by one's peers and not exclusively by the mere tools of irresponsible power. In our country all judges are peers of even the humblest citizen. And we can secure the 'greater intelligence' needed, on the bench, but not otherwise." We are glad to learn that our friend was joking when he suggested the employment of a permanent, expert, and peregrinatory jury. But as that suggestion was not more absurd than the idea of abolishing the jury, we did not recognize the jest. Our friend thinks it is more difficult to get intelligent laymen to determine facts than intelligent judges to pronounce the law. We do not think so. We believe the juries are intelligent enough as they are, on the average, but we suggested that it is possible to get a greater degree of intelligence by the system of struck juries. Our friend's idea that there is no present need of the jury system because the judges are elected by the people, seems fallacious. But as we are not sure that our friend is not joking in toto, we will argue the matter no longer, but simply give him this proposition, which we have often repeated, to reflect on: the jury system is capable of improvement; particular suitors. are at liberty to waive a jury trial; but the general the times in matters of law reform,' from any thing right to a jury trial, if the suitor wants it, is inesti We are expressed in the articles above referred to. satisfied, that if our friend would come here and live, as we have all our lives, he would be convinced that the state of society here is as good as it is anywhere; and that it would not be improved by many of the (so-called) 'law reforms' which have been VOL. 23.- No. 5. mable and indispensable. Mr. Bergh is really trying to re-establish the whipping-post. He has introduced a bill in the Legislature, providing that any male person who shall willfully beat, bruise or mutilate his wife or any other female human being, shall himself be beaten with not less than twenty-five lashes, "sturdily laid on, upon the bare back." He carefully provides that no female shall be whipped under the provisions of the act. This is almost as careful as the prisoners' commutation act, providing for shortening of term of sentence for good behavior, which also enacts that it shall not apply to any prisoner sentenced for life! At the same time he introduces a bill against vivisection. Mr. Bergh is a fanatic. While doing good in his sphere, he is apparently wont to be busy and mischievous outside of it. He would degrade justice to the brutal level of those who break the laws, and make a man-beater of the State. The whipping-post perhaps is not too good for the lawbreakers in question, but it is too bad for a government to use. It is a species of torture, no more defensible than the rack and thumb-screw. It is a cruel and unusual punishment, within the meaning of our Constitution. We hope the Legislature will dismiss his bill with the contempt it deserves. A bill has been introduced in our Legislature to amend the Constitution, in accordance with the recommendation of the Bar Committee, ante, p. 22, by increasing the number of judges and erecting a new General Term of the Supreme Court, in order to give that court the power of discharging their business. The recommendation and the bill seem to us, from our present reflection, to be quite proper. At the same time, the idea of utilizing our county courts, as suggested by a correspondent in another column, and as we have repeatedly suggested, by compelling or persuading business into those courts, seems to us worthy of consideration, not as a substitute for, but as an accompaniment to the other. Merely making the costs the same in both courts will not effect the purpose. To compel business into the county courts, costs must be denied in certain actions in the Supreme Court. We need both to strengthen our Supreme Court and to utilize our county courts. In the Assembly, Mr. Waring has introduced a bill to provide for detailing judges of the Brooklyn City Court to hold Special Terms and Circuits of the Supreme Court in Kings county. Mr. Patterson proposes to repeal the Code of Civil Procedure. It is too late. The tree is too big, and it would lacerate the soil too much to pull it up. He also proposes to amend section 190, subdiv. 3, by allowing an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order sustaining or overruling a demurrer. In the Senate, Mr. Roberts proposes to amend section 791, subdiv. 5, of the Code of Civil Procedure, by adding to the class of preferred causes those in which an infant is sole plaintiff or sole defendant. We cannot conceive any reason for such an extension. He also proposes to amend section 830, by adding to the class of excluded witnesses the hus |