unless such individual is exercising the public right which is obstructed by it, nor even then if he can reasonably avoid it.

A. built an illegal structure in a tide river and in front of the villa lots of B. B. destroyed the structure and A. brought trespass for the injury. Held, that B. could not justify the trespass because the value of the lots was diminished by the structure. As the structure had never been used, B. was not injured by the use. As the law recognizes no easement nor right of property in a landscape, B. could not rightfully destroy the structure merely because it was unsightly. Held, further, that B. could not justify the trespass because the structure made access to the lots by water less convenient, it not appearing that any one had used the water way to approach the lots.

DURFEE, C. J. This is trespass against the defendants for entering upon certain oyster lots in Barrington river, which the plaintiff occupied as such under lease from the State, and digging up and destroying the plaintiff's oysters growing there, and pulling down the plaintiff's building there erected, carrying away the materials and converting them to their own use. The alleged trespass was committed in November, 1879. It appeared in evidence that the building was erected in October, 1879, by the plaintiff for use in connection with his oyster business in Barrington; that Barrington river was a public navigable river in which the tide ebbed and flowed; that the plaintiff was a lessee of the oyster lots, but had no authority from the State or General Assembly to erect the building; that on the contrary, he had applied to the harbor commissioners for permission to erect it, and they had not only refused permission, but had expressly forbidden him to erect it, and after he had partly erected it, had notified him to remove it. It also appeared in evidence that the defendants, Lewis and Fenner, were trustees under the will of the late Allen Mathewson, and as such were owners of certain real estate on the west bank of Barrington river, which had been platted for sale as villa lots; that the building was erected near said estate, and directly opposite the lower or outermost end of it; that to a certain extent it interfered with the approach by water to said real estate, though there was no testimony that either the defendants or any other person had actually ever approached or had occasion to approach said real estate by way of the river after the erection of the building, and it was undisputed that if they had had occasion so to approach it, the building, while it might have somewhat incommoded, would not have prevented them. Testimony was also offered, and to some extent admitted, to show that the erection of the building had diminished the market or salable value of the villa lots. The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury: first, that where a party may maintain an action for a nuisance, he may enter and abate it of his own motion; second, that any person who suffers special damage by a public nuisance may abate the same of his own motion; and third, that if it appeared from the testimony that the existence of the building was unlawful, no action would lie for its removal. The court refused so to instruct the jury, but did instruct them, that though the building was wrongfully erected the defendants could not justify the destruction of it without showing that they suffered some special injury from it, or were obstructed by it in the exercise of their rights; that they had no right to pull it down simply because it lessened the value of their land; and that though it might obstruct somewhat the approach by water to their land, still if they had reasonably

convenient access which they could use without injuring the building, they were bound to avoid injuring it, and that they would not be justified in injuring it unless the injury was necessary to the actual exercise of their right. The defendants, against whom verdict was rendered, petition for a new trial for error in the instructions, and in the refusals to instruct.

The case presents two questions, namely: Did the defendants have the right to tear down the building, first, because it lessened the value of their villa lots; or second, because it rendered them somewhat less convenient of access by water?

1. The testimony does not distinctly show how the building lessened the value of the villa lots, but we presume it was supposed to lessen their value either because it was unsightly, or because it was intended to be used in a disagreeable manner, or for a disagreeable business, or possibly for all these reasons combined. The question is, then, whether the defendants had a right to tear it down on account of such an injury. We think not. A person who is specially injured by a public nuisance undoubtedly has a right to abate it under certain circumstances, but in our opinion he has the right only when he is specially injured by it qua public nuisance. For instance, if a nuisance is such because it obstructs a highway, the right to abate it exists only in favor of a person who is specially injured by it as an obstruction to the highway, and not in favor of a person whose special injury is that he loses in consequence of it a favorite view from one of his windows, or the sight of the church clock. The loss of the view, or of the sight of the clock, is purely a private matter, and the person who suffers the loss can have no right to abate the obstruction on account of it, unless he can show that the obstruction is, on account of it, a private as well as a public nuisance. Now, the injury to the defendants resulting from the unsightliness of the building, or from the purposes for which it was intended, was just such a purely private matter, and therefore they cannot justify tearing the building down simply on the ground that it was a public nuisance, but they must also show that on account of its unsightliness, or of the purposes for which it was intended, it was likewise as to them a private nuisance. This they have not done. The building had never been used, and therefore could not have been a nuisance on account of its uses. And the defendants had no right to abate it simply because it was a blot upon the landscape, for the law does not recognize any easement or right of property in a landscape or prospect. "For prospect," said Wray, C. J., in Aldred's case, 9 Rep. 57 b, 58 b, "which is matter only of delight and not of necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof; and yet it is a great commendation of a house if it has a long and large prospect, unde dicitur, laudaturque domus longos qui prospicit agros."

2. Did the defendants have the right to tear the building down because it rendered their villa lots less convenient of access by water? We think not. There was no evidence that either the defendants or any other person had occasion to go to or from the villa lots by water, or even attempted to go to or from them, after the erection of the building, or that the defendants or any other persons were ever deterred by it from going to or from them. There was therefore no evidence on which the defendants could have maintained an action at law; for an action at law does not lie against the author of a public nuisance without proof of special damage, not merely anticipated, but actually received. The only possible ground on which it can be contended that an action would lie in favor of the defendants is, that the building was opposite the lower end of their estate, on what may be termed its water front. But when we consider that no special damage actually did result from it as a public nuisance, and especially when we consider, that being remova

ble, it might have been removed before any resulted, we do not think an action could be maintained even on that ground. Supposing it to be true, then, as the defendants contend, that there is a right to abate whenever there is a right to bring an action, the defendants did not show a right to abate by showing a right to bring an action. President of Harvard College

v. Stearns, 15 Gray, 1; Brainard v. Connecticut River R. Co., 7 Cush. 506, 510.

We think the instruction given to the jury to the effect that an individual has no right to injure or destroy the property of another, because it is so situated as to be a public nuisance, unless he is in the exercise of the public right which is obstructed by it, and not even then if he can reasonably avoid it, was according to the precedents and substantially correct. Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339; Dimes v. Pettey, 15 id. 276; Bateman v. Bluck, 18 id. 870; State v. Keeran, 5 R. I. 497; Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89; Cobb v. Bennett, 75 Penn. St. 326; Clark v. Lake St. Clair, etc., Ice Co.,24 Mich. 508; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44. A new trial is therefore denied.

Petition dismissed.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CONTRACT-PERFORMANCE PREVENTED BY FAILURE TO PERFORM BY OTHER PARTY DAMAGES. — Where one party to a contract for services, performed a part of it according to its terms, but was prevented from performing the residue by a failure on the part of the other party, a city, to do its part, held, that the first named party might recover compensation for the work actually performed by him. Planché v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14; Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q. B. 576; Hall v. Rupley, 10 Barr. 231; Moulton v. Trask, 9 Metc. 577; Hoagland v. Moore, 2 Black f. 167; Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17. Judgment of U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Illinois, affirmed. City of Chicago v. Tilley. Opinion by Woods, J.

[Decided Feb. 28, 1881.]

COUNTER-CLAIM-AGAINST UNITED STATES.-Claims for credit can be used in suits against persons indebted to the United States to reduce or extinguish the debt, but not as the foundation of a judgment against the government. United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall. 484. Judgment of U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Pennsylvania, affirmed. Schaumburg v. United States. Opinion by Waife, C. J.

[Decided May 2, 1881.]

INSURANCE — LIFE POLICY WHAT NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH FRAUD IN ACTION TO CANCEL FORMER ADJUDICATION EQUITABLE ACTION UPON GROUND OF DEFENSE IN ACTION AT LAW.-(1) An insurance company brought action to cancel policies issued by it upon the life of G., against the widow and child of G., the beneficiaries therein, and to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained in an action at law against it by such widow and child upon such policies. The bill averred that the policies were obtained upon representations that the insured was a person of good health and not subject or predisposed to any bodily infirmity; that at the time he applied for the policies he had conceived the design to commit suicide, but first to obtain an insurance upon his life in favor of his son in order to leave a large amount to him and to his wife; that in pursuance of this design the policies were obtained, and soon afterward he committed suicide by taking poison; and that the wife and son were cognizant of the design of the deceased and conspired with him for its execution. Held, that the clearest evidence was necessary to establish plaintiff's case. Evidence that deceased had inquired for insurance

companies whose policies did not except death by suicide; that his death occurred not long after the policies were obtained, and was accompanied by convulsions stated to be similar to those attending death by strychnine, it not being shown that he ever had any strychnine, but only that he was once seen in the druggist's store looking at jars containing various medicines, and among others, one that contained this poison, and no poison being found in his body when submitted to a post mortem examination, and evidence that his wife refused to consent to a post mortem examination and thereafter left the State where the deceased had lived, held, not sufficient. (2) In the action at law the company set up fraud in procuring the policies, but afterward withdrew this defense. Held, that the judgment at law was a bar to this action. When an action at law is brought upon a contract, the defendant denying its obligation, either from fraud, payment or release, or any other matter affecting its original validity or subsequent discharge, must present his defense for consideration. A recovery is an answer to all future assertions of the invalidity of the contract by reason of any admissible matter which might have been offered to defeat the action. The contract is merged in the judgment. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. A suit in equity will not lie to give effect to defenses against a claim when they might have been fully set up in an action at law. There must have been some fraud practiced upon the court or some unconscientious advantage taken of the defendant without any fault or negligence on his part; or there must be some newly-discovered evidence which could not have been obtained at the trial, and which, if produced, would have changed the result, before a court of equity will interfere with the judgment rendered or the contract upon which it was recovered. Home Ins. Co. v. Stanchfield, 1 Dill. 424; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 336; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616. Decree of U. S. Circ. Ct., Minnesota, affirmed. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bangs. Opinion by Field, J.

[Decided May 2, 1881.]

MARITIME LAW- ADMIRALTY PRACTICE ON APPEAL -NEW RULE ESTABLISHED. - "Section 698 of the Revised Statutes provides, that upon the appeal of any cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, a transcript of the record shall be transmitted to this court and copies of the proofs and of such entries and papers on file as may be necessary on the hearing of the appeal.' While the act of February 16, 1876 (18 Stat., pt. 3, 315, ch. 77, § 1), limits the review by this court of the judgments and decrees on the instance side of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the questions of law arising on the record, and to such rulings of the court below excepted to at the time, as may be presented by a bill of exceptions, and requires the court below to find the facts, no change has been made in the law prescribing what should be included in the transcript sent here on an appeal. For that reason we will not order the testimony which has been sent up in this case to be stricken out. As under our repeated decisions (The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440, and The Benefactor at this term), the facts as found are conclusive on us, it is clear the testimony may not be necessary on the hearing of the appeal.' For this reason it may with propriety by consent of counsel be omitted from the printed record. We will not, however, make any order in that behalf, but if it shall be unnecessarily printed against the wishes of either of the parties, we will, on the final determination of the case, give such directions in respect to costs as may seem proper. The section of the Revised Statutes referred to, however, requires only copies of such of the proofs to be sent up as may be necessary on the hearing of the appeal.' This gives us power to prescribe by rule what shall be

question is conclusive, except upon appeal; and (3) that a subsequent decree by the county court of another county, granting letters of administration upon the same estate to H., while the first were in full force and effect, is null and void. Cases referred to: Cutts v. Haskins, 9 Mass. 543; Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20, and 9 id. 259; Becket v. Selover, 7 Cal. 233; Fletcher v. Sanders, 7 Dana, 345; Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119; Andrews v. Avory, 14 Grat. 236; Abbott v. Coburn, 28 Vt. 667; Burdett v. Silsbee, 15 Tex. 615; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 264; Coltart v. Allen, 40 Ala. 155; Irwin v. Scriber, 18 Cal. 503; Bumstead v. Read, 31 Barb. 664: Bolton v. Brewster, 32 id. 393; Roderigas v. East Riv. Sav. Inst., 63 N. Y. 460; Jochumsen v. S. S. Bank, 3 Allen, 88; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 9; Kane v. Paul, 14 Pet. 33; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 335; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210; Comstock v. Crawford, 3 id. 402; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 13 id. 469; Broderick's Will, 21 id. 509; Mohr v. Manierre, 101 U. S. 417; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 453; Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Ohio St. 465; Wanzer v. Howland, 10 Wis. 15; Gager v. Henry, 5 Sawy. 237. United States Dist. Ct., Oregon, Jan. 29, 1881. Holmes v. Oregon & California Railway Co. Opinion by Deady, D. J.

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS ABSTRACT.*

CONFLICT OF LAW-WILL-LEX LOCI-CORPORATION. - A statute of the State of New York provides that "no person having a husband, wife, child, or parent, shall by his will bequeath to any charitable corporation more than one-half of his estate after the payment of his debts, such bequest to be valid to the extent of onehalf and no more." Held, not to affect a bequest made by a testator domiciled in this State to a charitable corporation located in the State of New York. A bequest was made to a charitable corporation located in the State of Pennsylvania. After the will was made and before the death of the testator the Legislature of Pennsylvania authorized the corporation to transfer its entire property and franchise to a corporation established in the State of New York for the same charitable purpose, which corporation was to become its legal successor and hold and enjoy all its corporate franchises and powers. The Legislature of New York authorized the New York corporation to receive the property and franchise of the Pennsylvania corporation. The transfer was effected, and the New York corporation thereafter carried on, and at the time of the testator's death was carrying on, the same charitable work that had been carried on by the Pennsylvania corporation, using the same means and employing the same agencies. The legacy was a general one, with no directions as to the objects for which or the class of persons for whose benefit the money was to be applied. Held, that the legacy lapsed. If the corporation had been made a trustee to carry out a designated trust, another trustee might have been appointed to execute the trust. Crum v. Bliss. Opinion by Park, C. J. MERGER-WHERE EQUITY WILL NOT ALLOW.-J., in 1846, mortgaged to A. an undivided fifth of certain real estate of which A. already owned three-fifths. A. took possession of the interest mortgaged and remained in possession till her death in 1866. Prior to 1862 she had acquired J.'s equity of redemption, and in that year made a will devising the property to G. for life and after his death to K. In 1863 she assigned the mortgage for a valuable consideration to the petitioner. She died in 1866, and G. entered into possession under her devise and was in occupation of it when in 1878 the petitioner brought a bill against G. and K. for the foreclosure of the mortgage. Held, (1) that equity * Appearing in 47 Connecticut Reports.

would not regard the mortgage interest and the equity of redemption as merged in one estate where the interest of A. required that they be kept separate, or there was evidence of her intent to keep them so. (2) That A.'s assignment of the mortgage to the petitioner was sufficient evidence of such an intent. (3) That it made no difference that this intent was not declared, or that it did not exist, at the time the two interests became vested in her. Stantons v. Thompson, 49 N. H. 272; Bell v. Woodward, 34 id. 90; Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 373; Donalds v. Plumb, 8 id. 447; Bassett v. Mason, 18 id. 131; Mallory v. Hitchcock, 29 id. 127; Delaware & Hud. Canal Co. v. Bonnell, 46 id. 10; James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 248; Forbes v. Moffat, 18 Ves. Jr. 389. Goodwin v. Tenney. Opinion by Loomis, J.

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-ONE DELAYING CREDITORS TO PREVENT SACRIFICE OF ASSIGNOR'S PROPERTY INVALID SECOND ASSIGNMENT CONVEYS

ONLY PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER FIRST. (1) The members of a copartnership made a voluntary assignment of their copartnership and individual property in trust for the benefit of their creditors. The trust deed stated that the assets, although amounting in value to threefold the indebtedness, could not be made available for payment of the accruing liabilities, that the interests of the creditors might require the continuance of the business and its gradual closing up, and that the assignors were desirous of equally securing and paying their creditors. For these purposes the trustees received full power to manage the property at their discretion, to invest, reinvest, and change investments, to carry on the business so long as they deemed needful for the creditors' interests, and to prevent shrinkage and loss, and to close up the same to the best advantage, to give new notes and indorsements in place of existing ones and for the assignors' debts, to mortgage the assigned realty and personalty, and to lease the real estate on such terms as they chose. Provided that these powers should cease when a majority in amount of the creditors should so direct. Certain creditors of the firm attached the realty conveyed, and after judgment advertised it for sale on execution, whereupon the trustees filed a bill in equity to enjoin the sale and vacate the attachments. Held, on demurrer to the bill, that the assignment was upon its face invalid, as intended to secure an advantage to the assignors by preventing the sacrifice of their property, as tending to hinder and defraud creditors, and as allowing the trustees to exceed a reasonable limit of time in closing up the assignment. Van Nest v. Yoe, 1 Sandf. Ch. 4; Planck v. Schermerhorn, 3 Barb. Ch. 644; Burt v. McKinstry, 4 Minn. 204; Gere v. Murray, 6 Minn. 305; Vernon v. Morton, 8 Dana, 247; Ward v. Trotter, 3 T. B. Mon. 1; Phelps v. Curts, 80 Ill. 109; Nicholson v. Leavitt, 6 N. Y. 510; Gardner v. Commercial Bank, 10 Rep. 300; Dunham v Waterman, 17 N. Y. 19; D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb. 63. (2) After the attachments were laid upon the property conveyed, the assignors made new and unconditional assignments to the same trustees in order to vacate the attachments under the Rhode Island statute. Held, that the earlier assigument being good as against all persons except dissenting creditors, the later assignments could only affect property acquired after the earlier assignment or thereafter becoming attachable or accruing to the assignors as surplus. Held, further, that the later assignments could convey the previously assigned property neither by virtue of the statute, nor by operation of law. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252, 274; Randall v. Phillips, 3 Mason, 378, 388; Porter v.

*To appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports.

Williams, 9 N. Y. 142; Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Paige, 210, 211; Chapin v. Pease, 10 Coun. 69; Maiders v. Culver's Assignee, 1 Duv. 164; Fox v. Willis, 1 Mich. 321; Grimsley v. Hooker, 3 Johns. Eq. 4; Barton v. Vanheythuysen, 11 Hare, 126: Tate v. Liggat, 2 Leigh, 84; Griffin v. Marquardt, 17 N. Y. 28; Van Heusen v. Radcliff, id. 580; Holland v. Cruft, 20 Pick. 321; Knowles v. Lord, 4 Whart. 500; Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich. 445; Frow v. Downman, 11 Ala. 880; Luckenbach v. Brickenstein, 5 W. & S. 145; Maas v. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275; Thomason v. Neeley, 50 Miss. 310; Taylor v. Williams, 1 Ired. 249; Williams v. Avent, 5 Ired. Eq. 47; Ward v. Enders, 29 Ill. 519; Waterbury v. Westervelt, 9 N. Y. 598; Bostwick v. Menck, 40 id. 383; Burtch v. Elliott, 3 Ind. 99; Freeman v. Burnham, 36 Conn. 469; Gardner v. Commercial National Bank. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. [Decided December 18, 1880.]

EASEMENT TO MAINTAIN RACEWAY-PRESCRIPTION

-TIDE-WATER-ACTION FOR DISTURBING POSSESSION.

In A. D. 1794, D. received permission from the General Assembly to build a toll-bridge across one of the navigable rivers of the State. The son of D., who was also his devisee, built at one end of the bridge a mill, using for motive power a water-wheel placed between the west pier of the bridge and the west abutment, which were so extended in length as to make the intervening space a tidal raceway. A subsequent owner of the bridge and mill conveyed the bridge to the State in 1870, with full covenants of warranty. Afterward the mill was conveyed to A. During 1873, the millwheel was not in the raceway, being taken out to make room for a better one, which in November, 1873, was ready to be set up. Meanwhile the town of Warren in 1873, under authority from the General Assembly, proceeded to rebuild the bridge and make rip-rap work around the west abutment; stones were carried into the raceway by the current, into the wheel-pit, and along A.'s water front. A. was obliged to remove these before he could set his new wheel, and after getting it into place in May, 1874, he was obliged repeatedly to take up the wheel to clear away new deposits of stones which formed themselves about it. In an action by A. against the town of Warren for injury caused by the stones in the raceway and for obstruction in the water approaches to his land, held, that A. had no prescriptive right to maintain the mill and water-wheel, nor any prescriptive right to have the water flow unobstructed through the raceway - the enjoyment of the waterwheel and the water way depending on the bridge, which was conveyed to the State free from incumbrances. Cases referred to, Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 151; Beadle v. Beard, 12 Rep. 5; Mayor of Kingston v. Horner, 1 Cowp. 102; Powell v. Millbanke, id. 103, n.; Gibson v. Clark, 1 Jac. & W. 159; Johnson v. Ireland, 11 East, 280; Trotter v. Harris, 1 Y. & J. 285; Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. & A. 662; Jackson v. McCall, 10 Johns. 377; Crooker v. Pendleton, 23 Me. 339; Mather

v. Ministers of Trinity Church, 3 Serg. & R. 509; Carter v. Murcott, 4 Burr. 2162; Gould v. James, 6 Cow. 369; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237; Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. I. 210; Eldridge v. Knott, 1 Cowp. 214; Cross V. Mayor of Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305; Morton v. Moore, 15 Gray, 573; Tainter v. Mayor of Morristown, 19 N. J. Eq. 46; Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray, 473, 476; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Arundel v. McCulloch, 10 Mass 70; Renwick v. Morris, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 621. (2) Held, further, that the opportunity enjoyed by A. to use tide-water as a motive power was not an easement. (3) Held, further, that A. could not maintain his action on the ground of disturbance to his possession of actual en

Works v. McCarthy, L. R., 7 H. L. 243; Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613; also, 6 Scott N. R. 645; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477, 487; Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218. Folsom v. Freeborn. Opinion by Durfee, C. J.

[Decided Feb. 5, 1881.]

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACTS.*

EVIDENCE TELEGRAPH MESSAGES IN COMPANY'S HANDS NOT PRIVILEGED-SUBPŒNA-DUCES TECUM CERTAINTY OF DESCRIPTION REQUIRED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (1) Telegraphic messages in the possession of the officers of the company are not privileged communications. No act of Congress puts them on the same footing with the mails; and no statute of the State or principle of law gives them any different standing from that occupied by any communication made by one through another to a third party, with respect to the liability of the confidant to be called as a witness to produce it or testify to it. The agent of a telegraph company may therefore be compelled by proper process to produce such messages before the grand jury; and no rule of the company can excuse him from liability to punishment for refusal so to do. Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473. (2) A subpoena duces tecum to compel the production of telegraphic dispatches should give a reasonably accurate description of the papers wanted, either by date, title, substance or the subject to which they relate. The following description is not sufficiently certain: "Dispatches between Dr. J. C. Nidelet and A. B. Wakefield, and William Ladd and J. C. Nidelet, and William Ladd and Dr. Nidelet, between Warren McChesney and A. B. Wakefield, between Warren McChesney and J. C. Nidelet, between the latter and John S. Phelps, between A. B. Wakefield and John S. Phelps, between the latter and William Ladd, and between Geo. W. Anderson and A. B. Wakefield, sent or received by or between any or all of said parties within fifteen months last past.' Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith, 4 Ves. 90; 2 Fonbl. Eq., ch. 8, § 1, note a.; United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 567; Ex parte Brown, 7 Mo. App. 494. Ex parte Brown. Opinion by Henry, J.

LUNATIC RESCISSION OF CONTRACT BY. An exchange of property made by a person of mind so unsound that the want of mental capacity is apparent to any one of ordinary prudence and observation conversing with him, is of no validity. A guardian subsequently appointed may recover the property of the insane person without tendering back that received by him in exchange. See Tolson v. Garner, 15 Mo. 494. Halley v. Troester. Opinion by Norton, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ORDINANCE OF PAROL EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO VARY APPARENTLY

COMPLETE ORDINANCE. A package of papers, consisting of eight half sheets fastened together with ordinary paper fasteners, bore on the back of the eighth and last sheet the indorsement: "An ordinance for the establishing of the grades of certain streets." On the face of this sheet appeared the title, "An ordinance to re-establish the grades of certain streets," the enacting clause, a single section establishing the grade of a single street, the approving clause and the mayor's signature. The other seven sheets contained what purported to be seven sections, one upon each sheet, establishing the grades of as many different streets. At the bottom of the first sheet was a clause purporting to repeal all conflicting ordinances. In the record of ordinances, this ordinance appeared in the same form as in the original; and the entries on the journal of the

Cas. 662; Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R., 5 H. L. 418; Metropolitan Board of

the indorsement on the back of the eighth half sheet. To appear in 72 Missouri Reports.